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ABSTRACT 
 
   This thesis examines the activities and effectiveness of the British, Indian and 
Canadian cavalry which formed part of the British Expeditionary Force in France and 
Flanders (The ‘Western Front’) during the First World War. The study concentrates on 
the period from January 1916 to November 1918, focusing on four major Allied 
offensive battles; 
The Somme, July-November 1916 
Arras, April 1917 
Cambrai, November-December 1917 
Amiens and the ‘100 Days’, August-November 1918 
Other episodes of cavalry fighting associated with these offensives are also considered. 
   It is argued in this study that the contribution of cavalry to the fighting on the Western 
Front has been consistently underestimated by historians, a trend which began with the 
Official History of the conflict and continues in even the most modern scholarship. The 
arm has been characterised as vulnerable to modern weapons, out of date, of little use in 
combat, and an unnecessary burden on scarce resources. 
   Through analysis of the performance of mounted units in these battles, using data 
principally obtained from the unit War Diaries, as well as other primary sources, it is 
argued that cavalry were both much more heavily involved in fighting on the Western 
Front, and more effective, than has previously been acknowledged. The problems which 
constrained the performance of the cavalry are also examined. These included the 
limited understanding of their potential among senior officers, as well as command and 
control problems at lower levels. Issues concerning tactics, equipment, and interaction 
with other arms, (in particular tanks) are also examined. 
   The evolution of the cavalry arm is also considered in the context of the evolution of 
the B.E.F. as a whole, and its part in the changing face of the conflict is examined, both 
as an agent of change, and as a beneficiary of wider developments in how the war was 
fought. 
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NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY AND ORGANISATION 
 
   In the following text unit nomenclature follows the pattern established by the B.E.F. 
itself and subsequently the Official History; thus, Fourth Army; XV. Corps; 1st 
Division; 5th Brigade, etcetera. Where they appear, German formations are italicised. 
The British cavalry divisions on the Western Front were known throughout the war as 
the 1st 2nd and 3rd ‘Cavalry Divisions’. By 1916 the Indian Cavalry divisions were the 
only Indian divisions remaining in France, and were thus referred to simply as 1st and 
2nd ‘Indian Divisions’. Later these were to become the 4th and 5th ‘Cavalry’ Divisions. 
British Cavalry Brigades were numbered, Indian Brigades were known by their home 
stations eg. ‘Lucknow’ ‘Meerut’ etcetera It should also be remembered that each Indian 
brigade contained one British regiment, as well as British artillery and supporting 
elements. 
   Unlike the infantry, which had abandoned (at least officially) the old regimental 
numbers, cavalry regiments retained their numbers as well as titles. Regiments are 
therefore normally referred to by number and type, eg. 7th Dragoon Guards, 15th Hussars 
etcetera. However, historic distinctions between dragoons and hussars, or ‘heavy’ and 
‘light’ cavalry survived in name only. All Britsh cavalry used the same basic ‘Universal 
Pattern’ equipment and drills, the only variation being the issue of lances to ‘Lancer’ 
regiments. 
   Indian cavalry were also listed in a numerical sequence, and fell into ‘Light Cavalry’, 
‘Cavalry’, ‘Horse’, and ‘Lancers’, thus; 4th Cavalry, 19th Lancers etcetera Conveniently, 
no Indian Lancer regiments duplicated the number of a British Lancer regiment. For 
clarity in the text Indian regiments are usually additionally referred to by their 
regimental title, eg. 34th Poona Horse. Some regiments styled themselves in Roman 
numerals, eg. ‘XXth Deccan Horse’, again for clarity Arabic numerals are used 
throughout. 
   The term ‘cavalry’ is used in the text to denote the arm of service, whether mounted or 
not. In higher formations, brigade and above, this includes the attached RHA, signallers 
and other supporting services. Where the term ‘mounted troops’ is used, this specifically 
implies soldiers remaining on horseback in the battle area, or dismounting to fight but 
with their horses kept nearby. 
 xi 
   Where measures of weight and distance are quoted directly from original sources 
these have been left unaltered, but with a metric equivalent. All distances measured by 
the author are metric. 
 xii 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
A.D.V.S.  Assistant Director Veterinary Services. Officer in charge of veterinary 
 services, typically for a Division. 
B.E.F.  British Expeditionary Force. The British army in France and Belgium 
 1914-18. 
B.G.G.S. Brigadier General General Staff. Chief staff officer with the H.Q. of an 
 Army Corps. 
B.G.R.A.  Brigadier General Royal Artillery. Commander of artillery forces within 
 an Army Corps, Later G.O.C.R.A. 
Brig. Gen.  Brigadier General, Officer typically commanding a Brigade. 
C.I.G.S Chief of the Imperial General Staff. 
D.D.V.S. Deputy Director Veterinary Services. Officer in charge of veterinary 
 services, typically for an Army Corps. 
F.G.H.   Fort Garry Horse. Regiment within Canadian Cavalry Brigade. 
Gen.   General, Officer typically commanding an Army.  
G.O.C.R.A.  General Officer commanding Royal Artillery. See B.G.R.A. 
K.E.H.   King Edward’s Horse. Regiment of special Reserve, comprised of men 
 returned from residence in overseas colonies. 
L.A.C.  Light Armoured Car. 
L.S.H.   Lord Strathcona’s Horse. Regiment within Canadian Cavalry Brigade. 
Lt. Gen.  Lieutenant General, Officer typically commanding an Army Corps. 
Maj. Gen.  Major General, Officer typically commanding a Division. 
M.G.C.(C) Machine Gun Corps (Cavalry). 
R.C.D.   Royal Canadian Dragoons. Regiment within Canadian Cavalry Brigade. 
R.C.H.A.  Royal Canadian Horse Artillery. 
R.H.A.   Royal Horse Artillery. 
Sqn.   Sub-unit of cavalry regiment, typically approx. 100 men. 
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CHAPTER 1 
HISTORIOGRAPHY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
Introduction- In Search of a Debate 
 
   The Marquis of Anglesey opened the final volume of his History of the British 
Cavalry in 1997, with the words “Justice has never been done to the part played by the 
cavalry in France and Flanders during the years 1915 to 1918.”1 Ten years later that 
justice still remains to be served, for while Anglesey provided a fine narrative account 
of the efforts of the British Cavalry on the Western Front, and created a worthy literary 
monument to the arm, a detailed modern analytical investigation of the cavalry remains 
to be undertaken.  
   A survey of the constantly growing corpus of literature relating to the Western Front 
reveals (with the honorable exception of Anglesey), hardly any significant published 
works devoted wholly to the cavalry. Steven Badsey’s chapter in Griffith’s recent 
British Fighting Methods in the Great War2 stands virtually alone in this regard, and in 
any case forms a small part, less than 40 pages, of a larger work devoted to other arms. 
Badsey had previously given consideration to cavalry on the Western Front in his thesis 
on the ‘Arme Blanche controversy’,3 but this remains unpublished, and in any case the 
Western Front did not form the main focus of the research. Badsey also concluded his 
thesis with the rueful observation that 
The metaphor of the charge against machine guns, or of the incompetent 
Victorian cavalry general attempting to control a tank battle, has spread beyond 
military studies into the general vocabulary of historians and readers of history, 
as a touchstone of all that is reactionary, foolish, and futile. It is probably too 
well established ever to be removed.4 
Richard Holmes put the point rather more succinctly when he observed “There are few 
subjects where prejudice has a clearer run than with the mounted arm in the First World 
War.”5 As a result, what little has been written on the cavalry has, of necessity, largely 
limited itself to attempting to overcome this significant body of ingrained negative 
opinion expressed concerning the arm, and to attacking the wealth of myth and 
uncritically repeated half- truth which surrounds its activities. Cavalry chapters in recent 
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works by both Holmes, and Gordon Corrigan are honourable examples of this.6 
However, little or no time has yet been devoted to passing beyond assaults upon the old 
myths and preconceptions, and moving on to make a fresh and detailed assessment of 
the real history of cavalry in trench fighting. Thus there remains a significant gap in the 
literature of the Great War with regard to the analysis of the cavalry. It is the purpose of 
this study to move on to just such a detailed assessment. 
 
 
Existing Literature and Issues 
 
   It is a necessary preliminary to this study to examine how the omission of the cavalry 
from Great War research has occurred. How, in a field of study where lengthy works are 
devoted to a bewildering diversity of topics, more or less obscure, no major research 
effort has been directed specifically at the cavalry arm. The little research that has taken 
place has also concentrated on various rather narrow and oft-repeated questions. This 
omission can be discerned in the evolution of historical ideas concerning the Western 
Front as a whole, and in the changing orthodoxies surrounding the major issues of 
historical debate, such as the competence of command, the evolution of tactics, and the 
influence of technology. 
   An examination of the historiography of the First World War shows that a significant 
change of view has taken place, in particular over the last two or three decades. This is 
most readily apparent in the interpretation of the rôle of the infantry and artillery, and 
the men who commanded them. The old myths of bungling incompetent leadership and 
of futile repeated sacrifice have largely been demolished. The roots of this change lie in 
the works over the last thirty years, of John Terraine, and more recently in the efforts of 
scholars such as Griffith, Prior and Wilson, Travers, Sheffield, and others.7 Indeed these 
writers have built up a body of opinion so large that it may be argued that their school of 
thought has passed out of the realms of historical revisionism and become the new 
orthodoxy. 
   This quiet revolution in Great War studies has, however, largely passed without the 
detailed re-examination of the cavalry. Several of the old ‘incompetence’ myths which 
have been ably refuted in relation to the infantry have been allowed to stand in relation 
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to the cavalry, and been reinforced by writers who take a much more modern and 
revisionist view with regard to other arms. This is at least partly because the debate has 
been viewed in terms of the battle between ‘modernism’ and ‘reaction’ in military 
thought, and the cavalry arm is an easy (if erroneous) shorthand for the latter. Badsey 
observed “even those academic historians who write on operational matters take the 
uselessness of cavalry and the arme blanche for granted.”8 
   An example of this is Travers, who in expounding a lengthy and at times vitriolic 
critique of Field Marshal Haig, set up an opposition between the “traditional” (ie.‘bad’) 
and the “professional” (ie. ‘good’). In this distinctly black and white world he firmly 
placed Haig, “…clinging to traditional nineteenth-century ideas about moral and 
cavalry”9 at the head of the former camp. The word ‘cavalry’ is inserted in this context 
as a metaphor for all that is out-dated and unrealistic. 
   The roots of this ‘anti-cavalry’ stance can be traced to some of the earliest, and most 
infuential writers on the war. Terraine 10 and Badsey11 have both placed the early 
responsibility for this on Sir James Edmonds, the, in Badsey’s words, “now slightly 
notorious”12 Official Historian. Edmonds was an engineer officer, and clearly no great 
supporter of cavalry or cavalrymen. Three of the most tenacious, and erroneous ‘myths’ 
can be directly attributed at least in part, to him, and may be summarised as follows. 
Firstly, 
· The ‘Cavalry Generals’ myth; that the high command was both dominated by 
cavalry officers, and by extension, incompetent. 
Secondly, 
· The ‘Last machine-gun’ myth; that machine-guns in any quantity, and in 
virtually any circumstances rendered mounted operations suicidally costly. 
And finally, 
· The ‘Fodder’ myth; that the support of the Cavalry Corps was a drain on vital 
resources, particularly of shipping, and that the same effort would have been 
better spent in the support of other arms. 
   The post-war debate over mechanisation also assisted in the demonisation of the 
cavalry arm. Writers such as Fuller and Liddell Hart in their advocacy of the future of 
armour were quick to use the cavalry as a counterpoint to this, and as a symbol of all 
that was traditional and outdated.13 This train of thought has been adopted by more 
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recent writers seeking to show that victory on the Western Front was achieved through 
the advance of technology, and through the success in particular of the tank, to the 
extent that a fourth myth, ‘the victory of the tanks’, may also be discerned.  
   The curious feature of all of these allegations is that while a series of articles have 
appeared over the years individually demolishing each one, they are somehow so 
ingrained in the psyche of Great War writers that they do not really go away. Rather 
they persist, below the surface, as it were, to colour those writers’ subsequent views. 
Although, as has already been stated, it is intended here to move beyond these old 
arguments, the history, and pernicious influence of each is worthy of brief examination.  
 
 
Cavalry Generals 
 
   Broadly stated, the ‘Cavalry Generals’ myth alleges that the presence of Field Marshal 
Haig amongst the ranks of the cavalry supports a (rather circular) thesis within which 
the man is used to denigrate the arm, and vice versa. The argument runs that Haig was 
the figurehead of a wider group of out-of-touch nineteenth-century cavalry officers, who 
succeeded in gaining positions of high command due to their mutual influence and 
support, and who, to a man, proved incapable of dealing with the technological and 
intellectual challenges of a conflict on the scale of the Western Front. The usual 
suspects commonly listed among these ‘Cavalry Generals’ include besides Haig, his 
predecessor Sir John French, and army commanders Gough, Byng, Allenby, and 
Birdwood. (A concise summary of the history and chief proponents of this viewpoint 
can be found in Anglesey Vol VIII.)14  
   John Terraine’s article ‘Cavalry Generals and the ‘Gee’ in Gap’15 was the first to 
present a full, statistically supported refutation of this argument. The piece was more 
widely viewed as a model of the new (at the time in 1980) revisionist thinking on the 
war, and the demolition of the old mythologies. Terraine was able to marshal a range of 
statistics to disprove the notion that the senior ranks of the B.E.F. were 
disproportionately filled with cavalry officers. He was also able to show the origins of 
the myth in the published opinions of Edmonds (in the Official History) and Lloyd 
George, neither of whom were particular supporters of Haig, or of the cavalry arm. It is 
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largely his model which has been followed by later scholars tackling the same question 
(eg. Neillands16 or Anglesey17). Indeed, Ian Malcolm Brown was sufficiently confident 
of the expiry of this controversy in 1998 to state simply: 
…the very idea that Britain France and Germany (as well as Austria-Hungary 
and Russia) all managed simultaneously to produce a generation of complete 
incompetents at the highest levels of command is patently ludicrous.18 
   That might well be considered to be the end of the matter. However, in spite of the 
destruction of the myth itself, it continued to cast a shadow over subsequent thinking. 
On closer scrutiny, even Terraine’s own views on ‘Cavalry Generals’ are not as benign 
towards the cavalry as it might at first appear. The chief plank of his argument seems to 
be that the majority of commanders were not cavalrymen, and therefore by implication 
not incompetent. The inference can be drawn from this that to be a cavalry officer 
somehow implied a degree of incompetence. Terraine’s own biography of Haig, 
Douglas Haig The Educated Soldier albeit written seventeen years before ‘The G in 
Gap’ also showed that he was not quite able, in spite of his later protestations, to throw 
off an anti-cavalry prejudice. Examination of the earlier work reveals a marked degree 
of ambivalence towards the idea of Haig being a cavalryman. Terraine is at pains on a 
number of occasions to distance Haig from his own arm of service, observing, for 
example, “There was very little ‘Tally Ho’ about Douglas Haig”.19 
   In seeking to exclude generals from such a group, the ‘Cavalry Generals’ debate 
tacitly acknowledges the existence of it. It is tempting to reverse this chain of logic, and 
to argue that if the leading allied commanders were, as is suggested by Terraine, Griffith 
and others, actually quite good at their jobs, then their arm of service is irrelevant. 
Indeed further, the fact that so many of the senior commanders came from a cavalry 
background shows the pool of expertise and ability which existed within that arm, 
contrary to the opinion of those outside it, or of later historians.  
 
 
The Last Machine-Gun 
 
   The ‘Last Machine-gun’ myth, that a mounted soldier was hopelessly vulnerable on 
the modern battlefield of 1914-18, is also clearly traceable to Sir James Edmonds and 
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the Official History. Therein he quoted the observation by an anonymous American 
officer that “you can’t have a cavalry charge until you have captured the enemy’s last 
machine-gun.”20 Even Edmonds does not offer us any suggestion as to the qualifications 
of this commentator, and his opinion, for that is clearly what it is, is not borne out by the 
facts of a number of successful cavalry engagements. A number of these engagements 
will be examined in detail in the course of this study. However this viewpoint survives 
even into very recent literature on the subject.  
   The longevity of this myth can also, at least in part be laid at the feet of John Terraine, 
albeit with the assistance of later writers who followed his line of argument. Edmonds 
opinion was extracted from the Official History and quoted as if it were a substantial 
fact by Terraine both in To win a War in 197821 and again in White Heat in 1982.22 
Terraine extended this, to him self-evident, argument to provide a blanket assessment of 
the Cavalry’s contribution on the western Front; that cavalry was out-dated and 
vulnerable and that its contribution to the outcome of the war was insignificant. In his 
discussion of the battle of Neuve-Chapelle in 1915 he observed: 
To exploit a success, five divisions of cavalry were brought up behind the 
offensive front; this would also continue to be standard procedure. Occasion 
after occasion on the Western Front would show, until the changed conditions of 
the very last days, that cavalry were quite incapable of performing this 
function. 23 
Similarly, in a discussion of the Cambrai offensive in 1917: “The complete 
ineffectiveness of horse soldiers on a modern battlefield was demonstrated.”24 And 
finally as late as 1918: “For one branch, however, there was no change. The Western 
Front remained an impossible theatre for cavalry to the end.”25 Terraine is probably 
correct in his assertion that the overall contribution made by the cavalry to the outcome 
of the war was not great, (they certainly did not ‘win the war’). It is, however, by no 
means equally obvious that the cavalry was an inherently useless and obsolete fighting 
arm. As so often in history, an assertion that is deemed to be so self-evident as to 
require no further elaboration is found on closer examination to rest on extremely shaky 
foundations.  
   This same dismissal of the cavalry as self evidently useless, and requiring of no 
further comment or investigation has also continued to permeate other more recent and 
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otherwise highly balanced analytical studies of the war. Prior and Wilson’s Command 
on the Western Front (1992) has been widely praised as an important and penetrating 
work, yet their attitude to ‘Horse soldiers’ (by which epithet the cava lry are frequently 
described in their book), is dismissive to a degree. Indeed their keenness to denigrate the 
cavalry led the authors to offer an interpretation of events which undermines the 
credibility of the remainder of their work. In commenting on the action at High Wood 
on 14 July 1916 they observed: 
Unhappily a regiment of cavalry which had reached the front in the late 
afternoon accompanied the attack. The cavalry were soon dealt with by German 
machine-gunners. The infantry by contrast initially made good progress.26 
This action will be examined in detail in Chapter 2, but it takes little reading, even of 
Edmonds’ Official History27 to discover that on that particular occasion a brigade of 
cavalry was able to advance successfully, undertake at least one mounted charge, 
capture a number of prisoners and machine guns, and hold the position until relieved by 
supporting infantry. Such distortions reflect little credit on their authors, but are typical 
of the curious historical blinkers by which many historians seem constrained when 
dealing with cavalry matters.  
   Even very modern works by those who place themselves firmly within the ‘new 
thinking’ on the war suffer from this burden of received wisdom. Garry Sheffield, in his 
Forgotten Victory (2001), is able to take a much more balanced view of the detail, he 
calls the cavalry operations at High Wood “…a considerable success.”28 However when 
it comes to generalities, he follows the old line: “…under the conditions usually 
pertaining to trench warfare, a combination of barbed wire and modern weapons 
rendered cavalry obsolete.”29 This remark might well have been lifted from any one of 
Terraine’s writings of 20 years earlier. 
   The failure of these writers to examine fully the relationship between mounted 
soldiers and machine-guns also leads to a failure to appreciate the further point that this 
new technology was applied as often by the cavalry as at them. Even before the war 
Cavalry Training stated “the characteristics of machine guns as described in the 
previous section render them valuable for employment with cavalry…”30 This potential 
was further enhanced after the creation of the Machine Gun Corps (Cavalry) in 1916, as 
well as the issue of as many as sixteen Hotchkiss guns per regiment. Thus in the later 
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part of the war a cavalry brigade had a large and highly mobile source of potential 
firepower. This question will also be examined in more detail in later chapters, but the 
wider point often missed, is that the machine-gun was at least as much the friend of the 
mounted soldier as his enemy. 
 
 
Fodder 
 
   The third ‘Fodder’ myth is perhaps the most often repeated of Edmonds’assertions, 
and despite a number of thorough rebuttals in print continues to recur in Great War 
literature. Referring to the Canadian Cavalry Brigade’s successful action at Reumont in 
October 1918, Sir James Edmonds, observed: 
…the cavalry had done nothing that the infantry, with artillery support and 
cyclists, could not have done for itself at less cost; and the supply of the large 
force of horses with water and forage had gravely interfered with the sending up 
of ammunition and the rations for the other arms, and with the allotment of the 
limited water facilities.31 
It is possible that in this observation Edmonds was referring to the specifics of that 
operation, however it is equally probable that he intended a more general criticism. 
Either way, the remark has been taken and widened as a critique of the cavalry in the 
war as a whole, it is quoted at length by Terraine, both in To win a War32 and again in 
White Heat, where he refers to it as “the final verdict” on the cavalry. 33 The Cavalry 
Corps, the argument runs, was sat uselessly behind the line, eating its way through a 
vast amount of shipping resources which would have been better disposed winning the 
war. Statistics to support this view can be extracted from official figures. That the 
tonnage of fodder (5.8 million tons) shipped to France during the war exceeded even the 
tonnage of ammunition (5.2 million tons)34 is a statistic so often quoted as to have 
become something of an old chestnut. However the comprehensive demolition of this 
myth by several writers seems to have passed largely unnoticed by historians. Badsey 
provides convincing chapter and verse (and statistics) in his unpublished thesis of 
1981,35 and while a published version of the same arguments was presented by 
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Anglesey in 1997,36 a tone of resignation is detectable in the latter’s comments on this 
topic: 
There is one particularly pernicious myth that needs banishing from the minds of 
future historians. Even the most authoritative and reliable of those who have 
written about the Western Front repeat time and time again the fallacious idea 
that vast quantities of shipping had to be devoted to the provision of forage for 
the cavalry’s horses. This is nonsense. If the disquisition on p.286 will not 
dismiss once and for all this too often propagated falsehood, the present author 
presumes to believe that nothing will.37 
   Sadly one is inclined to agree with this depressing forecast. In the recent work by Ian 
Malcolm Brown British Logistics on the Western Front 1914-1919 (1998) one might 
expect to find a detailed account of the fodder question. This is not the case, Brown 
offers only one paragraph in the whole book on the question of cavalry supply.38 Indeed 
this serves only to muddy the waters as the relative statistics quoted relate only to the 
much smaller B.E.F. of 1914. He is no doubt correct that in October 1914 the cavalry 
represented 16.7% of the manpower and 34.4% of the equine strength of the army in 
France. However, this ignores the fact that the vast growth of the army after 1915 saw a 
decline in the relative strength of the cavalry to as little as 1.1% of overall B.E.F. 
manpower39 and 6% of its horses40 by 1918. The figures offered by Brown are therefore 
misleading by omission if nothing else. Ironically, Brown's most telling comment on the 
question is probably the very lack of any further discussion of the cavalry in his work. 
The absence of cavalry supply questions from his wider analysis of the supply problems 
of the B.E.F., and their solutions, allows the inference that these were simply not an 
issue. It is, however, a reflection of the state of the cavalry debate that a book of this 
sort can be considered complete without a proper examination of supply questions 
relating to an entire arm of service. It is also unfortunate that such a work, which might 
otherwise justly be considered the ‘last word’ on the subject, at least for the present, 
shies away from a significant and controversial aspect of its principal subject. 
   The tenacity not only of the fodder question, but of all three great (Edmonds inspired) 
myths concerning the cavalry is reflected in the work of Steven Badsey. His thesis of 
198141 offered a comprehensive critique of all three. In his contribution to Griffith’s 
British Fighting Methods In The Great War (1996)42 he was obliged to reiterate, at least 
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in precis in his opening pages, all that he had previously argued fifteen years before. His 
earlier observation concerning the deep roots of these prejudices, quoted at the outset of 
this chapter, seems painfully apt. 
 
 
Technology and Tanks 
 
   Reference has already been made to the use of the cavalry as a metaphor for the 
obsolescent, in contrast to new ‘modern’ methods of warfare. This practice has become 
particularly prevalent among writers examining the rôle of tanks in the First World War. 
A school of thought has developed that sees victory on the Western Front gained 
through technological advance; the new tanks are the instrument that breaks the trench 
deadlock, supported by aircraft, new artillery shells, wireless, and other new-fangled 
devices.43 In this brave new world there is no place for the outdated horseman or his 
medieval arme blanche. This ‘technological determinism’ has been subject to a 
thorough critique in Gervaise Phillips’ recent article (2002), where he observed: 
The rôle played by cavalry in the First World War has been obscured by the 
appearance of an (allegedly) alternative weapon system, combining mobility, 
firepower and the potential for undertaking shock action: the tank. Naturally the 
technologically minded military historian has seized upon the tank as the 
obvious replacement for the horse.44 
   Once again the mounted arm has provided an easy target for criticism, or more 
specifically, a place to lay the blame for some of the failures of the new technology. For 
example much has been made of the faltering progress, or for some commentators, 
outright failure of cavalry-tank co-operation in the latter stages of the war. Terraine 
commented “Much had been expected of the collaboration between the Whippets and 
the cavalry, but this proved to be an illusion. …By themselves the Whippets were very 
successful.”45 Prior and Wilson went further to suggest that the concept “made no sense 
at all”,46 and that when attempted it was a “predictable fiasco… Cavalry soon 
outdistanced the tanks and proceeded on their own. Fortunately for the horse-soldiers, 
by this stage most German resistance had collapsed.”47 This statement is open to 
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challenge on a number of points, but in this context it is their placing of the blame for 
this failure firmly on the cavalry which is most noteworthy.  
   The argument continues that not only were the cavalry incapable of co-operation with 
tanks, but at a higher level ‘Cavalry Generals’ (in particular Haig) failed to properly 
exploit the potential of the new technology. Phillips observed “For Tim Travers the 
tank’s impact on the conflict was only limited by the lack of imagination of cavalry 
generals, who were unable to grasp the potential for waging mechanised warfare.”48 
Thus the failure of tanks to play a more decisive rôle was not inherent in their 
technological immaturity, but imposed upon them by a ‘rival’ arm of service in the form 
of the cavalry. Griffith summarised this tendency: 
If the tank’s experience on the Western Front was unfortunate and rather 
disappointing, that of the horsed cavalry was sadder still. They actually enjoyed 
little less battlefield success than tanks, but found themselves heaped with 
unjustified vilification in proportion as the latter were accorded unjustified 
accolades. This was doubly irksome since the pre-war cavalry had actually been 
tactically more aware and more advanced than the infantry. 49 
His last point is particularly significant as rather than the cavalry failing to embrace the 
new technology, the reverse was true, large numbers of tank officers had come from the 
cavalry. Badsey has pointed out that this trend had been specifically encouraged at the 
time of the introduction of the ‘Whippet’ tank, with precisely such co-operation in 
mind.50 
   The battles of Cambrai in 1917 and Amiens in 1918 both had a significant cavalry, 
and tank components. These two offensives form the subjects of Chapters 4 and 5 of 
this study, and the relationship between horses and armour will be examined in some 
detail. However, in order to produce a balanced picture of the rôle of the cavalry in this 
context it is necessary to overcome a substantial weight of technologically driven 
prejudice, and to filter the large mass of armour-focused writing on these battles, to 
draw out the parallel, but to date largely untold story of the cavalry. 
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Explaining the Cavalry 
 
   Many of the writers who have been considered in this chapter are viewed by those 
concerned with topics other than the cavalry as important progressive thinkers. 
However, starting from a position of conscious or unconscious disregard for the 
relevance or usefulness of cavalry, these writers of the new ‘External’ school of thought 
on the Western Front (as it has become known),51 are confronted with a significant 
difficulty. One of the major platforms of their position is that the generals of the period, 
and Haig in particular, were possessed of more understanding of the military realities of 
their situation than history had latterly given them credit. And yet it was these same 
generals who persisted in retaining a cavalry force and building it into their plans for 
attack year after year, in spite of its repeated failure to play a decisive rôle. If these 
commanders were to be fully exonerated, the continued presence of cavalry must be 
accounted for, or to put it more bluntly ‘explained away’. Once again John Terraine 
serves as an exemplar, as it was he who set the tone for much of the following debate. 
   Despite his frequent repetition of the obsolescence and uselessness of cavalry, 
Terraine had no doubt that in the absence of a suitable alternative, cavalry was a vital 
part of offensive planning during the war:  
Cavalry were always held in readiness behind every large scale attack… Since 
the attacks failed, time after time, to break through the German defences, the 
Cavalry found little opportunity for mounted action, and their presence has been 
the subject of much derisive comment. The fact remains that, with all its evident 
weaknesses, cavalry was the only mobile arm available during the First World 
War. What comment would be appropriate for a high command, which planned 
and launched great assaults, without making any provision for mobile 
exploitation, is not difficult to see.52 
He leaves us in no doubt what that ‘comment’ would be in his scathing criticism of the 
German high command for their failure to support the offensive of 21 March 1918 with 
any mounted troops. (The remaining German cavalry divisions in the West having been 
dismounted, the reasons for this will be examined in a Chapter 5): “To launch an 
offensive intended to win the war with none at all was not just foolish: it was 
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criminal.”53 Similar strong language occurs elsewhere: “A general who launches what 
he hopes will be a decisive offensive without an arm of exploitation (as Ludendorf did 
in 1918) strikes me as criminally culpable.”54 It is curious that he should make specific 
reference to ‘derisive comment’ about the cavalry when he himself is the author of a 
good deal of it. He also makes no reference to the inherent contradiction contained in 
his view that cavalry was both a vital component of a decisive effort, and an arm which 
he variously dismisses elsewhere as ‘feeble’, ‘incapable’, and ultimately ‘obsolete’.  
   Terraine never fully resolved this dichotomy, while reluctant to dismiss the cavalry 
entirely acknowledgement of its usefulness ran counter to the ‘modernist’ argument. 
One solution to this lay in the manipulation of terminology: 
In the crisis of March [1918] the cavalry proved useful by virtue of its mobility, 
and its dismounted brigades, though weak…gave great help in puttying gaps and 
supporting counter attacks. Thus they won great credit in the capacity that 
cavalry had always affected to despise – mounted infantry. 55 
The underlying argument supporting this statement runs that ‘Cavalry’ are an arme-
blanche shock weapon, and that as soon as they are engaged in a firepower based rôle, 
they cease to be ‘Cavalry’ proper and become merely a more mobile offshoot of the 
infantry. By extension, this argument continues, the rôle of ‘mounted infantry’ could 
have been filled equally satisfactorily by the infantry themselves. Badsey has 
thoroughly demonstrated the falseness of this hypothesis,56 showing that the British 
Cavalry were able to absorb firepower doctrine and combine it with shock tactics to 
produce a highly flexible and effective tactical method, and that by contrast, simply 
putting infantry on horses was never a satisfactory solution. Arguably, the fact that 
cavalrymen were able to fulfil a firepower (or ‘mounted infantry’) rôle, as well as a 
more traditional shock (or ‘cavalry’) function, should be weighed in their favour when 
balancing their overall usefulness. Many historians, including Terraine have, however 
sought to argue for the removal of these achievements from the scales, as somehow 
outside the cavalry’s formal brief. This kind of sophistry would have meant little to the 
cavalrymen doing the fighting. 
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Models for the Future 
 
   In recent years there has been some new progress in studies of the cavalry. Both 
Griffith,57 Badsey, 58 and most recently Sheffield59 have identified the embryonic, but 
significant rôle of horse-mounted troops in the development of mobile warfare. It has 
been recognised that, in spite of the efforts of the propagandists of the 1930s to argue 
the contrary, the roots of ‘modern’ mobile warfare doctrine lay not in the tanks of the 
Western Front but in what could be termed in modern parlance ‘softskin’ transport. That 
the tanks of the day were not capable of the exploitation rôle that many have postulated 
for them is slowly becoming more widely accepted. These historians have gone further 
to consider the development of what Griffith calls the ‘cavalry brigade battlegroup’,60 
an all arms force consisting not only of cavalry and horse artillery, but also of motor 
machine-guns, lorry mounted infantry, and mobile medical and other supporting 
services. Badsey pursued this line further still, to make the analogy between cavalry and 
parachute forces, in their capacity to seize by coup de main positions ahead of the main 
force.61 These views are indeed a breath of fresh air in the cavalry debate, and it is 
arguable that they represent the start of the real debate on cavalry, rather than the old 
myth-based arguments. 
   There is a danger, however, that this sort of thought can result in what J.P Harris (in 
relation to the armour debate) terms ‘reading history backwards.’62 The application of 
late twentieth-century terminology and doctrine as a model for interpreting the Western 
Front immediately encounters the problem that Haig, and Kavanagh, the Cavalry Corps 
commander, probably seldom used the word ‘battlegroup’, and could hardly have 
dreamed of paratroops. In order to evaluate the doctrines of the time these must be 
viewed from within their own contemporary framework. Haig has been subject to years 
of unjustified vilification because he failed to be prescient enough to discern the roots of 
Rommel’s Panzer Divisions or operation Desert Storm in the faltering progress of the 
Mark I tanks at Flers. Travers is a particular proponent of this critique, observing: 
… the greatest problem was the way in which the late nineteenth-century 
paradigm failed to come to grips with the twentieth-century paradigm - one set 
of ideas simply did not engage the other emerging set of ideas.63 
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Yet it was not Haig’s concern to explore ideas that might win wars in twenty or seventy-
five years’ time, he had to win the war he was fighting then, and with the tools 
immediately available. To suggest that the shape warfare would take in the later 
twentieth century was apparent to observers living in its first decades is quite 
unreasonable, despite the hindsight-driven protestations of Fuller or Liddell Hart. In any 
case, even if Haig had been able to develop in theory a late twentieth-century style 
armoured warfare doctrine, the tanks at his disposal were simply not up to the job. 
   Thus, while interesting with the benefit of hindsight, the ‘birth of later doctrine’ 
argument misses the real point. The overall question which this argument fails to 
address, is not whether seeds for the future were sown, but whether the retention of an 
(albeit by 1918 pitifully weak) force of cavalry on the Western Front was a reasonable 
decision by the high command at the time. Alternatively, was it, as has so often been 
argued, a failure to understand the prevailing conditions of the fighting? The answer to 
this lies not in teasing out the roots of mobile warfare developments which would not 
fully develop until later conflicts, but in determining whether the cavalry soldiers there 
and then were able to fight effectively in a mounted rôle when called upon to do so.  
 
 
Research Questions 
 
   The various issues outlined in this chapter leave a basic overall question about the 
cavalry yet to be answered by historians of the Western Front: 
· How significant was the contribution of British and Dominion mounted troops, 
firstly to the period of trench fighting from Christmas 1914 to August 1918? and 
secondly to the winning of the war in the later months of that year? 
It is answering this question which forms the principal research objective of this study. 
Within this broader question a series of subsidiary themes and questions can be defined, 
and these can in turn be used as tools of measurement to assess the broader performance 
of the arm. 
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Effectiveness 
   The first of these is the most basic, and relates in part to the old ‘Machine-gun’ myth. 
That is, how did mounted troops fight? Not only against machine guns, but also against 
the whole range of opposition, artillery and wire, and with what degree of effectiveness? 
That is, to what extent were they able to manoeuvre and survive within the prevailing 
battlefield environment, inflict casualties on the enemy, and obtain battlefield 
objectives? Many of the answers to this are somewhat counter-intuitive, as episodes of 
cavalry galloping enemy positions with swords drawn were neither as rare, nor as 
suicidally ineffective as it has suited some critics to assume. Nor was the ground over 
which many of the battles took place the wilderness of wire and shell-holes, as typified 
by the latter stages of Third Ypres, which fills the popular imagination. For example, 
large portions of the Somme front in 1916 had yet to be fought over at the outset of the 
offensive, and the ground over which the Cambrai offensive was launched was 
specifically chosen for its lack of shell damage. In spite of this, trench lines did form a 
significant obstacle that taxed those wishing to see a cavalry advance. This obstacle 
was, however, by no means insurmountable and thought was given to the means, 
technical and logistical, of overcoming it. While previous writers have referred in 
passing to ‘cavalry tracks' and mobile trench bridging64 no detailed study of these 
developments has yet been made. The sheer size of even a brigade of cavalry in terms of 
road space, (although more often confined to cross country routes,) and its requirements 
in terms of shelter and water behind the line must also have provided a major challenge 
to those developing offensives. Thus the fact that it was possible for any mounted troops 
to reach the scene of action at all must indicate as significant level of planning and 
‘behind the scenes’ work not yet adequately explored by historians. 
   This question inevitably has its focus at the tactical level, in the activities of brigade-
sized formations and below, and in some cases in the exploits of individual regiments, 
squadrons and even troops of cavalry. It is only at this level that the true texture of the 
fighting, and the effectiveness or otherwise of various weapons and techniques becomes 
apparent. Griffith65 and others have already demonstrated the crucial importance of 
tactical and technical changes at this low level of command to the outcome of infantry 
and artillery fighting. The attitude taken to Lewis guns at platoon level, or the exact 
weight and speed of a creeping barrage have been shown to make the difference 
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between success and costly failure. A similar level of analysis remains to be undertaken 
for the mounted arm. 
 
Evolution 
   Many modern studies of the Great War, and in particular those concerned more at the 
tactical rather than strategic level, have also stressed the importance of ‘evolution’ in the 
development of the B.E.F. and in its ultimate success.66 This process is often described 
in terms of a ‘Learning curve’ along which the British army moved, developing its 
equipment and fighting methods with each new offensive. This raises the question to 
what extent the cavalry underwent a similar process, and this forms one of the themes of 
this study. It will be shown that while a variety of changes were made in the planning of 
cavalry operations at the divisional and corps level, and in the planning of army level 
offensives as a whole, there was a remarkable consistency in lower level cavalry tactics. 
The fighting methods spelt out in pre-war manuals, in particular Cavalry Training, 
published in 1912 continued to be applied by junior commanders, and continued to be 
effective. This was increasingly the case in the later stages of the war. However, this 
was not a result of an evolution in tactics by the cavalry themselves. It will be argued 
that instead the character of the war had evolved around the cavalry, and in particular 
the changes in German defensive systems, and the adoption of deep defence, made 
existing cavalry methods ever more appropriate on the battlefield.  
 
Command control and communications 
   If, as will be argued in this study, cavalry were more effective tactically during the 
Great War than they have hitherto been given credit, their failure to make a larger 
overall contribution to the fighting needs to be explained. The answer to this lies in the 
major factor hindering greater cavalry effectiveness, and the key to so many missed 
opportunities on the Western Front, Command, Control, and Communications. The 
attitude of army and corps commanders, and of the Commander- in-Chief, to cavalry 
operations will be examined in some detail. It will be argued that the slowness of these 
men to grasp the potential (and indeed the limitiations) of cavalry forces in the set-piece 
offensives of 1916-18, was a major factor in their performance. The rôle of Haig in 
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particular, as Commander- in-Chief, and his enthusiasm for the arm, but his fundamental 
misunderstanding of their rôle will also form a key theme of this study. 
   It will also be apparent that failures of communications, and a failure to appreciate the 
limitations of what communication methods were available was a critical factor in 
hindering cavalry operations. Attempts were made to address these difficulties by 
practical solutions in the form of increased use of wireless, of RFC and RAF contact 
patrols, for example. However, more important was the re-ordering of the chain of 
command to allow those nearer the ‘sharp end’ of the fighting a greater degree of 
control over the resources deployed on their battlefield. The degree to which this was 
achieved will be examined. 
   Another key factor in the effectiveness or otherwise of the cavalry in the period under 
consideration was the rôle of the Cavalry Corps as an institution, and of its commander 
Lt. Gen. Kavanagh. He was to play a significant part in the functioning of the chain of 
command, and to exert a powerful influence over the effectiveness of the Corps. 
Examination of this also leads to the question of what exactly the Cavalry Corps 
Headquarters was supposed to do, and indeed whether it even needed to exist in the 
form it took from the end of 1916 onwards, or whether it was a hindrance to operations, 
and should have modelled itself after the fashion of the newly created Tank Corps.  
 
Technology 
   Mention of the Tank Corps raises the question of cavalry-tank co-operation, and of 
new technology more generally. The significant anti-cavalry, and pro-armour bias of 
much of the existing literature has already been discussed in an earlier section. The 
examination of this relationship in detail will form another key theme of this study. The 
tank forms only one part of this picture, as armour in the form of armoured cars served 
alongside the cavalry from the outset of the war. These vehicles were to fight alongside 
the cavalry both in the Somme battles examined in Chapter 2, as well as in the 
operations of spring 1917 described in chapter 3. Tanks themselves co-operated with the 
cavalry at Cambrai in 1917, and particularly significantly at Amiens in 1918 (described 
in Chapters 4 and 5). The relative performance of the two arms, horsed and mechanical, 
will be examined, and their degree of compatibility considered. It will be shown that far 
from being a replacement for the cavalry, tanks had at best a complimentary rôle on the 
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battlefield, and in some cases performed an entirely different function. Thus the 
relationship between the two is far more complex than simply the ‘new’ taking over 
from the ‘old’. 
 
 
Success? 
   The final aspect of the contribution of the cavalry to the conflict considered in this 
study, and one that draws together the conclusions of all the earlier themes, is 
operational success. Were the cavalry able to accomplish the tasks set forth for them by 
their higher commanders? Or were they ultimately unsuccessful when measured against 
these goals? Typically this analysis is undertaken at the ‘operational’ level, that of 
offensives as a whole, at the command level of corps and army, as often the lower level 
tactical effectiveness of the arm was neutralised by poor command and control or other 
factors. Tactical battlefield effectiveness is only relevant, and command and control 
systems function well only when they bring the troops concerned into contact with the 
enemy at the right place and time. In each of the case studies in this thesis it is necessary 
to make a judgment on the success of the cavalry operations therein.  
   It will be argued that in most cases the cavalry failed to obtain the objectives set out 
for them by their commanders, and to that extent they were unsuccessful. However, this 
conclusion has to be balanced by consideration of the objectives set out by the 
commanders themselves. It will be argued that in many cases the objectives set out for 
the cavalry by army commanders, and by Haig, the Commander- in-Chief, in particular, 
were unrealistic, and provide a poor yardstick for assessment of the success of the arm. 
As was discussed earlier in this chapter, this has also been compounded by the keenness 
of many historians to use these objectives to denigrate not only the arm but also the 
commanders, notwithstanding the circular character of this argument. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
   In order to answer the questions outlined above this study will focus on four major 
periods of operations, each forming a separate case study, and a chapter in the text: 
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· The Somme offensive beginning in July 1916 and continuing until November 
1916. 
· The German retreat of Spring 1917, and the subsequent Arras offensive in April 
1917. 
· The ‘tank’ battle of Cambrai in 1917, and the subsequent German counter-
attack. 
· The German offensive in March 1918, the allied offensive at Amiens in August 
1918, and the fighting of the ‘Hundred Days’ up to November 1918. 
The nature of much of the fighting in 1914, prior to the development of trench warfare, 
means that the rôle of the cavalry during that period, while interesting, bears little on the 
questions raised by the later offensives, thus this period will not be studied in detail. 
Equally, although the Cavalry played a vital and costly part, largely on foot, in a 
defensive capacity at Ypres in 1915, they were not significantly involved in the major 
offensives attempted earlier that year. 
   Some consideration will be given in Chapter 2 to Loos in September 1915, the first of 
the B.E.F.’s large scale set piece trench offensives, however thereafter the focus of 
attention is narrowed to a field which encompasses the principal attempts by the British 
to break the deadlock from 1916 onwards. Third Ypres, in 1917 although crucial to the 
understanding of the evolution of other arms, will receive only brief examination in 
Chapter 4 as the Cavalry Corps was rapidly excluded from that battle as the true nature 
of the fighting became evident, and mounted forces played little significant rôle in it. 
   The amount of mounted activity the research for this study revealed was something of 
a surprise. Indeed particularly with the fighting of 1918 it became impossible to deal 
exhaustively with every mounted cavalry action in a work of this length. However 
rather than narrowing the focus of the study, it was felt that a broader, if slightly less 
detailed overview of the whole period was critical to the understanding of the subject. 
When Donald R. Morris set out to write his classic account of the Anglo-Zulu war of 
1879, he discovered that the story, in order to make sense, had to start in 1807.67 
Similarly, a stand alone study of 1918, or indeed consideration of only one of the earlier 
offensives would suffer from the lack of context provided by earlier battles, and the 
progress and continuity between them. The same might be argued for the pre-war 
cavalry debates, and for 1914, but the detailed examination of both these topics by 
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Badsey, and Holmes respectively (in works quoted earlier, as well as others68) allow this 
study to take as its stating point late 1915 and 1916. 
   It would have been possible to structure this study on a thematic basis, however it was 
felt that unlike some other aspects of Great War studies, the history of the cavalry has 
been so little investigated that a statement of the basic narrative history was required in 
order to provide a context for the analytical parts of the study. Also in a number of cases 
the narratives of events offered by previous writers are simply factually incorrect, so a 
retelling of the course of events was required. As was discussed earlier in this chapter, 
many of the conclusions of these earlier scholars were also based on little or no analysis 
of events, or on the hearsay opinions of participants in the war whose position could 
hardly be considered neutral. 
   The narratives contained in each of the case studies here were constructed to a great 
extent from contemporary unit War Diaries. These documents, consulted in the original 
in the National Archives, have the advantage of being written very close to the events 
described, and contain a significant amount of hard data, texts of messages and 
operations orders, times, map locations and grid references, and casualty figures. 
Comparison of the diaries from different participating units and levels of command was 
also instructive. Reference was also made to the diaries of individuals and published 
memoirs, particularly those in positions of command, as well as other eye-witnesses. 
However, the difficulties of taking some of this material at face-value are examined in 
Chapter 2. 
   Secondary sources of particular importance were the Official History of the conflict, 
(although this too is not without its own faults and internal biases) and the inter-war 
volumes of Cavalry Journal. The latter was a particularly important source as during the 
period 1919-39 a significant body of not only personal accounts of the war, but also 
analytical articles appeared in its pages. These pieces were also subject to peer review 
and discussion published in the letters pages of subsequent editions, much of which 
could be highly illuminating. From these various sources a narrative of events has been 
created that forms the core of each chapter. This then serves as a basis for analysis of 
the performance of the cavalry, judged against the various criteria laid out above. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE SOMME BATTLES, JULY-SEPTEMBER 1916 
 
It’s like staying somewhere for Ascot and not going to the races. 
    Lt Lascelles, Bedfordshire Yeomanry, 
 4 July 1916 1 
 
Introduction 
 
   This chapter deals with the part played by the cavalry in the Somme offensive of 
1916, commencing with their planned rôle in the opening day of the battle on 1 July and 
continuing through the renewed attack on 14 July, and the later battles in September. 
Mounted troops played little or no part in much of the Somme fighting, and none in the 
famous first day. However examination of the plans made for them, and the part in the 
fighting envisaged for them by Haig, and by the army commanders, in particular 
Rawlinson at Fourth Army, is instructive in highlighting the command and control 
problems which were to blight, and largely negate, any chance of operational success by 
the cavalry in that campaign. 
   By contrast, the two occasions when mounted troops were able to enter battle in 1916 
show a force which was not only well prepared for the battle it was to fight, but also 
surprisingly tactically effective, able to move around the battlefield with a degree of 
flexibility, without taking catastrophic casualties, and able to inflict both physical loss 
and psychological effect on the enemy. Cavalry units were also able to take on German 
machine-guns with their own firepower, and win the duel for fire superiority. As was 
outlined in Chapter 1, the 14 July battle in particular has been used by many historians 
as a shorthand for the vulnerability and ineffectiveness of the cavalry. This argument is 
frequently supported in the literature by accounts of events which characterize them as 
late into battle and quickly killed. A detailed study of this action forms the core of this 
chapter. This is intended to provide detailed evidence to refute these previous accounts, 
and to demonstrate the tactical effectiveness of the arm. 
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Background: 1914 - 1915 
 
   The activities of the cavalry in 1914 and 1915 fall outside the main focus of this study. 
However, it is helpful to examine the organization of the arm in these earlier years and 
to touch briefly on events in 1915 as these set the scene for the battles of 1916. The 
sources of some of the command and control problems the arm suffered can also be 
traced in its evolving structure, and lack of pre-existing divisional and corps level 
command elements. 
   At the outset of the war in 1914, the B.E.F. included five brigades of cavalry. Of these 
four were under the command of the newly created Cavalry Division, while one; 5th 
Cavalry Brigade under Brig. Gen. Chetwoode was nominally independent.2 This 
provided a force of fifteen regiments, along with a further two regiments broken up by 
squadrons among the six infantry divisions of the B.E.F. as divisional cavalry. All of 
these units including those forming the divisional squadrons were regular, rather than 
yeomanry regiments.*   
   A problem facing the B.E.F. as a whole at this period was the lack of any sort of pre-
existing higher command structure. The infantry was divided into two corps, but 
headquarters for these had to be created ad-hoc as no higher formation than the division 
had previously existed. In the cavalry the situation was worse, only brigade staffs had 
existed pre-war, and when Maj. Gen. Allenby was given command of the Cavalry 
Division he had to create a staff essentially by co-opting officers he knew to be 
available and suitably qualified.3 In any case a four brigade division was too large to 
handle effectively, and as the summer of 1914 wore on the division became split into 
two groups. In part this was prompted by rivalries amongst the senior cavalrymen 
themselves. The controversy over the rôle of the cavalry in the ‘Curragh Incident’ of 
earlier in 1914 had left scars on the relationships between many of these men, in 
particular Hubert Gough, initially commanding 3rd Cavalry Brigade, and Allenby.4 
These personal difficulties also extended beyond the Cavalry Division to the higher 
levels of command. There was little love lost between the two senior cavalrymen in 
France, Douglas Haig, now commanding I Corps, and the C- in-C Sir John French. If 
                                                 
*  One Regiment of Special Reserve, the North Irish Horse, was also attached to the B.E.F. at Army level. 
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nothing else, these rivalries give the lie to the idea that there was a club of ‘Cavalry 
generals’ in the B.E.F. helping one-another.  
   By Christmas 1914 the command situation was exacerbated as more cavalry arrived in 
France. The existing force was split into two divisions, and a third, initially commanded 
by Julian Byng was created. A Cavalry Corps was formed in October 1914, initially 
commanded by Allenby, and briefly by Byng, before in the course of 1915 the former 
was moved sideways to command of an infantry corps and the latter departed for 
Gallipoli.5 Two divisions of cavalry also arrived from India in November and December 
of 1914, forming a separate ‘Indian Cavalry Corps’ under Maj. Gen. Frederic 
Rimington. 6 (These included a mix of Indian and British regiments.) Counted together 
these two corps represented a force of 45 regiments of cavalry, or around 20,000 men, 
however few of its leaders had commanded more than a regiment in combat prior to 
1914, and none more than a brigade even under peacetime conditions.  
   No specific criticism of these men is implied by the observation that they lacked 
experience, Allenby, Byng, and Gough all rose to Army command and their 
performance in that capacity will be considered in later chapters of this study. However 
taken in conjunction with the fact that there were no pre-existing administrative or 
logistical structures for the cavalry at even divisional, let alone corps level, and (in spite 
of years of debate on the matter)7 no clear doctrinal model for how such large forces of 
horsemen should be used operationally, it is clear that those planning the rôle of cavalry 
in the coming set-piece offensives of 1915 onwards were working essentially in the 
dark. The extent to which a consistent operational method was ever developed by these 
commanders is one of the key themes of this study. 
   Both cavalry corps were engaged in significant fighting both in the winter of 1914-15 
and in the first half of the following year. They played a major part in resisting the 
German thrusts which became known as the First and Second Battles of Ypres. 
However this fighting was almost entirely of a defensive nature and took place on foot 
in trenches. The cavalry were able to demonstrate that they were a match for their 
colleagues in the infantry in shooting and fighting, but at a heavy cost in casualties.8 
Horses were used to provide mobility for reserves which could be rushed to whichever 
part of the British line was threatened, but no opportunity for mounted action as such 
arose. This practice became known as ‘fire brigade’ work, and ‘Kavanagh’s Fire 
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Brigade’, the 7th Cavalry Brigade, developed a particular reputation for it, under the 
command of Brig. Gen. George Kavanagh, who would rise to command the re- formed 
Cavalry Corps in 1916.9 Kavanagh seems to have been a popular and successful brigade 
commander. Unfortunately, as will be examined in more detail in Chapter 4, and later, 
these skills did not necessarily translate to the command of the Corps as a whole in the 
later part of the war. 
   The first opportunity for the cavalry to look forward to genuine mounted offensive 
action was in the attack around Loos planned for September 1915. Although this 
offensive does not form part of the main focus of this chapter, it is worthy of brief 
consideration as it offers an insight into Gen. Haig’s thinking about cavalry in offensive 
planning at a point when he was still an Army commander and had yet to step up the 
rôle of Commander- in-Chief. Here he was to spell out some of the ideas on the function 
of cavalry, and indeed some of the contradicutions in his thinking, which were to remain 
with him for the remainder of the war. 
   The Loos operation was mounted at the behest of the French, (in support of a larger 
offensive planned on two sections of the front further south,) and many of the British 
higher commanders were skeptical of its chances of success. The resources of the B.E.F. 
in terms of men and materiel were inadequate, and the chosen battlefield unsuitable, 
however allied co-operative strategy made it necessary and an attack plan was produced 
which tried to make the best of a bad situation. 10  
   The plan for the  attack called for First Army, under Gen. Haig, to attack with two 
corps, (a total of six divisions in the first attack) on a front of about 7km (4.5 miles) 
between Lens in the south and the canal at La Bassée in the north. Once the initial 
German defences had been pierced, First Army, supported by a division of cavalry 
would push on to the crossings of the Haute Deule Canal some 8km (5 miles) from the 
start line.11 Although the attack did not reach its intended objectives, and was widely 
considered to have been disappointing in its results, the plan drawn up for the 
involvement of the cavalry is worthy of examination in detail. 
   What is notable about the rôle of the cavalry at Loos is that it was multi- layered. 
Mounted troops were intended to participate in the battle at a number of levels of 
command, from local divisional control to directly under G.H.Q. Each of the six 
attacking divisions already had an attached divisional cavalry squadron. This was a rôle 
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taken by Yeomanry regiments, as the Regular divisional cavalry had been withdrawn 
into the Cavalry Corps in April 1915.12 Normally during an offensive, the greater part of 
each of these squadrons would be busy with a variety of jobs, for example as 
messengers, traffic controllers, and escorts to commanders and prisoners, thus few of 
them would be available as a unified fighting force. Haig ordered that one squadron of 
Yeomanry in each of the lead divisions, (1st and 9th Divs) should be retained intact in 
order to provide a mobile element for each of the leading divisional commanders, these 
were to work in concert with an attached battery of motor machine-guns and the cyclist 
companies of the infantry divisions, and “…be sent forward as circumstances permit.”13 
Rawlinson, at that time a Lieutenant General commanding IV Corps in Haig’s First 
Army, requested a more senior cavalry officer to command each of these forces than 
would otherwise have been present, pointing out that a Yeomanry squadron commander 
(a captain) would lack sufficient experience. Haig supported this idea, which strongly 
suggests both men saw this force acting substantially on its own initiative once the 
battle had started.14 This devolution of cavalry forces to front line infantry divisions is 
one of the more significant aspects of the planning for Loos. As will be shown in later 
chapters, Haig was to argue for a similar use of mounted troops on numerous 
subsequent occasions. Once he had advanced beyond army command to become C-in-
C, however, few of his subordinates seem to have seen fit to apply the idea in practice. 
   Thus cavalry was available at divisional level at the head of the attack. No cavalry 
was controlled by Rawlinson directly at Corps level, the next tier of cavalry command 
being First Army. Two brigades of 3rd Cavalry Division (6th and 8th Brigades) were 
placed under (Haig’s) First Army Headquarters, with the task of supporting and 
exploiting the First Army attack between Loos and La Bassée.15 They were to form up 
before the attack at the Bois des Dames, west of Béthune and about 14km (9 miles) 
from the attack front, and were given the objective of Carvin, the same distance again 
beyond the front, and across the Haute Deule Canal. 16 The remainder of the Cavalry 
Corps (two divisions) and the two divisions of the Indian Cavalry Corps were retained 
at the highest level of command, under G.H.Q. control, with the rather grandiose idea 
that they would be used either to exploit the gains of First Army, or to work in concert 
with the French cavalry to exploit their allies’ gains possibly as far south as Vimy. To 
support these sweeping cavalry moves the bus companies of First and Second Armies 
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were concentrated under G.H.Q. control, providing motor transport for up to a brigade 
of infantry. 17 This latter idea is notable as it prefigured developments which were to 
become more widespread in 1918, Haig was to advocate infantry in buses to support the 
Cavalry Corps in September of that year (discussed in Chapter 5) but these ideas seem 
to have been neglected in the intervening years, possibly due to their lack of success on 
this earlier occasion.  
   It is possible that the C- in-C, Sir John French retained direct control of the bulk of the 
Cavalry Corps because he lacked confidence in Haig’s ability to judge when best to use 
it. Haig seems to have thought so, remarking in his diary on 22 September “He seemed 
afraid that I might push the cavalry forward too soon.”18 It was perhaps understandable 
for French as a cavalryman to wish to retain control over his own arm. If so, he was not 
alone in these attachments. Haig himself was to be equally guilty of keeping cavalry 
‘under his hand’ when he became C-in-C. This tendency for commanders at corps, army 
and even G.H.Q. level to hold on to the power to determine the advance of the cavalry 
was first seen at Loos, but it was to be a feature of nearly all subsequent offensives by 
the B.E.F. right up to 1918. It was to be a significant brake on the success of the cavalry 
on each occasion, and is one of the themes of this study. 
   Among the rank-and-file of the cavalry there was much optimism about the attack 
Col. Preston, who at the time was a machine-gun officer serving with the Essex 
Yeomanry recorded in his diary “Everyone was very optimistic about the ‘Push’; our 
Brigade Major (Bethell) told us ‘ it was all worked out from A to Z.’”19 Unfortunately 
as was to be so often the case in the future, although the 3rd Cavalry Division closed up 
behind the attack front, no significant breach in the German defences was achieved on 
the first day of the attack (25 September) and the cavalry could get no further forward. 
6th and 8th Cavalry Brigades were to see a good deal of action over the following days 
(26-28 September) as lack of reserves in First Army forced Haig to commit them as 
infantry to the defence of the captured village of Loos, a job the brigades performed 
with some distinction, 20 however it was not a particularly appropriate use for specialist 
cavalry soldiers. This too set a pattern that was to be repeated in later offensives, 
particularly at Cambrai in 1917, when 1st Cavalry Division was to suffer significant loss 
on foot in Bourlon Wood (see Chapter 4). 
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   Inevitably the two cavalry corps under G.H.Q. control made no contribution to the 
battle, they were too far away, and at the wrong end of too long a chain of command to 
serve any useful purpose. Loos then, set the tone for much that was to follow. An over-
optimistic vision of what the infantry battle would achieve led to the conception of a 
rôle for the cavalry which it could never fulfill. Secondly control of the cavalry’s 
movements was placed in the hands of G.H.Q. and Army headquarters who were 
inadequately informed about the progress on the ongoing battle, and were unable to 
respond to events. Finally the cavalry were thrown into battle as an emergency stop-gap 
in a dismounted, defensive rôle, which although they were quite capable of carrying it 
out efficiently, was a waste of their wider specialist talents. As will be shown in the 
following chapters, each of these mistakes was to be repeated, in varying combinations 
throughout 1916 and 1917. In spite of these hindrances, however, the cavalry was able 
to show on numerous occasions that given the right opportunity it continued to be a 
formidable fighting force. 
 
 
The Cavalry in 1916  
 
   Following, and possibly reflecting the lack of mounted action by the cavalry at Loos, 
on 3 March 1916 both the British and the Indian Cavalry Corps were broken up and the 
divisions were attached to the headquarters of the individual Armies.21 Badsey has 
interpreted this as a change in Haig’s conception of the rôle of the cavalry, a move 
towards more devolved forces exploiting local advantages rather than a decisive, multi 
division cavalry breakthrough. 22 It should also be seen, however, in the context of the 
political pressure Haig was under to reduce his cavalry force in France, and it may have 
been a way of making cosmetic changes without losing actual fighting power. Notable 
in the orders for the abolition of the two corps is the retention of a skeleton corps 
headquarters staff, available to allow its rapid re-creation if required (as indeed 
happened in September 1916).23 
   On 1 April 1916 Haig also appointed Gen. Gough as Temporary Inspector General of 
Training of Cavalry Divisions.24 Haig urged Gough to be vigorous in instilling his 
combined-arms ideas through the ranks of the cavalry, recording in his diary “Above all 
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he is to spread the ‘doctrine’, and get cavalry officers to believe in the power of their 
arm when acting in co-operation with guns and infantry.”25 Any officers who  were 
deemed insufficiently flexible were removed.26 The question arises what exactly Haig 
meant by this co-operation with other arms. There is no doubt that he believed in the 
tactical combination of dismounted firepower from rifles and machine-guns, and 
support from artillery in the cavalry battle. Chapter 10 of Cavalry Training, “General 
Principles of Cavalry Tactics” makes this point explicitly.27 This manual was drafted at 
least in part by Haig himself. However, it is implicit in Cavalry Training that these 
dismounted elements are subordinate parts of what is essentially a separate cavalry 
battle. There is little in the pre-war manual to suggest that Haig and the cavalry 
considered the possibility of fighting as subordinate players in an infantry battle. Thus 
the combined-arms ideas of the Commander- in-chief should always be viewed in the 
context of his conception of a mounted breakthrough which was the keynote of his 
thinking throughout the war. As Loos had demonstrated, however, this thinking was 
always combined with (or possibly clouded by) an idea of integrating the cavalry into 
the battle at an early stage. Haig would never satisfactorily address this dichotomy. 
   An interesting by-product of this proposal was that in placing all the cavalry divisions  
back under a single (cavalry) commander, a corps was formed almost by default, this 
would have implications for Rawlinson’s plan for the coming offensive. Gough himself 
referred to “the whole Cavalry Corps”28 when describing his rôle during this period. 
Clearly while advocating localised, combined arms fighting, Haig had still not entirely 
lost his vision of large scale cavalry operations, as the subsequent creation of the 
‘Reserve Army’ under Gough was to indicate. 
   Meanwhile, undismayed by the disappointments of Loos, preparations were made at 
lower levels within the cavalry divisions through the spring and summer of 1916, in the 
form of reorganisation, new equipment, and training, for a renewed offensive which was 
expected in the course of the year. Many of the new techniques prepared for the 1 July 
1916 attack were successfully applied on a small scale on 14 July and later in 
September. These battles served to vindicate in practice many of the ideas developed 
during this training period, and show that contrary to popular belief, the cavalry arm 
was, at a regimental level at least, far from unprepared for the conditions of warfare it 
was to meet on the Western Front, and tactically highly effective. A variety of 
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organisational changes had already taken place by March 1916, and others were to 
follow during the period leading up to the Somme offensive. This reorganisation took 
place within all five cavalry divisions (mirroring in some cases similar changes in the 
infantry), but will be examined with reference to one division in particular; 2nd Indian 
Division, as this formation was later to play a key rôle in the fighting on 14 July.  
   Preparations in the division began in the spring of 1916. The first of these changes 
took place in February. This was the withdrawal of the regimental machine gun sections 
and the establishment of centralised Brigade Machine Gun Squadrons. These squadrons 
were formed into the separate Machine Gun Corps (Cavalry) or MGC(C). This mirrored 
an equivalent process taking place in the infantry brigades to form the MGC 
Companies. Initially these squadrons consisted simply of the guns, horses and men 
detached from the regiments, but over time their establishments were made up by drafts, 
and horses as well as other equipment could be returned to the parent regiments.29 These 
squadrons had a final establishment of six sections, each consisting of two Vickers 
machine-guns, carried on pack horses and commanded by a lieutenant. In addition 
Hotchkiss machine-guns were issued to the Regiments themselves along the same lines 
as the issue of Lewis guns in the infantry. This was a gradual process but by the time of 
the 1 July attack the 2nd Indian Division had been brought up to strength with 16 
Hotchkiss guns per Regiment.30 The machine guns in the Brigade MG Squadrons, 
combined with the Hotchkiss guns integral to the regiments, represented a marked 
increase in the firepower available to cavalry, both defensively, and offensively since 
the guns were all pack mounted, and were as mobile as the regiments themselves. The 
guns also served to counter the lack of firepower available to cavalry regiments due to 
the relatively small number of men available to form a dismounted firing line. One 
MGC(C) section was to play a notable rôle in the battle on 14 July, and the integral 
Hotchkiss of the 19th Lancers were to prove valuable in September.  
   Secondly towards the end of June the 9th Light Armoured Car battery was attached to 
2nd Indian Division with its six Rolls Royce armoured cars.31 Again this represented a 
boost to the firepower available to the Division, and this asset was devolved down to 
brigade level as the cars were divided in pairs between the individual brigades. 
Unfortunately the armoured cars found difficulties dealing with the mud, and even on 
roads were unable to live up to their full potential. In spite of this, however, the addition 
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of the ‘Lambs’ (as they became known) to the cavalry can be seen as representative of 
the forward thinking combined-arms culture evolving within the cavalry arm, and which 
Haig was at pains to develop. Also, much has been made of the supposed miss-match 
between cavalry and armour by supporters of the latter. This will be examined in more 
detail in chapters 4, 5, and 6 in connection with tanks, but it should not be forgotten that 
cavalry-armour co-operation had its roots in working with armoured cars long before 
the first tank made its appearance. Further, when these changes are considered alongside 
the other existing assets within each cavalry brigade, including a battery of horse 
artillery, and integral mounted signal and engineer troops, it can be seen that these 
formations were becoming increasingly mobile and potent units.  
   In adition to the organisational changes, Gough instituted a vigorous training 
programme, which was carried out both in divisional level manoeuvres, and at 
regimental level. The War Diaries of the 2nd Indian Division record this process; on 9 
May a divisional ‘Scheme’ was undertaken including “Practice in passing through 
Trench system and concentrating beyond.” On subsequent days exercises included the 
(perhaps a little optimistic) “Action against a beaten enemy”, as well as “Tactical 
exercise against an enemy in position”, and “Practice in crossing trenches by blowing 
up with explosive and by filling in with picks and shovels.”32 The Secunderabad 
Brigade diary for May also records “Training in mounted and dismounted work, bomb 
throwing, trench warfare, Hotchkiss gun, bayonet fighting and physical training 
continued throughout the month.”33 A feature of this training that shows the new 
seriousness with which it was undertaken, was that for the first time on exercise troops 
were allowed to ride through standing crops.34 It is perhaps more surprising that such 
constraints on training had earlier been enforced, even after nearly two years of war. 
   At divisional level, exercises in ‘liaison with RFC’ were also carried out on 2 and 3 
June.35 The rôle that aircraft could fulfil in keeping forward troops in contact with 
headquarters, and in the direction of supporting artillery, was quickly recognised, and 
training with lamps and wireless was undertaken. Officers from the Cavalry were 
detached to the RFC and vice-versa.36 The usefulness of this training, as well as some of 
its limitations were to be demons trated in the course of the 14 July battle. 
   A further change to the organisation and training of 2nd Indian Cavalry Division was 
the addition of the Canadians. The Canadian Cavalry Brigade was briefly attached to the 
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division in March, then reverted to direct command from G.H.Q. before being 
permanently allocated to 2nd Indian Division in June (after the removal from the 
division of the Meerut Brigade).37 The Canadian cavalry had been formed into a 
mounted brigade in the UK in 1915, but were initially sent to France on foot to reinforce 
the depleted Canadian infantry after losses during the German attack at Ypres in April 
of that year.38 Only in January of 1916 was the brigade reconstituted as a mounted 
unit.39 Prior to their permanent attachment to the division the Canadian Brigade had 
been a part of Gough’s training regime, and they took to one aspect of their training 
with particular vigour. This was the question of trench crossing. On 27 May 
“Experiments were made in the various methods of crossing trenches with cavalry and 
guns, by bridging and filling in.”40 This led on the 31 May to the testing of two specially 
designed portable bridges; an ‘RCHA Bridge’ weighing 550lbs (250kg), constructed for 
use by guns or wagons, and a ‘Fort Garry Bridge’, with a weight of 202lbs (90kg) 
devised for horses in single file. Tests were carried out and times recorded; the artillery 
bridge could be assembled and in position in just under three and a half minutes, while 
the Fort Garry Bridge could be thrown across a trench in less than 45 seconds. Both 
bridges were formally demonstrated before Haig at Helfaut on 3 June.41 His response is 
not recorded but it is likely to have been favourable as the Fort Garry Horse was 
adapted as a specialist bridging unit and its squadrons dispersed among the individual 
brigades of 2nd Indian Division. 
   Besides training, specific preparations for the upcoming offensive were also carried 
out. It was necessary for the cavalry to have a properly reconnoitred and prepared line 
of advance in the event of an attack. To this end the 2nd Indian Cavalry Division spent 
the latter part of June preparing and marking two tracks from their assembly areas, 
around Meaulte, north-eastwards around either side of Bécourt Châ teau woods, and on 
up to the British front line in Sausage Valley. 42 This task was not made any easier by the 
fact that they were specifically proscribed from using any roads usable by wheeled 
traffic, but had to cut a new track across country. On the day of the offensive these 
tracks were to be extended across the British and German trenches as far as just beyond 
Pozières. Secunderabad Brigade, forming the advanced guard of the division was to be 
specifically responsible for establishing and manning four trench crossing points 
suitable for both cavalry and guns in Sausage Valley. In this they were to be assisted by 
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detachments of Canadians equipped with their mobile bridges, to “make and indicate” 
trench crossings and to handle any prisoners.43 
   It is clear from this wealth of training and logistical preparation that the cavalry 
divisions were far from idle in the period leading up to the Somme battles. Inevitably 
the limitations of this preparation became apparent when battle was joined, but many of 
these faults were only readily apparent in hindsight. At a regimental level the cavalry 
should be seen as at least as well prepared for the Somme battles as its infantry 
counterparts, and in some respects more sanguine and realistic about forthcoming 
events. Unlike many of the ‘New Army’ divisions fo r whom the Somme would be their 
first taste of offensive fighting, many of the cavalry had been ‘out since ‘14’ and had 
significant combat experience. It should also be remembered that many cavalrymen 
were not only training behind the lines but also spent periods dismounted in the front 
line, such service would have provided a good understanding of the prevailing realities 
of the war. 
 
 
1916 – Four Battles 
 
   Cavalry played no part in the fighting on the first day of the Somme offensive. Writers 
on the battle have not generally examined the rôle of these mounted forces, or their lack 
of one, in any more detail than this. The cavalry tend only to appear in narratives of the 
Somme battles waiting hopefully behind the lines, their presence serving as a metaphor 
for the wider failures and ‘loss of innocence’ which the offensive has come to represent. 
For example, John Keegan observed “Haig had three cavalry divisions brought up to the 
Somme front, but they were neither expected to, nor did they, play any part on July 1st 
or any other day in 1916.”44 This simplistic view, however, ignores the fact that cavalry 
forces did become involved in the fighting as the campaign progressed, and that 
although they did not play a major part in the final outcome, they were not entirely idle. 
    Where more detailed accounts of the campaign do refer to the activities of the cavalry 
this coverage has also tended to be highly critical of the arm, and of those who defined 
its rôle. As has been discussed in the preceding chapter, these criticisms start at the top, 
with the implication that the senior commanders’ inclusion of cavalry in their plans was 
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characteristic of their wider lack of understanding of the nature of the battle being 
fought. At a lower level, the part in the fighting played by mounted troops is offered as 
evidence both of their inherent obsolescence and unsuitability for the war being fought, 
and perhaps more surprisingly, of their own lack of appreciation of this.  
   The rôle of the cavalry in the Somme fighting, as envisaged by the C-in-C, Haig, and 
by Gen. Rawlinson (as commander of Fourth Army) may be explored through 
examination of the four principal occasions on which cavalry forces were incorporated 
in the plans of attack; the initial 1 July offensive, the fighting at High Wood on 14 July, 
and the battles of Flers-Courcelette on 15 September and Morval on 25-26 September. 
Examination of the overall strategic plan for each attack, as well as the detailed 
planning within the cavalry formations themselves, reveals the faltering progress of the 
senior commanders in understanding how to use mounted troops in the prevailing 
conditions. This question of senior officers’ grasp of the prevailing difficulties of 
command, control and communications is one of the key themes of this study. The 
differences in attitude between Haig and Rawlinson towards the function of cavalry also 
become apparent. It will be evident in later chapters that Haig was remarkably 
consistent in his views of what the cavalry should do, clinging on, right up until 
November 1918, to a vision of a large scale breakthrough and pursuit. Rawlinson, by 
contrast, was initially sceptical of the value of cavalry, but learned later to incorporate 
them into his operations. In 1916, however, his views had yet to soften towards the 
mounted arm, and his plans for them reflected that early scepticism. 
   In only two of these four battles did cavalry become involved in the fighting; in 
brigade strength at High Wood on 14 July, and in squadron strength at Gueudecourt on 
26 September. Neither action was decisive in the outcome of the offensive, and the 
Gueudecourt action formed only a minute fraction of the fighting on that day. However, 
through detailed examination of these two episodes it is possible to evaluate the 
effectiveness of mounted troops in action, and to compare this with the aspirations of 
their commanders, and the criticism which has been made of the arm, both by its 
contemporaries and by later historians. 
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Planning for 1 July 
(Figure 2.1 overleaf) 
   The planning for the 1 July offensive on the Somme has been characterised as a 
conflict between the conservative ‘Bite and Hold’ tactics of Rawlinson as Fourth Army 
commander, and the more ambitious ‘Breakthrough’ objectives of Haig as C- in-C.45 
The difference between the two commanders’ thinking with regard to mounted forces 
tends to be seen in a similar light, with Rawlinson, an infantryman, making no provision 
in his plan for cavalry, and Haig, the cavalryman, eagerly awaiting the ‘G in Gap’.46 
With the benefit of hindsight some historians have tended to favour Rawlinson’s less 
ambitious plan, seeing in it a more realistic appraisal of the likely outcome of events, as 
opposed to Haig’s over optimism. Liddell Hart commented “The very belief in such far-
reaching possibilities suggests a failure to diagnose the actual conditions.”47 Others by 
contrast, have castigated Rawlinson for his timidity and for opportunities missed, 
especially on the southern flank of the attack, where a rapid follow-up of the successes 
of Congreve’s XIII Corps might have reaped significant rewards.48  
   In fact the difference between the two views is more subtle. As is outlined below, 
Rawlinson was prepared to permit the cavalry exploitation which Haig urged, but saw it 
essentially as a second, separate phase of battle from the breaking into and through the 
German main positions, which was primarily a matter for infantry and artillery. Only 
when a clear hole had been made in the enemy line would the cavalry advance, (and 
Rawlinson, frankly, did not expect such a gap to be easily or quickly produced). This 
view was, paradoxically, in line with much pre-war thinking within the cavalry, in 
which the arm had seen itself, assisted by integral machine guns and accompanied by 
horse artillery, as an increasingly mobile force, independent of the support of other 
arms.49  
   Haig, even before the war, as discussed earlier in this chapter had advocated this 
independent rôle for the cavalry, exploiting the success of a separate infantry battle. At 
the same time he was keen to see mounted forces involved in each offensive at an early 
stage. This had been reflected the year before in the plan for the Loos offensive 
examined earlier. His own thinking was thus irreconcilably split. Thus his proposals for 
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the Somme offensive were shot through with recommendations that the cavalry be 
brought into the fighting at as early a stage as possible. Unfortunately his thinking about 
this combined-arms doctrine was obscured by his optimism about the outcome of the 
offensive as a whole. His advocacy of the early commitment of cavalry to the battle was 
increasingly overtaken by visions of a substantial breakthrough of the German position 
and exploitation beyond the trench lines into open country. It was difficult for 
Rawlinson to devise a strategy that reconciled both of these ideas, and in the end he 
opted for a plan that relegated the cavalry to the more traditional independent 
exploitation rôle, at the expense of combined-arms fighting. 
   This difference of view can be followed through the sequence of plans for the attack 
produced by Rawlinson and Fourth Army, and Haig’s comments on those plans. 
Rawlinson took command of the newly formed Fourth Army in March 1916. On 26 
March he was formally requested by Robertson (CGS) to produce a plan of attack on his 
Army frontage for a force of approximately 15 divisions, supported by one cavalry 
division. 50 This was no great surprise as discussions of such an offensive had been in 
train since the New Year, and Fourth Army had been formed with this attack in mind.  
   Rawlinson and Maj. Gen. Montgomery, his Chief of Staff, produced their first formal 
plan for the Somme attack on 3 April 1916.51 This envisaged an attack on a front of 
some 20,000 yards (18km) with a penetration of the German line to a depth of between 
2,000 and 5,000 yards (1.8-4.5km). This was quite a conservative plan but reflected 
concerns about the range up to which infantry could be supported by artillery, and the 
manpower and guns available. 
   Haig was disappointed by what he saw as the lack of ambition in this plan. He 
recorded in his diary of 5 April: 
 I studied Sir H. Rawlinson’s proposals for attack. His intention is merely to take 
the Enemy’s first and second system of trenches and ‘kill Germans’. He looks 
upon the gaining of 3 or 4 kilometers more or less of ground [as] immaterial. I 
think we can do better than this by aiming at getting as large a combined force of 
French and British across the Somme and fighting the enemy in the open! 52 
 In particular the 5,000-yard maximum advance took in the whole of the German first 
line of defence, but only about two-thirds of the second, and offered no prospect of 
outright penetration of the enemy position. Indeed Rawlinson’s plan explicitly stated “I 
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do not therefore propose to include the Second Line south of Poziè res in the objectives 
allotted to corps.” 53 Haig criticised Rawlinson’s strictly limited objectives, 
commenting: “It is therefore usually wiser to act boldly in order to secure, at the outset, 
points of tactical value it may be possible to reach, rather than to determine beforehand 
to stop short of what may prove to be possible, in order to avoid risks.”54 
   Nor had any rôle been defined for cavalry, beyond a general position in reserve behind 
the attack. At this stage however, Rawlinson had at his disposal only the single division 
of cavalry allocated to Fourth Army when the Cavalry Corps was dissolved at the 
beginning of March. 55 No additional cavalry had been specially earmarked for the 
attack, although reserve divisions were available under the command of Haig at G.H.Q.. 
Rawlinson might therefore be forgiven for failing to consider a single cavalry division 
(with a rifle strength equivalent only to an infantry brigade), among a force of fifteen 
infantry divisions, as the decisive force at his disposal. 
   In spite of this, Haig demanded a larger rôle for mounted troops in the plan: 
“Opportunities to use cavalry, supported by guns, machine guns etc, and infantry, 
should be sought for, both during the early stages of the attack and subsequently.”56 
Two parts of this remark are significant. The first is that the cavalry are not expected to 
act alone, but in concert with all arms, and secondly that their involvement should not 
await the eventual hoped for breakthrough, but should take place ‘during the early 
stages’. This reflected the combined-arms part of Haig’s view of the rôle of the cavalry. 
In his eyes the cavalry was not only to serve in exploiting the breakthrough but also in 
making it, and the subsequent mission he provided for them beyond the German lines 
was also intended to be carried out in conjunction with supporting arms. 
    Rawlinson, by contrast still envisioned an infantry and artillery battle, followed, if 
successful, by a cavalry phase. He responded to Haig’s remarks on 19 April with 
revisions to his plan of attack: 
As regards the employment of cavalry, it appears to me that the best use we can 
make of them is immediately after the attack on the line Grandcourt – Pozières 
has been successful, and that they may be of the greatest assistance in enabling 
us to reach the further objectives, if we succeed in inflicting upon the enemy a 
serious state of demoralisation. 57 
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The final part of this remark is revealing. In Rawlinson’s mind the cavalry were only to 
be used to pursue a beaten and fleeing enemy. He continued to see the cavalry battle as 
a separate phase following on from a successful infantry and artillery attack, and 
furthermore was sceptical of such an opportune moment arising. A manuscript note 
alongside this paragraph in Haig’s own hand argues for an earlier and more integrated 
involvement of the horse “This seems to indicate the use of ‘the Cavalry’ as one unit, 
this is not my view of its involvement during the fight. Certain corps commanders ought 
to have some cav. regts at their disposal.”58 Here Haig can be seen advocating a mult-
layered cavalry battle similar to that proposed at Loos the year before, with some units 
operating locally in concert with the infantry to create the break, and others 
subsequently exploiting it. 
   The two men met again on 6 May. 59 Haig once again pressed his case for a deeper 
attack into at least the German second line, and for the first time outlined specific 
geographical objectives for the cavalry, proposing a thrust as far as Bapaume, followed 
by a turning movement to the north towards Arras. At the same time, however, Haig 
still expected these ambitious objectives to be reached by a single division of cavalry: 
“One division of cavalry, (the 2nd Indian Cavalry Division) will be at your disposal 
during the operations.”60 
   Significantly, much of the debate over the nature of the offensive was conducted at 
this stage in rather abstract terms. Haig in particular may be criticised for advocating the 
use of cavalry, without ever defining what exactly they should do, or indeed whether 
they should fight at an early stage, or be retained for exploitation (reflecting his own 
divided thinking). This problem had its root in the wider flaw within the whole 
offensive, which was the lack of any serious strategic objective behind the relevant 
portion of the front. The attack was to be made north of the Somme in order to co-
operate with the French to the south, but otherwise had no particular goal in sight.  
   Rawlinson does not seem to have been unduly troubled by this as his objectives had 
always been limited to the destruction of the German positions immediately in front of 
him, rather than a more sweeping strategic mission. In his formal Fourth Army 
Operation Order of 14 June, the objectives were defined simply as “breaking up the 
enemy’s defensive system” and “defeating his forces within reach”. 61 The detailed plans 
that followed outlined a relatively modest ‘Bite and Hold’ mission. Indeed Rawlinson 
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stressed the need to consolidate on early objectives and not get carried away by ideas of 
deep penetration: 
…the success of the operations as a whole largely depends on the consolidation 
of the definite objectives which have been allotted to each corps. Beyond these 
objectives no serious advance is to be made until preparations have been 
completed for entering on the next phase of the operations.62 
   Haig’s response to these plans seems to reflect a view of the battle that was sharply 
different from that of Rawlinson, but at the same time did not acknowledge this 
difference. On 16 June he suggested that “The enemy’s resistance may break down, in 
which case our advance will be pressed eastwards far enough to enable our cavalry to 
push through into the open country beyond the enemy’s prepared lines of defence.”63 In 
addition, in a note of 21 June he went on to propose not only “…pushing the cavalry 
through to seize Bapaume and establish itself in good positions in that 
neighbourhood.”64 but subsequently “When the cavalry has reached Bapaume it should 
be relieved there by the supporting troops so that it may be set free for co-operation in a 
further move northward.”65 
   To Haig’s credit, he no longer expected a breakout on this scale to be achieved by a 
single division of cavalry, in addition to the 2nd Indian Division, 1st and 3rd (British) 
Cavalry Divisions were placed at the disposal of Fourth Army under the command of 
Gen. Gough. 66 Significantly, the troops allotted to Gough, ultimately to become the 
‘Reserve Army’ also included three divisions of infantry from II Corps, whom Haig no 
doubt intended would fulfil a combined arms rôle in support of the cavalry breakout. (In 
an interesting aside, Badsey notes that it was at this time that one of these infantry 
divisions, the 25th, adopted the horseshoe as its divisional sign.67) The dissolution of the 
two cavalry corps headquarters (British and Indian) earlier in the year has already been 
discussed. In the creation of a separate layer of command for the three cavalry divisions 
used in the opening Somme attack, (in this case in the form of Reserve Army 
Headquarters) the reconstitution of the Cavalry Corps was prefigured. It may be argued 
from this that the specific exploitation rôle allocated to Gough’s force would colour the 
conception of the rôle of the later Cavalry Corps, by those both within it and under 
whose command it was placed. This will be examined in more detail in a later chapter. 
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Rawlinson never supported this addition to the chain of command, and he later 
succeeded in detaching II Corps from Gough’s control. 68 Even without the loss of the 
infantry, Gough was set a stiff task with the resources available to him, he later 
observed: 
When the very comprehensive task which was set me in these orders is 
considered, in conjunction with the fact that I had only three cavalry and two 
infantry divisions with which to carry it out, I certainly think that I should have 
required early reinforcements!69 
   Nonetheless it is difficult to see how even with three divisions of cavalry available 
these strategic opportunities would arise out of Rawlinson’s limited offensive plans. 
Also, in spite of setting these grandiose goals for the cavalry, as late as the G.H.Q. letter 
of the 16 June, Haig continued to define the objectives of the offensive as a whole in 
only the loosest terms. He described the objective simply as “relieving the pressure on 
the French at Verdun and inflicting loss on the enemy”.70  
   Rawlinson was extremely skeptical of the ever more ambitious cavalry objectives. At 
a command conference on 22 June he observed: 
An opportunity may occur to push the cavalry through…and in this connection I 
will read you the orders I have received on the subject from the Commander- in-
Chief this morning. But before I read them I had better make it quite clear that it 
may not be possible to break the enemy’s line and push the cavalry through at 
the first rush…A situation may supervene later…for pushing the cavalry 
through; but until we can see what is the course of the battle, it is impossible to 
predict at what moment we shall be able to undertake this, and the decision will 
rest in my hands to say when it can be carried out.71 
Rawlinson acknowledged the possibility of Haig’s wider vision coming to fruition in a 
memorandum ‘With regard to action to be taken if the Enemy’s resistance breaks down’ 
issued on 28 June.72 In this, however, he reiterated the point that any immediate 
exploitation of gaps in the German resistance was to be the job of the infantry. Indeed 
the cavalry are obliged to “Remain in their places of assembly until these [infantry] 
divisions have moved forward and cleared their line of advance.”73 Thus the rôle of the 
cavalry in Rawlinson’s eyes remained confined to a secondary phase of the battle, after 
the initial infantry combat had been fought and won. 
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   The other major question debated by Rawlinson and Haig was the precise line of 
advance along which any cavalry operation would proceed. This was not a matter that 
could be decided once the offensive had begun. Not only would it be necessary to 
bridge the enemy trenches once the attack was under way, but also routes had to be 
prepared and marked on the British side of the line to allow the cavalry to move up 
through the mass of men and materiel behind the attack. Any moves would also have to 
take place over ground already disturbed by German shelling. These factors 
significantly constrained the location and direction of any proposed cavalry 
breakthrough.  
   Haig had initially envisioned an attack northwards from the right (south) end of the 
Fourth Army front through Montauban, taking advantage of the eastward turn of the 
German line north of the Somme to roll up their position from south to north. 74 
Unfortunately two factors mitigated against this. The first was the presence of French 
troops north of the river, with the  boundary between the national armies passing through 
Maricourt. This made the area south of Mametz and Montauban very crowded and the 
insertion of cavalry forces from their forming-up areas in the west, into this area across 
the line of advance of the reserves already there would have been extremely difficult. 
Secondly the German Second Line position in this southern sector of the front was set 
back from the First Line, and did not fall within Rawlinson’s immediate objectives for 
the infantry attack. The axis of any cavalry exploitation had therefore to be placed both 
somewhere that could be reached sufficiently easily by the cavalry without interfering 
with other troops, and where the infantry attack was expected to penetrate sufficiently 
far into the German position for a breakthrough to be possible.  
   The potentially rather unimaginative answer to this was to define the cavalry axis of 
advance straight through the middle of the offensive front, along the Albert to Bapaume 
road. 2nd Indian Division was given the initial objective of Bapaume, with a line of 
advance south of the road, while 1st Cavalry Division was given the objective of Achiet-
le-Grand, 5km (3 miles) north-west of Bapaume, with a line of advance north of the 
road. The 3rd Cavalry Division was to remain in reserve east of Albert.75 It was also 
made clear not only in the Fourth Army Operation Orders76 but also in Divisional orders 
that the assault was to be primarily an infantry affair right up as far as Courcelette and 
Martinpuich. Only when a substantial hole had been punched in the German lines and 
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the Infantry reserves of III and X Corps had been pushed through would the cavalry 
advance begin. 77 
   What becomes apparent from this is that the cavalry divisions, although described as a 
‘Reserve’ force, were committed to battle before the offensive started. While Rawlinson 
retained the decision over when they were to move off, their objectives and line of 
advance were pre-determined, and to attempt to change these ‘on the hoof’ during the 
course of the battle would have been a recipe for chaos. Unlike commanders of previous 
eras who were able to retain a large force of reserve cavalry, and, as Napoleon 
demonstrated at Eylau in 1807,78 launch it both at a time, and on a part of the battlefield 
of their choosing Rawlinson had to decide in advance where he thought this critical 
point would be. A flaw in his plan was that having reached this conclusion over the axis 
of potential cavalry breakthrough, he did not focus the strength of his initial infantry 
attack in this area in order to facilitate it. Instead he retained an even, broad front attack 
all along the line. This made a critical collapse of part of the German defences not only 
less likely, but also less predictable in terms of where the line might break. This lack of 
offensive focus is another sign that Rawlinson did not really believe that such a collapse 
of enemy resistance would actually occur, and that his plan anticipated only limited 
‘Bite and Hold’ gains over a wide front. Rawlinson’s conservative attitude to the likely 
outcome of the attack was probably born of his experiences as a corps commander in 
1915. He had seen the limited gains achieved in the attacks of that year, and indeed as 
early as March 1915 had himself coined the term ‘Bite and Hold’ in response to the 
results of the battle of Neuve Chapelle.79 
  It is arguable that Rawlinson could have partially overcome this problem by dividing 
his cavalry force. As he was distributing guns and infantry along the twenty miles of his 
attacking front, he could have been distributing cavalry, either as complete divisions, or 
in brigade strength, to his infantry commanders at Corps level. This would have had the 
effect of multiplying his chances for success, albeit in each case on a smaller scale. It 
would also have fulfilled the ‘small print’ of Haig’s ideas for the use of cavalry 
“supported by guns, machine guns etcetera, and infantry… during the early stages of the 
attack”, 80 even if it was at the cost of the great turning movement through Bapaume 
which was the Commander-in-Chief’s wider objective. 
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   In the event, under Rawlinson’s ‘Bite and Hold’ plan, other assets such as infantry and 
artillery were distributed more or less evenly along the front, and given relatively 
modest operational objectives. Meanwhile his plan for the cavalry was a response to 
Haig’s vision of a strategic breakthrough, albeit filtered through his own traditional 
ideas of the rôle of cavalry. He collected all the cavalry together as an old-style ‘Mass 
of Decision’ at a single point behind the front. Haig’s appointment of Gough, and the 
assembling of the Reserve Army, allowed the three cavalry divisions on the Somme 
front to coalesce informally into a corps- like cavalry formation. Rawlinson’s plan, 
placing all three divisions together on one axis of attack, did nothing to prevent or dilute 
this effect. As a result the offensive for which the cavalry was prepared was quite 
different in character from the offensive which the infantry and guns actually carried 
out.  
 
 
The 1 July Attack 
 
   On the morning of 1 July the three cavalry divisions left their billets at 3.30am and 
were in place in their positions of assembly behind the III and X Corps front by 5.30 
am. Rawlinson had originally intended to keep the cavalry very much ‘under his hand’, 
holding them in a position near to his own Fourth Army headquarters at Querrieu. This 
would have left them more than 20km (12 miles) from the infantry start-line at Zero-
hour. This was altered after the intervention of Haig on 21 June and the 1st Cavalry and 
2nd Indian Divisions were advanced during the night of the 30/1 to positions around 
Bresle and Buire-sur-Ancre.81 This left them some 9km (5 miles) behind the start- line. 
As soon as the offensive began, at 7.30, patrols were sent to Bécourt and to Sausage 
Valley to monitor the progress of the infantry attack.82 Sadly this progress was 
negligible, and by 8.30am it was clear that this part of the offensive had failed. Orders 
were received from General Gough (at Fourth Army HQ) at 11.30am that no move 
would be made before 2.30pm. Meanwhile Rawlinson, the Fourth Army commander, 
had decided by midday that there was no chance for the cavalry, recording in his diary 
at 12.15pm “There is of course no hope of getting the cavalry through today.”83 At 
3.00pm the cavalry were stood down, and by 6.00pm had withdrawn to billets further to 
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the west. In short, when the particular portion of the offensive which was intended to 
open the door to a cavalry advance, failed, all three cavalry divisions were left with no 
other option but to return, frustrated, to their billets. 
   Meanwhile, opportunities for mounted exploitation on other parts of the front 
withered for lack of cavalry support. A collapse of enemy resistance did occur opposite 
XIII Corps in the south (ironically where Haig had initially proposed), but since this 
was not anticipated in the plan, nothing could be done to exploit it. Middlebrook 
suggests that “Two or three cavalry regiments boldly handled could have achieved 
results out of all proportion to their numbers”84 if they had been available to exploit XIII 
Corps’ success. While theoretically this was true, it neglects the fact that once the 
cavalry had been committed to another part of the battle little could be done to divert 
them. It has been suggested that “…reserves included 2nd Indian Cavalry Division, 
saddled-up three miles behind XIII Corps jumping-off point”. 85 In fact the bulk of the 
cavalry remained around Buire and Bresle, some 14km (or nine miles) from Montauban 
as the crow flies, but this suggestion also ignores the fact that this distance was 
measured diagonally across the British Front line in the midst of a major attack. Three 
miles or twenty, such a move was not practical for the cavalry except along previously 
prepared and reconnoit red lines of advance, and those lines of advance had been 
prepared towards another part of the battle. 
   Once again, as at Loos ten months before, the initial infantry and artillery assault had 
failed to create a breach in the German defences for the cava lry to exploit, or at least not 
on a part of the line where cavalry were available. This failure was so complete that any 
critique of the cavalry’s plans and preparations is rendered somewhat irrelevant. No 
alterations in the command arrangements or planning within the cavalry could have 
changed the outcome of the infantry battle, and without that, the mounted arm was 
powerless. However the cavalry did not have long to wait before a successful infantry 
attack would present a potential opportunity for them to show their worth. 
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Planning for 14 July 
 
   After 1 July the cavalry remained hopeful of a rôle in the fighting. 2nd Indian Division 
remained at four hours’ notice to move until 7 July.86 However, no advance was 
ordered. It was not until Rawlinson mounted his next large-scale set-piece attack that a 
rôle for mounted troops would once again be proposed. On this next occasion the 
cavalry would come to grips with the enemy; at High Wood during what has become 
known as the ‘Battle of Bazentin Ridge’ on 14 July. The small part played by the 
cavalry in this battle was probably no more significant in terms of the overall outcome 
of the Somme campaign than their part in the 1 July attack, but a detailed examination 
of this action sheds light on the tactical effectiveness or otherwise of the arm, and on the 
appropriateness of their preparations. In particular a detailed analysis of the movements 
of the cavalry forces involved demonstrates their battle field mobility, which was a key 
part of their overall tactical effectiveness. 
   Detailed reconstruction of the course of events on that day is also salutary in 
demonstrating how the actions of the cavalry have been misrepresented in many 
subsequent accounts of the battle, a topic which forms one of the subsidiary themes of 
this study. As early as 1938 the Official History painted an erroneous picture of the 
cavalry, stuck in the mud, unable to arrive at the scene of the action until the evening.87 
This image has been accepted uncritically by most of those subsequently dealing with 
the battle.88 
   On the basis of this supposed immobility and ineffectiveness, many historians have 
gone on to criticise the senior commanders for having unrealistic expectations of what 
the cavalry could achieve. Others have gone even further and suggested that 
Rawlinson’s inclusion of any cavalry in his plans was a grave error. Prior and Wilson 
argue that: 
These orders [for the cavalry] do no credit to Rawlinson’s command. … The 
result could only be a slaughter of the mounted force. Rawlinson’s orders 
therefore only make any sense if he was expecting the enemy to flee. And if that 
was his expectation then the boundaries of cloud cuckoo- land should be moved 
down a stage from their usual location around G.H.Q.. 89 
  49 
Harsh words indeed, and as will be shown, not an observation borne out by the facts of 
the battle. 
   In the aftermath of 1 July Haig and Rawlinson seem to have continued to hold 
divergent views of the nature of the battle. The infantry attacks along the proposed 
cavalry line of advance, those of X and III Corps had failed completely. Rawlinson was 
keen to renew these failed attacks from the British centre and left, possibly in order to 
try to wipe away the embarrassment of complete failure on this part of the front. Haig 
on the other hand, was keen to exploit the success on the right, in particular Congreve’s 
XIII Corps gains around Montauban. In due course Rawlinson accepted this latter line 
of attack. (Although Haig was to have a much harder job selling the idea to the French, 
on whose immediate flank the attack would take place.)90 
   Curiously a form of rôle reversal seems to have followed Rawlinson’s acceptance of a 
renewed attack on the British right. His plan for this offensive, was both tactically 
inventive, and incorporated his chief’s vision of a significant cavalry rôle at the early 
stages.91 It also made provision for a complete breakthrough of the German position. 
Indeed Rawlinson wrote in his diary “…if we are wholly successful, it will have far 
reaching results – especially if I can get the cavalry through and catch the guns and 
break up their commands.”92 This was a far cry from his pessimistic forecasts of the 
prospects for mounted troops before 1 July. Possibly Rawlinson was starting to 
succumb to the constant pressure for a larger rôle for the cavalry placed upon him over 
the past months by the commander-in-chief. Equally, he may have recognised that in an 
attack on the German second and third lines of defence, even a shallow ‘bite’ might 
fully penetrate the formal defensive system. Haig meanwhile, seems to have become 
increasingly conservative. In particular he was skeptical of the ability of his relatively 
untrained troops to carry out the complex form up by night in no-man’s land envisaged 
in Rawlinson’s new scheme of attack, and saw altogether too much risk in the plan as a 
whole.93 He was also worried that the cavalry might be committed too early before the 
time was quite right, arguing, somewhat uncharacteristically that “The divisions were 
not to go forward until we had got through the enemy’s fortifications, except a few 
squadrons to take ‘High Wood’.”94 (His earlier remarks about Sir John French before 
Loos come to mind in this context.) True to form, however, Haig did eventually let his 
subordinate have his way and the attack proposed by Rawlinson and his corps 
  50 
commanders went ahead. Interestingly, Liddell Hart suggested that “For once, Horne, 
who was usually as apt to agree with Haig’s views as he was dependable in other ways, 
agreed instead with his immediate superior [Rawlinson], and this fact may have helped 
tilt the scales.”95 (Indeed the influence of Lt. Gen. Horne, commander of XV Corps, not 
only on the planning but also the outcome of the battle will be examined in more detail 
later in this chapter.) 
   In brief, the overall plan for the attack on 14 July comprised an attack northwards 
from Montauban (captured on 1 July), into and through the German Second Line 
position on the Ginchy–Pozières ridge.96 The main attacking front was to be 
approximately 3,500 yards (3.2km) wide, with its flanks defined by Mametz Wood to 
the east, and Trones and Delville Woods to the west. The initial objective was the 
German Second Line itself, followed by the villages of Bazentin- le-Petit to the west, 
Bazentin- le-Grand in the centre, and Longueval in the east. These three villages lay 
immediately behind the German line. If the attack was successful up to this point, 
cavalry would be pushed through with the immediate objective of High Wood, in order 
to make a lodgement in the as yet only partia lly constructed German Third (or ‘Switch’) 
Line. Potential further exploitation by additional divisions of cavalry was also 
postulated. 
   The initial infantry attack would be conducted by four divisions, from right to left: 9th 
and 3rd Divisions of XIII Corps, and 7th and 21st Divisions of XV Corps. An additional 
supporting attack would be made on the left beyond Mametz Wood by III Corps. The 
initial assault would be made at first light of dawn, 3.25am, from forming up positions 
out in no-man’s land, as close to the German positions as possible. To reinforce the 
element of surprise this would be preceded by only 5 minutes of ‘Hurricane’ 
bombardment (although a less intense wire-cutting bombardment had already been 
taking place for several days).97 
   The cavalry force to take part in the attack was the same as for 1 July, 2nd Indian 
Division, and 1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions. The 2nd Indian Division was to start 
immediately to the south of Albert, in the vicinity of Meaulte (9km (5 miles) from 
Montauban), but by ‘Zero’ (ie. 3.25am on the 14th) would have one brigade immediately 
behind the infantry attack to the south of Montauban. One regiment of this brigade was 
to support each of XIII and XV Corps in their attacks on their second objectives, the 
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villages behind the line, and the third regiment was to be ready to seize High Wood by 
‘coup de main’ as soon as an opportunity arose. The other two divisions were assembled 
further away, 1st Division at Buire, (14km (9 miles) from Montauban) and 3rd Division 
at La Neuville (22km (13 miles) from Montauban).98 
   Further clarification of the cavalry orders was issued by Fourth Army on 12 July: “In 
the event of our attack on the enemy’s second line being successful…”99 the three 
cavalry divisions would advance sequentially through the German Second Line, 2nd 
Indian leading and 1st and 3rd following. 1st Division would form a flank guard towards 
Leuze Wood to the south-east, and 3rd Division similarly towards Martinpuich to the 
north-west, while 2nd Indian pushed on towards Flers and Le Sars. Significantly, these 
advances would take place under the control of XIII and XV Corps rather than Fourth 
Army, thus not only would cavalry be immediately available behind the infantry attack, 
but the local corps commanders would have control of it. This devolution of control of 
the cavalry from army to corps level was a vital first step in improving their 
effectiveness, but as will be shown, it still did not provide the local flexibility required 
to allow local commanders to fully exploit their tactical potential. 
   Subsequently it would appear that Rawlinson became uncomfortable with the placing 
of his entire cavalry force beyond his own immediate control, and a further 
‘Memorandum’ was issued on 13 July. In this he reclaimed 1st and 3rd Divisions under 
his own hand: 
The Army Commander does not consider that the entire responsibility for 
launching the 1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions should rest on the Commanders of 
the XIII. and XV. Corps. He has decided therefore that although the actual 
orders for the advance of these two divisions will be issued by the XIII. and XV. 
Corps, the final decision as to whether the suitable time has come for launching 
them will rest in his hands.100 
Events would prove that the immediate effect of this change was to write the two British 
cavalry divisions out of the battle entirely, as a “suitable time” never presented itself to 
Fourth Army. In the case of the 2nd Indian Division, however, Rawlinson used the 
Memorandum to reiterate their vital rôle:  
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He [Rawlinson] places the greatest importance on the seizure of High Wood and 
the enemy’s new line to the east and west of it, as a stepping stone to a further 
advance.  
The G.O.C. XIII. Corps will therefore issue orders for the 2nd Indian Cavalry 
Division to advance, on his own responsibility, when he considers the situation 
permits of it.101 
Thus not only would Congreve, G.O.C. XIII Corps, have at least one regiment of 
cavalry under his hand from the outset of the battle, he would in due course acquire 
control over a whole Indian cavalry division. The possibility of a true combined arms 
attack thus presented itself. The criticism of this plan has been made that the cavalry 
division was under XIII Corps control while their objective, High Wood, was in XV 
Corps area.102 This objection neglects the fact that the cavalry line of advance in order 
to get to High Wood crossed the portion of the German Second Line attacked by XIII 
Corps. Thus only XIII Corps would be able to judge when such an advance was 
practical. This confusion of command and objectives was, however, to become a 
significant factor in the failures of the attack. 
   Such were the broad outlines of the attack ordered by Fourth Army. How this was to 
be carried out by the troops involved is revealed in the orders issued lower down the 
chain of command at corps, division and brigade level. As always on the Western Front 
the primary difficulty was communications. Rawlinson and Fourth Army HQ were 
25km (15 miles) behind the front at Querrieu. General Congreve in command of XIII 
Corps was based at Chipilly, some 14km (9 miles) from Montauban, while XV Corps 
HQ was at Heilly, roughly between the two. In turn the headquarters of the three cavalry 
divisions would start the battle in their points of concentration, but the commanders 
would soon be on the move with their divisions. In order to overcome this problem the 
headquarters of the 3rd (infantry) Division, was nominated as an advanced reporting 
centre. This division, under Maj. Gen. Haldane, formed the left of XIII Corps’ line, 
roughly in the centre of the attack. Haldane’s Main Headquarters was initially located 
about 1km (1,100 yards) north-east of Bray-sur-Somme.103 Subsequently, an Advanced 
Headquarters was established at Billon Farm 1km (1,100 yards) south of Carnoy. 104 
This placed it only about 4km (5,000 yards) behind the start line of the attack. As the 
attack began, the commander of the Cavalry Advanced Guard, Brig. Gen. Gregory, and 
  53 
subsequently the G.O.C. 2nd Indian Division, Maj. Gen. MacAndrew were both to 
establish themselves at these headquarters. Cavalry liaison officers were also sent to all 
the other attacking infantry divisions, (with motor cyclists and mounted despatch riders) 
with orders to report to MacAndrew at 3rd Division Headquarters. It was at the 
Advanced Headquarters that much of the immediate business of fighting the battle was 
conducted through ad-hoc conferences among the commanders at divisional and brigade 
level.  
   The second difficulty faced by the cavalry divisions was their line of advance. As on 
the 1 July the route to be taken up to the start line of the attack was prepared in advance 
by the construction of cavalry tracks. These were formally defined in 2nd Indian 
Division operation orders of 12 July: 
Four new routes across country have been marked by flags from the new 
bivouack towards Carnoy and thence towards Montauban. … It is extremely 
important that all units should be thoroughly familiar with these tracks. They 
will be referred to in future orders as A, B, C, and D from south to north. 105 
This must have been substantial undertaking as each track ran for between 10 and 15km 
across country. Much of the route in the rear areas would have required relatively little 
repair, but the portions between Carnoy and Montauban would have crossed the former 
British and German front lines of 1 July, and the devastated area resulting from the 
British bombardment. The Secunderabad Brigade, at least, must have been ‘thoroughly 
familiar’ with the tracks as working parties detailed for their construction are recorded 
in the brigade War Diary on 7, 9, 10 and 11 July.106  
   Once the start line of the attack had been crossed, similar provision was to be made 
for the cavalry advance over the German Second Line trenches, and it was the 
responsibility of the attacking infantry to provide this. The attack orders for Haldane’s 
3rd Division include; 
The 8th Inf. Brigade will arrange to cut ramps 12 feet wide down to the captured 
German trenches in two places for the passage of cavalry in such a way as not to 
block the passageway in the trenches. The wire opposite these ramps will be 
cleared away by the infantry and the gaps clearly marked by flags. 107 
In addition the leading cavalry brigade would once again be accompanied by the 
Canadians with their portable bridges. Thus comprehensive preparations had been made 
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to get the cavalry into position for their rôle in the attack, all that remained was for the 
infantry corps commanders to launch them forward into battle. 
 
 
The ‘Battle of Bazentin Ridge’ 
(Figure 2.2 Overleaf) 
   The infantry attack began, on schedule at 3.25am on 14 July. The part played by 
mounted troops in the battle can be reconstructed from reports contained within the War 
Diaries of the formations concerned. Although at times vague and contradictory these 
accounts, taken as a whole, provide a fairly comprehensive narrative of the events of the 
day. This narrative is somewhat at variance with that typically appearing in published 
accounts of the battle. During the battle itself there was a good deal of confusion among 
the other arms concerning the progress of the cavalry. Bodies of horsemen were 
reported in various locations when in fact these were only patrols, or in some cases no 
cavalry were present at all. This confusion has been perpetuated in accounts of the  
action which refer loosely and interchangeably to the 7th Dragoon Guards, the 
Secunderabad Brigade, 2nd Indian Division, or even simply ‘the Cavalry’ as if these 
terms represented a single body of troops. This was not the case. Operational orders 
split the Division into a series of separated bodies,108 each moving on a different 
timetable and by different routes, only when the path of each is followed does the 
situation become clear.  
   On 13 July two of the three cavalry divisions allocated to the attack were in reserve to 
the west of Albert, The closer of the two being the 1st Cavalry Division around Buire-
Sur-Ancre, some 14km (9 miles) from the front line at Montauban. These divisions 
were held directly under Rawlinson’s hand, under Fourth Army command. As has been 
discussed above, Rawlinson never issued orders for these forces to move from their 
points of concentration. It is sufficient to say therefore, that these divisions took no part 
in the battle and no further reference need be made to them in this narrative. 
   At midnight on the night of 13-14 July, the 2nd Indian Division was in billets around 
Meaulte, to the south of Albert and perhaps 5km (3 miles) closer to the front than the 
other two wholly British divisions. The infantry attack was scheduled to begin at 
3.25am, but deployment by the lead infantry brigades into no-man’s land began several 
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hours before. In keeping with this the first elements of 2nd Indian Division were also on 
the move soon after midnight, so as to be as close to the front line as possible at the 
moment when they might be needed. It is something of a misrepresentation to refer to 
the location of large forces in precise terms: ‘the Xth Division was at map reference 
0.0.0’, as these formations took up large amounts of ground. For example a cavalry 
division moving in road column (half sections) is estimated to have formed a column up 
to 12 miles (19km) long. 109 It is possible, however to break down the 2nd Indian 
Division into some of its component parts and follow these parts individually, recording 
the locations of the head of each column at various times. The division was divided up 
as follows,110  
 
· The 2nd Indian Division Headquarters party, including Maj. Gen. MacAndrew 
(G.O.C. 2nd Ind. Div.) 
 
· Secunderabad Brigade Headquarters party, including Brig. Gen. Gregory (G.O.C. 
Sec. Brig.) 
 
· The ‘Vanguard’ formed from elements of Secunderabad Brigade, consisting of; 
7th Dragoon Guards 
1 squadron Fort Garry Horse (with trench bridges) 
2 sections Brigade MG Squadron (with 4 Vickers guns) 
 
· The ‘Advanced Guard’, formed of the remainder of Secunderabad Brigade, 
consisting of;   
20th Deccan Horse 
34th Poona Horse 
4 sections Brigade MG Squadron (with 8 Vickers guns) 
‘N’ Battery RHA (with 6 13pdr guns) 
1 Field Troop RE 
2 Rolls Royce armoured cars from 9th LAC Battery 
1 Squadron Fort Garry Horse (with portable trench bridges) 
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· The remainder of 2nd Indian Cavalry Division, consisting of; 
Ambala Cavalry Brigade  
Canadian Cavalry Brigade (less two Squadrons) 
Remainder 9th LAC Battery (4 cars) 
 
   At some time shortly after midnight, the Ambala Brigade, and the Canadian Cavalry 
Brigade moved from billets to their divisional point of concentration at Morlancourt. 
This was 4km (2.5 miles) south of Meulte, and actually marginally further from the 
front line. This assembly was complete by 3.30am. Here they were to stay until around 
8.00am. 111  
   Also at around midnight the two HQ parties set out from Meaulte, MacAndrew 
arrived at Main HQ 3rd Division, just outside Bray, at 3.30am. 112 Gregory went ahead 
arriving at Advanced HQ 3rd Division at Billon Farm by about the same time.113 At 
about 1.30am the two portions of the Secunderabad Brigade completed their assembly 
at Meaulte and moved off, Vanguard leading, towards Bray. The Advanced Guard 
halted just to the north-west of Bray, near 3rd Div. Main HQ. Arriving at about 
3.45am. 114 The Vanguard pushed on, crossing the Albert-Peronne road (just south of 
Carnoy) at 5.05am and moving on to a position in a valley immediately to the south of 
Montauban. Once across the old front lines the 7th Dragoon Guards (part of the 
Vanguard) closed up into column of Squadrons, (B Squadron leading) and advanced 
through moderate shelling, four horses being wounded.115 It is not clear at what time the 
Vanguard reached Montauban, but it is not likely to have been later than about 7.00am. 
In due course after resting and watering the horses at Bray, the Advanced Guard moved 
off at 6.15am and had arrived at 3rd Division advanced HQ at Billon Farm by 7.15am. 116  
   Thus by 7.00am the cavalry advance was proceeding on schedule, with the various 
portions of the 2nd Indian Division advancing by stages along its prepared routes. The 
Vanguard of the division had crossed the old 1 July front lines without difficulty and 
was in a position of support behind the infantry attack at Montauban, the remainder of 
the Advanced guard was 4km (2.5 miles) to the rear at Billon Farm, and the balance of 
the division still at Morlancourt. At this stage the Infantry attack was proceeding well 
on many parts of the front, and for the first time that day a report reached Rawlinson (at 
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around 7.00am) that Longueval, the key objective on the right hand side of the attack, 
had been captured.117  
   Eager to begin the next phase of the battle, Rawlinson (via XIII Corps) ordered the 
remainder of the 2nd Indian Division to close up to the front and for the Advanced Guard 
to proceed with its attack towards High Wood. These orders were received at 7.40am 
and the Advanced Guard moved up from Billon Farm across the old front lines to the 
position south of Montauban occupied by the Vanguard, mostly arriving probably 
around 8.30am. Meanwhile the other Brigades of the division, at Morlancourt, received 
orders at around 7.45 and were on the move by 8.20, advancing through Bray to 
positions in the vicinity of Billon Farm.118 It was at this stage that the Division 
encountered its first difficulties, The two armoured cars attached to the Advanced 
Guard, commanded by 2nd Lieutenants Williams and Pocock set off from Billon at about 
9.00am. Unfortunately the road across the old front lines was bad, a situation no doubt 
made worse by the recent bad weather and the passage a few minutes before of the 
hooves of a brigade of cavalry, and the two armoured cars became hopelessly bogged in 
the mud. It was to be midday before the two cars had been dug free and returned to 
Billon. 119 Some wheeled transport was, however, able to make the passage as ‘N’ 
Battery RHA was able to join the brigade concentrated behind Montauban by 9.30am. 120 
At about this time MacAndrew and the 2nd Indian Division HQ group also moved up 
from Bray to the 3rd Division Advanced HQ. at Billon Farm, joining Gregory and the 
Secunderabad Brigade HQ.121  
   Sadly, the reports reaching Fourth Army did not reflect the real situation, as a see-saw 
battle was taking place for the posession of Longueval, which would last all day, reports 
of capture or loss coming in every few hours, usually hopelessly out of date by the time 
they were read. Also from about 8.00am onwards there occurred one of the fatal 
breakdowns  of communications and confidence which were the hallmark of British 
attacks on the Western Front. At about 8.15am, as the struggle for Longueval continued, 
7th Dragoon Guards sent out two patrols under Lieutenants Malone and Hastings to 
reconnoitre their route towards High Wood.122 Unfortunately the route proposed for the 
advance was via the trench crossings prepared immediately to the west of Longueval, 
and on approaching the village the patrols came under machine-gun fire from it, and 
from machine guns surviving in the German Second line trenches to the west. These 
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patrols returned reporting the route impassable to the brigade, and on this information 
reaching Congreve at XIII Corps “it was decided by the Corps Commander not to push 
on to the allotted objectives until the situation became more favourable.”123 At this point 
the XIII Corps attack was effectively halted, halting the cavalry with it, waiting for the 
complete capture of Longueval. 
   On the left flank of the attack, on XV Corps front, however, the situation was rather 
different. By 9.00am all of the first and second phase objectives had been secured and 
the ground between Bazentin- le-Grand and High Wood was mostly clear of Germans. 
Indeed at about 10.00am Brig. Gen. Potter of 9th Brigade was able to make his famous 
walk, unmolested up the hill to High Wood.124 In the course of the morning several of 
the Infantry divisional commanders proposed attacks into this gap, both Watts, 
commanding 7th Division (XV Corps) and Haldane, commanding 3rd Division (XIII 
Corps) offered their reserve brigades, but were told by their respective Corps and by 
Fourth Army that these brigades were required as a reserve in case of counter attack, 
and to ‘wait for the cavalry.’125 Ironically, that very cavalry was also waiting, behind 
Montauban, for renewed orders to advance from XIII Corps. 
   Further cavalry patrols were sent out in the course of the morning to the west around 
Bazentin- le-Grand and into Bazentin- le-Petit. These patrols under Lieutenants Adair 
and Struben (7th Drg. Gds.) were able to witness a German counter-attack on the north 
end of Bazentin- le-Petit at around 11.45am, 126 but must also have been able to 
determine the viability of an attack along the more westerly line, still, no orders were 
given. Indeed the presence of mounted men advancing and then withdrawing in the 
vicinity of the Bazentins was reported to XV Corps as the failure of the Cavalry 
Advanced Guard attack.127 Meanwhile the Secunderabad Brigade itself, with elements 
of 7th Dragoon Guards out patrolling, occupied its Indian regiments by sending work 
parties to repair the cavalry tracks across the old front lines.128  
   By noon it seems to have become apparent to Rawlinson at Fourth Army that no 
cavalry advance had taken place on High Wood. Indeed no advance of any sort had 
taken place beyond that of a lone brigadier at around 10.00am. He therefore authorised 
the infantry attack on High Wood by 7th Division (XV Corps) originally proposed by its 
commander Maj. Gen. Watts earlier that morning. It was now the turn of Lt. Gen. 
Horne, commanding XV Corps, to develop the same concern over Longueval that had 
  59 
constrained Congreve at XIII Corps from ordering the cavalry forward in the morning. 
Horne delayed 7th division’s attack on XV Corps’ front until such time as Longueval 
had fallen to XIII Corps.129 It is difficult to see the justification for this decision. Horne 
may have felt that with German troops still in positions immediately to the north and 
west of Bazentin- le-Petit, as well as in Longueval, an attack on High Wood would be 
exposed to fire from both flanks. On the other hand, the capture of High Wood could 
equally be seen as a method of outflanking and rendering untenable the position of the 
German forces in Longueval itself. Either way, Horne’s decision once again stalled the 
attack as a whole, while 9th Division on the right continued to struggle for Longueval.  
   At 3.10pm reports of the capture of Longueval by XIII Corps, reached XV Corps. 
Once again these reports were out of date, as the struggle for the village continued.130 
Nonetheless Horne authorised the attack on High Wood by 7th Division for 5.15pm. 
Word of this attack reached Gregory, who was with Secunderabad Brigade behind 
Montauban, at 4.35pm, via a telephone line laid by the Brigade Signal Squadron from 
3rd Division Advanced HQ at Billon Farm to the brigade position at Montauban. 131 He 
returned to Billon Farm, and was briefed by MacAndrew on the attack orders passed 
down by XIII Corps. Secunderabad Brigade was to provide flank protection to 7th 
Division’s attack, with the objective of the German Third Line trenches east of High 
Wood, while the infantry attacked into the wood itself. During the briefing orders were 
received that the attack was postponed until 6.15pm. Gregory had returned to the 
Brigade by 5.40pm at which time he received a final version of his orders. Under these, 
he was to take two regiments, 7th Dragoon Guards, and the 20th Deccan Horse (plus the 
machine guns and the Canadian bridging squadron) north-west to Sabot Copse, where 
they would be placed under command of XV Corps. From that point they would move 
on their objectives to the east of High Wood. The third regiment, 34th Poona Horse 
would stay at Montauban. 132  
   The two regiments left Montauban at 6.00pm, crossing the British front line of that 
morning in ‘Montauban alley’ via ramps prepared during the day by the Brigade Field 
Squadron RE. The regiments had arrived at Sabot Copse, some 3km (2 miles) away in a 
straight line, by 6.25pm. Here Gregory attended further briefings with Br. Gen. 
Minshull-Ford, the commander of 91st Brigade, 7th Division, and the whole force moved 
off at around 7.00pm.133 The advance was conducted with 91st Brigade on the left, 
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advancing on High Wood. On their right came 7th Dragoon Guards, in column of 
squadrons, ‘B’ Squadron leading. (Column of squadrons was such a common attacking 
formation in the operations covered by this study that it is described in detail in 
Appendix 1.1.) In turn on the right of the Dragoons was the Deccan Horse in similar 
order (with ‘A’ squadron leading).134 ‘N’ Battery RHA deployed in support on a reverse 
slope to the south of the German Second Line position, with a forward observer in the 
German reserve trench. However, although the first round was fired by the battery at 
8.10pm, failing light restricted observation and only 21 rounds were fired in total in 
support of the cavalry. 135  
   As the cavalry advanced across the broad valley behind the German Second Line they 
were visible to observers on the ridge behind, and to the Germans in Longueval and 
Delville Wood, as well as to scattered parties of the enemy in the fields between. The 
regiments came under machine-gun and rifle fire, but sustained relatively few 
casualties. The lead squadron of 7th Dragoon Guards came abreast of the eastern side of 
High Wood at about 8.00pm. Here a larger concentration of Germans was encountered 
sheltering in shell holes within a crop of standing corn. The lead squadron, under 
Lieutenant Pope, charged these troops, who immediately fled. Sixteen Germans were 
ridden down and ‘speared’, (the leading squadron of all Indian based regiments being 
lance armed), while another 32 were made prisoner.136 In order to retain contact with the 
infantry attack the Dragoons then halted and taking advantage of a bank along the side 
of the road from the southern corner of High Wood to Longueval established a 
defensive line. This position came under machine gun fire from Longueval at about 
9.00pm, and the brigade machine guns were pushed out to the right flank to deal with 
this. The German guns were silenced, but not before one gun horse had been hit. 2nd Lt. 
Hartley, commanding one of the sections made an attempt to retrieve the gun, but was 
killed in the process, while the gun itself was found to be damaged beyond repair. 2nd 
Lt. Anson, who took over command of the party was also wounded while withdrawing 
the remainder of the Machine-gun Squadron. 137  
   The Deccan Horse advanced on the right of the Dragoons. Meanwhile the true 
situation in Longueval had become clear as the High Wood attack was being prepared, 
and new orders were issued to the Deccan Horse at 7.30pm. 138 According to these, 
while the regiment was to maintain contact with the Dragoon Guards on the left, their 
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new objective was to support a renewed attack by 9th Division into Longueval village 
and Delville Wood. The Deccan Horse were to advance right around the north end of 
Delville wood as far as the German Third Line towards Flers. This manoeuvre was 
carried out successfully, and 10 prisoners (of the 16th Bavarian Regt.) were captured. 
This advance, and its moral effect on the enemy, was described by a participant, Lt. Col. 
Tennant: 
 As each squadron cleared the defile it formed line and advanced at a gallop in 
 the direction taken by the advanced guard, which lay through a broad belt of 
 standing corn, in which small parties of the enemy lay concealed. Individual 
 Germans now commenced popping up on all sides, throwing up their arms and 
 shouting “Kamerad” and not a few, evidently under the impression that no 
 quarter would be given, flung their arms around the horses necks and begged 
 for mercy – all of which impeded the advance.139 
A notable feature of this account is the exaggerated fear that a few mounted men could 
inspire in the enemy. This is was an additional factor in the tactical effectiveness of 
cavalry which should not be underestimated, and which was to be significant in the 
fighting of 1918 discussed in Chapter 5. 
Due to enemy fire from Flers and from Delville Wood the regiment could not advance 
further than about 500m short of the German Third Line trenches, also as no sign of 
progress into Delville Wood by 9th Division was evident, to attack it unsupported would 
have been useless. In due course as darkness fell at around 9.30pm the Deccan Horse 
withdrew and took up a defensive position extending the line already established by 7th 
Dragoon Guards along the High Wood to Longueval road.140 
   Earlier in the evening, 7th Dragoon Guards had come under fire from German troops 
and machine guns in a sunken road extending from the eastern corner of High Wood. 
An RFC contact aircraft spotted these troops and by firing on them with tracer identified 
their position to the cavalry. The observer was also able to make a sketch of the 
situation and drop it onto ‘N’ Battery. The Secunderabad Brigade narrative records that: 
“An endeavour was made to communicate with the plane by lamp, to find its identity, 
but without success.” 141 Further light is shed on this incident by the Brigade Signal 
Squadron War Diary, which includes the complaint that the drills and codes for liaison 
with RFC contact aircraft had only been taught to the signallers attached to the 
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Divisional headquarters, (back at Billon Farm). The Brigade signallers at Gregory’s 
advanced headquarters in the fields behind the 7th Dragoon Guards thus had no means 
of communicating intelligently with the aircraft.142 This episode demonstrates once 
again the problem of lack of devolution to lower levels of command not only the 
authority to take command decisions, but also the means of communication in order to 
do so. The purpose of contact aircraft was surely to provide up-to-date, or even real time 
reconnaissance information, however if this information was required to travel along a 
long and unreliable chain of command before it could be acted upon, much of its value 
would be negated. 
   In the course of the night the Secunderabad Brigade was relieved, and the position 
taken over by infantry. The 7th Dragoon Guards and the Deccan Horse began a gradual 
withdrawal at 3.30am on the 15th,  and were able to depart without further loss.143 
Meanwhile the remainder of the division had also been withdrawn. Ambala Brigade was 
ordered up to Sabot Copse in the early hours of the 15th to be available to support the 
renewed infantry attack on High Wood, but as the day wore on the impracticality of any 
further cavalry action became apparent and the 2nd Indian Division was stood down at 
6.15pm on the 15 July.144 
 
 
The ‘History’ of 14 July 
 
   It is instructive to compare the course of events contained in this narrative with the 
way the battle has been described in published accounts. It rapidly becomes clear that 
preconceptions about the capabilities and vulnerabilities of cavalry have clouded these 
accounts from the outset. In short, the tactical effectiveness of the cavalry has been 
ignored. Some of these preconceptions have been touched on earlier, however two in 
particular stand out. The first of these is the lack of mobility of cavalry in the face of 
trenches and shell-damaged ground. The Official History stated that: 
At 7.40am the XIII. Corps had ordered forward the 2nd Indian Cavalry Division 
from its place of assembly around Morlancourt (4 miles south of Albert). The 
division moved at 8.20am, but its progress across slippery ground cut up by 
trenches and pitted with shell holes proved very slow: it was well past noon 
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when its advanced guard, the Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade (Br.-General C. L. 
Gregory) with attached troops, arrived in the valley south of Montauban. 145 
It is true that the weather had deteriorated since 1 July, a factor which was to halt the 
advance of the armoured cars, but there is no evidence that it interfered with the planned 
timetable of cavalry movement. The above account conflates the movement of the 2nd 
Indian Cavalry Division main body, which left Morlancourt at 8.20am but only to 
march as far as Billon Farm, where it was formed up and halted as ordered by about 
9.30am, and the Secunderabad Brigade, which had its Vanguard (7th Dragoon Guards) 
‘south of Montauban’ by 7.00am and was closed up in that location as a complete 
brigade including supporting artillery, by 9.30am. The Official History also observes 
that “…the brigade did not begin to cross the old British front line until the evening.”146 
Assuming this remark refers to the front line of 14 July, not 1 July, this is strictly true, 
but it fails to point out that this was after the whole day had been spent waiting behind 
Montauban. Taken in the context of the previous quoted statement it is easy to infer that 
this late advance was due to difficulties experienced in the cavalry getting forward. It 
was not. 
   Sadly once errors of this sort reach print, they tend to be replicated. Anglesey falls 
into this trap, suggesting: 
It was now that the daunting nature of progress by mounted troops across soft 
and slippery terrain cut up by the elaborate trench system and pitted with 
innumerable shell-holes made itself painfully clear. It was a long time past 
midday before the leading squadrons began to show near Montauban. 147 
Similarly, Liddle suggests that “…it took the Deccan Horse four hours to move the six-
seven miles [from Bray] to Montauban.”148 In fact this move was done in two stages; 
3.5km (2 miles) from Bray to Billon Farm, achieved in under an hour (6.15am-7.15am) 
and 4.5km (3 miles) Billon Farm to Montauban, carried out in 50 minutes (7.40am-
8.30am). Unfortunately, this erroneous picture of the cavalry stuck in the mud continues 
to recur, appearing most recently in Peter Hart’s work on the Somme, published in 
2005.149  
   It should not be inferred from these movement schedules that the cavalry were free to 
roam over the battlefield unhindered. All of the above writers were correct to state that 
shell holes, trenches, and particularly wire, were a serious obstacle to cavalry. What is 
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incorrect is to suggest that somehow the cavalry commanders were surprised by this, 
and were seriously delayed by it. Liddle also suggests that “During the morning infantry 
commanders were waiting for the cavalry to arrive, although nothing had been done to 
speed up their movement for example, by clearing the road.”150 On the contrary, the 
cavalry had spent most of the previous fortnight clearing a road, and on the day of the 
attack infantry battalions were specifically tasked with continuing this work through the 
German line. After its arrival at Montauban, Secunderabad Brigade also spent much of 
the day dispersed in working parties. The result of this detailed preparation was a 
relatively smooth and timely advance. The success of this work on trench crossings 
carried out by the cavalry itself and by the infantry is indicated by the fact that the 
squadron of the Fort Garry Horse attached to Secunderabad Brigade specifically to 
provide trench bridging returned to billets on 15 July with its portable bridges unused.151 
   Such an advance, however, could only take place along lines predicted and prepared 
before the battle. The significant difference between the 14 July attack and the failures 
on the 1 July lay in the fact that with a relatively narrow offensive front, it was easy for 
the cavalry commanders to predict where the cavalry might be needed, and to construct 
an access route to that point. On 1 July the construction of a cavalry track to cover every 
contingency would have been logistically impossible, and as has been shown, the point 
of breakthrough selected and prepared for by Rawlinson proved to be the wrong one. 
   The second aspect of the battle which has been frequently misrepresented is the extent 
to which the cavalry were vulnerable to enemy machine gun fire, and the casualties they 
suffered in their advance across the open ground towards High Wood. The casualties 
suffered by the Secunderabad Brigade were not high. A breakdown of these is included 
in the Brigade War Diary.152 The 7th Dragoon Guards suffered the wounds to Lt. Anson, 
sustained rescuing the machine-gunners, and two other ranks killed and 20 wounded. 
Sixteen horses were killed or missing with a further 23 wounded. 20th Deccan Horse 
suffered a higher loss, mostly probably when bumping up against the German Third 
Line trenches; two Indian officers were wounded, and three other ranks killed and fifty 
wounded. Eighteen horses were killed or missing and 52 wounded. The MG Squadron 
lost Lt. Hartley killed, ten other ranks wounded and lost 12 horses. ‘N’ battery was 
shelled briefly at around 11.00pm three shells falling on the wagon lines killing two 
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men and wounding twelve, and killing twelve horses.153 Two other men in the brigade 
were wounded. 
   When compared with an initial brigade strength of probably in excess of 1500 men, 
eight killed and slighly fewer than 100 wounded might be considered a trifling loss by 
Western Front standards. The loss in horses was slightly greater, with roughly 50 killed 
and 100 wounded. It must be considered, however that in the absence of horse 
ambulances, a wounded horse is one sufficiently lightly injured to keep up with the 
regiment on its own feet. Many of these are therefore likely to have recovered and 
returned to service. Horses wounded more seriously would have been destroyed in the 
field by regimental farriers, and thus fall under the ‘killed’ totals. This situation is a long 
way from the outcome for cavalry in the open on the Western Front, both as predicted at 
the time and assumed by subsequent historians. Prior and Wilson’ s remark that “The 
cavalry were soon dealt with by the German machine-gunners”154 is clearly wide of the 
mark, to say the least. Indeed, on the basis of the successful suppression of German fire 
from Longueval by the cavalry MG sections, it is tempting to suggest that the reverse 
was true. 
   It might be argued that the brigade was not very seriously engaged, the enemy soldiers 
charged by the 7th Dragoon Guards seem to have been mostly occupied in surrendering 
and running away. The two regiments were, however, deployed under fire and in sight 
of the enemy for at least two hours, from around 7.00pm until it got dark at around 9.30. 
They also occupied a position that was not entrenched, at least initially, and had to rely 
for cover on folds in the rolling ground, and the height of the standing crops.  
   Yet the idea that cavalry were somehow doomed to fail seems to have become rooted 
in popular imagination. One eye-witness, Lt. Beadle, an artillery observer with 33rd 
Division (XV Corps Reserve) allegedly observed the cavalry attack on High Wood: 
It was an incredible sight, an unbelievable sight. They galloped up with their 
lances and with pennants [sic] flying, up the slope to High Wood and straight 
into it. Of course they were falling all the way… I’ve never seen anything like it! 
They simply galloped on through all that and horses and men dropping on the 
ground, with no hope against machine guns, because the Germans up on the 
ridge were firing down into the valley where the soldiers were. It was an 
absolute rout, a magnificent sight. Tragic. 155 
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This account appeared originally in Lyn Macdonald’s Somme, and was subsequently 
quoted in a number of published sources where it was accorded the weight due to eye-
witness testimony. 156 It should be noted however that Lt. Beadle was listed by 
Macdonald as a ‘Direct contributor’ to her work, ie. an interviewee recalling events 
around 60 years later, and the ‘Valley of death’ tone of his account is notable, especially 
when the number of casualties in the overall operation is considered. With all due 
respect to a veteran of the battle, it would appear that Lt. Beadle was letting his 
preconceptions and his poetic imagination get in the way of his powers of recollection. 
A clue to this is the fact that he saw ‘pennants flying’ when lance pennons had been 
discontinued for active service since before 1914,157 and that the horsemen are 
described riding into the woods, a feat which was never attempted. To be charitable the 
squadrons may have been carrying trench crossing marker and signal flags, but the 
impression is of a recollection coloured by romantic expectations of what a cavalry 
charge on the Western Front ought to have been like, rather than the reality. Other 
historians have found the romantic idea of senseless cavalry sacrifice equally hard to 
resist, A. J. P. Taylor described “…a sight unique on the Western Front; cavalry riding 
into action through the waving corn with bugles blowing and lances glittering. The 
glorious vision crumbled into slaughter as the German machine guns opened fire.”158 A 
powerful image, but not one borne out by the facts. 
   Perhaps the most spectacular of the descriptions of the fighting that day comes from 
another supposed eye-witness, Lt. Col. G. Seton Hutchison, who in his memoirs 
recorded the advance of the Deccan Horse: 
I descried a squadron of Indian cavalry, dark faces under glistening helmets, 
galloping across the valley towards the slope. No troops could have presented a 
more inspiring sight than these natives of India with lance and sword, tearing in 
mad cavalcade onto the skyline. A few disappeared over it: they never came 
back. The remainder became the target of every gun and rifle. Turning the 
horses heads with shrill cries these masters of horsemanship galloped through a 
hell of fire, lifting their mounts lightly over yawning shell holes; turning and 
twisting through the barrage of great shells: the ranks thinned, not a man 
escaped. Months later the wail of the dying was re-echoed among the Himalayan 
foothills… “weeping for her children and would not be comforted.”159 
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The assertion that ‘…not a man escaped’ is a poor description of an engagement where 
the regiment in question suffered only three fatal casualties. 
   Other contemporary observers were influenced by their own experience of the 
fighting, and without seeing the cavalry actually in action, were cynical of their 
prospects. L/Cpl. Crask (of 8th Bn. Suffolk Regiment) was passed by the cavalry on its 
way to the front: “Unfortunately they are of no use and suffer very heavy casualties 
without getting near the Bosche from the fact that their horses cannot pass over the 
debris and the barbed wire that is lying about.” 160 It is not difficult to appreciate in what 
terms infantry soldiers would come to view a force that, in their eyes, had spent most of 
the war thus far in ‘comfort’ behind the lines, waiting for a moment which the infantry 
no longer believed would arrive. It is however, potentially misleading to place too much 
emphasis on the clearly rather jaundiced viewpoint of such a primary source. Caught 
between cynicism within other arms of the B.E.F. itself, and the popular demand for 
tragic heroism it is easy to see how an exaggerated idea of cavalry casualties could 
develop, and become embedded in subsequent interpretation of their rôle. 
   This erroneous view of the vulnerability of men on horseback, appears to have been 
quite widely held by those on foot, including infantry officers who might otherwise 
have chosen to ride. At least one cavalryman, however, considered that this was a 
misapprehens ion. The Ambala brigade, although never committed to action, spent a 
large part of 14-15 July in the forward area in support of the Secunderabad Brigade, and 
the 18th Lancers in particular remained in readiness about Sabot Copse through the 15 
July until the division as a whole was stood down that evening. An (anonymous) officer 
of the 18th considered that: 
Infantry officers should have made more use of their horses; the experience of 
the regiment in these days goes to prove that a man on a horse stands a better 
chance of getting through a hostile barrage than a man on foot. At the same time 
one feels extraordinarily naked and vulnerable when mounted and heavy 
shelling is going on, but that is only when standing still! 161 
Clearly when shells began to fall the advantages of the ability to move rapidly 
somewhere else were not lost on at least one participant in the battle. 
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An Opportunity Missed? 
 
   It has been demonstrated that at least part of the cavalry force was available behind 
Montauban early in the battle on 14 July, and also that when this force was finally 
released it was able to operate effectively in the battle zone without catastrophic loss. In 
spite of this there is little doubt that a tactical opportunity for cavalry exploitation was 
missed that morning, the arm was operationally unsuccessful. Whether this opportunity 
had wider implications for the offensive as a whole is more difficult to prove one way or 
the other, although the early capture of High Wood, would undoubtedly have lowered 
the price paid in casualties for this objective over the weeks that followed. With these 
points in view it must be asked why the moment was missed, and why the early 
opportunities were not seized upon. 
   As so often on the Western Front the answer lies in command and communications, in 
all arms including the cavalry, and at all levels. At the highest level Rawlinson must 
bear some responsibility. His decision to retain direct control over two of the three 
available cavalry divisions excluded them from the battle from the start. The 2nd Indian 
Division was able to participate in the battle from a relatively early stage, but this was 
only possible because these troops were on the move towards pre-determined objectives 
several hours before the infantry attack even started. The idea that cavalry could be 
moved up from rear areas after the battle had begun, and in response to front line events 
was clearly unrealistic. As later chapters will show this continued to be a problem 
throughout the war, Only cavalry already on the move towards pre-determined 
objectives prior to ‘Zero-hour’ would ever play a part in the fighting. 
   At the next level down the corps commanders are also culpable. The decision to place 
the Indians under the command of XIII Corps was an admirable start, as was the 
decision to deploy them forward at an early stage. XIII Corps, however, was in no better 
position to understand the unfolding events on the battlefield than was Fourth Army. 
There was also a significant breakdown in communications between XIII Corps and XV 
Corps in the course of the morning. The result was that when the cavalry was held up on 
the XIII Corps front opposite Longueval, neither they, nor Congreve at XIII Corps was 
aware of the ‘Gap’ developing on XV Corps front around the Bazentins. The divisions 
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on XV Corps front meanwhile, dug in awaiting the imminent arrival of cavalry from 
XIII Corps. Bt the time this had been resolved and cavalry made available to XV Corps, 
at around noon (although the two regiments of Secunderabad Brigade were not formally 
assigned to XV Corps until around 6.00pm), the commander of XV Corps, Horne, had 
become so obsessed with the battle for Longueval, on XIII Corps front, that he did not 
sanction an attack towards High Wood until nearly 4.00pm. This in spite of Rawlinson’s 
eagerness for the attack to be pressed on from midday onwards. By the time the assault 
began in the evening not only had the German Third Line been significantly deepened 
and reinforced, but the attacking forces simply ran out of daylight. 
   At divisional and brigade level command seems to have been more effective. The 
infantry commanders were near enough to the battle to know what was actually going 
on, and seem to have been prepared to improvise and develop any opportunities that 
arose. There are also a number of examples of these commanders getting together for 
ad-hoc conferences to develop combined operations between their units. The meetings 
at Haldane’s 3rd Division Advanced Headquarters, and between Gregory and Minshull-
Ford at Sabot Copse are examples of this. Unfortunately this initiative seems to have 
been hamstrung by the necessity to clear all plans through Corps and Army 
commanders, whose understanding of the battle was out of date, and whose offensive 
attitude deeply cautious. ‘Bite and Hold’ with the emphasis on ‘Hold’ seems to have 
been the watchword at Corps and above.  
   Ironically, if two commanders at divisional level stand out from their more flexible 
peers they are Gregory and MacAndrew. Contrary to Haig’s demands that cava lry 
commanders think ever more flexibly, on 14 July these two seem to have become quite 
narrow minded and unimaginative, unable literally to think outside the tracks built for 
them across the battlefield and the terms of their formal operation orders. The move up 
to Montauban was well executed. At that point orders prescribed a move across the 
German Second Line immediately to the west of Longueval. When patrols found these 
crossings to be impracticable, at around 7.00am, there seems to have been little urgency 
in exploring an alternative, despite the possibilities available further west near Bazentin-
le-Grand Wood. Rather, Secunderabad Brigade seems to have been content to wait for 
the infantry to finish its battle, and then call upon them in accordance with the plan. 
Patrols did not report back from the western side of the field until mid morning, by 
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which time the German defences, especially around Bazentin- le-Petit, had hardened 
significantly. Thus the force that was potentially best placed to take advantage of any 
fleeting chances to regain the momentum of the offensive, was the least well- led. It has 
been argued that two years of inactivity had resulted in a tactical stagnation of the 
cavalry officer corps, and the loss of its best talents to other arms.162 If so, 14 July 
stands as an example of that phenomenon. 
   In defence of these commanders, the difficulties presented by the available means of 
communication must be taken into account. Although miles of telephone cable were laid 
before the attack, this was vulnerable to shelling, and laborious to extend beyond the 
forward positions as units advanced. Curiously, it was also vulnerable to damage from 
friendly troops. Almost all cavalry movement orders for the battle include a post-script 
enjoining troops to watch out for and avoid telephone cables, and where they crossed 
the line of advance, these had to be specially buried by the parties building cavalry 
tracks.163 The telephone system also tended to follow the command hierarchy, with the 
result that adjacent brigades in the front line might have to pass messages through 
several higher formations in the rear in order to communicate laterally along the front. 
This also tended to be necessary because corps headquarters wished to retain tactical 
command over events on the battlefield. The consequences of this in terms of confusion 
and delay have already been discussed. 
   As far as the cavalry were concerned these problems were spelled out by an 
anonymous, but clearly disgruntled signals officer of the Secunderabad Brigade Signal 
Squadron in their War Diary.164 During the time the various parts of the brigade were on 
the move in the morning, communication was maintained up and down the various 
columns, and with Gregory at Billon Farm, by motor cycle and horse-mounted despatch 
riders. When the Brigade assembled behind Montauban it was found that although this 
location had been determined in advance, and lay behind the British front line, no 
telephone link had been provided for communication by the cavalry between 
Secunderabad Brigade itself, and its commander still at Billon Farm. Telephone lines 
existed between 3rd Division Headquarters at Billon and Montauban and beyond, but 
these all belonged to infantry and artillery formations who were busy with their own 
signal traffic. The cavalry brigade signallers laid a telephone line to link these two 
positions, but in so doing used up their entire stock of cable. The consequence of this 
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was that when the brigade moved off to Sabot Copse, and subsequently out towards 
High Wood, runners and lamps had to be used to communicate with the end of the 
telephone line at Montauban. This was to become a significant problem when the 7th 
Dragoon Guards and the Deccan Horse established their positions to the east of High 
Wood and night fell. Communications after that time rapidly deteriorated as runners and 
despatch riders got lost in the dark.  
   Fourth Army also issued orders for the use of wireless communications between XIII 
and XV Corps Headquarters and the cavalry divisions,165 but there is no evidence that 
significant use was made of this. The headquarters of 1st and 3rd Divisions never 
advanced, and MacAndrew and 2nd Indian Division headquarters remained with 3rd 
(Infantry) Division headquarters, which was in direct touch with XIII Corps by land-
line. It is arguable that wireless would have been more useful further down the chain of 
command at brigade level, but the bulk and complexity of the available equipment, and 
its unreliability, may have made this difficult. One wireless message concerning the 
movements of the cavalry was broadcast on the 14 July; at around 10:30am an aircraft 
was used to broadcast the message that “Enemy second line of defence has been 
captured on a front of 6,000 yards. British cavalry is now passing through in pursuit of 
the demoralised enemy”. Sadly this did not reflect the real situation on the ground but 
was rather a (possibly slightly naïve) attempt at signals deception, intended to confuse 
and alarm German wireless listening stations.166 Whether any Germans were actually 
deceived by this is not recorded. 
 
 
Planning the September Battles 
 
   After the the missed opportunities of 14 July, the Somme fighting degenerated once 
again into a period of smaller scale attacks, and small areas of ground won at great cost. 
By mid-August, however, Haig started to feel that this ‘wearing-out battle’ was reaching 
a critical stage, at which a final decisive blow might be possible to end the campaign. In 
his view a renewed offensive in mid-September offered the possibility of finally 
breaking entirely through the German prepared defences and into open country beyond. 
It was this offensive initiative that was to form the basis for the ‘Battle of Flers-
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Courcelette’ on 15 September, and its follow-up the ‘Battle of Morval’ on 25-26 of that 
month. These battles are considered here as the themes of 1 and 14 July, of limited 
tactical effectiveness, but of a failure of higher command and control are once again 
apparent. 
   Haig’s vision was spelled out in a G.H.Q. memorandum of 19 August, calling for 
plans of attack to be prepared by Fourth and Reserve Armies: “with the object of 
securing the enemy’s last line of prepared defences between Morval and Le Sars, with a 
view to opening the way for the cavalry.”167 The main thrust of this attack was to be the 
responsibility of Fourth Army, with Gough’s Reserve Army in a supporting rôle on the 
northern flank. Rawlinson responded with a characteristically conservative plan, 
involving a series of sequential limited ‘Bite and Hold’ attacks, conducted by night. 
Haig did not feel that these were decisive enough and spelled out his own more 
expansive scheme in a further memorandum of 31 August. Once again the attack was to 
be “planned as a decisive operation.”168 In particular, once the main defensive lines had 
been broken, “…as strong as possible a force of cavalry, supported by other arms, will 
be passed through…”169 with the aim of making a grand strategic sweep through 
Bapaume and rolling up the German lines to the north, in the fashion first proposed back 
in June.  
   To this end the Cavalry Corps, dissolved back in March, was to be re- formed under 
Lt. Gen. Kavanagh, and all five divisions of cavalry available in France were to be 
included within it. This was intended as a temporary measure, but in fact the corps was 
to continue in being, (albeit at reduced strength after 1917,) until the end of the war. 
This was a larger force of cavalry than was assembled for the 1 July attack, and shows 
Haig’s determination to exploit fully any opportunity that might be created. But while 
other arms were urged to support the cavalry advance, Haig did not specifically allocate 
any infantry to the Cavalry Corps as had been attempted in June when he had initially 
conceived the Reserve Army. He may have felt that in the light of 14 July his 
‘combined arms’ vision was starting to be absorbed anyway and did not need to be 
specifically reiterated, if so he was to be disappointed. 
   Rawlinson issued his detailed orders for this attack on 11 September.170 In these he 
specified tha t once the infantry had reached the last line of German defences, (an 
advance in four timed bounds over a total of around 4000m (2.5 miles)) cavalry would 
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be pushed through to secure objectives on the high ground beyond the Bapaume–
Peronne road. However he once again entirely separated the cavalry from the initial 
infantry battle. None of the cavalry divisions were to move until the infantry were 
firmly established on their final objectives: 
The Cavalry Divisions will not move forward to where they will mask the guns 
or interfere with the advance of the infantry supports and reserves, until the 
infantry have secured a sufficiently strong hold of the villages of Morval, 
Lesboeufs, and Flers to admit of the Cavalry Divisions advancing to their 
objectives.171 
   Indeed on 13 September Rawlinson went even further to restrict the freedom of 
movement of the cavalry. His ‘Instruction on the event of a general advance’172 
reiterated the necessity of avoiding clogging the rear areas and masking the guns with 
advancing cavalry. It insisted not only that the cavalry should wait until the infantry 
were established on the ‘Red Line’ final objectives, but also that they should wait until 
the artillery had been leap-frogged forward into supporting positions behind the new 
infantry line. Only after that were the rôles reversed and the infantry tasked to support 
the further advance of the cavalry “… the rapidity of whose advance at this period of the 
battle is all important.”173 It is hard to see how any rapidity of advance would be 
achieved by forces queuing up behind the advancing artillery. Indeed it is hard to read in 
Rawlinson’s orders for the cavalry any sense that he saw them as anything other than a 
bulky inconvenience and even a liability, his tone is clear in the last paragraph of the 
‘Instructions’: 
The Cavalry Corps must ensure that the forward areas now in our hands are not 
blocked with cavalry prematurely… The cavalry advance must be continuous, 
but it must also be very methodical, any attempt to push too much cavalry 
through at one time will only lead to confusion and consequent delay. 174 
   Despite the reservations of the Fourth Army commander, the newly re-formed 
Cavalry Corps began life in buoyant mood. Archibald Home, newly appointed as 
Kavanagh’s Chief-of-Staff wrote “I wonder if the old Cavalry will come into its own at 
last. To be with it if it does will be stupendous.”175 Nonetheless he cannot have been 
alone in feeling that the corps was under scrutiny by many of its opponents, both in 
France and in the government at home, and success was potentially vital to their future. 
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As the battle progressed on 15 September his tone was less optimistic “It would appear 
that if the cavalry does not get a chance this time it will be the end of them.”176 On 10 
September Kavanagh himself issued an upbeat assessment of the prospects for the 
corps. Besides setting out the divisional objectives for the coming attack he urged his 
subordinates to make the most of the opportunity to show their worth: 
Everything points to the probability of the Cavalry having its long wished for 
chance of proving its value in the near future, but in order to do so it must be 
used with the greatest boldness, and all risks must be taken and heavy losses 
occasionally expected, which will be amply repaid by the great results that will 
almost certainly be obtained.177 
He was, however restrained by the strictures of the Fourth Army Commander 
concerning his movements, and a memorandum was attached to the formal operation 
order issued by Cavalry Corps Headquarters on 13 September. This highlighted 
Kavanagh’s concern not to upset other arms: 
The Corps Commander wishes Divisions to be very careful as regards questions 
of traffic and water. They must remember that they are only guests in the 
different Corps areas, and a great deal of tact is required to avoid friction. 178 
The appearance of words like ‘guests’ and ‘tact’ are curious in the context of a military 
operational order. The Cavalry Corps thus began the September battles on the horns of a 
dilemma. On the one hand they had been given the opportunity finally to participate in 
the battle in strength and potentially show their true fighting value, but on the other they 
were not to be permitted even to advance until Rawlinson’s infantry and artillery battle 
had been fought and won. Indeed their mere appearance in the rear areas prior to the 
appointed moment would be seriously frowned upon by Fourth Army. It is difficult to 
see how any meaningful exploitation of successes by infantry could be obtained under 
these circumstances. 
 
 
Flers 
(Figure 2.3 overleaf)) 
   ‘Zero-hour’ on 15 September was set for 6.20am.179 The four phases of infantry 
attack, and the associated artillery barrages were timed to place the infantry on their 
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final objectives by approximately 11.00am (Zero plus 4.30). The lead Cavalry Divisions 
were therefore in position ready to advance by 10.00am. 180 However it was not intended 
that all five divisions should come into action immediately. 1st Cavalry Division and 2nd 
Indian Division were in place between Mametz and Carnoy, some 6km (3.5 miles) 
behind the infantry start- line and around 10km (6 miles) from the ‘Red Line’ objectives 
at Gueudecourt. On receiving the order to advance these divisions were to move on 
parallel tracks either side of Delville Wood to objectives beyond the Bapaume-Peronne 
road, to the south east of Bapaume and around 5km (3 miles) in advance of the infantry 
objectives. Cavalry Corps Forward Reporting Centre was located a little to their rear at 
Billon Farm (familiar to the Indians from 14 July). The remaining divisions were strung 
out in the rear and would only advance sequentially as each of their predecessors 
cleared the narrow line of advance. 2nd Cavalry Division had two brigades at Bray, 5km 
(3 miles) behind the lead divisions, with orders to move off at around noon, the 
remainder of this division and 1st Indian Division were concentrated at Dernancourt, to 
the south west of Albert. Finally 3rd Cavalry Division was assembled at Bonnay, 12km 
(7.5 miles) from Albert and nearly 30km (19 miles) from the Infantry objectives at 
Gueudecourt. It is difficult to see how any decisive exploitation of the infantry’s gains 
could be developed by means of this stately progress of the cavalry from deep behind 
their own lines, without taking into account the priority given by Rawlinson to artillery 
movements ahead of the cavalry advance. 
   When the infantry attack went in these difficulties became academic. In spite of the 
maiden use of ‘Tanks’ and the associated public rejoicing at their modest successes, in 
the laconic words of the Cavalry Corps War Diary “the attack did not develop 
sufficiently for the cavalry to advance.”181 Flers, Courcelette, and Martinpuich all fell, 
but the strongpoint villages behind the German third line, Morval, Lesboeufs and 
Gueudecourt all remained in enemy hands, and “until these three localities could be 
occupied there could be no question of a breakthrough.”182 The weather also 
deteriorated on the evening of the 15th and hopes for any cavalry advance faded. On 16 
September 1st Cavalry,  3rd Cavalry, and 2nd Indian Divisions were stood down and 
withdrawn from the battle area.183 Later in the month, although still nominally under 
Cavalry Corps command, two of these divisions would be posted out of Fourth Army 
area, 1st Cavalry going to Third Army, and 3rd Cavalry to G.H.Q. Reserve.184 Kavanagh 
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could not have known, but 15 September 1916 was to be the only operation in the whole 
war where all five cavalry divisions operated within the Corps under his direct 
command. Although they remained within the Cavalry Corps, divisions were to be 
detached to other Armies or fight under direct infantry corps command in later battles 
such that he never again had direct control of more than three. Home was therefore 
probably correct to consider the day something of a high-water mark in the aspirations 
of the arm. 
   The diminished Cavalry Corps continued to await its chance. Corps advanced H.Q. 
remained at Billon Farm, and 2nd Cavalry and 1st Indian Divisions remained in readiness 
at Dernancourt, in support of XIV and XV Corps respectively. During this period of 
waiting one significant step was taken, from 18 September onwards each division was 
ordered to provide a daily duty squadron in support of its respective infantry corps. 
These squadrons were held in the vicinity of Carnoy and were directly on call from the 
XIV and XV Corps, although any orders would be repeated to the Cavalry Corps for 
information. 185 A single squadron was not a large force, but this marked a return to the 
principle of cavalry formations directly controlled by the attacking infantry 
commanders, as had been the case on 14 July, (or as far back as Loos) and circumvented 
the lengthy chain of command resulting from the recreation of the Cavalry Corps. It was 
one of these squadrons that would see action on 26 September. 
 
 
Morval 
 
   Rawlinson renewed the offensive on 25 September. By this time, however the tone 
was quite different. The infantry objectives remained only those parts of the 15 
September objectives not yet obtained, Morval, Lesboeufs, and Gueudecourt, an 
advance of around 1500 metres (1 mile). ‘Bite and Hold’ was once again the guiding 
principle. The influence of this on the Cavalry Corps is apparent from the Corps orders 
issued on 20 September.186 Of the three divisions available to Kava nagh, only one, 1st 
Indian, was given formal orders to participate in the attack. 2nd Cavalry and 2nd Indian 
Divisions would remain in their billets at Dernancourt at two hours’ notice to move. 
Only two brigades of 1st Indian Division were moved up behind the attack, the Mhow 
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and Sialkhot brigades taking up positions around Mametz and as far forward as 
Montauban (around 5km (3 miles) from the infantry start- line). Their objectives were 
stated as Ligny-Thilloy and La Barque, a modest 3km (2 miles) beyond the  infantry 
final objectives. Also whereas on 15 September Corps orders had urged the cavalry on 
to attack German headquarters and rail termini as far away as Marcoing, 25km (16 
miles) beyond the enemy front,187 the new orders contained the following pessimistic 
prediction:  
In the event of the Cavalry advance contemplated above being possible, two 
situations may arise:- 
(a). The advanced cavalry troops may successfully seize part or all of the above 
villages. 
(b). These villages may be strongly held and the Cavalry forced to retire.188 
Clearly the new-found optimism of early September had been short lived. There was 
also an additional factor constraining the ambitions of the cavalry. In order to conform 
with an attack by the French to the south-east at Combles, Zero-hour was set for 
12.35pm. 189 This meant that in contrast to the dawn start on 15 September, the infantry 
were unlikely to be on their final objectives before 3.00pm at the earliest, leaving little 
of the autumn daylight for the cavalry. Corps orders acknowledged this stating that if 
the lead brigades could not pass the final ‘Blue line’ by 6.30pm at the latest, no large 
scale move should be attempted.190 
   The ‘Battle of Morval’ as it became known, followed a now familiar pattern. Initial 
reports were good and the Mhow Brigade, lead brigade of 1st Indian Division, sent 
squadrons of the 6th Dragoons (Inniskillings), and 2nd Lancers (Gardner’s Horse), as far 
as the 110th Infantry Brigade headquarters at Flers.191 However a situation now 
developed which was to bear striking similarities to the delays and failures of 14 July. 
The right of the British attack was a complete success. 5th, 6th and Guards Divisions of 
XIV Corps captured the villages of Morval and Lesboeufs on schedule. Word of this 
success reached the Corps commander Lord Cavan in the course of the afternoon, but 
due to uncertainty concerning the progress of both XV Corps on his left, and the French 
on his right, he chose to take no further action to exploit this, choosing instead simply to 
consolidate the positions gained.192 In fairness to Cavan, no cavalry had been allocated 
to this portion of the attack (apart from the daily corps duty squadron, and his integral 
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corps cavalry regiment). The line of advance prescribed for 1st Indian Division was 
through Gueudecourt in XV Corps area, and this part of the attack was held up. Thus no 
mounted exploitation of the successes of XIV Corps took place. 
   XV Corps meanwhile had made good initial progress into the German Third Line 
position in front of Gueudecourt, but parties of Germans remained in the ‘Gird’ trench 
line and no advance to the village itself was possible. At 4.00pm 1st Indian Division 
“received definite orders not to advance until the whole village was in our hands.”193  
And by 7.00pm: 
Owing to the fact that the whole of Gueudecourt was not captured, and that a 
party of Germans still held out in Gird Trench, which was in the direct route of 
the proposed cavalry advance, it was not possible to get the cavalry through… 
and the 1st Indian cavalry division was ordered back to billets near 
Dernancourt.194 
This was easier said than done in the dark, on the congested routes behind the attack 
front and it was not until past midnight that the division reached Dernancourt.195 Once 
again a battle plan that restricted all the cavalry to a single line of advance had 
prevented flexible exploitation of the day’s successes on XIV Corps front, while the 
cavalry waited behind the day’s failures on that of XV Corps. 
   The attack was renewed on 26 September, but only with the aim of capturing the final 
objectives of the previous day, and no large-scale cavalry involvement was proposed.196 
Starting at about 6.30am, the 110th Brigade, assisted by a single tank began clearing the 
final pockets of German resistance out of Gird Trench in front of Gueudecourt. This 
was completed by around 11.00am. At this point the situation became uncertain, 
Gueudecourt village lay about 500m (550 yards) beyond Gird and Gird Support 
trenches, and no enemy could be seen, but it was not known whether the Germans 
continued to hold the village. Lt. Gen. Horne, commanding XV Corps now took an 
unusually imaginative step and called up all the cavalry available to him to advance into 
the gap and explore the situation, with the aim of securing the village and taking up 
defensive positions on the ridge to the north-east.197 Unfortunately, the only cavalry 
remaining in the battle area were the daily duty squadron allocated to his corps from 1st 
Indian Division; ‘D’ Squadron, 19th Lancers (Fane’s Horse), under Capt. Fitzgerald, and 
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a single troop of the Corps Cavalry Regiment, the South Irish Horse, a force amounting 
to no more than about 100 men. 
   Fitzgerald’s personal account of subsequent events is contained in his official report to 
the Cavalry Corps.198 Leaving Mametz at 11.55am, the squadron advanced, east of Flers 
and across the open ground towards Gueudecourt. They crossed the two Gird trenches 
“without any difficulty” and moved on at a trot “in line of troop columns in half 
sections” (ie four parallel columns each two men abreast), reaching the sunken road at 
the south-western corner of the village by 2.15pm. The squadron was “heavily shelled” 
and fired on by at least one machine-gun during this advance but suffered only a single 
casualty. Basing himself in the cover of the sunken road at the entrance to the village, 
Fitzgerald then sent mounted patrols of his own squadron around the north side of the 
village, and of the South Irish Horse around the southern side. The latter made little 
progress due to machine-gun fire from the east, and returned. The northern patrol got as 
far as a sunken road running east to west into the northern corner of the village. This 
was occupied by battalions of the King’s Liverpool Regt. of the neighbouring 165th 
Brigade who had advanced to this point on the previous day. Heavy shelling prevented 
any further advance, and the patrol returned to the south-west of the village. Fitzgerald 
then dismounted the remainder of the force and advanced into the village on foot, taking 
up a line in extension of that of the 165th Brigade, through the centre of the village and 
facing roughly north-east. Using the squadron’s four Hotchkiss Machine-guns, and rifle 
fire he was able to repel a series of probes by German forces from the north-east, aiming 
at retaking the village, and held on until around 6.00pm when infantry of 110th Brigade 
took over his positions. 
   ‘D’ Squadron suffered total human casualties of three killed and seven wounded, a 
surprisingly modest loss. Unfortunately the German artillery was able to locate the 
horse lines in the sunken road to the south-west of the village, and shelling killed 35 
horses and wounded a further 24, equivalent to more than half the equine strength of the 
force. Fitzgerald felt in hindsight that the horses might have been safer dispersed in the 
open, rather than concentrated out of sight but vulnerable to shelling.199 
   Although a small-scale affair overall, Kavanagh expressed himself “thoroughly 
satisfied” with this operation, Fitzgerald was called to report to the Corps Commander 
in person and subsequently received the Military Cross.200 In many respects Kavanagh 
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was entitled to be satisfied. Once again mounted forces had demonstrated the 
characteristics first apparent at High Wood. Cavalry had been able to move relatively 
speedily up to the front line (Fitzgerald managed the 12km (7.5 miles) from Mametz to 
Gueudecourt in a little over two hours), cross the front line trenches without difficulty, 
and advance in the face of shelling and machine-gun fire without sus taining significant 
casualties. Furthermore the force had been able to improvise a defensive position on its 
objective, and using integral machine-guns repel enemy counter-attacks until relieved 
by supporting infantry. Unfortunately, while the horses provided the key to reducing 
losses by speed of movement, as soon as the force halted they became a vulnerable 
impediment, and suffered accordingly. 
   The Gueudecourt action can be viewed as an exemplar of a key rôle cavalry could 
have adopted on the Western Front, and towards which it moved gradually, particularly 
in 1918. Small forces, at the disposal of front line commanders, used to seize advanced 
positions and exploit small tactical advantages. This point was evident to some as early 
as 14 July, the anonymous officer of the 18th Lancers quoted earlier also wrote: 
It is an interesting speculation whether it would not have been sounder at this 
stage of the war to have split up say, one, of the five cavalry Divisions in being, 
and to have increased the numbers of Corps and Divisional cavalry. 201   
It is unlikely, however that Kavanagh would have seen it that way, he would more 
probably have taken the success of 26 September as vindication of the larger strategic 
rôle of cavalry as a force of wider exploitation, a concept which the offensives of 1916 
had so far shown to be beyond reach. 
 
 
Assessment 
 
   The involvement of the cavalry in the Somme campaign can be judged against the 
three key themes set out at the opening of this study. 
    Firstly, a close examination of the two occasions when cavalry became involved in 
fighting during the Somme battles has served largely to vindicate them at a tactical 
level. Their combination of mobility and firepower made them tactically effective. 
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Much of the criticism levelled at the arm, both at the time and since, is seen to be 
unfounded.  
   Secondly, however, at a higher operational and strategic level, it is difficult to detect 
any clear understanding by their commanders of their capabilities, or indeed their 
shortcomings. This led to a failure to achieve the wider operational objectives allocated 
to the arm.  
   Nor, thirdly, at this stage of the war was any particular process of evolution or 
development apparent in the thinking of the senior commanders, although as will be 
demonstrated in later chapters, it is arguable that this did develop later in the war.  
When the four offensive operations considered in this chapter are viewed together, a 
series of observations may be made. Haig appears remarkably single minded in his 
thinking. He laid out his objectives for the campaign in June, and in his G.H.Q. 
Instructions as late as September he was able simply to refer his subordinates to these 
earlier orders.202 The same villages recur as cavalry objectives; Ligny-Thilloy, Achiet le 
Grand, and Bapaume itself, the main strategic prize of the offensive (although its value 
was largely psychological rather than strategic). The main change was that as the Fourth 
Army painfully advanced these objectives became closer to the attacking front. The 
holding positions in which the cavalry divisions awaited the orders to advance also 
become familiar – the villages in the valley of the Ancre to the south-west of Albert; 
Dernancourt, Morlancourt, Buire, and Bonnay. Haig seems throughout to have been 
wedded to the concept of a breakthrough and cavalry exploitation. He was constantly 
anticipating a decisive collapse of the German defences. This was a keynote of his 
attitude throughout the remainder of the war, despite the fact that even up to November 
1918 arguably it never took place. 
   A distinction may be drawn however, between the two occasions when the 
Commander- in-Chief was able to insist on his vision of a decisive stroke; 1 July and 15 
September, and the two more limited attacks of 14 July and 25 September. On 1 July, 
the contrast between Haig’s strategic breakthrough vision, and Rawlinson’s own plans 
for a ‘Bite and Hold’ attack have already been discussed. In addition it has been shown 
that Rawlinson expected to win each battle with infantry and artillery before allowing 
the cavalry to participate. Thus where he was asked by Haig to plan a deep thrust into 
the enemy position he did so by setting ever deeper objectives for the infantry, and 
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thereby delaying ever further the involvement of the cavalry, rather than following 
Haig’s vision of early cavalry action. An example of this can be seen in Rawlinson’s 
plans for III and X Corps on 1 July. In the event that they achieved their initial objective 
of Pozières, (an advance of around 4km (2.5 miles)) this would not be followed by 
cavalry exploitation, but by a further infantry push as far as Courcelette and 
Martinpuich (another 4km (2.5 miles)). Equally in the plans for 15 September, when the 
‘Red Line’ was reached, the cavalry had to wait until the artillery had advanced and the 
infantry attack began again before they were allowed to move.  
   By contrast, where Rawlinson set more limited objectives, and the whole scale of the 
battle was smaller, such as at Bazentin Ridge or Morval, an opportunity arose not only 
for the cavalry to begin the battle closer to the infantry start-line, but also for the 
possibility of their becoming involved in the battle at an earlier stage. It is not clear at 
this stage of the war whether this was a deliberate policy on Rawlinson’s part, he still 
planned these offensives as essentially two-stage, infantry, then cavalry affairs. It will 
be shown in later chapters that as his conception of the ‘Bite and Hold’ battle 
developed, particularly in 1918, the integration of cavalry into the early stages became 
more pronounced, however there was only shadowy evidence of this in 1916.  
   A second recurring feature of these attacks was the narrowness and rigidity of the 
cavalry line of advance. Again this has been examined in relation to 1 July, but the same 
difficulty arose on the 14th, where it has been shown that 2nd Indian Division became 
stalled behind the failing attack on Longueval on the British right while opportunities 
for exploitation withered on the left of the attack. The same phenomenon is discernible 
on 25 September; the cavalry waited for Gueudecourt and Gird Trench to be captured 
on the left, while Cavan’s XIV Corps on the right was content to consolidate on 
captured trenches while the ground ahead was essentially clear of Germans. Clearly 
large scale strategic diversions of the cavalry as some have advocated in relation to 1 
July were not viable, but the case for more flexibility on a smaller scale at Bazentin 
Ridge or Morval/Gueudecourt is harder to refute.  
   The difficulties of cavalry movement behind the lines, and the need for cleared tracks 
has been examined, but it has also been shown that the cavalry were not nearly as 
constrained in their movements as has often been suggested. Their lack of flexibility has 
thus to be accounted for elsewhere, and it would seem likely that these constraints must 
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have been mental rather than physical. These may have been imposed from above by 
Rawlinson’s repeated strictures concerning the risk of clogging the rear areas, which 
seem to have severely curbed any aggressive spirit that Kavanagh and the Cavalry corps 
might otherwise have possessed. They may also have been self- imposed by a lack of 
tactical imagination on the part of more junior cavalry commanders. Most critically, 
however, any tactical imagination which might have been shown at lower levels was 
stifled by a system of command that required decisions to be refered up a slow and 
unreliable chain of command before they could be acted upon. Thus any possibility of 
rapid or spontaneous action was denied to local commanders. 
   Finally, apart from Haig himself, who was inevitably too divorced from the direct 
control of battles to greatly influence their progress, it must be asked whether any 
commanders fully grasped their Commander- in-Chief’s ideas of combined arms 
doctrine, that is the insertion of smaller mounted forces into the infantry/artillery battle 
at a stage prior to a complete ‘breakthrough’, and sought to apply them on the field of 
battle. Only one commander shows any evidence of such an understanding; Lt Gen. 
Horne, commander of XV Corps. It is surely more than coincidence that the only two 
occasions when mounted troops were committed to battle during the Somme campaign 
were on his Corps front. Significantly in neither case were the cavalry committed to 
battle in precisely the manner predicted in their orders. The evening attack on High 
Wood by 7th Division and the Secunderabad Brigade was broadly in line with earlier 
stated objectives, but was at least in part developed ad-hoc, in the course of the fighting. 
Equally on 26 September, after the capture of Gird Trench an opportunity opened-up for 
mounted troops, not perhaps to ride for a gap in the traditional sense, but certainly to 
explore and possibly exploit a fluid and uncertain situation. Again despite the fact that 
this was not specifically provided for in the battle plan, Horne was to be seen reaching 
out for cavalry. Unfortunately on this occasion the cavalry divisions available a day 
earlier had been stood down and he had to settle for a scratch force of a little over a 
squadron. 
   Horne went on to command First Army in 1917. He was also well acquainted with 
Haig, having been his C.R.A. (Commander Royal Artillery) when Haig commanded I 
Corps at the beginning of the war.203 He was not a ‘Cavalry general’ (a term whose 
validity has already been challenged elsewhere in this study), having served his earlier 
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career in the Royal Horse Artillery. 204 However, were his branch of service to be 
considered relevant to his grasp of combined-arms fighting, it would perhaps be more 
significant to note that, unlike his commander at Fourth Army Headquarters, he was not 
an infantryman. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE HINDENBURG LINE AND ARRAS, NOVEMBER 1916–APRIL 1917 
 
 
It seems rather a pity to lose all these chaps who were perfect cavalrymen for the 
sake of a village which is a complete shell-trap for the British side. 
       Julian Byng May 19171 
 
Introduction 
 
   This chapter examines the British cavalry, (both the re- formed Cavalry Corps, and the 
regiments of corps cavalry serving with the infantry,) from the close of the Somme 
fighting in November 1916, through their rôle in the advance to the Hindenburg Line, 
up to and including the Arras offensive of Easter 1917. It will be apparent that during 
this period the arm suffered a number of hardships and difficulties, resulting from a 
poor supply situation, and an unusually hard winter, but that in spite of these it 
continued to evolve, and played a larger part in events than that for which it has hitherto 
been given credit.  
   The part played by the cavalry in the German retreat to the Hindenburg line, examined 
in the first half of the chapter, is of particular interest in that not only did the cavalry 
continue to show the local tactical effectiveness it had shown in 1916, but that this was 
achieved largely through the use of established pre-war tactical principles. Moreover 
during this period the Corps was set realistic and achievable operational objectives by 
its senior commanders, which it was able to fulfil entirely successfully. Sadly this 
achievement has been obscured in much of the literature by historians seeking to set 
much wider objectives for the cavalry, and in turn point out that these were not reached, 
in spite of the fact that no such objectives were defined at the time. The fighting during 
this period also demonstrated the potential of co-operation between horsemen and 
armoured cars, prefiguring their more controversial relationship with tanks later in 
1917. 
   The Arras offensive, and the fighting at Monchy- le-Preux on 11 April, will also be 
examined in detail. By contrast with the operations in March this attack was to be 
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influenced by many of the command failures which had previously been evident in 
1916, only small improvements are discernible in the operational handling of the 
cavalry. Again, however, when brought into combat, albeit in accidental and 
unfavourable circumstances at Monchy- le-Preux, the cavalry was to prove itself 
tactically effective, in particular by the use of the machine-gun. 
 
 
Views of 1917 
 
   The usefulness of cavalry in the spring of 1917 has typically been characterised in 
much the same vein as their efforts the year before. Terraine commented of Arras “The 
astonishing spectacle was seen of cavalry trying to charge in crater fields; the result, as 
one might suppose, was high mounds of dead horses, much wasted gallantry, and no 
progress worth mentioning.”2 Nor is this a recent phenomenon. The propagation of this 
view can be detected as early as 1920 when J.F.C. Fuller (never a friend to cavalry) 
observed “…in 1917 Cavalry, though used in the battles of Arras and Cambrai 
accomplished practically nothing save on foot.”3 Even Richard Holmes, who generally 
offers a more positive view of the mounted arm, describes how at Arras “…cavalry 
loyally trotted off to calamity in the crater fields around Monchy- le-Preux: some sang 
the Eton Boating Song as they disappeared into a blizzard.”4 The latter part of this 
remark, although true, tends to create the familiar image of cavalry as socially elite, but 
out of touch with reality, gallantly riding to their inevitable doom. (It also neglects the 
fact that the regiment referred to was the Royal Horse Guards (Blues), which might be 
expected to include more Old Etonians than most, and the ironic humour of the B.E.F. 
which would inevitably prompt soldiers to sing of ‘jolly boating weather’ in the middle 
of a snowstorm.) A will be shown, none of these comments does justice to the part 
played by the cavalry in these battles. 
   A more specific charge levelled at the cavalry is that the static warfare of the 
preceding years had dulled their senses and led to a tactical staleness which left them 
unable to exploit fully the opportunities created in 1917, in particular the German retreat 
to the Hindenburg Line. Terraine observed “… cavalry and infantry alike, after years of 
trench warfare, had lost the habit and art of movement. Broad horizons and empty 
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country bewildered and frightened them; long dependence on massive artillery support 
created another inhibition, and further delays occurred as the guns struggled forward 
along the mined and miry roads.”5 Again this will be shown to be a significant mis-
representation of the success of the cavalry in these operations. 
   Another factor seriously restricting the effectiveness of the cavalry in the spring of 
1917 has been suggested, although more in mitigation for their poor performance than 
as a criticism. This was that a combination of lack of supplies and reinforcements, and 
one of the worst winters of the century, left the arm weak in manpower, and sickly in 
horsepower, and thus unable to live up to the rôle proposed for it. As Anglesey put it 
“… the B.E.F.’s mounted arm entered the year of L’Affaire Nivelle, and the battles of 
Arras and Cambrai noticeably weak.”6 This difficulty will be examined first. 
 
 
The Winter – Training, Reinforcements, and Fodder 
 
   As the autumn of 1916 progressed the weather became progressively worse, and it 
became evident that no opportunity for mounted work by the cavalry would arise until 
the following year.7 In mid-November the five divisions of the re- formed Cavalry Corps 
were withdrawn to winter billets on the Channel coast. These billets stretched from 
Boulogne in the north, 80km (50 miles) south as far as Le Treport at the mouth of the 
River Bresle. 1st, 3rd, and 2nd Cavalry Divisions respectively were allocated areas from 
Boulogne as far south as the mouth of the River Somme, north-west of Abbeville, while 
the two Indian divisions were billeted south of the Somme.8 The wide dispersal of the 
Corps was intended both to provide space for training and to reduce the load on the 
various billeting areas. Positions near the coast were also intended to ease the logistical 
difficulties of forage supply, 9 although problems with this were to arise nonetheless, as 
will be examined below. 
   Brig. Gen. Home, B.G.G.S. (Brigadier General, General Staff) of the Cavalry Corps 
was concerned at the end of the Somme battles that the cavalry had lost their edge : “Our 
cavalry has got slow, it wants speeding up. They want ginger and to forget that such 
things as trenches exist.”10 While his own preference was for front line action, even in 
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the infantry, he recognised that training was vital over the winter if the cavalry were to 
make an impression when the weather improved: 
It is very dull back here with the Cavalry. We have got all our Divisions back 
now and they are busy settling into their winter quarters – then we shall be able 
to commence some training. A great deal will be required from the Cavalry next 
Spring and I hope that they all realise it.11 
The nature of what would be required of the Corps, at least in the minds of its 
commanders and of G.H.Q. had been spelled out as early as September 1916, in a 
document signed by Home, entitled Winter Training.12 This stated that a ‘clear task for 
the cavalry’ had been laid down by the Commander- in-Chief (Haig). And that unlike the 
previous winter where much training was devoted to the conversion of mounted troops 
to trench fighting on foot (described in the previous chapter), the reverse was now true. 
The ‘mission-statement’ (in modern parlance) embodied in this document merits 
quotation at length: 
  Up to the present the Cavalry in France has played a dual rôle – trained as 
Cavalry but at the same time has had the shadow of trench warfare continually 
hanging over its head. The result has been that attempts were made to have the 
Cavalry equally good for both these rôles, and trench warfare being the nearest, 
a great deal of time and labour was devoted to fitting Cavalry to take its place in 
the trenches, and fighting equally well as infantry. 
  There is no doubt that this training has left its mark on the Cavalry. The 
horizon has been narrowed, movement and suitable ground for training have 
been non-existent, men have been away from their horses for long periods, and 
the characteristics of Cavalry, laid down in Cavalry Training 1916, namely “the 
power to move with rapidity, to fight when moving, to seize fleeting 
opportunities, and to cover long distances in a short time” have been sometimes 
forgotten. 
  The task laid down by the Commander-in-Chief for the Cavalry embodies all 
the characteristics quoted above, and all training must work towards this end.13 
In short, mobile warfare remained the vision towards which training should be focused. 
In the Commander in Chief’s (ie. Haig’s) mind the breakthrough remained a dominant 
motif, despite the disappointments of 1916. The document acknowledged that service in 
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the trenches was likely, but discouraged undue time spent on preparation for this, the 
implication being that time in the line was inherently a suitable education. It was in this 
spirit that the cavalry divisions began their winter training programmes. 
   In spite of the dogged ambitions of their overall commander, however, a subtle but 
significant change had taken place in the emphasis of this training, and the type of 
operations for which the Corps was preparing. This was described by Maj. Darling, 
serving with the 20th Hussars (5th Cavalry Brigade): 
It was known that a great Allied offensive was to take place in the spring, so we 
had once more to prepare to go through the “gap”. Officially the expression 
“gap” had long since been dropped as it had become almost a term of derision. 
We had been told to speak of “operations beyond the trench system,” or some 
such phrase. However “gap” was shorter and the term continued to be used to 
describe the cavalry’s share in the offensive.14 
Training was carried out in co-operation with infantry, the cavalry practising the capture 
of relatively nearby objectives, which were then consolidated and handed over to 
supporting troops. Darling continued: 
We were not to pursue blindly whooping and yelling through the night, as the 
Prussian cavalry are said to have done after Waterloo. Nor were we to make 
raids on distant aerodromes, railway junctions and headquarters, as we were to 
have done on the Somme in 1916. Every detail was cut and dried, but I do not 
remember that anyone was told off to bring back the Kaiser’s head on a charger. 
On the whole, it was a modest programme compared to former ones.15 
It is possible to discern in these remarks a transition in cavalry thinking away from an 
optimistic, but ultimately unrealistic ambition of a distant breakthrough rôle, as had 
been postulated in 1916, towards more limited local tactical objectives. It is this 
transition which forms one of the key themes of this study, and it is important to note 
the appearance in embryonic form in the winter of 1916-17, of concepts which were to 
become key in 1918. At this stage, however, while it is important to acknowledge that 
this change in thinking was taking place, it was not yet fully understood or reflected in 
the organisation, command and tactical handling of the cavalry. Nor were combined-
arms operations in co-operation with infantry, and in particular artillery well enough 
developed. The situation was further complicated by the changes in the defensive battle 
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the Germans were to fight in 1917. The Arras offensive, as will be explored later in this 
chapter, demonstrated the gap between the development of these new tactical ideas on 
paper and in training, and their practical application on the battlefield.  
   Winter Training also contained more detailed training objectives, and several of these 
are noteworthy. The first of these was communications: “The question of 
communications requires a great deal of attention. Trench warfare has wedded us to the 
telephone, and when moving the telephone will hardly be used.”16 Training of despatch 
riders, both horse and motor-cycle mounted was urged. Secondly co-operation with 
armoured cars was to be practised: “The Corps Commander is of the opinion that these 
cars should be used with troops both in reconnaissance and attack and that they seldom 
– if ever – be employed on distant expeditions by themselves.”17 (The latter part of this 
instruction may reflect Home’s own scepticism. In January 1917 he recorded: “[I] Went 
down to inspect the 5th Cav. Div armoured cars today. They want some brushing-up, I 
think.”18) The failure of combined cavalry/armour operations on the Somme has already 
been examined, but such operations were also to be a feature of the fighting of spring 
1917, with varying degrees of success.  
   Several organisational changes were also carried out over the winter. The first of these 
was simply of nomenclature, 1st and 2nd Indian Divisions becoming respectively 4th and 
5th Cavalry Divisions.19 This acknowledged their presence within a unified Cavalry 
Corps, but also reflected the fact that in the 5th Division in particular, Indians were in a 
minority; the division contained four Indian regiments, two British, and three (a 
brigade) of Canadians. Secondly in the spring sufficient specially trained reinforcements 
were received to start posting men directly to the Cavalry Machine Gun Squadrons, 
allowing some cavalrymen to return to their parent units. The Indian brigades’ 
squadrons in particular were entirely re-manned with British troops sent as formed units 
from the M.G.C.(C) training centre at Maresfield in Sussex, both British and Indian 
officers and Indian other ranks being returned to their regiments.20 
   These reinforcements, however, should be considered the exception rather than the 
rule. More generally an ongoing man-power crisis was developing in the B.E.F.21 
Trained British reinforcements were at a premium and Robertson (C.I.G.S.) started to 
send trained men from the cavalry reserve to the Infantry and Engineers in France, 
blocking reinforcement of the Cavalry. 22 This left many regiments below strength. 
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Indeed the reinforcement of the M.G.C.(C) may be seen in this light as a ploy to 
circumvent this block and free more cavalrymen to return to the ranks of the regiments. 
   This general shortage of men was not the only obstacle to Home and Kavanagh’s 
vision of winter training. From October 1916, each cavalry brigade was required to 
furnish a pioneer battalion for dismounted service.23 Theoretically only two of these 
battalions would be formed within each division at any one time, leaving one brigade 
free for mounted training, and they were to be disbanded at the end of January. In fact 
most of the pioneer battalions continued work until March, at which point although 
nominally disbanded, working parties were required to start on construction of cavalry 
tracks for the Arras battle.24 Add to this the fact that the remaining men in each brigade 
were obliged to tend the horses of their dismounted colleagues, and the impact on 
training as formed units must have been significant. Further, virtually all of the 
machine-gun squadrons were required to spend periods in the front line,25 and the corps 
R.H.A. batteries were all removed over the winter and sent to support infantry 
formations, not returning until mid March. 26 Thus despite the pious hopes of Winter 
Training, the “…shadow of trench warfare” continued to loom darkly over any 
preparations for a mobile battle that the cavalry might attempt. 
   Already short of men, and burdened by this range of extra responsibilities, the Cavalry 
was further hindered by a lack of forage. Towards the end of the Somme fighting 
concern was starting to be expressed about the condition of the horses. This can be 
followed in the War Diary of the Deputy Director Veterinary Services (D.D.V.S) of the 
Cavalry Corps, Col. Harris. Early in October he inspected the 18th Hussars and 9th 
Lancers (2nd Cav. Brig.), commenting “There were a large number of thin horses in both 
these units.”27 Similarly a few weeks later he saw the Hampshire (Carbineers) 
Yeomanry: “There was a large percentage of thin horses, I recommended grazing and 
ordered some special tonic balls.”28 By November shipping problems exacerbated the 
problem and hard feed, particularly oats started to become scarce. Harris visited the 5th 
Army Artillery School at the end of November, and commented that the horses were 
getting only 6lb of oats rather than the official ration of 12lb, and as a result were 
“…looking very poor.”29 Similarly, hay was running short, 1st Cavalry Division halved 
the ration to 6lb in November, and the 15th Hussars reported difficulty in finding even 
this much, feeding only 5lb per day. 30 It was not until 13 April, two days after the 
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Monchy battle that the full ration of 12lb of oats and 12lb of hay was restored. Harris 
commented rather ruefully “It is a pity this was not done when they were in the back 
area during the spell of very cold weather. There would have been fewer debilitated 
animals and, as we have seen by experience, fewer casualties.”31 
   The latter remark also alludes to the other great problem suffered by the cavalry, and 
indeed all combatants in France, the very cold winter of 1916-17. Frost and snow 
continued from November through until April. The combination of cold weather and 
short rations had a severe impact on the condition of the horses, and was to be a 
significant factor in losses during the Arras battle in April. A measure of the severity of 
the conditions is shown in the use of petrol to wash cuts and wounds to horses’ legs, as 
water simply froze over the wound.32 Opinion was divided in the cavalry over the best 
response to the cold. Some units worked their horses hard in an effort to acclimatise 
them, suffering in the process a higher casualty rate, other units kept their mounts as far 
as possible under shelter. The latter policy produced fatter horses for brigade 
inspections but proved to be the downfall of several regiments as these animals were 
unprepared for the shock of work and weather when the attacks began in the spring. 
Either way, as Darling observed, “I can only repeat that when we finally left for the 
battle, we were far from satisfied with the condition of the horses.”33 
   On top of all this, sarcoptic mange, widespread among the French civilian horse 
population, broke out within the Cavalry Corps in January 1917.34 While not necessarily 
fatal, this disease created the need to constantly re-billet troops out of villages where the 
cases occurred, and the temporary quarantining of large numbers of horses. This led to 
congestion of the veterinary hospitals, already coping with the large volume of 
‘Debilitated’ horses resulting from the forage shortage.35 A number of equine casualties 
were also suffered due to the necessity of clipping the winter coats of mange cases, 
which subsequently left them vulnerable to the extreme wintry weather.36 
   In the light of all these difficulties it is hard to see how very much useful preparation 
for the up-coming campaign could have been achieved over the winter within the 
Cavalry Corps. Hunger, the weather, and the constant demand for labour to support the 
troops in the front line would all have taken their toll, and it is unlikely that overall the 
corps was in any better shape to fight than it had been at the close of the Somme battles. 
No doubt the cavalry remained keen to take their long-awaited opportunity to prove 
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themselves, and some have interpreted this as reflecting the preparedness of the corps as 
a whole for the fight ahead. Preston describing Arras and Monchy in the Cavalry 
Journal asserted that “The cavalry regiments had had no serious casualties since the 
Second Battle of Ypres; [in 1915] their standard of training had reached a high level; if 
the day of the ‘Gap’ was indeed at hand, all ranks were ready for it.”37 However will-
power alone would not be sufficient. As will be seen although the cavalry showed 
themselves keen and courageous in the battles of March and April, the cost among tired, 
overloaded horses in atrocious weather was tragically high. 
 
 
The Hindenburg Line: March 1917 
 
   As early as September 1916, while the Somme battle was still in progress the 
Germans began preparations for a new defensive position in the rear behind the 
battlefield. A network of reserve positions was mapped out stretching along the whole 
of the German line from the Belgian coast to the Moselle. Construction of the first of 
these ‘Siegfried’ running from Arras to south of Laon, was begun on 27 September. 
This position, and its northern neighbour, the ‘Wotan’ position were to become more 
commonly known both by the British and Germans, as the Hindenburg Line. While 
originally intended as a position of last resort, a decision was taken by the German high 
command in February 1917 in the light of the territorial and manpower losses of the 
Somme battles, to make an organised and voluntary withdrawal to the Siegfried 
position. 
   The full detail of this new defensive system, and the thinking behind it was examined 
by G.C. Wynne in his 1940 work If Germany Attacks.38 Key to understanding this new 
defensive method was the idea that ground may, temporarily at least, be traded for 
tactical advantage. Rather than seeking to halt an allied attack against a heavily 
defended front line, the German plan allowed attacking troops to be absorbed within a 
much deeper defensive network. Once inside, the attackers would be caught in 
previously devised killing zones, between individual strong-points, before ultimately the 
status quo was restored by specially trained counter-attack units. This had the incidental 
effect of creating a battlefield which was much deeper than previously (up to 10km (6 
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miles) rather than 2km (1.5 miles)), but at the same time less densely defended. Also the 
effects of artillery would inevitably be dispersed across a wider area. Thus while the 
British cavalry were narrowing their horizons to look for a more limited and integrated 
tactical rôle on the battlefield, the Germans were simultaneously creating a defensive 
system which allowed the horsemen greater local offensive opportunities. It is the 
development of this new ‘deep’ battlefield, and the evolution of British offensive tactics 
to deal with it, both in the cavalry and in other arms, during 1917 and 1918 which forms 
one of the themes of this study.  
   Operation ‘Alberich’; a staged withdrawal to the new position via a series of 
intermediate defensive positions began on 14 March 1917. This was combined with a 
‘scorched earth’ policy in the areas abandoned, including the mining of roads, 
demolition of villages, and destruction of anything perceived to be of use to the 
advancing allies. The withdrawal may be compared to the swinging of a door, with its 
hinge at Arras in the north, and its southernmost point, as far as the British were 
concerned, 50km (30 miles) to the south beyond Peronne, the depth of the withdrawal at 
this southern end being around 20km (12 miles) eastwards towards St Quentin. 
Opposite the northern end of this movement was General Gough’s Fifth Army, faced 
with only a short distance to follow up, but under pressure to close up with the Germans 
in time to support an attack at Arras at the beginning of April. To the south was Fourth 
Army under General Rawlinson. His force was under less pressure of time but was both 
more thinly spread along its frontage, and had further to go to reach the new German 
position. 39 
   Within a few years of the war’s end criticism was developing of the failure of the 
Fourth and Fifth Armies to make more of the German retreat to the Hindenburg Position 
in March 1917. The adverse comment of J.F.C Fuller for example, has been alluded to 
earlier in this chapter. This was refuted by Cyril Falls in the Official History, where he 
was at pains to explain that the organized nature of the German withdrawal, the 
devastation left in their wake, and the strength of the defensive position to which they 
were known to be falling back “…acted as a brake” upon the advance of the British 
forces. Further “…it was plainly useless to attack that position until the bulk of the 
artillery was within range and well supplied with ammunition.”40 Nonetheless some 
writers have continued to propose the somewhat circular argument that on the one hand 
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the British High Command launched an all-out ‘pursuit’ of the Germans, but that at the 
same time such an operation was doomed to failure. Terraine argued: “‘Pursuit’ by the 
allied armies, no matter how vehemently ordered by their higher commanders, was 
hardly more than a pious hope.” He went on to add “The Cavalry, the only weapon of 
exploitation that they possessed, was seen to be almost completely ineffective in these 
circumstances.” and that “…the arm was not well handled.”41  
   A closer examination of events shows that on the contrary, rather than a reckless, but 
ineffective pursuit, Fourth and Fifth Armies conducted a methodical but largely 
successful follow up of the German withdrawal. This managed to balance the twin 
requirements of closing up to the Hindenburg position in time for the planned Easter 
offensives, by the British at Arras, and by the French to the south, and of minimising 
unnecessary loss. These twin objectives in the light of the German withdrawal were laid 
out by Haig on 16 March in a G.H.Q. letter to Army Commanders and to Kavanagh at 
the Cavalry Corps: 
 2. The general intention of the Field-Marshal Commanding- in-Chief is:- 
(a) To maintain pressure on the enemy and harass his rearguards with the 
minimum number of troops required for that purpose. 
(b) To strike the enemy on the Arras-Vimy front in the greatest possible 
strength with a view to penetrating his defences, outflanking the 
Hindenburg Line from the north and operating in the direction of 
Cambrai. 
Advantage should be taken of local opportunities to cause the enemy loss in his 
retirement, especially by means of artillery fire; but attacks in force which will 
be met by rearguards fully prepared, are unlikely under the conditions to give an 
adequate return for the losses likely to be incurred.”42 
(Incidentally this letter was an early example of Haig’s tendency to include Kavanagh, a 
corps commander, in meetings and correspondence otherwise only addressed to the 
commanders of Armies.) Taken in the light of these criteria, the cavalry operations of 
March 1917 were far from ‘ineffective’. The Germans were indeed ‘harassed’ and 
‘caused loss’, at the cost of a minimum of casualties to the cavalry. The operations also 
provided a valuable opportunity for the cavalry to put into effect some of the training 
undertaken over the winter, and for the tactical evolution of the arm to continue. Indeed 
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minor operations such as the Villers Faucon attack of 27 March (discussed below) 
might be considered textbook examples of the successful application of mounted units 
to attacks on limited objectives.  
   When the German withdrawal began (on 14 March opposite Fourth Army, and on 17 
March opposite Fifth Army) only the corps cavalry regiments attached to the infantry 
corps were available to follow this up. It rapidly became apparent that these limited 
cavalry forces would not be sufficient and on 19 March a division from the Cavalry 
Corps was ordered up to support each army. The two Indian divisions, now re-named 
the 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions were selected, 4th division going to Fifth Army in the 
north, and 5th Division going to Fourth Army in the south. 43  
   However, although these additional troops represented nearly 40% of the cavalry 
available to G.H.Q., they were sufficient only to replace the existing corps regiments 
and slightly increase the numbers of cavalry on each corps front. 4th Cavalry Division, 
attached to Fifth Army (I (Anzac), II, and V Corps) deployed forward only the Lucknow 
Cavalry Brigade; three regiments for the three corps on the army front. Meanwhile to 
the south, the Canadian Cavalry Brigade (from 5th Cav. Div.) took over the front of the 
two northerly corps of Fourth Army (XIV and XV), while the Ambala Brigade covered 
the two southerly Corps (III, and IV). As the latter two brigades adopted the standard 
pattern of putting two regiments in the line and keeping one in reserve, this also 
represented a front line reinforcement of each infantry corps equivalent to only a single 
regiment of cavalry. As this was intended to replace rather than augment the already 
exhausted corps cavalry regiments it reflects little more than maintenance of the status-
quo in numbers of mounted troops rather than a significant increase. This simple lack of 
manpower should be taken into account when the impact of the cavalry on these 
operations is judged. This was clearly not a force large enough to deliver a decisive 
blow upon the retreating Germans, ‘well handled’ or not. 
   Nor was that the intention of the cavalry commanders. The modest ambitions of the 
Cavalry divisions can be read in the orders issued by 5th Cavalry Division H.Q. on its 
attachment to Fourth army: 
2. The tasks of the Division are:- 
(a) To ascertain the dispositions of the advanced hostile detachments. 
(b) To ascertain the enemy’s defences and strength. 
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(c) To picket the enemy so as to prevent his advancing and so as to 
give instant information of his withdrawal. 
(d) To be ready to follow up the enemy if he withdraws.44 
These orders clearly reflect the tone of Haig’s G.H.Q. letter of the 16 March; contact 
was to be maintained, but no rash and costly moves made. As the following narrative 
will show, however, far from being overly timid in the execution of these instructions, 
the lead brigades of 5th Division fought extremely aggressively, not only following up, 
but forcing the pace of the German withdrawal. In short, within the bounds set by their 
orders, the operations of the cavalry during this period were a complete success. 
 
 
Operations 23-28 March 1917 
(Figure 3.1 overleaf) 
   As has been outlined above, the task of the Fifth Army in the north required a more 
urgent push against the retreating Germans. Their way was blocked, however by a more 
well-developed system of German intermediate defences, including the ‘R1’, ‘R2’, and 
‘R3’ reserve lines. Although only the third of these was defended with any vigour, 
Gough was forced to advance by a series of methodical set piece attacks, which left 
little rôle for cavalry beyond reconnaissance patrols and flank guards.45 Thus little 
significant mounted action took place on this front. On the Fourth Army front, however, 
covered by 5th Cavalry Division, the greater distance to be covered, and the lack of 
formal intermediate defensive positions left more scope for cava lry operations. 
   When 5th Cavalry Division took over from the regiments of corps cavalry on 24 
March, the Fourth Army front lay approximately 8km (5 miles) east of the Bapaume to 
Peronne road, running north-west to south-east, parallel to, but some 10km (6 miles) 
short of the Hindenburg position. Divisional Headquarters was established in Peronne. 
The Canadian Cavalry Brigade took over the northern half of the line from Bus to 
Longavesnes, the Royal Canadian Dragoons covering XIV Corps on the left (north) and 
the Fort Garry Horse covering the XV Corps on the right, with Lord Strathcona’s Horse 
in reserve. To the south the Ambala Brigade took over the front of III and IV Corps with 
the 8th Hussars and 18th Lancers initially in the line.46  
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   The regiments were in action immediately. Having made contact with the Australians 
to the north and the French to the south, both brigades started to patrol forwards. The 
Canadians attacked the village of Ytres at the northern end of the line and “… after a 
sharp fight”47 established posts there. Meanwhile 9th Hodsons Horse, the third regiment 
of the Ambala Brigade, occupied Etreillers in the south, although their posts were raided 
overnight 24/25 march and several men were lost.48 
   25 March was spent in a similar fashion in what the divisional War Diary described as 
“Outpost, reconnaissance and patrol fighting along whole front of Fourth Army.”49 On 
26 March the Canadians pushed forward, capturing the villages of Equancourt and 
Longavesnes, driving out small parties of the enemy and handing the villages over to 
the infantry. 50 Meanwhile to the south the Ambala Brigade combined with elements of 
III Corps in an attack on Roisel. Earlier, on 21 March, Maj. Gen. Fanshawe, commander 
of 48th Division, but in temporary command of III Corps, had formed an advanced 
guard consisting of his ‘Corps Mounted Troops’ (Cavalry and Cyclists), 1/4th Oxford 
Light Infantry, two batteries of field artillery, and two sections of engineers. This 
became ‘Ward’s Force’, named after the Corps C.R.A. Brig. Gen. Ward, who was given 
temporary command of it.51  
   On 26 March, this force, with its mounted component now formed by 2 squadrons of 
18th Lancers, and supported by 3 armoured cars from 9th L.A.C. Battery, attacked 
Roisel. The cars and the infantry attacked the village frontally from the east while the 
lancer squadrons outflanked it north and south. The armoured car attack was very 
successful, driving- in a post of about 40 Germans on the western side of the village,52 
but the outflanking effort proved more difficult: “B Squadron [18th Lancers] were 
unable to co-operate effectively as the ground south of Roisel was too marshy and 
intersected.” ‘D’ Squadron “…co-operated on the northern flank” but machine gun fire 
from the village prevented a significant advance.53 As a result the remaining German 
garrison was able to make its escape and only one prisoner was captured.54 This battle 
was not particularly significant in the overall campaign, but it is noteworthy because 
‘Ward’s Force’ represented a combined-arms concept which is more often associated 
only with the ‘Hundred Days’ in 1918. In fact, however, it is one strand of a thread 
which can be traced from the combined bicycle, machine-gun, and cavalry formations 
proposed at Loos in 1915, through the cavalry and armoured car operations of 1916, and 
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eventually into the cavalry and tank operations of 1917 and 1918 described in later 
chapters. As will be demonstrated, far from being a revolution in 1918, the 
developments of that year should be seen as the culmination of a long development 
process. 
   Returning to the events of March 1917, overnight 26/27 the Canadians pushed a small 
enemy detachment out of Lieramont, once again handing the village over to the 
infantry. 55 With this village taken the front line lay along a line from Lieramont, through 
Longavesnes and Roisel. From there the next bound would include the village of Villers 
Faucon 3km (2 miles) to the east, and to the north the twin settlements of Guyencourt 
and Saulcourt. For this operation the Canadian Cavalry Brigade was reinforced by the 
addition of the 8th Hussars from the Ambala Brigade, and the Royal Wiltshire 
Yeomanry (XV Corps Cavalry), as well as the armoured cars of 9th L.A.C. Battery, and 
3 batteries of artillery from 48th Division (in addition to the RHA batteries of all three 
brigades of 5th Cav. Div.) 
   The attack was to be one of envelopment from north and south, (Figure 3.2 overleaf)  
the Canadians moving into Guyencourt from the north and the 8th Hussars attacking 
Villers Faucon from the south. As a preliminary, at about 1:00pm one squadron of the 
Royal Canadian Dragoons advanced east from Longavesnes for about 1km (1000 yards) 
and charged a German outpost, nine prisoners were captured and a further three killed 
with the sword.56 This would later allow machine guns to be pushed forward in this area 
to cover the attack on the villages. 
   A preliminary bombardment of 40 minutes duration was begun at 4:30pm and at 5:10 
the attack began. After a short delay caused by a snowstorm the Canadian Brigade 
advanced from the north-west in bounds, carried out in open order at the gallop. The 
Wiltshire Yeomanry were pushed out to the north and north-east to cover the flank and 
rear of the attack while Lord Strathcona’s Horse swung around to approach Guyencourt 
from the north. Meanwhile the Fort Garry Horse advanced on their right approaching 
Saulcourt from the north-west. Artillery and machine gun support from the west 
continued “…to the last minute”, 57 halting as the Canadians dismounted to fight on foot 
through the ruins of the villages. The villages were secure in Canadian hands by 
6:00pm. The defenders fled in the direction of Epehy, and although machine guns in 
that village rendered a close mounted pursuit impossible, the Hotchkiss teams of the 
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Fort Garry Horse rapidly deployed east of Saulcourt and were able to inflict casualties 
on the retreating Germans.58 
   During the course of the Guyencourt attack, Lt. Harvey of Lord Strathcona’s Horse 
came upon an enemy trench protected by several strands of barbed wire. Knowing that 
this was an obstacle insurmountable to his horse, he dismounted, jumped the wire on 
foot and entered the position with his revolver, capturing a machine gun. For this he was 
subsequently awarded the Victoria Cross.59 
   Meanwhile a similar assault was made on Villers Faucon from the south. B and D 
Squadrons 8th Hussars moved off at 5:00pm while the bombardment was still in 
progress. B Squadron advanced rapidly to the cover of several copses to the west of the 
village, and dismounted to provide fire support, while D squadron swung wide to the 
right and approached the village from the south. Again, after a short dismounted fight, 
the village was in British hands by 6:00pm. Hussar casualties were very light, two killed 
and fifteen wounded, with fifteen horse casualties.60  
   Unfortunately the armoured cars fared less well. After the success of the cars at Roisel 
in drawing enemy fire, two were sent along the Marquaix to Villers Faucon road with 
the specific intention of distracting the enemy from the cavalry. Sadly, the Germans had 
responded to the previous battle by rushing up armour piercing ammunition for their 
machine guns and both cars were quickly knocked out, their entire crews, with the 
exception of one officer, killed or wounded.61 The impact on the 9th L.A.C. Battery of 
this loss is poignantly summarised in the laconic entry in the battery War Diary: 
“27/3/17, 2 armoured cars in action. O.C. seriously wounded.”62 
   In general, however, all parties were well pleased with the operation. Brig. Home 
visited the Headquarters of 5th Cavalry Division on 29 March and recorded in his diary 
that “They were very cheerful and pleased as their men had had quite a pretty little fight 
and were all the better for it.”63 MacAndrew, the divisional commander also sent a wire 
to his troops offering “Heartiest congratulations… for the dashing attack…”64 On the 
same day the division was withdrawn from the front line, and was to take no further part 
in the advance. 
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Lessons of the Spring Fighting 
 
   It may seem odd in the light of the successes of the end of March that the 4th and 5th 
Cavalry Divisions were withdrawn from the battle area after only five or six operational 
days. However, those who have castigated the cavalry for not ‘doing more’ neglect the 
high intensity of these operations. The cavalry were in action almost every day on 
reconnaissance or in attack, and the intervals would have been spent digging in, 
awaiting infantry relief, and then moving onto the next objective. Rest and shelter were 
almost non-existent, and the weather continued to be very cold. The Wiltshire 
Yeomanry (XV Corps Cavalry) recorded that “During the operations between March 
19th and 30th the Regiment was in action 9 days besides sending out troops on 
reconnaissance on two othe r days… The horses were in the open from March 18th 
onwards and owing to very severe weather, hard work, and long hours saddled-up, 
suffered very severely in condition.”65 Nor as has already been discussed did the 
Divisions come into the line as fresh as they would have liked due to the weather and 
the ration situation over the winter.  
   It is a long-standing military truth that mobile operations are highly fatiguing and 
difficult to sustain for more than a short period. The highly mechanised forces involved 
in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 were only able to sustain their momentum for a few days 
before an ‘Operational pause’ was forced upon them by their own logistical situation. 
On the Western Front even the duties involved in garrisoning a static front line trench 
were considered sufficiently fatiguing that troops relatively rarely spent more than 
seven or eight days in the line before relief, and four days was considered the reasonable 
norm.66 The infantry system of supports at all levels from Company to Division allowed 
for a rotation of troops with only a minority in the line at any one time. For the cavalry, 
however, when the German withdrawal began each infantry corps had just a single 
cavalry regiment available to follow up. After five or six days (19-24 March) these 
troops were worn out. As has been explained, over the front of Fourth and Fifth Armies, 
a reinforcement of two divisions of cavalry provided only slighly better than one or two 
further regiments per corps. Five days later on 29 March these too were exhausted, and 
with 1st, 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions being held back for the Arras offensive there was 
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simply no more cavalry available to provide a third ‘rotation’. Far from having ‘lost the 
habit and art of movement’ the cavalry wore itself out by its very mobility. The 
remainder of the advance to the Hindenburg Line thus took place with only very limited 
cavalry support. 
   Reference has already been made to the ‘textbook’ character of cavalry operations 
during this period. Both brigades of 5th Cavalry Division showed themselves capable of 
attacks using a well-coordinated combination of artillery and machine gun support, 
dismounted fire-power, and the astute use of mounted shock. Nearly all attacks were 
characterised by the use of outflanking manoeuvres and the rapid consolidation of 
ground gained by the advance of both integral Hotchkiss teams and supporting machine-
gun squadrons.  
                             
Fig. 3.3 Diagram of cavalry tactics from Cavalry Training, Fig. 20 
 
   The Canadian capture of Equancourt on 26 March is a good example. The village was 
first engaged by machine gun and artillery fire from the north-west from the Canadian 
M.G. Squadron and R.C.H.A. battery. Subsequently under the cover of this fire, the Fort 
Garry Horse established dismounted fire positions to the west and north, A Squadron on 
the north side ‘menacing’ the village particularly vigorously. 67 With the enemy suitably 
distracted, two squadrons of Lord Strathcona’s Horse were able to gallop the village 
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from the south virtually unmolested. Casualties for the whole operation were five men 
wounded.68 A sketch of this operation, with attack by fire on one flank masking a 
mounted advance on the other would bear a striking resemblance to the model for such 
an attack laid out in Fig. 20 of Cavalry Training.69 (Reproduced on previous page.) In 
spite of Home and Kavanagh’s reservations, examined earlier, the cavalry had not 
forgotten the key elements of mobile warfare. These were also pre-war tactics, classical 
‘fire and movement’ concepts which were applicable in 1900 and remain so in 2007. 
Much has been made of how the citizen infantry of the B.E.F. re- learned these 
techniques in 1917, assisted by such documents as SS143 Instructions for the Training 
of Platoons for Offensive Action 1917, published in February of that year.70 It is 
arguable that the cavalry, still leavened by a significant number of pre-war regular 
officers and men, had never forgotten them. 
   The attack on Guyencourt-Saulcourt-Villers Faucon on 28 March took essentially the 
same form but on a larger scale. It is also remarkable for its co-ordination between the 
several brigades and their supporting arms. Simultaneous, widely separated attacks from 
north and south were successfully launched, with troops advancing at high speed, but 
moving tactically in bounds using the available cover. Crucially, the artillery and 
machine guns were able to suppress the defenders with fire until the cavalry were 
virtually amongst them. A German officer captured on the day considered the speed and 
co-ordination of the attack to have been key: “The speed with which the squadrons 
effected their entrance from the south and north completely upset his plans, which he 
had no time to alter.”71 In the light of these actions the accusation of tactical staleness 
among the cavalry after months of static warfare is hard to sustain. 
   On 10 April 1917, while 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions huddled in snow-filled shell-
holes east of Arras, G.H.Q. issued one of the few doctrinal pamphlets of the war 
addressed specifically at cavalry fighting. This pamphlet A Note on the Recent Cavalry 
Fighting up to 7th April 1917 is highly significant in that it gives an insight into the 
contemporary view of what had taken place in the advance to the Hindenburg Line in 
March, and of any lessons from it. The pamphlet is reproduced in full as Appendix 3.1, 
as the points it raises offer a valuable tool for re-assessment of the spring fighting and 
will have relevance to a subsequent analysis of the Arras battles. 
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   Several of the observations in the pamphlet are relatively mundane, ‘time spent on 
reconnaissance’ (Paragraph (a.)) is something of a military cliché, however others are 
more significant. Paragraph (b.) highlights the problem encountered at Gueudecourt in 
September 1916, (which was later to be the keynote of the fighting at Monchy); that 
cavalry halted and dismounted on a captured objective particularly a village, are 
hopelessly vulnerable to horse casualties if the enemy can bring observed artillery to 
bear. This was to become even more of a problem as the Germans became more adept 
from 1917 onwards in the creation of observed artillery ‘killing zones’ within their new 
flexible defensive systems.72 The advice is therefore to push on beyond such ‘localities’, 
and to tell off pursuing detachments. However, it is hard to find examples of this 
working in practice, even the most successful of the cavalry’s spring operations, the 
Guyencourt-Saulcourt-Villers Faucon attack was unable to advance beyond its 
immediate objectives due to enemy machine-gun fire.  
   The main body of the pamphlet, paragraphs (c.) to (g.) outlines the ingredients of a 
classical mobile attack, combining speed and flanking assaults, masked by a frontal 
attack, using carefully timed suppressive artillery, armoured cars, and machine-gun fire 
on the target. Again the Guyencourt attack serves as an exemplar, but in this case of the 
successful application of all these principles. It can be argued that this is not a 
particularly radical set of tactical principles, and indeed it has been noted earlier that a 
similar battle plan was presented in pre-war cavalry manuals. The contemporary value 
of the pamphlet, however, lies in its implicit assertion that these methods have now been 
tested ‘for real’ on the battlefield and have been shown to retain their validity. 
Moreover, that although much of the character of the war may seem new and different, 
commanders neglect these ‘old-fashioned’ principles at their peril. This consistency, and 
the continued application of pre-war doctrine on a battlefield that evolved to make it 
ever more appropriate, is one of the themes of this study. 
   Overall the contribution of the cavalry to the advance to the Hindenburg Line was 
probably not decisive. However it was not a phase of the campaign which offered any 
promise of decisive results, and this fact was quickly recognised by Haig and the 
commanders of Fourth and Fifth Armies. An infantry advance unsupported by mounted 
troops would probably have been slower, and potentially more costly, but would 
ultimately have achieved the same results. What then of the decision to commit two 
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divisions of cavalry to the battle? This should not be seen, as some have interpreted it, 
as a misguided vision of a great rout of the retreating Germans, which the cavalry failed 
to achieve. Rather it may be viewed as a routine reinforcement of a part of the Fourth 
and Fifth Armies; the corps cavalry, that was feeling the strain. 
   It is arguable, and it was a recurrent theme of Haig’s thinking, that the Cavalry Corps 
needed to be carefully husbanded until the ‘big day’. As Home put it : “If you think you 
may want Cavalry, it must be kept in a glass cage until the day arrives, no half measures 
are of any use.”73 In the light of this it may seem profligate to commit a large part of the 
cavalry to an operation that it was already known would not be strategically decisive. 
However, it must be remembered that Haig was under pressure from a timetable not of 
his own making. The Easter deadline for the B.E.F. to be ready for a combined 
offensive with the French in the south must have been a factor in his thinking. If cavalry 
could speed up the advance of the two southern armies into position to support this 
attack then the commitment of these sparse resources wo uld be justified. The removal 
over the winter of the Cavalry Corps’ artillery and machine guns for service in the front 
line, and the formation of pioneer battalions also showed that G.H.Q. was not afraid to 
dip into the resources of the Corps when it was convenient to do so. Equally while the 
cavalry could ill afford the additional horse losses incurred during the campaign, there is 
no doubt that the opportunity for mounted action provided a boost to the morale not 
only of the divisions involved but to the whole arm. A similar although limited effect 
may have been produced in the ranks of the rest of the army, the appearance of 
horsemen still being viewed as a sign of forward progress.  
   As was alluded to in the introduction to this chapter, the March fighting is also 
significant in that it was one of the few occasions when Haig (whatever his motivations) 
provided the cavalry with a realistic and achievable set of operational objectives. These, 
the cavalry were able entirely to fulfill. Thus judged against their operational goals as 
laid out by their commander they were entirely successful. Arguably this was not to 
happen again until Amiens in August 1918, and even there Haig widened his horizons at 
the last minute before the attack and insterted unrealistic additional objectives into the 
plan. While admittedly quite modest, this success has been almost entirely ignored by 
subsequent historians. There is one honourable exception, Cyril Falls, the Official 
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Historian. His remarks on contribution of mounted troops to the Hindenburg advance 
may be left as a final comment on the cavalry during this period: 
Practically all the work fell upon the infantry divisions because the corps cavalry 
regiments were not strong enough for much more than reconnaissance. It was 
perhaps unfortunate that the cavalry divisions were so carefully husbanded for 
the coming offensive during this phase; for the work done by the 5th Cavalry 
Division during the few days it was at the disposal of Fourth Army was 
brilliant.74  
 
 
Planning the Arras Offensive 
(Figure 3.4 overleaf) 
   In the spring of 1917, as with the Somme offensive the year before, Haig as 
Commander- in-Chief of the B.E.F. did not have a free hand to attack where he chose on 
the Western Front. He remained convinced that the decisive sector of the front was in 
the north, in Flanders, where an attack could clear the Germans from the Channel 
coast,75 but this plan was not to be realised until the autumn. Meanwhile he was obliged 
to fight on in the south in co-operation with the French. The replacement of General 
Joffre at the head of the French armies, the appointment of General Nivelle, and the 
politics which followed have been thoroughly examined elsewhere,76 however, the 
outcome of these discussions and the strategy for the coming months were laid out by 
G.H.Q. in January 1917.77 Essentially the B.E.F. was to play a supporting rôle to French 
attacks in the south, attacks would be launched in the Ancre Valley by Fifth Army, at 
Arras by Third Army (under General Allenby), and at Vimy Ridge by First Army. 
These would be limited affairs intended only “To pin the enemy to his ground, draw in 
his reserves, and thereby facilitate the task of the main French attack.”78 General Nivelle 
had also successfully argued for the British to take over a substantial additional sector of 
the line south of the Somme battlefield in order to free French Divisions for the 
upcoming offensive. This extension of the line was to be the responsibility of Fourth 
Army (as was examined earlier in this chapter). 
   The task laid before Third Army at Arras was “Firstly to seize the high ground about 
Monchy le Preux. Secondly, to turn the German defences south of Arras by a rapid 
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advance in a south-easterly direction towards Croisilles and Bullecourt.”79 This was to 
be the main thrust of the attack, and would be supported to the north by the capture of 
Vimy ridge by First Army, and by the operations of Fifth Army in the south. Haig, as 
was his habit, called for proposals from his army commanders for the details of how 
these attacks should be undertaken.  
   Edmund Allenby, commander of Third Army, was an almost exact contemporary of 
Haig, both were 56 years old in 1917. His career had also followed a path similar to 
Haig’s; Allenby following him into the post of Inspector General of Cavalry in 1910. 
He had gained significant combat experience in South Africa, both as a regimental 
officer and as a column commander, and in 1914 was appointed to lead all of the British 
cavalry in France, as commander of the Cavalry Division of the original B.E.F. As the 
number of cavalry in France increased he rose to command of the Cavalry Corps (then 
of 3 divisions, with a separate Indian Cavalry Corps) in October 1914.80 Perhaps 
unusually for the expanding B.E.F. all of these rôles were accommodated within his 
substantive pre-war rank of Major General, which he had held since 1909. He led the 
corps through the costly defensive fighting of First Ypres over the winter of 1914-15, 
before moving on to command V Corps in May 1915, again leading that formation 
through the defensive fighting of Second Ypres.81 Allenby took over command of Third 
Army in October 1915 when its former commander, Monro, was sent to the 
Dardanelles.82 T A Heathcote described Allenby as “the British Army’s last and greatest 
captain of horse”83 and it is probably true that he was the most experienced cavalry 
leader in the B.E.F. He was also to go on to famous success with mounted forces in 
Palestine. However in the spring of 1917 Third Army, with the exception of its 
unsuccessful diversionary attack on 1 July 1916 had not done much fighting. Apart from 
his limited rôle on the Somme, Arras would be Allenby’s first army-level set-piece 
battle, and his first major all-arms offensive action. 
   Opinions vary concerning the relationship between Haig and Allenby; Wavell claimed 
that “He [Allenby] and Haig had never been congenial to each other.”84 Lawrence 
James more recently described their relations as “outwardly tranquil”.85 Possibly, the 
similarity between the two men in their relative inarticulateness led to a degree of 
awkwardness in their meetings.86 General Charteris was a witness to this, observing 
“Allenby shares one peculiarity with Douglas Haig, he cannot explain verbally, with 
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any lucidity at all, what his plans are. In a conference between the two of them it is 
rather amusing.”87 Although he went on to point out that “…they understand one-
another perfectly.”88 In spite of their communication difficulties James asserts that Haig 
found in Allenby “…a trustworthy general, in tune with his own thinking and second to 
none in his adherence to the principles of the aggressive spirit and wearing down the 
enemy.”89 Indeed Allenby had gained a reputation for perhaps being unnecessarily 
aggressive, or profligate with the lives of his men. Haldane, commander of 3rd Division 
under Allenby at Ypres in 1915 remarked “Everyone hates being in Vth Corps”90 and he 
was widely unpopular. Wavell, naturally sought to excuse this, arguing that Allenby 
“…merely carried out the orders of superior authority” but tellingly went on: 
 But Allenby’s gospel of absolute loyalty to the orders of those above him made 
him wholehearted in his persistence to push in [sic] while any possible chance of 
success remained.91 
   This ‘aggressive spirit’ is apparent in the Appreciation produced by Third Army in 
February, outlining the Arras attack.92 Allenby believed a degree of tactical surprise was 
possible, even in an operation on a large scale, and measures were included to hide 
preparations for the assault. A short but intense artillery bombardment of only 48 hours 
was also proposed. This combination of shock and surprise, Allenby believed, would 
soon carry the attacking troops through the German defences and into open country, and 
he advocated a change in thinking among his subordinates: 
   At this period, the beginning of open warfare, it must be realised that the 
maintenance of the forward movement depends on the determination and power 
of direction of the commanders of sections, platoons, companies and battalions. 
The habit of digging a trench and getting into it, or of waiting for scientifically 
arranged artillery barrage before advancing, must be discarded.  
   A slow advance will give time for German reinforcements to arrive. If the 
advance is continued with reasonable rapidity it is probable that the resistance 
will quickly lessen and that we shall reach places in which there are no German 
troops other than those running away in front of us. 
… Artillery as well as infantry must shake off the habits of trench warfare. 
Battery commanders must be prepared to use their initiative and be able to make 
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rapid reconnaissance followed by rapid movement… direct fire will become 
common. 93 
Allenby’s thinking about the fluid nature of the likely fighting is also in evidence in his 
remark that “Staffs will move with the troops, and staff and other officers will require 
horses.”94 The contrast between this optimistic all-out attack and the measured ‘Bite and 
Hold’ approach of Rawlinson a year before is obvious. It is an easy cliché to suggest 
that this reflected Allenby’s cavalry background as opposed to Rawlinson the 
infantryman, but this is probably less relevant than the contrast between Rawlinson’s 
bitter experience of the Somme battles, and Allenby’s thrusting personality, combined 
with his inexperience of this type of fighting. This was the first offensive of this 
magnitude of which he had charge, and no doubt he wanted to make an impression. 
   In some respects this optimism had good grounds, in particular Third and First Armies 
were well supplied with artillery, over their 20km (12 mile) attack front they had twice 
the number of guns used on the 30km (18-mile) front of 1 July 1916.95 Expertise, 
particularly in the use of creeping barrages had also increased. Haig, however, was 
characteristically sceptical of the more innovative parts of the plan (as had been the case 
when he considered the proposed night attack on 14 July 1916). The 48-hour 
bombardment in particular was vetoed in favour of a more conventional four-day 
artillery preparation. 96 
   As this planning progressed, the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line 
(discussed in the previous section) began to unfold. In some respects this ought to have 
rendered Haig and Nivelle’s offensive plan obsolete, as the ‘Bapaume salient’ in the 
German line, which formed the original objective, no longer existed. Nivelle, however, 
remained adamant that the attacks at Arras by the British, and on the Aisne by the 
French should be carried out as planned, with minor amendments, and with the 
(somewhat coincidental) objective of taking the Hindenburg Line position in flank at 
both ends. Curiously, Haig’s principal concern became that further withdrawals by the 
Germans might take place before the offensive could be launched, preventing a 
sufficiently massive blow from being delivered against their forces.97 
   The Third Army infantry attack, supported by artillery, was divided into four main 
phases, corresponding with four objective lines;  
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· The ‘Black line’, to be captured in the first few minutes, consisted of the German 
front line trenches, and represented an advance of around 500-1000 yards (450-
900m); 
· The ‘Blue line’, attacked two hours after ‘Zero Hour’, included the German second 
line, a further 1000 yards (900m) forward. At this point the advance would pause to 
allow artillery to move forward. 
· The ‘Brown line’ was to be attacked at ‘Z plus 6 hours 40 minutes’ and included the 
so-called ‘Wancourt-Feuchy line’, an additional German defensive line some 2200 
yards (2km) beyond the ‘Blue line’. 
· Finally, an advance would be made at ‘Z plus 8 hours’, before dusk, to a position on 
the ‘Green line’. This line did not reflect a specific German defensive position but 
was an arbitrary line drawn along the high ground beyond the village of Monchy- le-
Preux, 7000 yards (6.4km) beyond the infantry start line. 
The ambitious nature of these infantry objectives is clear. They represent a significant 
penetration of the German position.  
   The rôle of the cavalry in the offensive was laid out in Instructions issued to the 
Cavalry Corps for offensive operations to be carried out by the Third Army issued on 5 
April 1917.98 The Corps was placed under Third Army command. Kavanagh, as corps 
commander however, did not have unified control of all five divisions. 1st Cavalry 
Division was allocated to support the Vimy Ridge attack under First Army command 
(later amended to G.H.Q. Reserve). Also the two Indian Divisions were separated from 
the corps; 4th Cavalry Division was attached to Gough’s Fifth Army in support of the 
Bullecourt attack to the south (which was to follow the Arras and Vimy Ridge 
offensives), and 5th Cavalry Division was held in G.H.Q. Reserve. Third Army was 
therefore immediately supported by the remaining two divisions of the Cavalry Corps; 
2nd and 3rd, along with an attached infantry division (the 17th). The Cavalry Corps 
objectives lay beyond those of the infantry, and were defined as a line astride the Arras 
– Cambrai road stretching from Riencourt in the south to Etaing in the north, a front 
some 8km (5 miles) wide, 16km (10 miles) beyond the initial British front line. This 
advance was to be attempted in the last hours of Z-Day, after the infantry had reached 
the Green line and formed defensive flanks on either side to the north and south.  
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   When compared with the cavalry objectives for 1 July 1916 the plans for the cavalry 
at Arras are superficially similar. Both required an advance by two divisions astride the 
main axial road through the battle front, to a depth of around 16km (10 miles). However 
as has been noted earlier there was less discussion at Arras of onward exploitation deep 
into the enemy’s rear areas. The contrast with the later operations of 1916 is also 
discernible in the movement timetable for the cavalry. 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions 
were expected to be in their ‘final positions of readiness’ astride the Cambrai road at 
Tilloy les Moufflaines “…by the time the infantry attacks are expected to reach the 
Brown line”, i.e. around Z plus 6 hours. Indeed the whole movement was intended to be 
more or less simultaneous. Instructions to the Cavalry Corps stated: 
It is the intention to issue this order [‘Cavalry advance’] in such time as will 
enable the leading brigades of the cavalry divisions to pass through the Green 
line as soon as, or very shortly after, the infantry reach that line.99  
Further, unlike the previous year when the cavalry had waited even in its most advanced 
positions of readiness behind the infantry start- line, the final position of readiness was 
defined actually beyond the German front line (Black line) position. This was certainly 
an innovative step, but the wisdom of pushing so many cavalry so far forward before the 
outcome of the infantry attack was certain is not beyond criticism, as subsequent events 
were to prove. Allenby and Kavanagh were forced strike a balance between placing 
mounted troops close enough to the battle to be of use, and potentially stranding them, 
out of supply in the chaotic forward area of an ongoing attack. A recognition of this 
potential supply problem can be seen in the orders to all arms to carry iron rations for 
three days, and the subsequently rather notorious order for the infantry to save weight 
by leaving greatcoats behind.100 The cavalry were issued three days oats for the horses 
(around 8kg (20lb)), as well as 190 rounds of rifle ammunition. 101 (In the event, the 
impact of this extra weight on already undernourished horses was severe). 
   The plan also suffered from the same command and control problems as had occurred 
the previous year. The final position of readiness of the two cavalry divisions was of 
less importance to their ability to advance, than their authority to do so. Once again 
instead of this being automatically timetabled, the order ‘Cavalry advance’ would come 
from Third Army via Cavalry Corps Headquarters. The likelihood of this order being 
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issued in a timely fashion, and quickly communicated to the troops concerned was very 
low. 
   Two final features of the Cavalry orders for the offensive are worthy of note. The first 
of these is a page of ‘Variations’ appended to the Instructions issued to the Cavalry 
Corps, these envisioned possible outcomes of the attack other than that initially outlined 
and offered compensating changes to the plan. Of particular interest was the ‘Second 
variation’. This gave ins tructions for routes to be reconnoitred so that in the event of the 
failure of VI Corps’ attack south of the river Scarpe, and a corresponding success by 
XVII corps to the north, the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions could be re-routed to exploit 
north of the river. The practicality of this manoeuvre in the middle of an attack is 
questionable, but the appearance of such flexible, contingency based planning is 
significant. Such a change of plan would also be hamstrung by the length of the chain of 
command between the troops concerned, and those at Third Army deciding to make the 
change. This factor was to become apparent during the course of the battle. 
   Secondly, in operation orders of 8 April,102 details are given of Army-level heavy 
artillery co-operation with the Cavalry Corps, both from Third and Fifth Armies, using 
long-range guns to ‘shoot’ the cavalry onto its distant objectives, the villages of Boiry, 
Vis, and Fontaine les Croiselles. This was a good idea in principle, but was to prove 
unsuccessful, the lack of controllable artillery support for the cavalry divisions 
becoming a significant factor in their subsequent performance.  
 
 
Arras: 9 April  
 
   The Cavalry Corps began April 1917 in its winter billets near the Channel coast. Two 
days before the start of the attack, the three cavalry divisions committed to the Arras 
battle began their movements (1st Cavalry Division supporting First Army, and 2nd and 
3rd Cavalry Divisions supporting Third Army). These moves were originally scheduled 
for 6 April, but were delayed until the 7th in the light of a 24-hour postponement of the 
whole operation requested by the French. 103 Initially the divisions closed up and moved 
to positions to the west of Arras. From north to south these were: 
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· 1st Cavalry Division: the valley of the Ternoise, north-west of St Pol, (HQ at 
Croix); 
· 3rd Cavalry Division: the valley of the Canche, from Frevent west as far as Conchy, 
(HQ at Monchel); and 
· 2nd Cavalry Division: the Authie valley from Doulens west to Auxi- le-Château, 
(HQ at Wavans).104 
In the case of 2nd and 3rd Divisions these moves simply followed the river valleys which 
had formed the units billeting areas, the Canche and the Authie. Each river valley 
offered water, and lay on a direct road towards Arras, the heads of the divisions lying 
an average of 30km (18 miles) from the city.  
   On ‘Z-1’; 8 April, the three divisions closed up further and advanced to holding 
positions closer to Arras. 1st Division moving to Frevin-Capelle 10km (6 miles) to the 
north-west of Arras, 3rd Division to Gouy-en-Artois, 14km (9 miles) to the west, and 
2nd Division to Pas-en-Artois, 25km (16 miles) to the south-west.105 
   The infantry attack began at 5:30am on 9 April. Significant gains were made by all 
three attacking corps on the Third army front; XVII Corps to the north of the Scarpe, 
and VI and VII Corps to the south of the river. Indeed Falls observed in the Official 
History that ‘… the first day’s operations of the battles of Arras were among the 
heaviest blows stuck by British arms in the Western theatre of war.’106 The greatest 
advance, some 5km (3½ miles) took place on the XVII Corps front immediately north 
of the Scarpe where 9th and 4th Divisions advanced to within a few hundred yards of the 
final Green Line objective beyond Fampoux, (the furthest advance yet in a single day in 
the trench war).107 In the centre VI Corps completely overwhelmed the German first 
line defences and were able to capture a number of guns in ‘Battery Valley’ to the rear 
of this position. Unfortunately delays in the attack meant  that the artillery barrage 
outran the infantry advance and the attack mostly halted short of the last major German 
defensive position, the Wancourt-Feuchy or Brown line. Only 15th Division on the left 
(north) of the VI Corps attack was able to penetrate the Wancourt-Feuchy defences and 
occupy a long north-south ridge, which became known as Orange Hill, but this was 
only achieved late in the day and little could be done to exploit this success. 108 
   In accordance with the plan, 109 the two cavalry divisions under Third Army command 
moved off on the morning of the 9th to positions of readiness. 2nd Cavalry Division 
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advanced to the suburb of Ronville, immediately behind the British line to the south-
east of Arras, arriving by 9:30am, and 3rd Cavalry Division halted on the racecourse to 
the north-west of Arras by 10:00am.110 In the light of the infantry successes, the order 
‘Cavalry advance’ was issued by Third Army. This was received at Cavalry Corps HQ 
by telephone at 2:40pm and wired to the divisions shortly after.111 In response to this 
3rd Cavalry Division moved around the north of Arras and onto Cavalry track ‘A’, the 
northernmost of the cavalry tracks prepared through the British front line. 2nd Cavalry 
Division advanced from Ronville via tracks ‘C’ and ‘D’ further to the south. Each 
division crossed the original front-line trenches via extensions to the tracks completed 
by dismounted parties earlier in the afternoon. 112 Both were in position in their ‘Final 
positions of readiness’ at Tilloy, astride the Arras-Cambrai road and beyond the 
German first line positions by 4:00pm, ready to advance towards their objectives 
beyond the Green line.113 Unfortunately with the Brown line defences still largely un-
breached such an advance was impossible and at 8:20pm the divisions were ordered to 
fall back to the west and south of Arras. 2nd Cavalry Division moved back to the 
Crinchon valley to the south-west of the town while 3rd Cavalry Division circled back 
around to the north to billets between the St. Pol road and the river Scarpe114 and on the 
racecourse.115 
   No cavalry support had been assigned to the XVII Corps north of the Scarpe in the 
original plan, except as one of the ‘variations’ included as an appendix. At a meeting 
during the afternoon Allenby (ignoring the planned ‘variation’) asked Haig, in view of 
the successful advance on this front, for the use of a brigade from 1st Cavalry Division, 
to support XVII Corps.116 Up to this time this division was he ld in G.H.Q. Reserve at 
Frevin-Capelle, 10km (6 miles) north-west of Arras. (9th Brigade of this division had 
already been detached to support the Canadian Corps of First Army to the north but 
was not brought into action).117 Haig agreed, but at this point the rather tortuous nature 
of the command structure became apparent. Although 1st Cavalry Division was in 
G.H.Q. reserve, it was still nominally under the command of Cavalry Corps (The 
remainder of which was under Third Army command). Thus orders from G.H.Q. to 1st 
Cavalry Division to detach a brigade to Third Army went through Cavalry Corps 
Headquarters. Cavalry Corps H.Q. were telephoned by G.H.Q. at 4.15pm, and in turn 
rang 1st Division with a warning order. Corps received a confirmatory G.H.Q. wire at 
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4.55pm, 118 but this was not passed on, instead 1st Division sought direct confirmation 
from G.H.Q., which was not received by the division until 6.15pm.119 By this time it 
was too late for anything significant to be done. The 1st Brigade was moved up as far as 
Athies, but got no further.120 The loss of this opportunity for exploitation was felt 
keenly by the infantry commanders of 4th and 9th Divisions.121 Br. Gen. Carton de 
Wiart, himself a cavalry officer, although at the time in command of 12th Infantry 
Brigade (part of 4th Division) recalled: 
We could have taken many more prisoners and much valuable ground if only 
cavalry had been available, but as it was we could see the guns being driven 
away into the distance, to be used against us, another day. 122 
Once again the length of the chain of command had prevented local commanders from 
exploiting situations where a rapid deployment of mounted troops might have made a 
significant difference. 
   Only one small-scale, but significant cavalry success is recorded from 9 April. The 
Northamptonshire Yeomanry were serving as the corps cavalry regiment of VI Corps, 
and accompanied by the corps’ 6th Cyclist Battalion formed the ‘Corps Mounted 
Troops’. Their orders were to advance behind the 15th Division attack, and then pass 
through the infantry and seize the river crossings over the Scarpe at Fampoux. These 
crossings would be vital in retaining contact between VI Corps south of the river and 
XVII Corps to the north, as the two corps advanced on their respective Green Line 
objectives.  
   When Feuchy village (the northern end of the Brown line on the VI Corps front) was 
captured by 15th Division, around 5:00pm, the Yeomanry under Lt Col. Seymour, 
accompanied by ‘A’ Company of the Cyclists advanced through the infantry. 
Continuing along the river bank for a further 1km (1/2 mile) the Yeomanry reached the 
cross-roads south of Fampoux village. ‘B’ Squadron under Maj. Benyon turned left 
towards Fampoux, and despite coming under sniper fire from the houses north of the 
river, drove off the snipers, captured two field guns, and “made good the road bridge”. 
Patrols were also sent across the river to link up with the forward elements of 4th 
Division north of the river. Meanwhile ‘C’ Squadron under Maj. Nickalls advanced 
further east to secure the railway bridge over the river, capturing four further guns and a 
number of prisoners, The two squadrons then bivouacked overnight, the horses 
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remaining saddled, in the marshes beside the river.123 The Cyclist company had been 
held up somewhat by the bad going along the river bank but arrived in time to throw out 
outposts to the south-east on the Monchy road, and to help secure the position 
overnight.124  
 
 
Arras: 10 April 
 
   Although by nightfall on 9 April no units of Third Army had reached the Green Line, 
their final first day objectives, Allenby was content that the battle was going well, and 
was keen to push on and exploit the success of the first day. Orders were given for a 
renewed attack at 8.00am on the 10th in which all three corps were to secure the 
remainder of the Brown Line positions.125 Orders were received from Third Army at the 
Cavalry Corps H.Q. at 11.30pm to be ready to move to support this attack at 7.00am. 126 
However VII Corps on the right (South) of the line was held up by continuing fighting 
in the Hindenburg Line trenches opposite its attack, and asked for a delay. A new start 
time was therefore agreed of 12:00 noon, this was telephoned to Cavalry Corps H.Q. at 
4.10am on the 10th and duly passed on to the cavalry divisions.127 While allowing the 
infantry more time to re-organise and for artillery to be brought up, the late start reduced 
the opportunities for cavalry exploitation. As Falls put it “The prospects for the cavalry 
going through before dark were thus diminished.”128 The attack on 10 April was 
successful in as much as the remainder of the Brown Line position, and Orange and 
Chapel hills beyond were captured.129 Further advance, however proved difficult. The 
ground before Monchy-le-Preux was swept by fire not only from the village itself but 
also from positions to the north of the Scarpe around Mount Pleasant and Roeux. As a 
result the infantry attack was halted by nightfall on the forward slopes of Orange Hill 
and as far east as Les Fosses Farm. 130 
   To the north of the Scarpe, Gen. Fergusson, commanding XVII Corps (belatedly) 
considered that there might be a “favourable” opportunity for cavalry along the north 
bank of the river from Fampoux towards Greenland Hill, supported by 4th Infantry 
Division attacking on their right towards Mount Pleasant and Roeux. 131 Accordingly at 
11.15am command of the whole of 1st Cavalry Division was restored to the Cavalry 
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Corps and Third Army from G.H.Q. (Excepting of course 9th Brigade still supporting 
the Canadians to the north.) Formal orders for the operation were issued as part of 
Cavalry Corps Operation Order No. 4 at 11.45am. 132 Maj. Gen. Mullens’ 1st Cavalry 
Division set off from its overnight position at Fermont-Capelle 10km (6miles) north-
west of Arras at around 1.45pm, 133 closing up to 1st Brigade which had moved forward 
the previous day, and with 5th Dragoon Guards (of 1st Brigade) as advanced guard. 
Progress was slow, 1st Cavalry Brigade recorded that “the road along the north bank of 
the Scarpe was not only very bad, but the congestion of traffic going both ways caused 
numerous blocks.”134 When Brig. Gen. Makins, in command of 1st Brigade reached 
Fampoux at 4:30pm it was clear after consultation with the infantry commanders of 4th 
Division that their supporting attack had made no headway against fire from Roeux 
chemical works and the railway embankment. Thus the cavalry attack stood no chance 
of success. 
There was no doubt that the cavalry could not advance – dismounted action 
would have had no more possible result than the infantry attack, and the 
mounted action was evidently not feasible. There was no scope, the troops were 
in a regular neck of a bottle, with no chance of outflanking movement.135 
The attack was called off and the division bivouacked where it stood, strung out 
between St. Nicholas, (north of Arras) and Fampoux. This attack was to be renewed at 
noon on the following day, 11 April, but the continuing opposition from Roeux made 
significant advances impossible and the operation was cancelled again at 6.00pm.136  
   For the two cavalry divisions supporting the Third Army advance south of the Scarpe, 
the delay in the infantry attack from 8.00am until noon gave a welcome respite. 
Retirement on the night of the 9th had been very slow, against the flow of traffic moving 
up in support of the attack, and most units had not reached their bivouac positions until 
the early hours of the morning of the 10th. 5th Cavalry Brigade recorded that their last 
unit in, ‘E’ Battery R.H.A., did not arrive until 5.30am. 137 The weather had also 
deteriorated, Monday had been cold but fine, overnight the wind rose bringing heavy 
showers of sleet and snow.138 4th Cavalry Brigade, moving in support of 3rd and 5th 
Brigades of 2nd Cavalry Division recorded on 9 April that “Owing to the darkness and 
the state of the Cavalry track” some units did not reach bivouac positions until 3.00am, 
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“…weather conditions miserable.”139 Again on 10 April “Weather conditions were 
abominable and could not have been worse.”140  
   As daylight came on 10 April the cavalry divisions turned laboriously around and they 
now set out again on the tracks north and south of Arras. 3rd Cavalry Division was to 
advance north of the Cambrai road with Monchy as its immediate objective. 2nd Cavalry 
Division was to advance south of the road towards Hill 90, behind the southern end of 
the Wancourt-Feuchy position. (Orders were issued by telephone from Cavalry Corps 
H.Q. in the early hours of the morning, and formalised in Cavalry Corps Operation 
Order No.4, issued at 11.45am on the 10th.)141 
   North of the Cambrai road 3rd Cavalry Division was telephoned by the Cavalry Corps 
H.Q. at around 11.00am. It was reported that infantry of 37th Division had been seen in 
Monchy- le-Preux, and that consequently the leading brigades of 3rd Cavalry Division 
should advance.142 Accordingly, Maj. Gen. Vaughan, commanding 3rd Cavalry Division 
ordered an advance by 8th Brigade north of Monchy towards Boiry-Notre-Dame, and by 
6th Brigade south of Monchy towards Vis-en-Artois (7th Brigade would remain in 
support). These movements began around 2:30pm.143 Throughout the afternoon 3rd 
Cavalry Division received reports of the faltering progress of 37th Division towards 
Monchy, coupled with optimistic urgings from Kavanagh at Cavalry Corps to push on 
and become involved in the battle at the earliest opportunity. At 3.40pm the Divisional 
Diary records “Patrols in touch with Infantry reported that 37th Division held up at 
western exits to Monchy le Preux, … [village] believed to be held by only two 
battalions which 37th Division hoped soon to dislodge.” Meanwhile at 3.50pm “Corps 
commander gave verbal orders on telephone that troops on south were pushing on well 
and that he wished division to push on rapidly and take risks.”144 These telephone 
interventions were to become a common feature of Kavanagh’s command style, not 
only at Arras but also in later battles. Unfortunately, as will be explored more fully in 
later chapters, he was rarely in command of the full facts at Corps H.Q. and these 
interventions were often unhelpful. 
   By five o’clock it was apparent to those at the front line that the infantry attack had 
stalled short of Monchy. 3rd Cavalry Division reported to Cavalry Corps at 5.20pm “Our 
infantry have not got Monchy”. 145 To get the attack moving again 37th Division 
suggested that the cavalry gallop the ridge to the north of the village around Pelves Mill, 
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as machine-gun fire from this area had the infantry pinned down. 146 By this time the 
lead elements of 8th Cavalry Brigade had advanced as far as the forward slopes of 
Orange Hill and were coming under fire from Monchy and from across the river to the 
north-east. At around 6.00pm an attempt to advance was made by a squadron each of 
the 10th Hussars (under Capt. Gordon-Canning) and Essex Yeomanry (under Maj. 
Buxton). The two squadrons galloped as far as Pelves Mill,147 but were driven back by 
artillery and machine-gun fire. Fortunately, their retreat was covered by a brief 
snowstorm. Casualties were also reduced by the Germans’ use of high explosive shells, 
which largely buried themselves in the ground, instead of airburst shrapnel. 148 
Meanwhile to the south of 8th Brigade, 6th Cavalry Brigade was supporting the infantry 
attack immediately to the west of Monchy, but this too was held up due to fire from the 
village and the Brigade could make no progress.149  
   The armoured cars of 7th L.A.C. Battery (attached to 3rd Cavalry Division), also made 
an attempt to advance, pushing down the Cambrai road. This proved extremely difficult 
as the road surface was shell damaged and blocked by fallen trees. The weather also left 
the going very muddy and falling snow blocked the drivers’ vision slits. The Battery 
diary records “with the exception of the drivers the personnel of the cars was constantly 
outside guiding and making up the road surface.” Some Germans were engaged around 
La Bergère crossroads, but with nightfall the attempt was abandoned, one car having to 
be left at Les Fosses Farm, stuck in a shell-hole.150 
   Meanwhile, south of the Cambrai Road Maj. Gen. Greenly’s 2nd Cavalry Division was 
at its position of readiness at Tilloy by 12.30pm. The division advanced with 5th Brigade 
on the left towards the south end of the Wancourt-Feuchy line, and with 3rd Brigade on 
the right towards Hill 90, at around 3:00pm (4th Brigade remained in support). However, 
as Hill 90 remained in German hands little progress was made.151  
   At 6.00pm 37th Division reported “…that situation west of Monchy was not rosy”, 152 
however this fact, although clear to those at the front, seems not to have been 
appreciated by the higher commanders. At 6:35pm a meeting took place between 
Allenby and Kavanagh where it was agreed that the cavalry should try to take Monchy 
that night, in co-operation with the 37th Division. Kavanagh once again telephoned 
Vaughan at 3rd Cavalry Division: 
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Corps Commander stated on telephone 6.35pm that both he and the Army 
Commander agreed that the Cavalry should make a determined effort to get 
Monchy tonight, as great importance was attached to the capture of Monchy. He 
considered that it was an opportunity for Cavalry to achieve important results by 
working wide round the flank in co-operation with infantry. 153 
This was clearly an overly optimistic appreciation of the situation, however it should be 
noted that reports were very slow reaching Cavalry Corps H.Q. Formal word of the 
failure of 8th Cavalry Brigade’s push on Pelves Mill, attempted at 6.00pm, did not reach 
Corps until 8.45pm.154 In the event there was no opportunity for an infantry advance due 
to continuing shelling and machine-gun fire, and indeed some battalions of 37th Division 
did not receive the attack orders until after the preparatory artillery barrage had already 
lifted.155 Thus no attack materialised.   
   The 3rd Cavalry Division retired at nightfall and bivouacked north of the Cambrai road 
and west of the Wancourt-Feuchy Line trenches and Orange Hill. No hot food was 
available and the ground was too soft to picket so the men sheltered in shell holes 
holding the horses. It snowed through most of the night. 8th Cavalry Brigade was subject 
to overnight shelling, 10th Hussars in particular suffered 9 men and 51 horses killed. 156 
South of the Cambrai road Gen. Greenly commanding 2nd Cavalry Division gave his 
brigadiers the choice of staying put overnight, or retiring, on the proviso that they 
returned ready to resume the attack at 5:00am on the 11th. The three brigades chose to 
stay put, and bedded down in shell-holes where they were, spread out between Tilloy 
and Neuville Vitasse. 157 They were re-supplied overnight by packhorse with 6lb (3kg) 
of oats per horse.158 5th Brigade in particular came under significant shell- fire during the 
night, and unable to re-deploy due to the darkness and the amount of wire lying around 
their position, suffered over 100 human casualties as well as losing a number of 
horses.159 Overall it was a cold and miserable end to a second frustrating day for the 
cavalry. 
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Monchy le Preux: 11 April 
(Figure 3.5 overleaf) 
   Even on 11 April, the third day of the offensive, Allenby believed that the possibility 
remained of a decisive blow. Indeed his orders for the day suggest that he thought a 
collapse of the enemy resistance was imminent. A telegram to corps commanders ran: 
“The A.C. wishes all troops to understand that the Third Army is now pursuing a 
defeated enemy and that risks must be freely taken.”160 How closely this represented the 
real situation is a moot point. The offensive was to be resumed by all three attacking 
Corps at 5:00am. Orders for the Cavalry Corps were issued at 11.45pm on the 10th.161 
One cavalry division was to support each corps attack; 1st Division supporting XVII 
Corps north of the Scarpe, 3rd Division Supporting VI Corps between the river and the 
Cambrai road, and 2nd Division supporting VII Corps south of the road. Cavalry was to 
advance at 6:00am; “Each [infantry] division will have one [cavalry] brigade close up 
behind, and in close touch with, the attacking infantry.”162 Ambitious objectives were 
set, not only of capturing the Green Line of 9 April, but of pushing on as far as the final 
German position, the so-called ‘Drocourt-Queant Line’ (nearly 10km (6 miles) east of 
Monchy), and linking up with Fifth Army, attacking that morning from the south at 
Bullecourt.163 
   The inability of the 1st Cavalry Division to advance north of the Scarpe has already 
been described. The activities of the 2nd Cavalry Division on the south side of the 
Cambrai road are equally quickly dealt-with. VII Corps to the south was tasked with the 
capture of Hill 90, and when this attack failed no opportunities remained for the division 
to advance. 2nd Cavalry Division remained in its overnight positions and came under 
renewed shell fire on the 11th, suffering significant casualties among the horses, before 
the whole division was withdrawn to its forming up positions in the Crinchon Valley at 
4.50pm. 164 
   Between the Cambrai road and the Scarpe, the attack was resumed by VI Corps at 
5:00am, supported by 3rd Cavalry Division. 15th Division attacked between Monchy and 
the Scarpe, while 37th Division attacked Monchy village itself. During the fighting of 
the previous day, 10 April, the German line to the north of Monchy had been held by 
the Reserve Battalion of the 162nd Regiment of the 17th Reserve Division holding a line 
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along the Monchy-Roeux road. This was a relatively fresh battalion. The line to the 
south through Monchy itself and along the Wancourt road was held by remnants of the 
other battalions of 162nd and 163rd Regiments, both of which had suffered heavily in the 
defence of Neuville Vitasse on 9 April, and subsequently holding the southern part of 
the Wancourt-Feuchy line. They had thus already been driven out of two previous 
defensive positions and their divisional artillery had been almost entirely captured or 
destroyed.  
   However, by the morning of 11 April the German position in Monchy had been 
reinforced (on the evening of the 10th) by the 3rd Bavarian Division. In particular I 
Battalion 17th Bavarian Regiment took over positions in the village. Unfortunately as 
these positions were taken over at night the Bavarians had little chance to arrange a 
proper defence. As a result the Bavarian battalion was virtually destroyed in the 37th 
Division attack at dawn. By 7:30am elements of both 15th and 37th Divisions were 
holding positions in, and to the north of Monchy village; 13/KRRC and 13/Rifle Brg. of 
111th Brigade (37th Div.) occupied the village, while 10 and 11/HLI of 15th Div held 
positions to the north. 165 Significantly, however, unlike the guns of the garrison of the 
village the previous day, the artillery of 3rd Bavarian Division survived intact, and was 
deployed in a great arc behind Monchy ready to pour fire onto the village. 166 
   Vaughan’s 3rd Cavalry Division took up a position behind the infantry attack ready to 
exploit around the flanks of Monchy. Their objectives were Pelves Mill on the left, and 
Bois Du Vert and ‘Hill 100’ in the centre approximately 1000m (1100yds) beyond the 
village. At 7:10am 8th Cavalry Brigade learnt that 112th Brigade had a foothold in the 
western part of Monchy and reported this to 3rd Cavalry Division. 167 Later at 7:55am 6th 
Cavalry Brigade to the south passed on a similar report: “112 Brigade report Monchy 
has fallen, also considers it safe to say that La Bergère has also fallen.” Further patrol 
reports from the 3rd Dragoon Guards (6th Brigade) suggested that the village was not 
wholly in British hands but that it was at least partly captured. 168 In response to this 
news, Brig. Gen. Bulkeley-Johnson, commanding 8th Cavalry Brigade ordered his 
brigade to advance on their objectives to the north of, and beyond the village. He issued 
verbal orders to the brigade: 
Seize the ridge Bois des Aubepines to Pelves Mill; Essex Yeomanry on the right, 
Tenth Hussars on the left. When this is achieved, proceed to first objective, 
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namely Bois du Sart - east end of Pelves, including Hatchet and Jigsaw woods… 
to each leading regiment two subsections machine guns. Rest of Brigade to 
follow in this order, G battery R.H.A., Blues, remainder of Machine Gun 
Squadron. 169  
He also reported the advance to 3rd Cavalry Division: 
In consequence of information that Monchy is now taken I am sending off Tenth 
and Essex to try to get their objectives. They are both going south of Orange Hill 
as M.G. fire from the river is as bad as ever and holding up the infantry. 170  
In the light of this advance, Brig. Gen. Harman of 6th Cavalry Brigade to the south 
ordered his own lead regiment, 3rd Dragoon Guards forward to conform with the 8th 
Cavalry Brigade move and cover their southern flank.  
   These three regiments moved forward over prepared trench crossings in the Wancourt 
Feuchy line at around 8:30am. 10th Hussars and Essex Yeomanry of 8th Brigade on the 
left (north), intending to circle around between Monchy and the Scarpe, while 3rd 
Dragoon guards of 6th Brigade headed south of the village. Emerging south of Orange 
Hill they advanced at the gallop, in line of troop columns, with one troop advanced as 
scouts.171 An advance in brigade strength like this was a rare enough sight to make a 
significant impression on the watching infantry. Capt. Cuddeford of the Highland Light 
Infantry (15th Div.) was witness to this advance: 
During a lull in the snowstorm an excited shout was raised that our cavalry were 
coming up! Sure enough, away behind us, moving quickly in extended order 
down the slope of Orange Hill was line upon line of mounted men covering the 
whole extent of the hillside as far as we could see. It was a thrilling moment for 
us infantrymen, who had never dreamt that we should see a real cavalry charge, 
which was evidently what was intended.172 
   It was at this moment that a decisive point was reached in the battle. The objectives of 
the cavalry advance lay beyond Monchy, and the squadrons had intended to skirt around 
the village, but after their experience the day before, Bulkeley-Johnson had ordered that 
if fire was encountered from north of the river the 8th Brigade should swing right and 
head directly for Monchy. The subsequent death of the Brigadier later that morning has 
denied history his own account of this decision, but it was recalled by Capt. Gordon-
  131 
Canning of the 10th Hussars, who had led the unsuccessful reconnaissance north of 
Monchy the day before: 
On the morning of 11th I definitely said that it would be impossible to advance 
via the low ground on Pelves Mill; the advance must be made via Monchy and 
then directed N.E, along high ground in order to outflank Pelves and Pelves 
Mill. This was agreed to by B.J.173 
   The advancing regiments were indeed brought under a heavy fire coming from Mount 
Pleasant Wood across the river and both regiments veered right into the village.174 After 
a brief conference in the village square between Lt. Col. Whitmore of the Essex 
Yeomanry and Lt. Col. Hardwick of the 10th Hussars, one squadron of Essex Yeomanry 
advanced north-east along the Pelves road, while the lead 10th Hussars squadron moved 
north along the road to Pelves mill. The remaining Germans in the village fled, but it 
was found to be impossible to advance beyond the village due to fire from German 
positions to the east and north. Lt Col. Hardwick (C.O. 10th Hussars) took a squadron 
around the north side of the village but he was driven back into the cover of the village 
via the château park on the northern side. Hardwick was severely wounded in the course 
of this manoeuvre and Lt Col. Whitmore of the Essex Yeomanry took command of 
forces in the village.175 These forces were quite substantial as in spite of the heavy fire 
received by the leading squadrons, and their inability to advance beyond the village, the 
remaining squadrons of both regiments had followed on closely, and rather than rallying 
back to Orange Hill had followed on into the village. Thus probably near to 1000 men 
and horses were packed into the village. 
   The infantry of 37th Division in Monchy were found to have suffered heavily, virtually 
all officers had been killed, and a party of only about seventy exhausted men was found 
in the western part of the  village, many were sheltering in cellars rather than active in 
defence.176 The infantry was set to collecting wounded, digging, and salvaging tools and 
ammunition while the cavalry took over defence of the village. The Vickers guns of the 
MG Squadron and the regimental Hotchkiss were deployed on the north-eastern, 
eastern, and south-eastern exits to the village, two strong-points being constructed; at 
the north-eastern apex of the châ teau park, and on the eastern side of the Pelves road.177 
Unfortunately as a number of the tool-pack horses had been lost in the advance, 
fortifying the position proved difficult, in addition both the MG Squadron and the 
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regiments had lost a number of machine-gun ammunition packs, so rounds were in short 
supply.178 The Essex Yeomanry made up for this loss by salvaging two infantry Lewis 
guns and bringing them into action. 179  
   By around 9.30am the village had been placed in a reasonable state of defence, but 
around this time German shelling of the village also started to intensify. While out in the 
open the effect of German shelling had been greatly nullified by the softness of the 
ground, this was not the case among the streets and buildings and the cavalry started to 
suffer heavily as a result. Large numbers of led horses filled the streets of Monchy, and 
sought cover on the western side of the village. These streets were soon blocked with 
dead and injured horses.180  
   Meanwhile on the right of the 8th Cavalry Brigade, 6th Cavalry Brigade advanced as 
far as the Monchy-Wancourt road south of Monchy, with 3rd Dragoon Guards leading. 
The regiment advanced with B Squadron in front (Capt. Holroyd-Smith), with one troop 
of the squadron in line and the remaining three troops in line of troop columns behind, 
followed by C Squadron (Maj. Cliff). On reaching the road, the Dragoons came upon a 
party of Germans attempting to dig in, in front of four guns. These troops fled leaving 
the guns.181 Very few friendly infantry were to be seen and the Brigade came under fire 
from Guemappe 1000m (1100 yards) to the south-east, so they took up dismounted 
positions along the road, deploying their Hotchkiss guns, and supported by the Vickers 
of the attached MG section. 182 
   Towards 9:00am, in an attempt to assess the situation Brigadier Bulkeley-Johnson 
commanding 8th Cavalry Brigade, advanced with his staff as far as the Monchy-
Fampoux road, but here he was killed. As a result command of the brigade fell to Lord 
Tweedmouth, C.O. of the Blues, although in fact with 10th Hussars and the Yeomanry in 
Monchy, Tweedmouth’s command was limited for practical purposes to his own 
regiment, the brigade RHA battery, and the remainder of the Brigade MG Squadron. 183  
   At around 10:30am the 63rd Brigade (Reserve brigade of 37th Division) was ordered 
up to reinforce the village. These troops were able to advance only as far as an area of 
German practice trenches north-west of Monchy, where the bulk of the brigade took 
cover, feeding small parties into Monchy as opportunities arose during breaks in the 
firing.184 Also at around this time the three batteries of horse artillery belonging to 3rd 
Cavalry Division; C, G, and K, Batteries of IV Brigade RHA came into action in 
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support of 6th and 8th Brigades. Deploying in the valley between the south end of 
Orange Hill and Monchy itself, they fired protective barrages beyond the village,185 450 
rounds per battery were fired in the course of the day. 186  
   As the morning wore on, the situation in the village became grim, especially for the 
exposed horses. Indeed Lt. Swire of the Essex Yeomanry had to be specially detailed for 
the task of shooting wounded horses in the crowded streets.187 Col. Whitmore reported 
at 11:10am: 
Have sent several messages conveying all information of E.Y. and X.R.H. What 
remains of those regiments are holding on to the north-east, east and southern 
exits of the village. Require both M.G.s and ammunition. Am afraid we have 
had many casualties. Counter-attack expected. Col. Hardwick and several 
officers wounded. Reinforcements required as reserve. Majority horses 
casualties.188  
   An attempt was made at around 11.20am by the Royal Horse Guards (Blues), with the 
remaining four guns of 8th Machine Gun Squadron to try and reinforce the village but 
this was forced back by the weight of fire falling around the village. Two gun pack 
horses were hit and the guns lost in the snow. 189 At this point Vaughan, in command of 
3rd Cavalry Division realised that no further progress was likely and a decision was 
made for the division to “strengthen any position they now hold” using machine guns 
and to try to withdraw the remaining horses.190 Those of 6th Cavalry Brigade (3rd 
Dragoon Guards) to the south of the village escaped without great loss, but the horses of 
8th Cavalry Brigade were heavily shelled, and many more were killed during attempts to 
withdraw them.  
   A further despatch from Whitmore in Monchy at 11:45am read ‘We are badly in need 
of reinforcements and machine-guns.’191 In response to this a second attempt was made 
at around 2:00pm by A Squadron of the Royal Horse Guards and the remaining 
subsection of machine guns to reinforce the village. No. 1 MG Section did make it into 
the village, although the accompanying squadron of the Blues was forced back, perhaps 
fortuitously as their additional presence in the village would probably have served only 
to provide further targets for the German guns. 
   Similar concerns were being felt by the 3rd Dragoon Guards on the right (6th Cavalry 
Brigade) front. Fearing being outflanked to the south, where the line was held only by a 
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party of about thirty infantrymen, survivors of the morning attack, a message was sent at 
around 2.30pm asking for reinforcements. One squadron of the North Somerset 
Yeomanry (6th Cavalry Brigade), was despatched accompanied by four machine-guns, 
and by regimental tool-pack horses.192 An initial attempt to advance mounted was met 
with heavy machine-gun fire, but a second attempt on foot leading pack animals only 
was successful, reinforcing the 3rd Dragoon Guards on the Wancourt road.193  
   By mid afternoon it was appreciated at all levels of command that the attack around 
Monchy had stalled. At 5.00pm, Kavanagh at Cavalry Corps H.Q. ordered the 
withdrawal of the un-engaged parts of the corps; (2nd Cavalry Division, and the 7th 
Brigade of 3rd Cavalry Division) to their former positions to the west of Arras. The 
remaining brigades in Monchy were to withdraw “…when the situation permits”. 194 
Indeed despite the fact that the Hussars, and Yeomanry in Monchy and the Dragoon 
Guards to the south fought on into the evening, Advanced Cavalry Corps Headquarters 
in Arras ignored them, closing at 6.00pm and withdrawing to Duisans, west of the city.  
   In the late afternoon infantry of 12th Division were sent into the village under cover of 
snow to relieve the cavalry. These were later reinforced by the 17th Division, formerly 
the division attached to the Cavalry Corps as part of the Third Army reserve.195 As night 
fell a line was consolidated from Fampoux, through Monchy and along the Monchy-
Wancourt road. The majority of the cavalry were withdrawn, handing over the defence 
of the village to 37th Infantry Brigade at midnight. Due to a lack of machine guns the 
cavalry Hotchkiss teams as well as the Vickers guns of the 8th Brigade Machine Gun 
Squadron were retained in Monchy until the following day. A party of fifty men, mostly 
10th Hussars, stayed on under the command of Capt. Palmes.196 
   With the departure of this stay-behind party on 12 April the part played by the cavalry 
in the Arras offensive came to an end On the night of the 11th Allenby had ordered all 
the cavalry back to its billets of 8 April, to the west of Arras. After resting there they 
were further withdrawn on 16 April. On 18 April, Haig ordered Kavanagh to keep two 
brigades in readiness within 36 hours of the front line, but these were never called for 
and cavalry took no further part in the battle.197 
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Lessons of Monchy 
 
   An analysis of the overall ‘success’ or otherwise of the cavalry in the operations 
during the advance to the Hindenburg Line has already been offered. It has been argued 
that while strategically of limited significance, these operations were tactically well 
conducted and reflect credit on the mounted troops involved. The production of the 
G.H.Q. pamphlet also reflects an acknowledgement of this at the time, even if this was 
to be forgotten by post-war commentators.  
   The part played by the Cavalry Corps in the Arras battles, however, is less easily 
defined. A simple verdict on the Arras offensive is offered by the fate of its commander. 
Allenby was removed from command of Third Army and sent off to Egypt.198 Despite 
his later successes this move can only be viewed at the time as a demotion, and the 
inference from that is that the offensive was a failure. Rawlinson had learned in 1916 
that such set piece offensives have a na tural internal momentum, and to push on after 
that has run out is to court great human loss for little territorial gain, hence ‘Bite and 
Hold’. The latter stages of the Arras campaign follow this pattern, the battle was pushed 
on into the second half of April, when the Third army was exhausted and the Germans 
had reorganised their defences, and became increasingly bogged-down and bloody. The 
early stages of the attack, however, are rightly viewed as a notable success. The Third 
Army advanced further, faster, and with fewer losses than had been achieved hitherto in 
trench fighting. Unfortunately the cavalry attack at Monchy- le-Preux fell at the ‘high-
water mark’ of the offensive. No further significant advances were made after 11 April, 
and the failure of 8th Cavalry Brigade has developed into a metaphor for the failure of 
the offensive as a whole, and for Allenby’s lack of understanding of the battle.  
   At first glance the cavalry fighting of 9-11 April supports this conclusion. Clearly the 
advance of 3rd Cavalry Division on 11 April was, from the point of view of its 
operational objectives, a failure. No units reached even their first objectives of Pelves 
Mill and Hill 100, and exploitation beyond towards the wider operational goal of the 
Drocourt-Quèant line 10km (6 miles) to the east, was never a possibility. Also, as 
Kavanagh wrote to Allenby in a letter of 13 April “Altogether I am afraid it has been 
rather an expensive business.”199 Just how expensive is detailed in Appendix 3.2. 3rd 
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Cavalry Division as a whole took 598 casualties over the three days, and the regiments 
that held the line around Monchy suffered the greater part of these losses; over 400. Col.  
Whitmore estimated that by 11.00 am on 11 April the garrison of the village, (formed of 
the 10th Hussars, Essex Yeomanry, 8th MG Squadron and some infantry) had been 
reduced to “…considerably less than half its strength”. 200  
   This human loss, however, was overshadowed in the eyes of contemporary observers 
relatively accustomed such losses, (Preston described the casualties as … “Regrettable 
[but] proportionately no higher than in many infantry attacks.”201) by the more unusual 
sight of the equally massive loss of horses. Lieutenant Alan Thomas, an infantry officer 
who visited Monchy on the evening of 12 April as part of the 37th Division described 
the scene:  
Heaped on top of one another and blocking up the roadway for as far as one 
could see lay the mutilated bodies of our men and their horses. These bodies torn 
and gaping had stiffened into fantastic attitudes. All the hollows of the road were 
filled with blood. This was the cavalry. 202 
This passage has been picked up by nearly every subsequent published account of the 
battle,203 and serves as a graphic image of the scale of equine loss. Exact figures for 
horse casualties are hard to determine (this question will be examined in more detail 
later in this chapter), but may be estimated at somewhere between 500 and 1000. A 10th 
Hussar survivor of the battle offered the higher figure, claiming that his regiment left 
the village after dark with only 30 horses still in hand.204 Whatever the exact figure, the 
loss was enormous, and the gains very limited.  
   It is tempting to look no further at the involvement of the cavalry at Monchy than this, 
and to take Thomas’ final words “This was the cavalry” as an overall verdict on their 
usefulness in the offensive.205 However while it is easy to characterise the offensive as a 
whole, and Monchy in particular as expensive failures, when these events are viewed in 
more detail, from the point of view of mounted troops, some facts emerge to the credit 
of the cavalry and their commanders. 
   The precise events of the early morning of 11 April remain somewhat controversial, 
The ‘capture’ of Monchy is claimed by the 37th Division, and a fine memorial to this 
achievement stands in the village. However units of 15th Division to the north, the 
cavalry, and even C Battalion of the Tank Corps all claimed a share of these laurels.206 
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What is less in doubt is that credit for the retention of the village in British hands for the 
remainder of the day falls to Col.  Whitmore and the 6th and 8th Cavalry Brigades. Again 
as at Gueudecourt the previous autumn, a point had been reached where an important 
tactical objective fell briefly between the two armies. The German defences of the 
village had been more or less destroyed, but in making the effort 111th and 112th 
Brigades had so exhausted themselves that they were in no position to defend the 
ground gained against a counter-attack. The albeit somewhat accidental arrival of the 
cavalry secured the village for the British. Kavanagh claimed that “… if they had not 
gone in and occupied Monchy the Germans could have reoccupied it when they 
pleased.”207 There is no evidence that the Germans made any serious attempt to 
recapture the village once the cavalry had arrived, concentrations of enemy infantry 
were noted on several occasions, but these were dispersed by artillery and machine-
guns.208 However, this should not be viewed as evidence that they would not have taken 
it back if they thought it practicable, rather that the presence of the cavalry rendered 
such a counter-attack foolhardy. 
   The accidental nature of the cavalry presence in the village should also be stressed 
(and has been examined earlier). Monchy did not form the objective of their attack; a 
commander who deliberately placed nearly an entire brigade of cavalry in such a 
position, and left it there at the mercy of enemy artillery for the remainder of the day 
would be open to serious censure. However, in the confused situation of the morning of 
11 April, the ability of the cavalry to consolidate (albeit at great cost) the work of the 
infantry earlier in the day, until proper infantry relief could be co-ordinated, probably 
turned the attack of 37th Division from a costly failure into a success.  
   It is possible to speculate why the Germans made no serious attempt to recapture 
Monchy. One answer, and possibly one of the key tactical lessons of the battle, is the 
effectiveness of cavalry machine-guns. Ivor Maxse is famous for observing later in the 
war that “A platoon without a Lewis Gun is not a platoon at all!”209 and the same may 
be said for the Hotchkiss guns in the cavalry. Since 1916 these had been issued at the 
level of 16 per regiment, or at least one per troop. This overcame the earlier problem 
created by the numerical weakness of cavalry units, namely that their dismounted rifle 
strength, and thus unit firepower was very low. The presence of pack-mounted 
Hotchkiss guns within the troops themselves, as well as the addition of the 12 Vickers 
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guns in each brigade machine-gun squadron, provided cavalry units with substantial 
mobile firepower. This was recognised before the Arras offensive began. The Third 
Army appreciation of 7th February stated that: 
With the cavalry, as with the infantry, the essence of success lies in moving 
forward rapidly before German reinforcements arrive on the scene. Once the 
ground is gained it will not be difficult to hold it against counter attacks, having 
in view the great increase in firepower now made available by machine guns.210 
Col. Whitmore put this into practice at Monchy basing his defence of the village around 
machine gun strong points. Unfortunately many of the guns and as importantly 
ammunition pack-horses had been lost in the advance and he never had as many 
machine-guns as he would have liked. This is reflected in the stress he placed on “M.G.s 
and ammunition” in his messages to Brigade H.Q., and the necessity of salvaging two 
infantry Lewis Guns found in the village. The remainder of the day resolved itself into a 
duel between the dwindling number of cavalry machine-guns firing from the village, 
many of which were put out of action, 211 and German machine-guns and artillery 
seeking to silence them. In the event the cavalry were able to hang on, and the tenacity 
with which their guns were manned is reflected in the Victoria Cross awarded to Lance 
Corporal Mugford, formerly of the Essex Yeomanry, then serving in the 8th M.G. 
Squadron, who continued to man his Vickers with two broken legs, refusing to be taken 
to the aid post.212 
   A similar situation developed to the south of the village where the 3rd Dragoon Guards 
based their defence of the Wancourt road around their machine-guns, receiving 
reinforcement of further guns from the 6th Brigade M.G. Squadron and from the North 
Somerset Yeomanry in the course of the afternoon. The Brigade War Diary drew 
attention to this stating: 
O.C. 3rd D. Gds reported very favourably on Hotchkiss rifles stating that the line 
held by 3rd D. Gds was defended entirely with Hotchkiss rifles which were able 
to break up assembly of Germans prior to counter-attack.213 
   The ability of relatively small numbers of machine-gun armed cavalry to defend 
tactically important positions leads to another important question concerning their use 
not only in the Monchy battle but in the offensive as a whole; were there simply too 
many cavalry? There is little doubt that Monchy could have been defended by a 
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significantly smaller force. To pack the whole of two regiments into the village simply 
resulted in the heavy casualties suffered by these units in the crowded streets, without 
greatly enhancing the potential defence. Kavanagh himself raised this point “Each 
Commanding Officer brought the other two squadrons of his regiment rather too close 
on the leading squadrons and in turn were forced to close into the village.”214 Further 
reinforcements from the Royal Horse Guards and 8th MG Squadron also made several 
attempts to reach the village in the course of the day. But while the machine guns were 
desperately needed, and had been requested by Whitmore, it is hard to see what help the 
Blues would have been, other than to provide additional targets for the German artillery. 
   At a higher level, the same problem arose with the 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions as a 
whole. Allenby deserves credit for his keenness to deploy these troops forward, and 
Final Positions of Readiness beyond the Black Line (German Front Line) reflect a 
useful tactical change from 1916 when such formations were typically held hopelessly 
far behind the line. However it is clear that Allenby miss-read the battle in one critical 
respect. After the infantry made the dramatic progress of 9 April, he seems to have 
concluded that the battle was very nearly won, and that the successes of the first day 
would continue on subsequent days. As he put it in his telegram to corps commanders 
on 10 April; “The A.C. wishes all troops to understand that Third Army is now pursuing 
a defeated enemy and that risks must be freely taken.”215 He expressed slightly more 
reservation in a letter to his wife the same day, but the tone is similar: “The battle is not 
over, as we are still on the tail of the enemy, pressing and capturing their rearguards.”216 
If this is viewed alongside the deep objectives set out for the cavalry advance on 11  
April, it is clear that he did not anticipate much organised resistance.  
   In drawing this conclusion Allenby was simply wrong. It has been pointed out by both 
Falls217 and Wynne 218 that at Arras the new German techniques of defence in depth 
were not fully developed. Counter-attack divisions were held too far in reserve (to 
protect them from Allied artillery), and were thus not available to support the front line 
divisions, which were in many cases virtually wiped out. Nonetheless, the German 
position was, if incomplete, still significantly deeper than those of the previous year. A 
typical German regimental defensive position (of three battalions) now extended to a 
depth of up to 10km (6 miles)219 as opposed to the deployment over as little as 1000m 
(1100 yards) used previously on the Somme. It was therefore unrealistic to expect that 
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after an infantry advance of only around 5km (3 miles), that had not completely 
overcome the enemy’s existing fixed defences (much of the Brown line was still in 
German hands on the night of 9 April) that cavalry would be able to advance in strength 
unimpeded. Instead the 2nd and 3rd Divisions were trapped, out of reach of water and 
supply, in the muddy space between Arras at their backs and the remaining German 
defences in front of them to the east.  
   It is arguable that the greater progress achieved by XVII Corps north of the Scarpe 
offered the possibility of cavalry exploitation. Unfortunately on this side of the river the 
available cavalry of 1st Division had been held so far back in reserve (in a manner 
reminiscent of the Somme battles the year before) that it was not able to reach the 
battlefield in time. E. L. Spears summed up the frustration felt by those who were 
witness to these events: 
As a cavalry officer I cannot but feel the deepest regret that my old arm was so 
mishandled. There seems to be absolutely no doubt from the evidence of 
infantry officers, both of the 9th and 4th Divisions, that cavalry could have got 
through on their fronts on the afternoon of the 9th. It is deplorable that instead of 
this being attempted the division north of the river was held so far back as to be 
useless, while south of it great masses of horsemen clogged the advance of both 
infantry and guns.220 
Elsewhere Spears went on to add “in one respect the unfortunate cavalry… was lucky in 
that the Germans had neither guns to fire nor planes to see with; for this great assembly 
of horses only four thousand yards from the front presented an unheard-of target.”221 In 
the light of what happened at Monchy this is an important point. Fortunately apart from 
those engaged at Monchy, only one brigade was exposed to significant shelling. 5th 
Cavalry Brigade came under fire between 5.00pm on 10 April and 7.00am on the 11th as 
it occupied a position at the southern end of the cavalry line opposite Wancourt and Hill 
100. Here losses were substantial, amounting to over 100 human and nearly 350 equine 
casualties suffered in one night.222  
   Losses from enemy artillery were not the only casualties suffered by the Cavalry 
Corps over the three days spent in and out of the forward area. The extreme weather 
also played a significant part. The generally poor condition of the horses as a result of a 
long cold winter on short rations has already been discussed. Added to this was the 
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heavy weight carried (including extra ammunition and horse feed), and the dreadful 
going on roads and cavalry tracks which rapidly deteriorated into deep mud and slush. 
Maj. Parks, Assistant Director Veterinary Services (A.D.V.S.) of 2nd Cavalry Division 
summed up the conditions; “The cavalry track was deep with mud almost impassable to 
riding horses, quite impassable to wheels; horses suffering from exposure got down and 
were unable to rise.”223 Even in the billeting areas to the west of Arras the weather made 
conditions terrible. Trooper Bailey of 1st Life Guards (7th Cavalry Brigade) gave a vivid 
and widely quoted description of the morning of 10 April on Arras racecourse: 
The horses had pulled up their heel pegs and were huddled together. Some were 
dead through exposure, others had chewed their saddle blankets to pieces. It was 
impossible to release the head chains as they were completely frozen, and so 
were our fingers. … After a while came the order to saddle up and mount. What 
with the freezing night which had weakened the horses and our combined 
weight, many of them just collapsed and died.224 
   Maj. Jolliffe, A.D.V.S. of 3rd Cavalry Division complained after the battle that “There 
appears to be a great deal of difficulty in obtaining accurate figures for horse casualties - 
…in a large proportion of cases it was quite impossible to find out what had become of 
the horses that were missing.”225 This remains the case. Accurate overall figures for 
horse losses are difficult to determine, not least because there was little standardisation 
in listing. Horses were recorded as ‘killed in action’, ‘died’, ‘destroyed’, ‘evacuated’, 
‘wounded’ and a host of other sub-categories. A table of fatal horse casualties for the 
Cavalry Corps was produced by the Deputy Director Veterinary Services (D.D.V.S.) 
and this is reproduced as Appendix 3.3, however it is clear from other sources that the 
total of 1208 fatalities for the Corps suggested by the D.D.V.S. is an underestimate of 
the losses. For 2nd Division the figure of 464 excludes a further 308 horses wounded or 
evacuated226 giving a divisional total of 772. Similarly, a further 382 horses 
evacuated227 should be added to the figure of 603 for 3rd Division giving a total of 985. 
On this basis the figure for 1st Division of 141, should perhaps be increased by around 
50% to 200. This gives an overall corps loss of approximately 2000 equine casualties 
from all causes. 
   Clearly the majority of losses in 3rd Cavalry Division were from enemy fire (in 6th and 
8th Cavalry Brigades in particular). However for units less heavily engaged the losses 
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from cold and exhaustion were proportionally higher. 5th Cavalry Brigade lost 347 
killed wounded and missing from shellfire, but a further 130 died of exhaustion. 228 4th 
Cavalry Brigade, who as divisional reserve suffered very little at the hands of the 
Germans lost 15 horses killed and wounded, but a further 65 either died of exhaustion or 
had to be destroyed. In addition 29 were evacuated sick.229 In the light of these figures 
the ‘mishandling’ of the Cavalry Corps complained of by Spears becomes all the more 
evident as their advance not only exposed them to enemy attack to no purpose but also 
the very act of advancing in such atrocious conditions inflicted significant casualties on 
already weakened horses. 
   In view of all these difficulties and losses, and of Allenby’s over-optimism, the 
question arises whether any useful rôle existed for cavalry in the offensive. The 
deepening of the German defensive system had made a ‘breakthrough’, in the sense of a 
complete strategic penetration of their organised defences as Haig had envisioned the 
year before, ever less likely. It is not axiomatic, however, that this diminished the 
possible usefulness of mounted troops in the offensive. It has been shown earlier in the 
remarks of Maj. Darling that during the winter cavalry had been training for a re-
defined offensive rôle, involving relatively close ‘definite objectives’ and interacting 
with supporting infantry. It is arguable that the deepening of the German defensive 
zone, rather than offering fewer opportunities for mounted troops, in fact had an 
opposite effect. As the battle area deepened, fighting inevitably became more fluid, with 
a lower density of troops and artillery within it. In this more open fighting the potential 
for small mounted units to exploit ‘gaps’ at a tactical rather than operational and 
strategic level, and to take advantage of fleeting opportunities was ever greater. Cavalry 
could also potentially extend of the gains of the infantry (typically limited, as at Arras, 
to around 5km (3 miles)) and push on to the full depth of the enemy defences.  
   As this study will go on to show, the full significance of this change was not 
appreciated, and reflected in cavalry fighting until the following year. The seeds of it 
were evident at Arras, and again at Cambrai in November 1917 but were not fully 
developed until Amiens in 1918. However on both those later occasions this cavalry 
effort followed closely on the heels of the infantry attack on the first day, or even first 
few hours of the battle. A significant dislocation of the German defences could be 
expected from the shock of the opening of an offensive, and therein lay the opportunity 
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for the cavalry. To expect that this effect would persist until the following day, or as 
Allenby did, to the third day of the battle was simply unrealistic. German 
reinforcements could be expected if not within hours then at least within a day, and after 
that any forward momentum would be lost. 
   The operations around Monchy reflect a move towards this new style of fighting, 
initial objectives were quite modest and infantry support was expected to take over the 
positions gained. Unfortunately the command structure and communications available 
to 37th Division and to the cavalry were not flexible enough to cope with this new style 
of fighting. Artillery co-ordination in particular failed completely. In the attempt to 
deploy guns forward to support the renewed attacks confusion reigned. The commander 
of 111th Brigade reported of his attack on Monchy on the morning of 11 April: “At 
5.00am when the attack started my brigade had no artillery support, and I did not know 
what batteries had been allotted to me, or who was commanding them.”230 Indeed it has 
been suggested that the bombardment which did arrive in support of this attack actually 
fell on the attackers, hitting two of the four available tanks.231 If this was the situation in 
a prepared infantry attack, how much more difficult it would be to support more 
spontaneous mobile cavalry operations can only be imagined. Allenby’s remarks about 
the need for troops to discard the habit of waiting for a “…scientifically arranged 
barrage” have been quoted earlier, but while the flexibility he was urging was 
admirable, proper artillery support remained fundamental to the success of any attack. 
As was mentioned above, this general deterioration in the organisation of the attackers 
was also exacerbated by a corresponding, inverse level of re-organisation by the 
Germans. By the third day of the battle the defences around Monchy had hardened out 
of all proportion to their condition on 9 April. 
   The fate of the 8th Cavalry Brigade at Monchy has been blamed on a neglect of these 
tactical basics. Capt. R. Gordon-Canning, who commanded ‘B’ squadron of the 10th 
Hussars in the battle wrote to the Cavalry Journal in the 1930s making this point: 
I consider that arrangements should have been made for a machine gun and 
artillery barrage on to Pelves Mill and Mt. Pleasant Wood. The German 
garrisons were left untouched to do what they liked with us…The invariable 
error of a localised attack was again brought out. No sooner were the two 
advanced regiments in Monchy than all further movement stopped. This 
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permitted every German gun to concentrate on Monchy within two minutes of 
our arrival. If a holding attack had been carried out by the infantry on Pelves 
Mill and Roeux at the identical moment of our advance, I believe the cavalry 
could have obtained Keeling Copse and Bois des Aubepines within half-an-hour 
of leaving Orange Hill.232 
In short, in the absence of diversionary attacks, and suitable artillery and machine-gun 
support, the cavalry inevitably became trapped in the village, a target for enemy 
artillery. Of the Army level artillery support proposed for the cavalry in orders of 8 
April, (referred to earlier) no sign can be found on 11 April. Even the 3rd Cavalry 
Division’s own integral R.H.A. batteries only came into action in support of the attack 
at around 10.30am, by which point the lead regiments were already bogged-down in 
Monchy, and the initiative had been lost. Had proper artillery support been available to 
the cavalry from the outset of their attack, (As had been the case in the Hindenburg Line  
battles in March) the result may have been very different. 
   A second aspect of this new fighting which has been alluded to earlier is scale. Two 
divisions of cavalry advanced on the VI Corps front, yet it has been suggested that 
Monchy was somewhat over-garrisoned by two regiments, and during the offensive as a 
whole only three or four regiments were seriously engaged (out of eighteen). It is 
arguable that very similar results could have been obtained with a far smaller force of 
cavalry, and indeed that a smaller force would have been more manoeuvrable, and 
would have led to a less cumbersome command structure and more flexibility. Falls 
recognised this, observing “In place of the ambitious scheme of using cavalry in masses, 
by divisions, as was projected south of the Scarpe, the best opportunity seems to have 
been for squadrons acting independently.”233 For this to work, however, a change in 
command structure and philosophy would also be necessary, with far more delegation to 
front line leaders. Falls again, “… responsibility and freedom of action should be 
delegated to subordinate commanders who are well forward. The German system which 
made the battalion commander the real controller of the battle proved its value again 
and again.”234 Sadly there was little evidence of this on the British side at Arras. The 
situation north of the Scarpe on 9 April serves as an example, where local commanders 
saw the potential for mounted exploitation but had no cavalry to hand, and no authority 
to obtain them. 
  145 
   Much of this may seem somewhat theoretical, and based upon hindsight, but the Arras 
fighting does offer one practical demonstration of these principles. The capture of the 
bridges at Fampoux by the VI Corps Mounted Troops (the Northamptonshire Yeomanry 
and Corps Cyclists) on 9 April is a brilliant example of the potential for small units to 
exploit the more fluid situation, advance past the leading infantry, and seize points of 
tactical importance. Not only did this small force successfully reach the bridges which 
formed their objective, they captured a number of German guns in the process, and were 
still holding on 36 hours later in a position to support the attack on Monchy on the 
morning of 11 April. Stephen Badsey’s comparison of cavalry with paratroops has been 
referred to earlier in this study, but in this case it is perhaps particularly apt. The seizure 
of bridges ahead of the main force by lightly equipped mobile forces immediately 
conjures images of later airborne operations, the difference being that at Arras it was 
entirely successful. 
   Unfortunately the very success of the Northampton’s advance (the regiment took only 
four casualties),235 and the small scale of the operation has led to it being widely 
overlooked when the rôle of the cavalry in the offensive is considered. Monchy is not 
only a larger action, but possesses the components of mass casualties and ‘pointless 
sacrifice’ that fulfil popular expectations of a Great War cavalry battle. It was at 
Fampoux rather than Monchy, however, that the real potentia l of mounted troops on the 
evolving trench battlefield of 1917 was demonstrated. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CAMBRAI, NOVEMBER–DECEMBER 1917 
 
Then a most ludicrous thing happened, there was a great deal of clattering, 
galloping and shouting and a lot of our medieval horse soldiers came charging 
down the street; I yelled to them that the bridge was gone but they took no notice 
of me and went right up to it, one MG would have wiped out the lot, and then 
they turned about and with a very piano air trotted back the way they had come. 
       Maj. Philip Hammond, 
 ‘F’ Battalion Tank Corps1 
 
Introduction 
 
   It has been demonstrated in the preceeding chapters that at a tactical level the cavalry 
was capable of being an effective fighting force, both offensively, as on the Somme, and 
in March 1917, and in the defence of static positions using firepower at Monchy- le-
Preux. However, both in 1916 and the first half of 1917 this potential was largely 
negated in set piece attacks by failures of command, control and communications, and 
of operational planning which excluded the cavalry from much of the fighting, or by 
failures of the initial infantry and artillery attack to create the opportunities for mounted 
advance.  
   This chapter examines the part played by the cavalry in the Cambrai offensive of 
November 1917, and the German counter-attack that followed in December. Although it 
does not form a major case study, brief consideration is also given to the Third Ypres 
battles of August to November that year. Despite a lack of major cavalry action at Ypres 
the planning for the offensive sheds light on the thinking of senior commanders, in 
particular Gen. Gough, whose involvement with the cavalry is examined in more detail 
in Chapters 5 and 6. 
   The offensive near Cambrai in November 1917 was initially an enormous success, a 
substantial ‘break in’, at least, was achieved in the German defences. Thus in theory an 
ideal opportunity for the cavalry to show its mettle was created. Unfortunately, the 
cavalry entirely failed to take advantage of this, and the arm has been vilified as a result 
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ever since. Once again the roots of this failure lay in the complexity of the chain of 
command and the inadequacies of communications. This theme will be explored in 
some detail in the following pages. It will be shown that these structural problems were 
also compounded by failures of command by individual leaders at the higher levels. By 
contrast, once again on the few occasions where individual units were able to enter the 
fight they did so with their accutomed skill and vigour. 
   The offensive was also the first occasion where tanks and cavalry were both used in 
large numbers. How well these two arms were able to co-operate, or indeed were 
expected to co-operate will be examined. In particular the contrast between the structure 
and function of the two Corps; Tank and Cavalry, will be investigated. It will be shown 
that far from being the polar opposites some have suggested, the two arms had 
potentially much to learn from eachother. 
 
 
Cambrai, A Tank Battle? 
 
   Unlike Arras earlier in the year, which ranks as one of the ‘forgotten’ offensives of the 
Great War, the attack at Cambrai in November 1917 has received a significant amount 
of scholarly attention. Unfortunately, from a cavalry perspective, the focus of most of 
these studies is evident in the titles, such as The First Tank Battle, Cambrai 1917,2 
produced by Robert Woollcombe, grandson of Lt. Gen. Sir Charles Woollcombe, 
commander of IV Corps, and Brian Cooper’s The Ironclads of Cambrai,3 both 
published in 1967. These were followed by A J Smithers’ Cambrai the First Great Tank 
battle 1917,4 produced in 1992. Only William Moore’s A Wood called Bourlon, The 
cover-up after Cambrai, 19175 takes a slightly less techno-centric viewpoint, but 
follows the same line as its predecessors with regard to mounted troops. Tim Travers 
devoted a chapter to Cambrai in his How the War was Won (1992) but as will be 
discussed his viewpoint is perhaps the most technophile of all.6 
   The primary interest of all these writers is the tank, and Cambrai as the first 
manifestation of large scale armoured warfare. This is an entirely legitimate theme, but 
as has been observed in earlier chapters, it is all too easy when seeking to emphasise the 
importance of the (actually rather faltering) first steps of the tank, to offer as a 
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counterpoint the manifest uselessness of the cavalry arm. All of these works are guilty 
of this to a greater or lesser extent, characterised by the fact that the opinion on the 
‘medieval’ cavalry expressed by Maj. Hammond at the head of this chapter occurs 
repeatedly in them. 
   The use of the cavalry as a convenient scapegoat for the failures of the Cambrai 
offensive as a whole began almost as soon as the battle was over. When the battle was 
debated in the House of Commons in December 1917 the use of cavalry was described 
as “…obviously absurd.”7 This criticism continued after the war and led to the 
complaint by T. T. Pitman in the Cavalry Journal that,  
Of all the cavalry operations on the Western Front, none met with more criticism 
than their ‘action’ or as some say, ‘inaction’ at the Battle of Cambrai. Their 
failure to achieve success gave anti-cavalry critics the opportunity they had been 
seeking since 1915, and the result was censure by many, who neither knew their 
subject, nor the orders that were issued to the cavalry whom they condemned.8 
The Cambrai volume of the Official History9 was one of the last of the series to appear, 
published as late as 1948. While the compiler Wilfrid Miles gave a reasonably balanced 
account of the Cavalry’s performance, this was not so with the Preface, written by Sir 
James Edmonds, who took the opportunity to repeat once again the words of his 
anonymous American concerning ‘…the last machine-gun’ (discussed earlier in this 
study) and to observe “It is by no means certain… that there was any place for bodies of 
horse on the battlefields of 1917.”10  
   The tone having been set by Edmonds, the degree of vilification heaped on the cavalry 
seems if anything to have grown with the passing of the years. Robert Woollcombe, 
writing in 1967 devoted a chapter to ‘The failure of the cavalry’.11 This largely took the 
form of an analysis of the communications difficulties of 1st Cavalry Division and IV 
Corps on 20th November, and does contain a useful commentary on the events of the 
day. By contrast Smithers in 1992 did not devote space to such an analysis, restricting 
himself to sweeping judgements. He quotes Col. Baker-Carr of the Tank Corps 
“Nothing much has been said about the cavalry, for there is nothing to say… The 
cavalry, after blocking all the roads for miles, sat down behind a hill, and remained 
there all day and then returned homewards, again blocking up the roads which were 
desperately needed to bring up every sort of supplies for tanks and infantry.” He went 
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on once again to invoke the views of Maj. Hammond of the Tank Corps “… those poor 
horse soldiers were a pitiful sight in a modern war.” 12  
   The balance has been somewhat redressed in recent years with the 1997 publication of 
Anglesey’s volume on the Western Front13 which covers Cambrai from the cavalry 
perspective in some detail. The exploits of the Indian cavalry on 30 November and 1 
December were also covered by Gordon Corrigan (an authority on the Indian army in 
the Great War) in the cavalry chapter of his recent Mud, Blood and Poppycock.14 
Nonetheless, it remains the case that, as Anglesey observed, Cambrai was a battle “in 
which the cavalry took a controversial part which has never been adequately studied.”15 
 
 
The Background to Cambrai: Third Ypres 
 
   Almost from the moment of his appointment to the command of the B.E.F., Field 
Marshal Haig took the view that a decisive blow was best delivered against the Germans 
at the northern end of the Western Front, in Flanders.16 This ambition was thwarted by 
the need for inter-allied co-operation over both the Somme and Arras operations, as has 
been alluded to earlier in this study. With the collapse of Nivelle’s offensive in the 
south, the disturbances in the French army that followed, and the replacement of that 
general by Petain as Commander- in-Chief of the French army in May 1917,17 Haig 
finally got an opportunity to put his plan into effect. The product of this was the series 
of battles from August to October 1917 officially known as ‘Third Ypres’, but more 
commonly and iconically referred to as ‘Passchendaele’. A formal case-study has not 
been made of Third Ypres here as there was very little involvement of mounted troops 
in the battle. However it forms the background to the Cambrai offensive, and even 
though large scale cavalry operations did not take place, the rôle of mounted troops in 
the operational plan, and the small part played by the Corps Cavalry Regiments, merits 
examination as it shows the continuing evolution of mounted fighting. 
   In brief, the plan for the opening phase of the offensive starting on 31 July, which 
came to be known as the Battle of Pilkem Ridge, was for an advance out of the Ypres 
salient over a fifteen mile (24km) wide front. The Second Army on the right of the 
attacking front under Gen. Plumer would make limited advances to secure the southern 
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flank, while the Fifth Army on the left under Gen. Gough would launch the main attack 
east and north, pivoting on its left flank, towards Pilkem Ridge and then north-east 
towards Passchendaele itself. Passchendaele village and the spine of the ridge were to 
be captured by Day 4, and by Day 9 (8 August) Gough was to have reached, and linked 
up with operations launched by British and French forces along the coast. How realistic 
in its objectives this plan was, and its chances of success, have been regularly criticised. 
Sir James Edmonds observed in his preface to the Official History: “Almost every point 
in connection with it became in after years a matter of controversy, or rather a reason 
for attacking the reputation of Field Marshal Earl Haig.”18 In particular the appointment 
of Gough to command the greater part of the battle in preference to Plumer (the 
architect of the triumphant Messines operations) has given ammunition to those of a 
‘Cavalry Generals’ persuasion. Leon Wolff commented: 
And of all British generals with a zest for the assault the name of Sir Hubert 
Gough headed the list. In his hands Haig placed the spearhead of the campaign, 
though he and his army had never set foot in the salient before. Because he was 
only forty-seven, impetuous, and an ex-cavalryman like his chief, Haig 
considered him more likely to crash through than Plumer and Rawlinson, both of 
whom were older and (in the past) more sympathetic toward limited attacks for 
partial gains – precisely what Haig did not have in mind at the moment.19 
This interpretation is at best a gross oversimplification of the situation. It would appear 
that Haig did still retain hopes for a decis ive blow, but no longer considered this to be 
the only, or even the most likely outcome. He looked for a plan of attack which was 
methodical and limited in initial objectives, but which retained the flexibility to exploit 
any greater opportunities that might occur; as Vandiver recently put it “Haig’s idea of 
objectives ran wider and deeper than ‘Bite and Hold’ tactics, but it has to be said that he 
turned to these methods in practice,”. 20 This may have been in part a response to the 
Messines battle where there was a growing feeling that more could have been made of 
the spectacular success of that attack and that the offensive was overly conservative in 
its aims and was consolidated too quickly.21  
   The command arrangements have been characterised as Gough, a ‘Thruster’ planning 
deep, ambitious objectives, with Haig, rather than endorsing this, frequently calling for 
caution and delay on the part of his subordinate, eventually handing the greater part of 
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control of the battle back to Plumer and Second Army. 22 As will be outlined below, in 
fact Gough’s plan for the battle was more sophisticated and measured than is widely 
acknowledged, and shows his growing understanding of the rôle of cavalry on the battle 
field of 1917 (This theme is examined in more detail in Chapter 6). Within the 
operations of Third Ypres the seeds of a tactical change can once again be seen in the 
application of mounted troops, and in combined-arms fighting. Similar traces were 
apparent at Arras, and although not fully exploited at Cambrai, were to become mature 
features of the battles of 1918.  
   Little had changed in the operations of the large bodies of cavalry within the Cavalry 
Corps itself. There is nothing in the orders for, and movements of these Cavalry Corps 
units which is noticeably different from the Somme or Arras. In preparation for the 
Ypres offensive, all five divisions of cavalry were concentrated around St Pol, around 
40 miles (64km) south-west of Ypres, under G.H.Q. control.23 Two divisions were 
moved up to the shoulders of Fifth Army’s attack, positioned at Elverdhinge, 4 miles 
(7km) to the north-west, and Dickebusch 2½ miles (4km) south-west of Ypres. Two 
further divisions were to be advanced as required to an advanced concentration area at 
Merville about half-way between St Pol and Ypres.24 In the event none of these troops 
were to become involved in the battle. 
   It is, however, in examination of the activities of the Corps Cavalry Regiments 
attached to infantry units that a new development is revealed. Gough characterised the 
plan for the Ypres offensive in a memorandum of 28 June as “a succession of organised 
attacks at short intervals”25. The attack was not to over-reach itself by trying to push on 
continuously, as at Arras, nor to be satisfied with a single ‘Bite and Hold’ as at 
Messines. Rather a series of manageable ‘bites’ would be carried out in quick 
succession, (repeated every 3-10 days) allowing the attacking forces to bring up guns, 
and stay in supply and communication, but at the same time not allow the enemy to re-
organise. (This is a manifestation of the concept of ‘Tempo’; the ability to assemble 
repeated attacks within a short time-frame, which was one of the keys to success in 
1918.)26 Orders continued to describe a succession of coloured objective lines 
corresponding to successive German defensive positions, but a complete breakthrough 
of all of these at the first push was not necessarily expected.  
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   Orders for the 8th Division (part of II Corps attacking Château Wood) stated that while 
the first three objective lines were to be captured on timetable, the advance to the Fourth 
Objective (German Third Line) would be developed much more flexibly, and “will 
consist of pushing out strong cavalry and infantry patrols with tanks, supported by 
larger bodies to secure localities.”27 The advance to the Fourth Objective would only 
take place on ‘Z Day’ if it were found to be weakly held, otherwise the division would 
consolidate on the third objective. In the case of the 8th Division the ‘strong cavalry 
patrols’ were to be formed from a squadron of the Yorkshire Dragoons attached to the 
division from II Corps. Thus mounted troops would be used within the deeper 
battlefield, to secure local objectives as opportunities arose, and the attack as a whole 
would not over-reach itself. 
   In the event the attack of II Corps on 31 July stalled on its early objectives and so the 
Yorkshire Dragoons remained in reserve. However, similar orders were issued to the 
Corps Cavalry Regiment of XIV Corps; King Edward’s Horse, and, as their War Diary 
records they did come into action. 28 The XIV Corps formed the northernmost of the 
attacking corps of Fifth Army, and the two attacking divisions of the corps were each 
allocated a squadron of K.E.H.; ‘B’ Squadron supporting the 39th Division and ‘C’ 
Squadron the 51st. ‘A’ Squadron was on traffic duties in the rear, but its Hotchkiss 
teams were divided among the other two squadrons, bringing the number of guns in 
each squadron up to six. By midday on 31 July the 51st Division had captured its second 
objective line, west of the Steenbeck stream. At 12:30pm, ‘C’ Squadron K.E.H. 
received a message from the 1/6 Seaforths saying that they had crossed the stream with 
a small party (30 men) but that while they could see no enemy they required support. 
‘C’ Squadron advanced mounted as far as Ferdinand Farm, on the west bank of the 
stream, before coming under fire, which forced them to dismount and deploy behind the 
infantry around the farm. The Hotchkiss teams in particular were able to give valuable 
support to the infantry by firing overhead from their position slightly to the rear. This 
continued for the remainder of the day, until all but the Hotchkiss teams were 
withdrawn at 11:30pm, the machine gunners being relieved by infantry the following 
morning. The squadron suffered 11 men killed and 13 wounded (out of a strength of 
probably around 120 or approximately 20%). But also as the diary records “The horses 
during all this time were in a bad way as they were continually falling into shell holes 
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full of mud, and were also exposed to artillery and machine-gun fire.”29 51 Horses were 
listed as killed or missing. 
   The exploits of ‘C’ Squadron K.E.H. can only be considered a very minor part in the 
vast canvas of Third Ypres, but they are significant in that they represent an unusual 
degree of tactical flexibility and combined-arms thinking. Cavalry, albeit in small 
quantities was attached directly to the front line attacking divisions, and came under 
their immediate command. Also its integrated use not only after battle objectives had 
been reached by the infantry, but as part of the fight for those objectives was built into 
the plan for the attack. The capability of mounted troops not only for patrolling ahead of 
the infantry, but also for providing valuable mobile supporting firepower, was 
demonstrated. If troops were to have been attached from the Cavalry Corps itself this 
would have been further augmented by the Vickers guns of the MGC(C) Squadrons. 
This potential had already been demonstrated at Monchy le Preux in April, but as has 
been discussed in Chapter 3, that was largely by accident and did not represent a 
deliberate tactic. At Ypres this integrated use of cavalry can be seen built into the plan 
of attack, albeit tentatively and in small numbers, from the outset.  
   In using cavalry forces in this way Gen. Gough can arguably be seen applying the 
spirit of Haig’s ideas on the application of cavalry, both in small packets within the 
battle but also in a large ‘mass of decision’ held to the rear. In this aspect the plan for 
Ypres is reminiscent of that for Loos two years before, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
Gough did not get the opportunity to plan another set piece offensive after 1917, but as 
will be examined at more length in Chapter 6, his ideas concerning cavalry continued to 
evolve in a way that those of his colleages in other Army commands possibly did not. 
 
 
Cambrai: The Plan 
(Figure 4.1 overleaf) 
   The long struggle that was Third Ypres was brought to an end after the capture of 
Passchendaele village by Canadian forces in mid-November 1917.30 In the light of the 
effort and cost of the fighting in Flanders it is difficult to see why Haig launched 
another offensive towards Cambrai less than a fortnight later. A variety of factors 
influenced the decision to make another attack so late in the year. Individually none of 
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them was a compelling reason for an offensive, but their conjunction was sufficient to 
generate the impetus for another battle. Unfortunately, as will be seen, this conjunction 
did not lead to a coherent plan, nor were the various participants clear how their various 
individual motivations interacted with one-another. The result of this was an under-
resourced offensive which lacked clear operational objectives, and which turned short-
term success into longer-term failure. 
   As early as the end of April 1917 Haig had discussed with Nivelle an attack in the 
Cambrai area, to draw off German reinforcements from the already faltering French 
attack in the south. Fourth and Fifth Army staffs were tasked to examine the question, 
and on 19 June III Corps, then part of Fourth Army, produced a plan for a small scale 
operation. By then, however, the justification for such an operation had passed. Also in 
June, Gen. Byng took over Third Army from Allenby, who departed for Egypt, and on 5 
July Third Army took over the Fourth Army area including III Corps. Thus the III Corps 
plan arrived on Byng’s desk at Third Army. 31  
   Simultaneously, in July 1917 the Tank Corps, (formerly Heavy Branch Machine-Gun 
Corps) came into existence.32 The commander of the new corps, Brig. Gen. Elles, and 
his Chief of General Staff,  Lt. Col. Fuller, were keen to develop an operation which 
would show off the potential of their tanks, newly upgraded in the form of the Mark IV. 
These had been available since June, and were now in service in substantial numbers. 
On 4 August Elles and Fuller submitted a plan to G.H.Q. for a tank-based raid in the 
Cambrai area. This received a cold reception as staff were busy with Ypres. The same 
plan, however was passed the following day to Byng at Third Army. Byng was only too 
happy to include the tanks as part of an offensive plan already under consideration. 33  
   Thirdly, on the staff of IV Corps in the line opposite Cambrai was Brig. Gen. Tudor, 
commanding the artillery of 9th Division. He too came up with a plan, advocating a 
surprise attack based upon unregistered artillery bombardment. This too was passed via 
Lt. Gen.  Woollcombe, commanding IV Corps, to Third Army on 23 August.34 Byng 
took a plan combining all these elements to Haig at the end of August. The situation in 
Flanders meant that Haig was not in a position to approve the attack or make any firm 
promises of resources, but Byng was encouraged to continue planning on paper against 
a day when the plan might be put into effect. That day came on 13 October when Haig 
formally approved the start of preparations for the attack. Following that decision a 
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formal conference of subordinate commanders was held at Third Army on October 
26th.35 
   Several reasons have been offered for Haig’s approval of the Third Army plan. Both 
his supporters and detractors argue that he was desperate for a spectacular success to 
counter the long drawn out failures of Ypres. The difference between them is whether 
this is viewed as shrewd out-manoeuvring of his opponents in Westminster, or desperate 
vanity. Either way, as Moore put it: 
Haig’s position was not unlike that of a stage impressario whose backers begin 
to mutter about seeing a return on their investment. The long running Ypres 
show was drawing to a close without showing much profit and it was no good 
blaming everything on the weather. …It wasn’t excuses Haig needed but a new 
star turn. 36 
The result of this was an offensive which was supported by the C.-in-C. for political 
reasons, had been born in Third Army for reasons which were now obsolete, and was 
planned by tank-men and gunners whose objectives were technical demonstration rather 
than strategic success. The result of the latter in particular was that, as Terraine 
observed “Third Army had allowed itself to be so preoccupied with the first stage of the 
fight that it never properly considered what would come next.”37  
   The operation was also compromised by a lack of troops. After the Italian disaster at 
Caporetto in October, Haig was forced to provide divisions from France to reinforce the 
Italian front.38 This left barely enough to cover the Cambrai operation with virtually 
nothing in reserve. Charteris, Haig’s intelligence chief expressed this concern: “We 
should get surprise, but we are really taking on a big job with 5 divisions less than we 
expected to have.” He went on: “Our own big attack is heavily prejudiced by the 
withdrawal of the divisions to Italy. We shall have no reserves. We shall be alright at 
first, afterwards is in the lap of the God of battle.”39 This lack of reserves was reflected 
in the fact that for the first time since 1915, the cavalry divisions were dismounted in 
the latter stages of the Cambrai attack, and committed to battle as infantry. A rôle in 
which they performed with great credit, but a profligate use of specialist troops. These 
events were all too reminiscent of Loos in 1915, where a similar lack of manpower for 
reserves led to the use of cavalry in this rôle. 
  164 
   Fundamental to the planning for the battle of Cambrai was the ground over which it 
was to be fought. The British line, running broadly north-west to south-east, passed 
approximately 7½ miles (12km) to the south-west of Cambrai itself. Facing it were the 
German ‘Hindenburg’, and ‘Hindenburg support’ trench systems. However crossing the 
front lines from north to south were the roughly parallel Canal du Nord (to the west) and 
Canal de l’Escaut, also known as the Canal de St. Quentin (to the east). Between these 
two canals was an area roughly 7 miles (11km) wide and 12 miles (19km) deep, defined 
to the north by the Sensée River, running east-west. This ‘quadrilateral’ as it was termed 
was key to the plan.  40 As first devised, the plan called for the use of surprise artillery 
bombardment and tanks to smash through the Hindenburg defences, then an advance 
northwards along the corridor between the canals. This advance would be continued 
over Bourlon ridge and the Sensée crossings, and further along the German position to 
the north-east, rolling it up from the flank. However, a series of meetings between Haig 
and Byng followed where the plan was refined.41 As a result the focus was shifted from 
a rolling attack north-east up the German line to a more ambitious encircling operation 
passing to the east of Cambrai and as far as the Sensée. Third Army expressed the 
objectives thus: 
1. The object of the operation is to break the enemy’s defensive system by a 
coup de main; with the assistance of tanks to pass the Cavalry Corps through the 
break thus made: to seize Cambrai, Bourlon Wood, and the passages over the 
Sensée river and to cut off the troops holding the German front line between 
Havrincourt and that river.42 
Critically, the plan called for the capture by the infantry of the crossings over the Canal 
de l’Escaut on the eastern side of the attack at an early stage to allow the Cavalry Corps 
to cross and swing around the rear of Cambrai. Wilfrid Miles observed rather ruefully in 
the Official History: 
It will be noticed how important it was to pass the cavalry divisions, without 
delay, across the St. Quentin canal, [Canal de l’Escault] which constituted a 
truly formidable obstacle for mounted troops. Once the way was cleared by the 
other arms, all would depend on the boldness and enterprise with which the 
cavalry was handled.43 
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   Third army had at its disposal 19 infantry divisions. The main attack was to be made 
by seven of these; four divisions of Lt. Gen.  Woollcombe’s IV Corps on the left, astride 
the partially built and still dry Canal du Nord, and three divisions of Lt. Gen. Pulteney’s 
III Corps on the right with its right resting on the Canal de l’Escault. A fourth division 
of III Corps and three divisions of V Corps were in reserve. In addition a total of 476 
tanks were to spearhead this attack.44 The use of unregistered artillery and the lack of a 
preliminary bombardment would not only provide surprise, but also avoid churning up 
the ground, allowing these tanks to advance more easily. 
   The detailed rôle of the cavalry was laid out in ‘Instructions for Operations GY’ 
issued on 10 November.45 All five divisions of the corps were to be involved, but only 
three were to be committed on the first day (‘Z Day’). Cavalry Corps Advanced 
Headquarters was to be established at Fins, approximately 5 miles (8km) behind the 
British front line. This was also to serve as the advanced concentration area for two 
divisions (1st Cavalry Div. and 5th Cavalry Div.), while a third (2nd Cavalry Div.) was to 
concentrate at Villers Faucon, a few miles to the south-east of Fins. All divisions were 
to be ready to advance from these positions at 2½ hours after the start of the infantry 
and tank attack (referred to as ‘Zero’+2½). Three routes of advance were specified. 1st 
Cavalry Division would advance from Fins via Metz, Trescault, and Ribecourt to the 
canal de l’Escaut at Marcoing. From there it would swing north and advance up both 
banks of the Canal with the dual objective of isolating Cambrai from the west, and co-
operating in what Haig had urged should be an ‘all arms attack’ on Bourlon Wood and 
Bourlon village to the north.  
   To the east of 1st Division, 5th Cavalry Division was to advance astride two routes; 
from Fins via Gouzeaucourt, beside the line of the railway through Villers Plouch to 
Marcoing; and from Gouzeaucourt via La Vacquerie to Masnières. This division would 
then cross the canal at Marcoing and Masniè res, pass through the last line of German 
defences on the far bank, the so-called ‘Masniè res Beaurevoir Line’ to the north-east of 
the canal, and embark on a great sweep around the east side of Cambrai to the Sensée 
crossings in the north. 2nd Cavalry Division would follow the routes taken by 5th 
Cavalry Division and swing eastwards on the far side of the canal to guard the flank. To 
further disrupt the German rear areas, one brigade of 4th Cavalry Division, the Lucknow 
Brigade, was to advance with 2nd Division and raid south-east towards Walincourt. 3rd 
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Cavalry Division, and the remainder of 4th Division would move up to the concentration 
areas vacated by the first three divisions, and would be committed to follow up the 
advancing divisions at a time to be determined by Cavalry Corps Headquarters. 
   This plan was, to say the least, ambitious. The divisions were concentrated on the 
night of 19 November (Z day –1) in villages an average of 12 miles (20km) to the west 
of Fins.46 On the night prior to the attack they would have to march from there to the 
forward concentration areas, and in turn on to the canal and their objectives. For 5th 
Cavalry Division in particular this added up to a total of some 30-35 miles (50km). 
Routes across the Hindenburg defences would have to be constructed, and crucially, the 
canal bridges would have to be secured intact by the advancing infantry. The cavalry 
was to be criticised, as will be examined later, for its lack of ‘attack’, but as can be seen 
both distance and the physical obstacles faced by the cavalry divisions, the German 
defences and critically the Canal de l’Escault weighed heavily against their success. 
   Communications were also likely to be vital. Although a proposed time of departure 
(Zero +2½) was stated, this would not be executed automatically, instead the time of 
advance of the cavalry divisions was to be determined by Cavalry Corps, on the basis of 
reports from cavalry patrols and from the advancing infantry. However, in the spirit of 
combined-arms operations, 1st Cavalry Division was removed from the Cavalry Corps 
and placed under the command of Woollcombe’s IV Corps. (Similarly but less 
significantly, the Lucknow Brigade was placed under the command of III Corps.) This 
would have been a useful step had it not been that all communication between IV Corps 
and the cavalry still had to pass through Cavalry Corps Advanced H.Q. at Fins. The lack 
of a direct link between the infantry corps (and divisions) and the cavalry, and the 
potential for delay and interference by Kavanagh at Cavalry Corps were to be a 
significant problem. The serious consequences of this will be discussed later, but the 
reluctance or inability of corps and army commanders to relinquish direct control of the 
cavalry is once again evident. As during the Somme and Arras battles this insistence by 
higher commanders on chosing for themselves the moment of advance was to be fatal to 
the chances of the cavalry of seizing fleeting opportunities, and once again was largely 
to write them out of the battle. 
   A variety of efforts to improve communications were attempted, but in the event were 
not enormously helpful. A cable connection was to be laid from Cavalry Corps to an 
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Advanced Report Centre at Marcoing, and a contact aircraft of 35 Squadron RFC was 
allocated to each advancing cavalry division for liaison with Cavalry Corps. Pack-
mounted wireless sets were also to accompany the divisions, and  set up on the line of 
the canal. Instructions also stated that tank mounted radios would be available to take 
messages as they would also be in operation on the canal line. Somewhat bizarrely, 
however, it was determined that cavalry radios should not broadcast within 1 mile 
(1.6km) radius of a tank radio as this would cause interference.47 How cavalry radios 
were to function given this restriction is not clear. Arguably the necessity for all of these 
complex technical solutions, none of which worked effectively anyway, could have 
been avoided simply by devolution of command of the cavalry to the divisional 
commanders themselves, and the establishment of a fixed timetable for advance. 
 
 
The Advance of 1st Cavalry Division: 20 November 1917  
 
   ‘Zero Hour’ arrived at 6:20am on 20 November 1917. In the absence of a preliminary 
bombardment the Germans were caught by surprise and the successes of the tanks and 
infantry in capturing their initial objectives were rapid and substantial. These have been 
thoroughly examined elsewhere,48 thus only the movements of the cavalry will be 
considered in detail here.  
   It was calculated that the initial march of the cavalry divisions from their positions of 
concentration to the advanced positions at Fins would take five hours. Thus in order to 
allow the horses and men some rest on arrival the divisions set off shortly after midnight 
with a view to arriving at Zero Hour. 1st Cavalry Division completed this march without 
mishap and arrived north of Fins at 6.15am.49 On arrival, command of the division 
formally passed from Cavalry Corps to IV Corps,50 but as no direct link existed between 
IV Corps and the division, messages continued to be relayed by Cavalry Corps 
Advanced H.Q. Within the 1st Cavalry Division, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade was detailed 
as advanced guard, with the objective of moving up the west bank of the St Quentin 
Canal on Cantaing and Fontaine. The 5th Dragoon Guards of 1st Cavalry Brigade were 
also attached to 2nd Cavalry Brigade, with orders to cross the canal at Marcoing and 
support up the eastern side.51  
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   At 8:20am, (equivalent to ‘Zero +2’, thus actually half an hour ahead of schedule) the 
division was ordered by IV Corps to advance from the forward position of concentration 
at Fins as far as Metz. The division duly moved forward, the  lead elements reaching 
Metz by 9:55am.52 Encouraging reports continued from IV Corps. At 10:08am Cavalry 
Corps was informed “Havrincourt being mopped up. Ribecourt taken. 1st Cav. Div. to 
feel forward as soon as road is clear.”53 This message was passed on to 1st Cavalry 
Division and they continued their advance through Trescault. It was at this point that 
one of the most controversial episodes of the battle of Cambrai occurred. The village of 
Flesquières lay on a reverse slope roughly in the centre of the British attacking front. It 
lay behind the German defences, and formed part of the ‘Rearward Battle Zone’ known 
to the British as the ‘Hindenburg Support Line’. Not only was the position very heavily 
garrisoned and expertly defended, but for reasons which have occupied many pages of 
scholarship and debate since,54 the infantry of Maj. Gen. Harper’s 51st Highland 
Division became separated from their tanks, and when the latter were mostly destroyed 
by German artillery fire, the infantry attack stalled short of the village.  
   This reverse should not have influenced 1st Cavalry Division as their line of advance 
took them south of Flesquières via Ribecourt, Marcoing and east of the Bois des Neuf 
(described in some sources as ‘Nine Wood’). However at about 11:00am, apparently 
unaware that the village was still in German hands, Gen. Harper commanding 51st 
Division rang Gen. Woollcombe at IV Corps to report that “Flesquières was in our 
possession and that the road from Trescault to that place was fit for cavalry.”55 How he 
reached this conclusion has never been established, but he did. As a result IV Corps 
passed on a message to 1st Cavalry Division timed at 11.15am: 
HP14 Road from TRESCAULT through K29 Central to FLESQUIERES 
reported fit for cavalry AAA FLESQUIERES now taken AAA Push forward 
through BROWN LINE AAA No report so far about RIBECOURT road AAA56  
(The exact text of this and following orders is given as their content was to 
become highly controversial.) 
This message was to become a major bone of contention in the aftermath of the battle 
between Lt. Gen. Woollcombe of IV Corps and Maj. Gen. Mullens, commanding 1st 
Cavalry Division. Woollcombe would later assert that no part of HP14 changed the 
specific orders or route of advance of the cavalry, and that it contained only 
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‘information’.57 In this he is strictly correct, but the clear inference to be drawn from the 
message is that an advance via Flesquières might be more successful than one via 
Ribecourt. Mullens had also visited the reserve brigade headquarters of 51st Division in 
person at 11:15am and been advised that the capture of Flesquières was imminent. As a 
result of this he concluded that an advance via Flesquières “…might not only be better, 
but might be the only available or quicker line of advance on Cantaing, to pass to the 
west of the Bois des Neufs (sic).”58  
   In spite of Mullens’ ability to talk in person to 51st Division, his chain of command 
still passed from IV Corps via Cavalry Corps H.Q. to his own division, and it was from 
Cavalry Corps that the final crucial interference came. At 11:50am he received a 
message from Cavalry Corps also timed 11:15am: 
G.210 IV Corps report 11.10am the road from TRESCAULT through K29 and 
through FLESQUIERES is open AAA It is not yet known if RIBECOURT road 
is open yet (sic) AAA The 1st Cav. Div. will advance through FLESQUIERES 
AAA59 
The final sentence of this message may be considered a direct change to Mullens’ 
orders, albeit from a corps under whose direct command his division no longer fell. The 
interfering hand of Kavanagh at Cavalry Corps can be sensed in this order (G.210), 
‘interpreting’ the orders from IV Corps. It may be that this order truly reflected the 
wishes of Woollcombe at IV Corps at the time (although he was to deny this later), but 
it certainly removed any remaining discretion from Mullens as to the line of advance of 
his division. In the light of this at 11:20am Mullens ordered his advanced brigade (2nd 
Cavalry Brigade) to advance on Flesquières. Unfortunately as has been mentioned, 
despite Harper’s claims to the contrary, Flesquières was still resisting 51st Division. 
With no progress possible in this direction the advance of 1st Cavalry Division was 
effectively halted. 
   It was not until 1:00pm that 2nd Cavalry Brigade was able to make further forward 
progress. It should be noted at this point that, in circumstances reminiscent of High 
Wood 16 months before, while 1st Cavalry Division was under the command of IV 
Corps, its original route of advance from Ribecourt via Marcoing and Noyelles lay 
entirely in III Corps area. On returning from a visit to the forward elements of his 
brigade in front of Flesquières, Brig. Gen. Beale-Brown commanding 2nd Cavalry 
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Brigade met his liaison officer with 86th Brigade of 29th Division, the division tasked 
with the capture of Bois des Neuf for III Corps. This officer was able to tell him that the 
attack on Bois des Neuf was going well and that although he had been heavily sniped at, 
a passage through Ribecourt was possible.60 
   As a result of this new information, starting at about 1:00pm a move was made to 
revert to the original line of advance. At about 2:00pm, more than 1½ hours after the 
brigade had been unsuccessfully diverted towards Flesquières, Ribecourt was assaulted 
by two dismounted squadrons from 2nd Cava lry Brigade61 while the remainder of the 
brigade ‘turned’ the village from the south, and resumed the advance towards Bois des 
Neuf. Unfortunately this route lay along the forward slope south of Ribecourt and 
exposed the advancing troops to heavy machine-gun fire from German positions around  
Flesquières, thus the advanced elements of 2nd Cavalry brigade, 4th Dragoon Guards, did 
not reach the Bois until around 3:00pm. On arrival it was discovered that reports of the 
situation there were also incorrect, and that the Bois des Neuf was still not captured, so 
2nd Cavalry Brigade halted in the valley immediately east of Marcoing.62 
   At this point a further change of plan was ordered by IV Corps. 51st Division was to 
make a further attempt to carry Flesquières and several messages were sent from 
2:45pm onwards that 1st Cavalry Division, and in particular 2nd Cavalry Brigade, should 
support this by doubling back in a move north-westwards over Premy Chapel Ridge 
towards Orival Wood to outflank Flesquières from the east. This move was attempted 
but on crossing the ridge patrols of 2nd Cavalry Brigade came under such heavy fire 
from the north-west that the move was not considered practical. 63 Meanwhile, more 
orders continued to arrive from IV Corps including at 3:40pm: 
HP.19 51Div. are attacking FLESQUIERES from west and south AAA 1st Cav. 
Div. will try to work round the north east of FLESQUIERES from PREMY 
CHAPEL RIDGE 
Mullens was later to criticise this change of orders as he had HP.14, issued earlier in the 
day, pointing out that it served only to further delay the advance of the division and 
distract from its overall objective.64 Woollcombe argued, with some sophistry, that as 
Flesquières was holding up the whole advance, to “…hasten its fall” might be 
considered within 1st Cavalry Division’s overall objectives, and in any case the move 
was only to be made by two regiments, “… This left him [Mullens] 2 cavalry brigades 
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to carry out his original orders.”65 The weakness of this argument is self evident, the 
capture of Flesquières was never an objective of 1st Cavalry Division, and indeed was 
not even on their original line of advance. In an effort to press home his case, 
Woollcombe spoke directly to Byng at Third Army by telephone.66 The nature of the 
conversation is not recorded but Woollcombe cannot have been persuasive as at 4:00pm 
IV Corps was obliged to pass on to 1st Cavalry Division: 
HP.20 Third Army orders that you are to push on with full strength through 
MARCOING and carry out original plan67 
Woollcombe had lost the argument, and once again Mullens was to revert to the plan to 
advance up the canal bank, this time on direct orders from Byng at Third Army. In the 
event, however, so much time had been lost that he was only in a position to order the 
advance of 2nd Cavalry Brigade (supported by 5th Dragoon Guards of 1st Brigade) from 
their position south of Bois des Neuf, the remainder of the division being hopelessly far 
back in the rear. 1st Cavalry Brigade was still in the vicinity of Trescault, the wrong side 
of the Flesquières -Ribecourt bottleneck, and 9th Cavalry Brigade remained at Metz. The 
confusion of contradictory orders passed to 1st Cavalry Division is recorded in the War 
Diary of the Cavalry Corps, acting as relay for the messages; 
5:30pm 1st Cavalry Division report by telephone that after orders had 
been given to 2nd Cavalry Brigade to go to Orival Wood, [ie. Back to 
Flesquières] orders were received from IV Corps to say that one regiment was to 
move on Cantaing in accordance with original scheme. G.O.C. 2nd Cavalry 
Brigade had already ordered 4th D.G’s on Cantaing. G.O.C. 1st Cavalry Division 
then ordered whole brigade to move on Cantaing with one Regt. 1st Cav. Bde. 
[5th Dragoon Guards] to move to Marcoing in support.68 
   As the daylight rapidly faded and misty rain started to fall it was left to Brig. Gen. 
Beale-Browne’s 2nd Cavalry Brigade, and in particular to his lead regiment, the 4th 
Dragoon Guards, to make up this lost time and press on towards the division’s 
objectives. Elements of the 4th Dragoon Guards were soon able to ascertain that not only 
was the Bois des Neuf finally free of enemy, but the village of Noyelles beyond it next 
to the canal had also been captured (in a mounted attack at 3:00pm by elements of 5th 
Cavalry Division, discussed below). Cantaing was “…faintly visible in the mist”69 from 
the north-east corner of the Bois des Neuf, but apparently still occupied by the enemy. 
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Accordingly, Lt. Col. Sewell of 4th Dragoon Guards sent his lead squadron (A Squadron 
under Capt. Warter) towards Les Vallée Wood, on the canal bank to the north of 
Cantaing, meanwhile B squadron (Capt. Darley) was sent to form a defensive flank 
towards Cantaing to protect A Squadron’s advance. Unfortunately B Squadron were “… 
checked by wire and heavy machine-gun fire from Cantaing and were unable to do more 
than draw the enemy’s fire from that village.”70 This was, however, sufficient to allow 
A Squadron to advance. Two troops were dropped off on the left to extend the flank of 
B Squadron northwards while Warter and the remaining two troops galloped on. In the 
centre of Les Vallée wood was La Folie Château, approaching this four German 
ammunition wagons were encountered, the horses and crews were shot as the cavalry 
rode on, charging with swords a further party of twenty enemy on foot, killing or 
capturing all. The château itself was approached and further prisoners taken.  
   Simultaneously with the advance of 4th Dragoon Guards, 5th Dragoon Guards had 
been sent to continue towards their objective of moving up the eastern bank of the canal. 
Unfortunately this was impossible as although the infantry had got across the canal in 
Marcoing, no advance could be made beyond the bridge due to fire from Flot Farm 
1200 yards (1000m) north of the crossing. As a result the 4th Dragoon Guards were now 
dangerously deep within the German positions, and receiving fire not only from 
Cantaing to the west but also from across the canal to the east. Thus they were forced to 
retire to the Bois des Neuf, B squadron covering the withdrawal of A Squadron to a 
position east of the Bois.71  
   4th Dragoon Guards were happy with their efforts, a large number of casualties had 
been inflicted, with Hotchkiss, rifle, and sword, between 50 and 60 prisoners had been 
taken, (the exact number was not recorded as they were handed over immediately to the 
infantry of 86th Brigade) and two machine guns had been captured. Total loss in the 
regiment was three killed (one of whom was Capt. Warter, killed during the retirement), 
four wounded and eight missing, with 30 horses lost. While only a small part of the 
overall canvas of Cambrai, the 4th Dragoon Guards had shown that they could both 
survive and manoeuvre in this part of the battlefield without suffering excessive 
casualties. As has been shown in previous chapters, the tactical effectiveness of the 
cavalry was once again not in doubt. One wonders what could have been done if the rest 
of the brigade or indeed the division had been available. The brigade then withdrew for 
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the night to a position west of Cantaing. Lt. Col. Sewell was disappointed not to have 
taken Cantaing: “In my opinion had it not been for the enemy on the east of the Escault 
canal it would have been possible to push our advance and turn the village from the 
east.”72 However, the enemy remained east of the canal and no more could be done. 
 
 
2nd and 5th Cavalry Divisions: 20 November 
 
   While 1st Cavalry Division spent the short daylight hours of 20 November struggling 
to get forward to their objectives, the two other cavalry divisions on their right in the III 
Corps area underwent a similar experience. 5th Cavalry Division, supported by 2nd 
Cavalry Division, was tasked with the grand sweep around to the east of Cambrai, 
crossing the Canal de l’Escault at Marcoing and Masnières. This advance was to be 
made along two cleared cavalry tracks, the western route passing from Gouzeaucourt 
through Villers Plouch to Marcoing, and the eastern or ‘Kavanagh’ track from 
Gouzeaucourt via La Vacquerie to Les Rues Vertes and thence across the canal at 
Masnières. However unlike 1st Cavalry Division which made its advance strung out in 
one long column along a single route of advance, both 5th Cavalry Division in the lead 
and 2nd Cavalry Division in support were split across both tracks. Their order of march 
may be shown schematically as follows:73 
 
 Marcoing Route   Masnières (‘Kavanagh’) Route 
 
5th Cav. Div.: Secunderabad Bde.  Canadian Cav. Bde.  
 5th Cav. Div. H.Q. (MacAndrew) 
 Ambala Bde.    
 
2nd Cav. Div.: 4th Cav. Bde.   5th Cav. Bde.  
     2nd Cav. Div. H.Q. (Greenly) 
     3rd Cav. Bde. 
 
4th Cav. Div.:     Lucknow Bde. (Under III Corps) 
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   The idea behind this split was presumably that it delivered a complete division (the 
5th) across the canal as rapidly as possible, allowing the division to advance rapidly as a 
coherent whole towards its objectives beyond Cambrai. However, the difficulty 
presented by such an arrangement was that while communications along each line of 
march were reasonably good, laterally they were virtually non-existent. As each 
division was split across the two lines of advance, the Canadian Cavalry Brigade under 
Brig. Gen. Seely would be almost entirely out of touch with 5th Division H.Q, while 4th 
Brigade would be similarly separated from 2nd Division. To counter this Maj. Gen. 
MacAndrew commanding 5th Cavalry Division and Maj. Gen. Greenly of 2nd Cavalry 
Division had agreed that should the left column be able to push on while the right was 
held up, command of the Canadians would pass to Greenly.74 In any case the advance of 
both divisions was to be controlled from Cavalry Corps H.Q. in the rear. The 
consequences of all these arrangements will be examined later. 
   Unlike the situation on IV Corps front, the early stages of the III Corps advance were 
extremely successful. The ‘Outpost’ and ‘Battle’ zones of the Hindenburg defences, 
forming the first and second objectives were secured by 11:30am. The attacking 
divisions on the right of the III Corps front (12th and 20th Divisions) then swung further 
to the right to form a defensive flank along Bonavis Ridge, overlooking the canal, in 
order to allow the supporting 29th Division to push on towards the canal crossings at 
Marcoing and Masnières.75  
   Aside from the activities of the cavalry divisions, another feature of this advance is 
noteworthy. As at Ypres in August, troops of the corps cavalry regiments were attached 
to the attacking infantry divisions to patrol forward and to exploit any opportunities 
during the latter stages of the advance. Two troops of the Northumberland Hussars, III 
Corps cavalry, were attached to 59th Brigade in 20th Division. Their orders were, once 
the ‘Brown Line’ (Second Objective, Hindenburg Support system) had been captured to 
push on quickly to the crest of the Bonavis Ridge to prevent German observation from 
the ridge onto the lines of advance of 29th Division and the cavalry.  
   The two troops set off at just before 9:00am and advanced successfully to the ‘Brown 
Line’ where they halted dismounted, “the wire being safely crossed and the trenches 
remaining unfilled, jumped.”76 From there they were able to see that the advance of 12th 
Division (along the spine of the ridge to the east of their position) was being held up by 
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rifle and Machine-gun fire from a position north of le Quennet farm. Taking a rather 
liberal interpretation of their orders, the two troops attacked this position. Lt. Sanders’ 
troop dismounted and advanced frontally by short rushes, supported by the Hotchkiss 
guns of both troops (2 guns). Meanwhile Lt. Ramsay’s troop circled around the rear of 
the position, deliberately exposing themselves periodically in order to draw fire away 
from the frontal attack. Two tanks were also flagged down and persuaded to join the 
attack. These were able to contribute fire support, knocking out a machine-gun position 
before being themselves hit by field gun fire. Ramsay then galloped the position from 
the rear, resulting in its surrender and the capture of two field guns. Leaving Sanders to 
remount and re-organise, Ramsay then pushed on at a gallop towards Bonavis Ridge 
securing positions on the crest which both troops then occupied until relieved the 
following morning. 77  
   Once again the skill and enterprise of junior cavalry leaders was displayed, as was to 
be seen later in the day with the 4th Dragoon Guards at la Folie, (described earlier). The 
two lieutenants showed that they not only grasped the wider tactical situation, but were 
able to use their initiative to mount successful local attacks, using a mixture of 
dismounted firepower and mounted shock just as their training manua ls proposed. As at 
Ypres, these troops were in a forward position able to assist the infantry, and even to 
successfully co-operate ad-hoc with nearby tanks. Unfortunately there was to be little 
opportunity for such action by the members of the cavalry divisions within the Cavalry 
Corps. 
   2nd Cavalry Division had arrived at its forward point of concentration, at Villers 
Faucon 10km (6 miles) behind the British front line, at ‘Zero Hour’; 6:20am, having 
marched through the night. 5th Cavalry Division was delayed by an hour by railway 
crossings, and did not arrive at Fins until 7:30am, however this delay was not significant 
as they were not time-tabled to move until ‘Z+2½’ or 8:50am. 78 In the event they were 
kept waiting somewhat longer. A report timed at 9:15am (received at 10:25am) was sent 
by the Secunderabad Brigade, lead brigade on the western, Marcoing, route that their 
contact patrols with the infantry were onto the second objective, however no orders for 
an advance by the 5th Cavalry Division were issued. Progress to the east was slower 
still. As has been described above, the 12th Division was held up on Bonavis Ridge and 
the right flank of the advance was not considered secure. At 10:05am III Corps advised 
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Cavalry Corps H.Q. that 29th Division was being released to advance “with caution” 
towards Marcoing and Masnières.79 That division began its advance at 10:15am.80 It 
was not until 10:52am, 2 hours after their scheduled start time that Kavanagh ordered an 
advance by the lead brigade of 2nd Cavalry Division (5th Cav. Bde.). Even this was only 
as far as the road south-west of Gouzeaucourt.81 Here they were to wait. It should be 
noted, however, that 5th Brigade was not the lead unit time-tabled to use this route, the 
order of march had them following the Canadians of 5th Cavalry Division. The 5th 
Division had still not been ordered forward, and in acknowledgement of this 2nd 
Division were ordered to keep south of the road and leave it clear. It is difficult to see 
what Kavanagh was hoping to achieve by this move, reversing the order of march of the 
two divisions.  
   Cavalry working parties had meanwhile been sent forward to consolidate the gaps in 
the wire and complete construction of the two tracks. Cavalry Corps H.Q. was advised 
that this work would be comple te by about noon. 82 At 11:40am 5th Cavalry Division 
finally received the order to advance by telephone from Cavalry Corps H.Q. This was 
confirmed in writing at noon (3 hours after their planned start time); the division was to 
“…move forward as ordered pushing patrols in touch with advancing infantry so as to 
advance across the canal should the situation be favourable.” 2nd Cavalry Division was 
to close up on its lead brigade to the south of the Gouzeaucourt road, so as to be 
“…ready to follow 5th Cav. Div. should the situation develop favourably.”83 
   On the left-hand (western) track, leading elements of the Secunderabad Brigade of 5th 
Cavalry Division reached the southern outskirts of Marcoing by around 1:45pm, having 
covered the 16km (10 miles) from Fins in around 1½ hours.84 The majority of the 
village had by that time been in the hands of the 87th Infantry Brigade for over an hour, 
but although they had been able to make good the river and canal crossings they could 
make no progress beyond the railway station, which remained stubbornly defended. The 
Advanced Guard of Secunderabad Brigade, a squadron of 7th Dragoon Guards, crossed 
the canal bridge at about 2:00pm, but immediately came under machine-gun fire and 
opted to dismount and extend the line of the 87th Brigade infantry attacking the 
railway. 85 Maj. Gen. Macandrew, commanding 5th Cavalry Division, is reported to have 
been somewhat displeased at his men reinforcing the infantry, as he was still hoping to 
make a substantial mounted advance.86 However, the move might just as easily be seen 
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as another example of the tactical flexibility on display by the cavalry at local level on 
20 November, where attacking on foot where appropriate was as common as staying 
mounted.  
   Still keen to get across the canal the second squadron of 7th Dragoon Guards was 
ordered north to try to secure the bridge at Noyelles. A report on this action was made 
by the squadron commander Capt. Lane : 
At about 2:15pm on the 20th November I was ordered to take my squadron and 
make good the village of Noyelles Sur l’Escault. Lt. Dawkins and one troop was 
detailed as advanced guard. They advanced rapidly to point L.11.d [immediately 
south of Noyelles] where they came under rifle and M.G. fire. I decided to 
gallop the village with troops at 40 yards distance. The M.G. fire was high and 
did no damage. The advance was successful and the village was captured at 
3:00pm. Total captures 35 prisoners, of whom 10 were found hiding in the 
village.87 
Capt. Lane had reason to be pleased, as the squadron suffered no casualties in this 
attack, but although infantry was able to move up and consolidate the hold on the 
village it was not possible to cross the canal bridge due to hostile fire from the far bank. 
Several of the river bridges leading to the canal had also been destroyed. 
   Shortly afterwards the lead brigade of 1st Cavalry Division arrived at Marcoing, and 
4th Dragoon Guards were able to continue probing northwards along the east bank of the 
canal beyond Noyelles as far as La Folie, (described earlier) however they were equally 
unable to cross the canal, and 5th Dragoon Guards’ advance on Flot Farm had no more 
success than that of the 7th Dragoon Guards at 2:00pm. Thus both the 1st Cavalry 
Division, and the western portion of the 5th Cavalry Division were halted east of the 
canal, and made no more progress that day. This left only the Canadian Cavalry Brigade 
of 5th Cavalry Division, and the 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades of 2nd Cavalry Division on 
the easternmost ‘Kavanagh’ track with any possibility of crossing the canal, via the 
bridges at Masniéres. 
   The Canadian Cavalry Brigade, as advance guard of the column using the ‘Kavanagh’ 
track set off from fins at around 11:40am, simultaneously with the advance of the 
Secunderabad Brigade on their left. They made similar time, arriving on the southern 
outskirts of Les Rues Vertes, (as the village on the south side of the canal was known, 
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Masniéres being on the north side) at around 1:40pm. Here they met elements of 88th 
Brigade and were subject to “…a certain amount of hostile artillery and M.G. fire.”88 
Les Rues Vertes had been in the hands of the 88th Infantry Brigade since some time 
after noon, but an event had occurred which was to be critical in the failure of the 
Cavalry Corps’ advance, and as a result has become rather controversial. 
   ‘F’ Battalion of the Tank Corps was tasked with the capture of Les Rues Vertes and 
Masniéres ahead of 88th Brigade. Maj. Philip Hammond, the commander of ‘F’ 
Battalion left a memoir of the capture of the villages which has been widely quoted in 
subsequent accounts.89 According to his account he was able to enter Les Rues Vertes 
on foot accompanied only by one other soldier and ran for the canal bridge only to see it 
disappear in “…a cloud of dirty white dust” as the German defenders blew their 
demolition charges. The extent of the damage to the bridge is unclear, but it was still 
passable. When the tanks of ‘F’ Battalion arrived they were accompanied by Capt. 
Martel of the Tank Corps staff, and he, believing that the bridge might still take the 
weight of cavalry, prevented the tanks from attempting to cross.90 Unfortunately as no 
cavalry had arrived and as the Germans were consolidating their defence of the far bank 
of the canal it was decided at 12:40pm to send a tank across. The sequel has become one 
of the legends of the Cambrai battle; ‘F’ Battalion tank ‘Flying Fox II’ drove onto the 
bridge, carrying what Moore has termed “…the world’s first ‘panzer grenadiers’”;91 
bombers from 11 Rifle Brigade. This was too much for the bridge, which collapsed, 
dumping the tank in the canal. The bombers and tank crew fled unharmed, covered by 
the steam created by the flooding of the hot exhausts, but the bridge was gone. 
   It was not until around an hour later (at 1:40pm) that Seely, commanding the 
Canadian Cavalry Brigade, arrived at the south end of Les Rues Vertes. Here he 
conferred with Brig. Gen. Nelson commanding 88th Brigade, who was under the 
erroneous impression that the tanks had crossed the canal bridge and that it remained 
intact.92 Accordingly Seeley ordered forward his advanced guard regiment, the Fort 
Garry Horse. They reached the bridge at about 2:15pm, to be greeted by a broken and 
impassable bridge.93 It was this appearance by the cavalry which prompted Maj. 
Hammond’s often repeated remarks about “…medieval horse soldiers” and “…a 
ludicrous thing” quoted at the head of this chapter, however more should be inferred 
from it about the prejudices of a tank officer than about the performance of the cavalry. 
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Indeed he places the arrival of the Fort Garry Horse in his narrative ahead of the 
collapse of the bridge by Flying Fox, implying that it was already impassable, and thus 
avoiding any odium on the Tank Corps for its destruction. 94 Others have gone further, 
A. J. Smithers sought  to argue that the destruction of the bridge somehow saved the 
cavalry from a worse fate on the far bank, as their advance was self-evidently doomed: 
“But for the mishap of Lieutenant Edmundson’s tank on Masniéres bridge they [the 
German machine-gunners] would have collected vastly more scalps. Fortunately for 
themselves the British cavalry did nothing.”95 Little further comment on such remarks is 
necessary here. 
   Far from doing nothing, the Fort Garry Horse looked for an alternative crossing point 
over the canal. Subsequent events were described in a report by their commander Lt. 
Col. Paterson. 96 Arriving at the downed canal bridge at around 2:15pm Paterson was 
advised that the canal was passable by the lock gates and footbridge 1000 yards (900m) 
to the east of the village. This was “…stated by civilians to be suitable for horses in 
single file, and over which I could see the infantry crossing.” Maj. Sharpe was sent to 
examine the crossing, he did not return, but around 3:00pm Maj. Walker of the MG 
Squadron reported that his squadron had prepared a crossing over the lock. B Squadron 
of the Fort Garry Horse (under Capt. Campbell) was ordered across, and the remainder 
of the regiment prepared to follow. 
   Meanwhile, as 5th Cavalry Division had been exploring the canal crossings at 
Marcoing and Masniéres, 2nd Cavalry Division had been waiting south of the 
Gouzeaucourt road with no orders. Tiring of this delay, at 1:20pm Maj. Gen. Greenly 
sent a motorcycle to Cavalry Corps to find out what was going on. A staff officer 
returned from Cavalry Corps H.Q. at 2:08pm with orders for the division to follow 
closely on the advance of 5th Cavalry Division. 97 2nd Cavalry Division advanced, 
Greenly himself arrived in Les Rues Vertes some time after 3:00pm and found the 
Canadians were out of contact with the rest of their division. He rode on to the 5th 
Cavalry Division report centre to consult with MacAndrew, the divisional commander, 
but he was nowhere to be found. In accordance with the command contingency 
arrangements described earlier, he took command of the Canadian Brigade and called a 
conference with Seely, the commander of the Canadians, and Brig. Gen. Nelson, 
commander of 88th Infantry Brigade.98  
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   The outcome of this meeting was crucial as Greenly was persuaded that the single 
lock crossing was too precarious to push a whole brigade, let alone most of 2nd Cavalry 
Division over. The approaches were marshy, the crossing was under increasing enemy 
fire, the weather was deteriorating, and there were perhaps only 1½ hours of daylight 
remaining. Orders were duly sent to the Fort Garry Horse that no more troops should 
cross the canal and any on the far bank should be withdrawn. The Canadian Brigade 
were to assist 88th Brigade in consolidating a line along the canal, and the remainder of 
the 2nd Cavalry Division column, approaching in the rear of the Canadians, was to halt 
with its head 2 miles (3.2km) south of Les Rues Vertes.99As these orders were sent out, 
the possibility of getting significant numbers of cavalry anywhere across the canal on 20 
November disappeared. 
   On receiving the recall orders Lt. Col. Paterson commanding the Fort Garry Horse set 
off himself in pursuit of Capt. Campbell’s ‘B’ Squadron. Unfortunately he was not able 
to catch them up and they disappeared into the gloom beyond the canal.100 The 
subsequent activities of ‘B’ Squadron Fort Garry Horse have become another of the 
legends of Cambrai. Capt. Campbell was killed early in the advance, and the squadron 
was led by Lt. Strachan, who was subsequently awarded the Victoria Cross for his 
leadership. Strachan left a detailed narrative of their adventures in an article for the 
Cavalry Journal in 1927.101 According to his account, the squadron was tasked with a 
special mission separate from the rest of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, that of 
capturing an enemy Corps Headquarters in the village of Escadoeuvres north-east of 
Cambrai, and they set off with this in mind. The squadron passed through the wire of 
the German Masnières-Beaurevoir line north of the canal, and cutting their way through 
a camouflage screen on the Crevecoeur - Masniéres road, charged a battery of German 
guns. Many gunners were killed and the squadron rode on, past a group of around 100 
germans with four machine-guns who tried to surrender, but who, in the light of ‘B’ 
Squadron’s special mission, were left for supporting troops to round up. After an 
advance of about 3 miles (5km) the squadron rallied in a sunken road and took stock of 
their position. It was apparent that they had taken over 50% casualties, and that no 
support was forthcoming, in addition the Germans had identified their position and 
increasing fire was directed upon them. At this point Strachan decided that the mission 
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was now impossible and, abandoning the remaining horses the survivors of the 
squadron withdrew under cover of darkness to the canal.  
   A somewhat more sanguine account of the expedition was provided in a letter printed 
in the Cavalry Journal of 1928 in response to Strachan’s article. This was produced by 
Lt. (later Capt.) Cowen, who had been sent with the squadron as a German-speaking 
interpreter. In particular he was highly critical of Strachan’s choice to ignore the 
German machine-gunners:  
The Germans had their hands upraised in token of surrender. I told Lieutenant 
Strachan that I was going to take a section and send it back with those prisoners. 
Instead of this he seized my reins as I started to give the order, directing me to 
keep going – a serious mistake which cost many lives, for the moment we had 
gone by, the Germans picked up their rifles and machine-guns and started firing 
from our rear.102 
It is also apparent from Lt. Cowen’s account that it was largely due to his ability to bluff 
enemy sentries in German that the foot party was able to return to the canal without 
further loss. As it was the squadron had lost Capt. Campbell, 86 out of 129 other ranks, 
and all 140 horses,103 as well as Hotchkiss and packs. Eighteen prisoners were brought 
in.  
   On this basis B Squadron’s foray across the canal can hardly be considered a great 
success. However, in the reports of both Strachan and Cowen the evidence of an even 
greater failure can be discerned. Strachan observed “… it will easily be seen that, the 
whole success of the cavalry action depended upon crossing the river and the canal. It is 
ancient history now that a tank crossing the Masniéres bridge crashed through and as 
this prevented the cavalry from crossing the “show” was practically called off.”104 
However he continued “Judging from what one single squadron did, what could five 
cavalry divisions not have done?”105 His description of the advance through the 
Masnières - Beaurevoir line, the last formal German defence line on the north side of 
the canal, shows that this was met with comparatively little resistance: “Up to this point 
[the German gun battery] no opposition had been encountered from German infantry. 
The trenches marked on the map were merely ‘spit- locked’ (dummy) and there was 
practically no wire, but there were a few concrete ‘pill boxes’ completed and machine-
guns were firing from them.”106 He concluded “It appears that there would have been a 
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remarkable opportunity for a great cavalry success, had the operation in its original form 
been carried out.”107 Cowen supported this view, recalling the spit- locked trenches and 
absence of wire. He bemoaned the lack of air reconnaissance “The visibility that day 
had been very low, due to fog, causing many of our low flying planes to crash into the 
hills. Had they been able to see clearly and get reports back promptly our infantry could 
have advanced to the Rumilly - Crevecoeur Line with little resistance.”108 
   This perception by the front line commanders that a gap in the German defences 
existed can be contrasted with the view from Cavalry corps H.Q.: 
At 3p.m. the situation was that Masniéres and the Masniéres - Beaurevoir line 
was still held by the enemy, that the main bridges over the canal were broken, 
that the crossings that existed were narrow, and that it would take a very long 
time for any considerable body of cavalry to cross even if there was no 
opposition, and secondly, that the crossings were still under the enemy’s fire.109 
The senior commanders within the Cavalry Corps have been criticised for making much 
of their difficulties, and seeing little of their opportunities.110 It would seem that this was 
the case here. Greenly in particular seems to have allowed himself to be pursuaded that 
a further advance across the canal was not possible. Left alone, Seely might have 
pushed on, but he was both the subordinate commander, and a Yeomanry officer faced 
with Greenly the Regular. Moore has suggested that Maj. Gen. MacAndrew, the 
commander of 5th Cavalry Division, in view of his displeasure at the dismounting of the 
7th Dragoon Guards in Marcoing, appears to have been in more aggressive mood, and 
may have continued to attack,111 but he was away in Marcoing and command of the 
Canadians reverted to Greenly. 
   Kavanagh must also bear some responsibility. The plan of attack called for the cavalry 
to be ready to move by Z+2½ that is 8:50am. 1st Cavalry Division, under the command 
of IV Corps, began its advance by this time, indeed half an hour ahead of time. 
However it was not until nearly three hours later at 11:40am that Cavalry Corps saw fit 
to order the advance of 5th Cavalry Division. 2nd Cavalry Division was ordered forward 
to Gouzeaucourt, and then apparently forgotten until 1:20pm when Greenly sent for 
further orders. The result of this was that infantry and tanks had been in Les Rues 
Vertes for around two hours before any substant ial force of cavalry arrived, by which 
time the bridge had been broken and German defence had thickened decidedly. In this 
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climate of hesitancy and delay it is easy to see why Greenly felt there was not enough 
daylight left to continue. 
   A final puzzling feature of the cavalry advance to Masniéres is the question of Mon 
Plaisir bridge. This was highlighted by Wilfrid Miles in the Official History. 112 
Approximately one mile (1.6km) east of the bridge in Masniéres was a second crossing 
of the river and canal via a wooden bridge sheltered from fire by the river valley and 
screened by trees. This was intact and entirely suitable for cavalry. This bridge had been 
identified in a survey compiled by Third Army intelligence branch, but this was not 
circulated,113 however it did appear explicitly in the operation Orders of 29th Division as 
it formed part of the Fourth Phase objectives of the 88th Brigade.114 It was also depicted 
on both 1:20,000 and 1:10,000 map sheets. Strangely, no reference to it appears in any 
of the operational orders for the Cavalry Corps, nor was it brought to the attention of 
Greenly when he met Seely, and with Brig. Gen. Nelson of 88th Brigade and the latter’s 
Brigade Major, both of whom ought to have been familiar with the orders for 88th 
Brigade. The only reference to the bridge in cavalry records is in the Canadian Cavalry 
Brigade War Diary, where at around 4:00pm four guns of the machine-gun squadron 
were deployed “…to support the infantry [presumably of 88th Brigade] who were being 
pressed back at Mon Plaisir bridge.” In addition B battery R.C.H.A. came into action 
covering the crossing. 115 It is difficult to see how such a large oversight should have 
occurred. It remains possible that the use of this crossing was rendered impossible by 
some circumstance known to the men present at the time but not recorded. If not, it must 
be added to the list of higher command failures of 20 November. 
   No further action was undertaken by the cavalry on 20 November. Cavalry Corps 
contacted 29th Division at 6:25pm to ask if any assistance from 2nd or 5th Cavalry 
Divisions would be required overnight. As no support was requested, orders were issued 
for both divisions to withdraw to their forward concentration areas. Unfortunately 
communications with 5th Division were very slow, and those with 2nd Division had 
broken down almost entirely as their wireless had broken, and the head of the cable 
from Cavalry Corps was lost in the dark. The cavalry tracks had also deteriorated in the 
continuing rain such as to be virtua lly impassable at night. As a result both divisions 
were counter-ordered at 9:15pm to stay were they were and carry on with the advance in 
the morning. Only 4th Cavalry Brigade (of 2nd Cav. Div.) at the rear of the column on 
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the Villers Plouch – Marcoing route received the orders early enough to move and they 
fell back to Villers Faucon. 116 For the remainder “…at midnight we were told to off-
saddle and peg down for the night. The prospect was by no means a cheerful one but we 
lay down behind the horses to get what little sleep we could.”117 
 
 
Cantaing 21 November: Cavalry and Tanks 
 
   During the night of 20/21 November the embattled German defenders of Flesquiéres 
were advised that they could no longer be supported, and they withdrew. Thus by dawn 
on 21 November 51st Division was able to consolidate its second ‘Brown Line’ 
objectives.118 Orders were issued overnight by IV Corps for the attack to be continued 
on the left towards Bourlon, by 62nd Division, and on the right towards Fontaine, by 51st 
Division. 1st Cavalry Division was instructed to support the advance of IV Corps by 
detaching one regiment to support 62nd Division, and for the remainder to continue to 
try and advance west of the canal. 119 Mullen’s lead brigade of 1st Cavalry Division, the 
2nd Cavalry Brigade, was already committed to the defence of Noyelles and the canal 
crossings, and indeed heavy German counter-attacks were to be made on these positions 
throughout the day. 120 He therefore called up 1st Cavalry Brigade, which had spent the 
previous day in reserve around Trescault. One regiment, 11th Hussars, was detached to 
support 62nd Division while the remaining two regiments, 2nd Dragoon Guards (Queen’s 
Bays) and 5th Dragoon Guards were to support 51st Division. 121 
   Starting at about 6:00am the 51st Division advanced, occupying Flesquiéres, and 
moving on to overtake positions along the Graincourt – Marcoing road with relatively 
little opposition. Next they faced a partially constructed defensive line running from 
north of the Bois des Neuf, across the front of Cantaing, and up to Bourlon Wood. An 
attack on this position was prepared for 10:00am, with the as-yet unengaged 154th 
Brigade of 51st Division leading. This was to be supported by artillery and by 13 tanks 
of ‘B’ Battalion 2nd Tank Brigade. Unfortunately orders only reached the tanks at 
9:00am, giving them little chance of reaching the start line in time. Seeing no tanks by 
10:30, Br. Gen. Buchanan commanding 154th Brigade launched his Highlanders into the 
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attack unsupported, with pipers leading. This assault rapidly foundered, facing severe 
enemy machine-gun fire, and the brigade was pinned down short of Cantaing village.122 
   1st Cavalry Brigade, meanwhile had been maintaining touch with 51st Division via 
contact patrols.123 Moving off from a position to the east of Havrincourt at 9:40am they 
reached the southern side of Premy Chapel ridge, west of Marcoing at 10:25. From there 
elements of the advanced guard regiment, 2nd Dragoon Guards (Bays) advanced north-
east over the ridge towards the Bois des Neuf. At about 10:45 the infantry attack was 
observed, and the Brigade R.H.A. battery (‘I’ Battery) was brought into action to shell 
Cantaing in support of the infantry. In spite of this support the infantry attack was seen 
to be held up. At 11:15 the tanks finally arrived, and seven (some sources suggest 
thirteen124) made their way over Premy Chapel ridge towards Cantaing, drawing heavy 
machine-gun fire as they advanced. By about noon the tanks were making good 
progress into the village, but were unsupported by any infantry. Anxious about the fate 
of his unsupported tanks in the village, the colonel of ‘B’ Battalion sent a request for 
assistance to Brig. Gen. Makins commanding 1st Cavalry Brigade. In response, all three 
squadrons of the Queens Bays moved north along the canal and galloped the village 
from the east, and by 1:40pm the village was reported clear of enemy. Realising the 
importance of the position, Makins rapidly reinforced the Bays with a squadron of 5th 
Dragoon Guards, and as signs of a counter-attack were observed around 2:00pm the 
defences of the village were further enhanced with 6 guns from the brigade machine-
gun squadron. These troops continued to defend the village for the remainder of the day, 
being relieved by infantry of 6th and 51st divisions overnight. 
   Clearly the arrival of the tanks had retrieved the situation and made a success out of 
what could very easily have been a disaster. (Unfortunately the lack of progress of 62nd 
Division towards Bourlon persuaded Gen. Harper, commanding 51st Division to call a 
halt to the advance, and any advantage gained was thus thrown away. 125) The Bays also 
seem to have got away with very light casualties, only one man being recorded killed, 
and 3 officers and 34 men wounded.126  
   The action can be viewed as evidence of the success of cavalry working mounted in 
co-operation with tanks, a fact that few commentators on the battle seem to have 
acknowledged. Smithers was scathing about the rôle of the cavalry: 
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In addition to the Highlanders and Captain Raikes’ tanks there was a cavalry 
brigade. What it was expected to achieve was unclear. An officer who watched 
attempts of Cavalry and Infantry to co-operate with the tanks in the open ground 
south of Bourlon Wood was much impressed with the difficulties of co-
ordinating cavalry with tanks. When MG fire was met the horsemen had to go so 
far back to get cover that they lost touch and the Tank was left alone on the 
objective for a long time before the cavalry could be communicated with and got 
forward again. This should hardly have come as a surprise; there was no place 
for animals in such a battle.127 
Other writers simply ignore the presence of the cavalry, attributing the fall of the village 
to the 4th Gordon Highlanders, who were in the lead of the 154th Brigade attack.128 Br. 
Gen. Makins perhaps anticipated such counter-claims for the village, in the 1st Cavalry 
Brigade report he states: 
The village was soon over-run by the Bays. The 4th Gordons who had reached a 
trench to the S. of the village, then came into the village but retired again later. 
Lt Barnard [commanding the lead squadron of Bays] never saw any infantry in 
the village when he got there and the whole credit of taking Cantaing is entirely 
due to the Tanks supported by the Bays.129 
One has to be somewhat sceptical of this claim as Makins could hardly be considered 
un-partizan, but even if the Gordons were able to make a simultaneous advance on the 
west of the village, the cavalry was nonetheless able to contribute significantly to the 
battle, contrary to the widely perceived wisdom that cavalry could not work 
successfully with tanks. 
   The capture of Cantaing also marked the last mounted action in the offensive battle. 
2nd and 5th Cavalry Divisions had been held in readiness to advance via Marcoing and 
Masniéres after a further infantry attack on the Masniéres-Beaurevoir Line to the east of 
the canal, but this attack failed to make any progress against a greatly reinforced 
German line. On the evening of the 21 November both divisions were withdrawn, and 
although 1st Cavalry Division was initially retained in the battle area, and 4th Cavalry 
Division moved forward to relieve the 5th, these two were also withdrawn on the 22nd. 
   Elements of 1st and 2nd Cavalry Divisions were to play a significant part in the 
struggle for Bourlon Wood between 25 and 27 November, but as this fighting was 
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carried out entirely on foot, the divisions forming dismounted battalions from each of 
their brigades, this lies outside the scope of this study. The use of precious cavalry 
soldiers in this way reflects Charteris’ prediction before the offensive began that 
ultimately the attack had been launched with too few troops. It also reflects the 
increasing desperation with which the Third Army command continued to press the 
attack, refusing to acknowledge that the offensive had essentially halted on 22 
November. 
 
 
The German Counter-stroke: 30 November 
 
   While British attention continued to be focused on the increasingly stalemated battle 
for Bourlon, the Germans were making plans of their own. The reinforcements which 
had been rushed to the area meant that not only were they in a position to halt the 
British offensive, but also to contemplate a counter-attack of their own to reverse the 
British gains and restore the Hindenburg Line front. Preparations at the headquarters of 
Crown Prince Rupprecht’s group of armies, in whose sector Cambrai lay, began on 24 
November. This was followed by a conference with Ludendorff on the 27th, after which 
a formal order to the German Second Army was issued. The broad outline of the attack 
was as follows. A main thrust was to be launched at the internal south-eastern angle of 
the British salient by the Caudry and Busigny groups of German divisions, with the aim 
of striking across the base of the salient towards Metz en Couture. This would be 
accompanied by a thrust south by the Arras Group of divisions to the west of Bourlon 
Wood. At worst this would cut off the British troops in the head of the salient around 
Fontaine, Marcoing and Masnières, and at best offered the possibility of rolling up the 
British line towards Arras from the south-east.130 
   The British Third Army commanders seem to have been taken largely by surprise by 
this attack when it fell on 30 November. Partly they were absorbed in the fighting for 
Bourlon, where a counter attack was expected, and indeed delivered by the Arras Group 
of German forces. Also they had been influenced by unduly optimistic intelligence 
assessments of the German inability to mount such an attack after the losses of the 
Cambrai battle thus far, and in Flanders. In any event the lack of available forces meant 
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that even had they been aware of the German plans there was little they could have done 
to oppose them. The British line around the salient continued to be held by the divisions 
of III and IV Corps which had participated in the original attack ten days before. To the 
south VII Corps, which took the brunt of the German southern thrust was spread out 
occupying a thinly held and poorly constructed line.131 
   The northern arm of the German attack made little progress, at great cost in German 
casualties, and as no cavalry were engaged little more need be said of it here. The 
southern attack, however resulted in the involvement of three of the five British cavalry 
divisions in the subsequent fighting and forms the basis of this section. Of particular 
relevance here is the attack by the German 34th and 208th Divisions of the Busigny 
Group, which attacked at the extreme southern end of the German offensive front, 
between Vendhuille in the south and Banteux in the north. These troops were faced 
initially by the British VII Corps, on a section of the line which had not formed part of 
the British attack front on 20 November, and which was relatively ill prepared for the 
storm which was to descend upon it. 
   The German attack of 30 November began with a bombardment of gradually 
increasing intensity upon the northern half of the VII Corps front, held by 55th Division. 
This was followed at 7.00am by infiltration by small columns of German infantry, (in a 
style which was to be used on a larger scale the following year) supported by low flying 
aircraft, gas and minenwerfer bombardment, and covered by smoke, and the natural mist 
of early morning. This initial attack was enormously successful. Within hours Villers 
Guislain and Gouzeaucourt had been captured and a hole approximately five miles (8 
km) north to south and three miles (4.5 km) deep had been torn in the British defences. 
Many guns had been captured and what opposition continued was mostly provided by 
scratch forces of rear-echelon troops.132 
   Largely by coincidence, part of the Cavalry Corps was in the area to the rear of VII 
Corps when the German blow was struck. As a result, when Lt. Gen. Snow of VII Corps 
appealed for reinforcements the cavalry were the natural choice for Third Army to 
commit to the battle to halt the German advance. Cavalry Corps Headquarters was at 
that time at Villers Carbonnel, south of Peronne and approximately 16 miles (25 km) 
from the German break- in. All but one of the Cavalry Divisions, were also some 
distance away from the fighting, 4th and 5th Divisions were at Athies and Monchy-
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Lagache respectively, a few miles from the Corps headquarters, while 1st and 3rd 
Divisions were at Bray and Querrieu, further to the west. Only 2nd Cavalry Division was 
in the immediate Cambrai area, at Fins, still recovering its dismounted battalions from 
their time in Bourlon Wood.133 
   Cavalry Corps HQ was telephoned by Third Army with news of the attack at 8.30am. 
At that point the cavalry divisions had already begun to prepare a move into the VII 
Corps line to take over dismounted from the 24th Division, holding the southern half of 
the corps front. These orders were rapidly rescinded and 5th Cavalry Division was 
ordered up to Villers Faucon, where 55th Division had its Headquarters. Shortly after 
this 4th Cavalry Division was ordered to follow in support of the 5th, and with admirable 
despatch, Kavanagh himself followed by motor car, taking the commanders of 4th and 
5th Cavalry Divisions, Kennedy and MacAndrew, with him and opening an Advanced 
Corps Headquarters at Villers Faucon by 10.45am. 134 At about this time 2nd Cavalry 
Division, nearest the northern end of the German break- in, was ‘placed at the disposal’ 
of III Corps command.135 This was a sensible move as the German attack had struck the 
junction of the two corps, and while 55th Division and VII Corps lay to the south of the 
incursion, III Corps troops mostly lay to the north. In allocating this division to the 
defending infantry corps Kavanagh also devolved responsibility for his artillery to them, 
the R.H.A. batteries of 2nd Cavalry Division (operating under III Corps) and 4th Cavalry 
Division were both handed over to 55th Division. 136 This was an understandable move 
as 55th Division had had its gun lines largely overrun, and was desperately short of 
artillery (although several of these gun positions were to be recaptured rapidly as the 
day progressed). The unfortunate consequence of this was that it denuded the cavalry 
themselves of what little integral artillery they possessed, and this was to be a 
significant factor in the fighting of the next few days. 
   The first cavalry into action on 30 November were from 2nd Cavalry Division. As 
already stated, this division was at Fins awaiting the return of one of its dismounted 
battalions. At about 10.30am orders were received to reinforce the line at Gouzeaucourt, 
about 4 miles (6.5 km) to the east. 5th Cavalry Brigade, formed of the 20th Hussars, 12th 
Lancers and 2nd Dragoons (Scots Greys) was allocated as advanced guard, and departed 
at around 11.00am, with 20th Hussars, (who had been in the process of arranging 
regimental baths for that morning) as vanguard. Approaching Gouzeaucourt, patrols 
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reported the village in German hands, opposed on the ridge to the west by a thinly held 
line of assorted British stragglers, and 470th Field Company Royal Engineers. Fire from 
the village made forward progress impossible so the Hussars dismounted and reinforced 
the line. 137  
   At about the same time 1st Guards Brigade arrived on the left of the cavalry opposite 
Gouzeaucourt. The Guards Division had been initially allocated to VII Corps but this 
was changed as III Corps’ need seemed greater, unfortunately this confusion of orders 
meant that only 1st Brigade, operating alone, moved into the line. Notwithstanding their 
lack of support and numbers, 1/Irish Guards, and 2/ and 3/Coldstream Guards, carrying 
20th Hussars with them on their right flank, attacked into and through Gouzeaucourt at 
midday. Further progress was checked beyond the village but a new line was established 
which was held by the Guards and cavalry for the remainder of the day. 138 
   While Gouzeaucourt was falling to the Guards and Hussars, the lead elements of 5th 
Cavalry Division arrived at Villers Faucon. The Ambala Brigade, leading, reached there 
at 12.15pm, 139 however having travelled some eleven miles (18 km) at a brisk trot in 
only just over an hour, most of the officers of the brigade had only the vaguest idea of 
where they were.140 Orders from Kavanagh at Corps Advanced HQ followed at 1.10pm: 
The Cav. Corps will advance in a northerly direction with a view to attacking the 
enemy’s flank between Villers Guislain and Gouzeaucourt and seizing the 
Gonnelieu ridge. The 5th Cav. Div. will move at once with objective the enemy’s 
flank between Villers Guislain and Gouzeaucourt. It will be supported by the 4th 
Cav. Div. In accordance with the situation as it develops.141 
   5th Cavalry Division moved off from Villers Faucon shortly after, with 8th Hussars and 
Ambala Brigade leading. These lead troops were broadly heading for Gauche Wood, 
and Gouzeaucourt with the aim of linking with the Guards and 2nd Cavalry Division to 
the north, but they still had very little idea of the position of their own and the enemy’s 
troops, or indeed where they were themselves. On arrival at Vaucelette Farm at around 
2.30pm, it was possible to compare maps with the infantry holding the line along 
Revelon Ridge and a better picture of the situation was gained.142 8th Hussars pushed on 
but soon drew fire from the direction of Gauche Wood, and became entangled in the 
trenches and wire of the British second line, which ran to the west of the wood. 
Abandoning their horses they took up position in a sunken road to the west of the wood. 
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The second regiment of the brigade, 9th Hodson’s Horse attempted to move up on the 
left (north) of the Hussars in support, but it too got no further than the sunken road, 
about 600 yards (550m) from the wood. A German counter attack was, however, 
repulsed from the direction of the wood, and by 4.00pm as it grew dark, contact was 
made by Hodson’s Horse with the 20th Hussars to the north and a stable defensive line 
established just west of the railway line from Gouzeaucourt in the north to Revelon 
Ridge in the south. 143 
   A feature of the Hodson’s Horse advance was that it was made mounted. This was 
effective where the ground was clear but where bottlenecks were created crossing the 
abundant wire in the area German artillery was able to inflict significant casualties. Lt. 
Col. Rowcroft, who rode with the regiment recalled: 
The passage of the defile and advance by ‘C’ Squadron had been so rapid that 
the enemy’s artillery had not had time to get on to the troops. However as ‘D’ 
Squadron started to follow ‘C’ through the gap in the wire, there was a different 
tale to tell, and the leading troop was literally blown to pieces.144 
   There is little direct evidence of Kavanagh’s view of the battle on 30 November, but it 
is possible to infer from what few clues exist that he felt that this was a decisive 
moment for the cavalry, and that Third Army had placed responsibility for stopping the 
Germans in his hands. His rapid advance by motor to his Advanced Headquarters is a 
symptom of this. His insistence upon mounted attacks was apparent the following day, 
as will be discussed later, but it seems likely that he adopted a similar tone on the 30th. 
The Cavalry Corps War Diary records that at 3.15pm “G.O.C. [Kavanagh] rode up to 
G.O.C. 5th Cav. Div. H.Q. [MacAndrew]… Ambala and Secunderabad Brigades had 
just been directed mounted on Gauche Wood.”145 (emphasis added). If indeed he did 
insist on mounted attacks on 30 November it suggests he had misread the battle. Had the 
Germans been advancing in large bodies across open ground then a sharp mounted blow 
might have sent them reeling, but in fact their advance was by infiltration of small 
parties across ground which although behind the British front line, was still part of the 
‘battle zone’; heavily wired and cut by trenches. Also by midday the German advance 
had largely run out of steam and their forces were consolidating in entrenched positions. 
In short Kavanagh seems to have anticipated a return to ‘open warfare’ which had not 
actually occurred. 
  192 
   Fortunately the local commanders were not so deceived, and both 8th Hussars and 
Hodson’s Horse rapidly dismounted and fought on foot. Another lesson had also been 
learned, Lt. Col. Maunsell observed: 
As it was now clear that there was no hope of any further advance, the led horses 
were all sent back some three miles, well out of the way. The mistake of 
Monchy- le-Preux where 700 horses were shelled to death in the streets of the 
village owing to no orders having been received to send them away, was not 
repeated.146 
   The remaining two brigades of 5th Cavalry Division followed the Ambala Brigade 
between 3.00 and 4.00pm. Secunderabad Brigade swung north to extend the line on the 
left of Hodson’s Horse, however on approaching Gouzeaucourt they made contact with 
5th Cavalry Brigade (2nd Cavalry Division) who were already filling that gap so 
Secunderabad brigade retired to a position in reserve to the west. An attack on 
Gonnelieu, one of the original corps objectives, was considered, and “Patrols were sent 
towards Gonnelieu with a view to a mounted attack, but the place was found to be 
defended by wire and machine guns.”147 Brig. Gen. Gregory, commanding the brigade 
decided that this stood no chance of success and it was not attempted. (It is perhaps 
fortunate that at the northern end of the line he was not in good communication with 
Kavanagh.)  
   The Canadian Cavalry Brigade meanwhile moved up on the right (south) of the 
Ambala Brigade, taking up positions around Vaucelette Farm, and it was in these 
positions that 5th Cavalry Division spent the night, 18th Lancers (of Ambala Brigade) 
relieving 8th Hussars in the front line after dark.148 
 
 
The ‘Battle of Epehy’: 1 December 1917 
(Figure 4.2 overleaf) 
   Overnight 30 November to 1 December orders were drawn up for a renewal of the 
British counter-attack at dawn the following day. Unlike the previous day, when few 
had been available, a significant number of tanks had been found to support this attack, 
and a combined infantry, cavalry, and tank assault was envisaged. Orders were issued 
by Cavalry Corps Headquarters at 6.40pm on the 30th: 
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The 5th Cavalry Division, with the Lucknow Cavalry Brigade attached to it 
[from 4th Division] will attack Gauche Wood and Villers Guislain tomorrow 1st 
December, co-operating with 14 tanks, 8 of which will be directed on Gauche 
Wood and 6 on Villers Guislain. … 
4th Cavalry Division less Lucknow Cavalry Brigade will be assembled west of 
Peiziere by 6.30am with the object of taking advantage of the advance of the 
tanks and seizing Villers Ridge.149 
A conference of the leading brigade commanders and a liaison officer from the tanks 
was held at 5th Cavalry Division Headquarters at 1.15am where the details were worked 
out.150 1st Guards Brigade, supported by 20 tanks would attack Gauche Wood from the 
north. Simultaneously, on the right (south) of the Guards, Ambala Brigade of 5th 
Cavalry Division would attack the wood on foot from the west, supported by a further 
six tanks. Secunderabad Brigade would take up a supporting position to the west of 
Ambala Brigade, mounted. The Canadian Brigade would cover the southern shoulder of 
the attack. Meanwhile further south, Lucknow Brigade (of 4th Cavalry Division but 
under temporary command of the 5th) would attack towards Villers Guislain, supported 
by nine tanks, on the south-east side of the Peiziere to Villers road. In turn on their right, 
this attack would be supported by the remaining brigades of 4th Division; Mhow and 
Sialkhot, attacking north and east ‘to take advantage of the advance of the tanks’.151 
   To mount such a coordinated attack over unfamiliar ground, in the few hours of 
remaining darkness was a difficult undertaking, for the tanks in particular, as Col. 
Maunsell observed: 
Conditions for tank co-operation in the contemplated attack on 1st December 
were extremely unfavourable. The machines were a long way from the points of 
assembly. It was dark, and there had been no time to reconnoitre lines of 
approach and find out the state of affairs in general. The uncertainty as to the 
locality of our own troops made things difficult enough for infantry and cavalry. 
It was infinitely worse for the tanks, especially as the terrain was absolutely 
new, and the machines are by nature extraordinarily blind.152 
   Nor was the artillery support for the attack remotely adequate. The two R.H.A. 
batteries of 5th Cavalry Division were to support the Gauche Wood attack, while the 
third R.C.H.A. battery was lent by the Canadians to support Lucknow Brigade. 
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“Anyone with the slightest experience of France” Maunsell remarked “would know that 
this was a mere fleabite.”153 
   In spite of these disadvantages the northern part of the attack the following morning 
was a success. 1st Guards Brigade waited about ten minutes for their supporting tanks, 
but seeing no sign of them simply took Gauche Wood at a rush, supported only by the 
fire of their brigade machine gun company. 18th Lancers, the lead assaulting regiment of 
Ambala brigade supported this attack and helped mop up the wood, indeed as officer 
casualties in the Guards were so heavy, the officers of the 18th Lancers took temporary 
command of the forces in the wood.154 The tanks allocated to support the Lancers, 
although they arrived on time, rapidly lost direction and instead of heading east towards 
the wood, swung north across the face of the wood, and in passing, shot up the trenches 
occupied by Hodson’s Horse, inflicting several casualties.155 Some eventually entered 
the wood from the north but only at about 8.30am, after the battle was substantially 
over.156 
   Further south events took a rather different turn. The Lucknow Brigade, with the 36th 
(Jacobs’) Horse leading, were to attack towards Villers Guislain from a position south-
east of Vaucelette Farm at 6.20am. At 5.45am, just over half an hour before they were 
due to set off, a message was received that the tanks allocated to the attack would not 
reach the rendezvous in time and would move off from a point a mile (1.6km) to the 
north-west, at Genin Well Copse.157 This would place the tanks some distance away and 
on the other side of the ridge running along the Peiziere to Villers road. Brig. Gen. 
Gage, commanding Lucknow Brigade, frantically sought to check his Brigade’s 
advance, (Jacobs’ Horse were contacted less than five minutes before they were to move 
off), and re-deploy the force a mile to the west. This was achieved by 6.50am, but no 
tanks were contacted.158  
   Gage assumed that since the tanks were on his left their advance would converge with 
that of his brigade towards the objective (Villers Guislain), and anxious firstly that the 
tanks may have gone on ahead without support, and secondly to make good his rôle as 
flank protection for the attack on Gauche Wood, he ordered Jacobs Horse into the 
attack. Gage was unaware that not only had the tanks’ start point been altered but that 
their axis of advance had also been changed to send all the tanks towards Gauche Wood, 
thus no tanks would enter his brigade area at all. As a result, Jacobs’ Horse were left to 
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advance with no tank support, little or no artillery support, as the brigade R.H.A. had 
been detached, and in increasing daylight. In the face of heavy German artillery and 
machine gun fire the attack progressed no more than about 100 yards (100m) before 
becoming pinned down in the network of British second line trenches ahead of them. 
This was a great relief to the scratch force of rear echelon troops holding those trenches 
but did not carry the Brigade anywhere near Villers Guislain. 159 
   Worse was to follow on the right of the Lucknow Brigade, and here the involvement 
of Kavanagh and Cavalry Corps Headquarters in the conduct of affairs was starkly 
highlighted. On the right of Lucknow Brigade, who were temporarily under 5th Cavalry 
Division command, lay the remainder of 4th Cavalry Division; the Mhow Brigade 
leading with Sialkot brigade in support. Their orders had been to advance “… taking 
advantage of the advance of the tanks and seizing Villers Ridge.”160 Wilfrid Miles also 
claims in the Official History that “Mounted action was insisted upon by Lieut. General 
Kavanagh.”161 The Brigade was concentrated to the north of Peiziere by 6.30am, ready 
to go, and under artillery fire, but seeing no tank attack developing and aware that the 
Lucknow Brigade had made no progress, Brig. Gen. Neil Haig, commanding Mhow 
Brigade made no move. 
   The Cavalry Corps War Diary is somewhat coy about what happened next. No 
mention of the Mhow brigade appears in the diary itself apart from a report of its 
advance at 8.45am. In the attached ‘Report on Operations’, events are described thus: 
The Corps Commander, who had sent a Staff Officer to the 4th Cavalry Division, 
to report on their progress, telephoned at about 7.45am to G.O.C. 4th Cavalry 
Division, ordering him to commence the advance on the objective allotted to 
him in the Corps Order. He had not moved earlier in view of the fact that the  
advance of the tanks with Lucknow Brigade had not materialised.162 
Also contained in the Corps War Diary is a typescript ‘The battle of Epehy’, by Col. 
Maunsell, which formed the basis of his later account of events published in the Cavalry 
Journal.163 Associated with this are letters from both Neil Haig, commanding Mhow 
Brigade itself, and Maj. Gen. Kennedy, commanding 4th Cavalry Division. The letters 
are somewhat more revealing. Haig states: 
The attack on Villers Guislain was by direct order of the Corps Commander. … 
I went up to Alfred Kennedy’s H.Q. and explained the enemy’s situation to him, 
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and asked him to come down to my H.Q. himself. …Kennedy quite agreed with 
me that an attack on this position was impracticable and said he would go and 
talk to the Corps Commander on the telephone at once and explain the 
situation. 164 
Kennedy’s letter gives an account of this conversation: 
 Kavanagh: How is your attack getting on? 
Kennedy: My attack? Why it has not started as the dismounted attack has 
not made any progress. The tanks failed to turn up and there is 
nothing doing. 
Kavanagh: Rot! You have to carry out your attack as ordered. 
Kennedy: But my orders were to take advantage of any success gained in 
the mounted(sic) attack and as I say there has not been any 
success. 
Kavanagh: You have to carry out your attack at once. 
Kennedy: If you order me to do so I will try it. 
(I may say the Corps Commander was evidently very annoyed, and from the 
first, spoke very rudely.)165 
Haig Continues: 
Kennedy returned later and informed me that he had explained the situation 
carefully, that the Corps Commander was very annoyed at the delay and ordered 
the attack to take place at once. 
   While I was issuing my orders… one of the Corps staff rode up and said to me 
“then can I inform the Corps Commander that you have great hopes of success?” 
I told him that he could go back and tell the Corps Commander that I didn’t 
think we had a “Dog’s bloody earthly.” He returned and told the Corps 
Commander that I was not optimistic.166 
   Kennedy and Haig were thus left with no option but to press ahead with an attack in 
which they had no confidence. Haig’s report of subsequent events appears in the Mhow 
Brigade War Diary,167 and was reprinted verbatim in the Cavalry Journal after his 
death. 168 Much of what follows is drawn from that account. Kennedy passed a formal 
order to Mhow Brigade at 8.15am. “You are to endeavour to push towards your 
objective supported by the artillery.” The situation which presented Haig was as 
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follows, the brigade lay at Peiziere, and the adjoining village of Epehy. Approximately 
5000 yards (4500m) to the north-east lay Villers Guislain, on the brigade objective; 
‘Villers Ridge’. The terrain in between was largely open and unobstructed, sloping 
down to the canal to the east, but with higher ground forming the shape of a capital ‘E’. 
The ridge carrying the road between the two villages formed the spine to the west, with 
a ridge to the south around Epehy, a central ridge, known of British maps as ‘Lark 
Spur’, and Villers Ridge to the north. Two re-entrants ran westwards from the canal. 
The southerly of these was ‘Catelet Valley’ and the northern, ‘Targelle Ravine’, two 
southward projections of this northern valley were known as ‘Quail’ and ‘Pigeon’ 
Ravines, although neither is more than a gentle depression in broadly rolling country. 
Cutting off the eastern ends of these features was the former British line, now occupied 
by the Germans, principally consisting of a series of fortified posts connected by 
communication trenches. To the west, about two thirds of the way along the road to 
Villers lay a ‘Raperie’ or ‘Beet Factory’ which had been occupied and fortified by the 
Germans. 
   Haig’s plan was that 2nd Lancers, suppported by one Squadron of 6th (Inniskilling) 
Dragoons should swing wide to the east, following a road along the northern face of 
Catelet Valley, before turning north via pigeon Ravine onto Villers Ridge. Meanwhile 
the remaining three squadrons of the Inniskillings would pass along the east side of the 
main Villers road, dropping into Quail Ravine and the southward turn at the eastern end 
of Targelle Ravine, in order to gain some shelter from, and bypass the beet factory. 38th 
(Central India) Horse would remain in support, as would Sialkot Brigade. 
   2nd Lancers moved off through Epehy at around 9.00am. The regiment had been on its 
way into the trenches when recalled on 30 November so the men were without swords 
or lances. These had to be handed out from wagons as the men rode off and many went 
into action without either.169 Shelling was intense from the start. The Regiment 
(followed by ‘C’ Squadron Inniskillings, and a brigade MG section) deployed beyond 
the village into column of squadrons in line of troop columns, and set off at a gallop 
down Catelet Valley. They came under heavy machine gun fire from in front and from 
the higher ground on both flanks, but rode on until they reached the rear of the former 
British positions, a trench known as Kildare Trench, and the associated Kildare Post. 
The fresh German wire behind the post was jumped, or gaps found and the Lancers 
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captured the trench after some hand to hand fighting. Fortunately the trench ran along 
the line of a pre-existing sunken road, so it was possible to get some horses under cover, 
as the lancers were rapidly pinned down in this position. The remaining horses had to be 
sent back up the valley and suffered severely on the return trip. Haig summed up the 
resulting situation: 
A German position had been captured and was occupied by about 200 men 2nd 
Lancers, 36 Men Inniskilling Dragoons, 4 machine guns 11th M.G. squadron and 
in addition there were 169 horses in the position, which greatly interfered with 
the movement of the garrison and the evacuation of the wounded.170 
2nd Lancers were to remain cut off in Kildare Trench for the rest of the day, fighting an 
at times desperate struggle with bombs and machine guns, and only withdrawing under 
cover of darkness.  
   The remainder of the Inniskilling Dragoons, meanwhile were unaware that this would 
be the fate of the Lancers, and seeing them move off to the east at about 9.35am, took 
this as their cue to begin their own advance. In similar formation to the Lancers, 
squadron column of line of troop columns, extended, they set out from north of Peiziere, 
but unlike the Lancers who had the slight cover of a valley, the first part of the 
Inniskilling’s route as far as the Beet factory was completely exposed. Also due to an 
oversight, and the absence of ‘C’ Squadron, which normally led the column, the attack 
was led by ‘D’ Squadron, with the machine gun section immediately behind it, instead 
of at the rear of the column. Intense fire was encountered almost immediately, but the 
Dragoons pushed on at a gallop. Despite their best efforts, however the task was 
hopeless, ‘D’ Squadron and the machine guns got as far as the Beet Factory itself before 
being surrounded and forced to surrender, while Lt. Col. Paterson, leading the rear two 
squadrons, pulled up while 600 yards distant and withdrew to Peiziere. 6th (Inniskilling) 
Dragoons lost 102 casualties, and over 150 horses in a little under ten minutes. The 
machine gun section, consisting of two officers 53 other ranks and 87 horses, was a total 
loss, killed or captured. The widely quoted remarks of Col. Maunsell in this attack bear 
repetition here “The point of attempting a mounted attack under the circumstances 
seems incomprehensible. In the case of the Inniskillings, not one single element that has 
conduced to the success in mounted attacks since, and including, the time of Napoleon 
was present.”171 Sadly this fact was known to Haig and Kennedy before the operation 
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was attempted, only Kavanagh, at Cavalry Corps Headquarters it seems, believed there 
was any chance of success. 
   Haig’s final effort to press forward the attack was at 10.10am. Two squadrons of the 
Mhow Brigade reserve regiment, the Central India Horse were sent to try to push down 
the north side of Catelet Valley and support the 2nd Lancers. These troops despite 
advancing on foot rapidly came under heavy machine gun fire and could make no 
progress. One squadron in fact became itself pinned down on Lark Spur and was forced 
to remain there until darkness fell. 
   The result of the morning’s operations was that while the 2nd Lancers occupied a 
position at the eastern end of Catelet Valley, and the Guards and the Ambala Brigade 
held Gauche Wood, a large westward salient lay between the two, still occupied by the 
enemy. In particular German machine guns were active on the railway embankment 
north of Vaucelette Farm, in the area known as Chapel Crossing, 172 and the Beet 
Factory was still strongly held. Nonetheless, it is highly questionable whether the 
Germans had either the will or the ability to push on south-westwards beyond the 
positions they had gained on 30 November. Their activities seem to have been limited to 
local counter-attacks against thrusts by the cavalry. Kavanagh however, felt that a 
further effort to dislodge them was required. At about midday he rode forward to the 4th 
and 5th Cavalry Divisions’ Headquarters just to the west of Peiziere, summoning 
Kennedy and MacAndrew to arrange further assaults during the afternoon. 173 Orders 
were issued for an attack by the Canadian Cavalry Brigade towards Chapel Crossing, 
linking up with the south end of Gauche Wood, while Lucknow Brigade, now returned 
to 4th Division command, would attack towards the Beet Factory, supported by Mhow 
Brigade on its right. Orders for an attack at 3.00pm were issued at 12.40. This order did 
not reach Haig at Mhow Brigade until 2.15pm due to the weight of shelling falling on 
Peiziere. His response was to point out the parlous state of his brigade after the disasters 
of the morning “4th Cavalry Division were informed that the total available force in the 
hand of the G.O.C. Mhow Cav. Bde. consisted of two weak squadrons of Inniskilling 
Dragoons, one squadron of C.I.H. and two machine guns.”174 Nonethless an attack plan 
was developed requiring the remaining squadron of C.I.H. to push forward, assisted by 
the two squadrons of that regiment already trapped on Lark Spur. “O.C. Inniskilling 
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Dragoons was informed that in the case of success in this attack, the remains of his two 
squadrons would act mounted.”175  
   Once again the artillery support for an attack on foot against entrenched enemy with 
large numbers of machine guns was limited to little more than the intrinsic R.H.A. and 
R.C.H.A batteries of the two divisions. This was simply not enough to make any 
impression on the enemy. The Canadian attack was initially successful, Lord 
Strathcona’s Horse, with support from a squadron of the Royal Canadian Dragoons 
were able to evict the Germans from Chapel Crossing and link up with the southern end 
of Gauche Wood, but that was as far as they were able to go.176 To the south of them 
Lucknow Brigade were presented with the same obstacle s as they had faced in the 
morning, and with no new resources with which to attempt them. Nor were they advised 
of the Canadian attack on their flank so no proper co-ordination was possible. Jacob’s 
Horse led the attack towards the Beet Factory, advancing in short rushes, but each 
attempt was met with rising casualties and the attack stalled after a few hundred 
yards.177 At least “as no attack appeared to develop on the left flank” Mhow brigade 
were spared the necessity of further effort, and the squadrons of C.I.H. were not sent 
forward.178 
   The attack by the Canadians on Chapel Crossing marked the end of significant 
offensive operations on the Cavalry Corps front. Overnight the brigades in the line were 
relieved by the reserve brigades of the two divisions, Secunderabad on the 5th Division 
front and Sialkot on the 4th. The Germans were content to hold the ground gained and 
while fighting continued to the north, the German flank opposite the cavalry remained 
quiet. The Cavalry Corps was finally relieved by III and VI Corps on 6 December, and 
Corps Forward Headquarters at Villers Faucon was closed on that day. 179 By that time 
the British salient, gained on 20th November, had largely been evacuated and returned to 
German hands. 
 
 
The Failure of the Cavalry? 
 
   Clearly the offensive at Cambrai failed to achieve the objectives desired of it by its 
planners, and much of the ground gained was rapidly lost as a consequence of the 
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German counter-offensive of 30 November. A series of recriminations rapidly followed 
culminating in both ‘questions in the House’ and several official enquiries.180 These 
tended to focus on the reasons why the Germans made such good progress on 30 
November, and dwelt little on the actions of the cavalry. Unofficially however, the 
feeling was quick to develop that the cavalry had failed to live up to the opportunity 
presented to it by the tank and infantry attack. Home noted in his diary on 10 December: 
“There is a lot of talk about the Cavalry just now; people seem to think that we should 
have got through on 20 November.”181 As was outlined at the beginning of this chapter, 
this view that the cavalry failed has been picked up by most subsequent literature on the 
battle.182  
   Two major criticisms have been made of the cavalry. The first of these corresponds 
closely with one of the themes of this study, command and control. It has been argued 
that Kavanagh and Cavalry Headquarters were too far in the rear to properly control the 
battle, and thus missed what fleeting opportunities for advance occurred. Combined 
with this is criticism of Kavanagh himself as a commander. This view was first 
promulgated by J. F. C. Fuller, and is adopted more or less verbatim by Travers, quoting 
the former, “Meanwhile, J. F. C. Fuller knew that Kavanagh was miles away from the 
battle and was ‘surely the worst Cavalry general in all history’.”183 The performance of 
Kavanagh will be examined in more detail later, suffice to say at this point that part of 
the problem was intrinisic in the command structure, not in the person of the  
commander. This criticism was also voiced by those involved in the battle itself. Gen. 
Woollcombe is reported to have remarked to his ADC at IV Corps “…that the cavalry 
had cost us our chance.”184 Smithers in his 1992 work once again quoted Col. Baker 
Carr of the Tank Corps “What a chance that day was missed! Never before and never 
again was such an opportunity offered.”185 Interestingly, Smithers, while keen to quote 
Baker-Carr’s castigation of the cavalry, signally neglects the remarks in mitigation of 
their performance which followed in the original work: 
 Why, then, did the cavalry not avail itself of this golden opportunity? It is a 
difficult question to answer, though one fact which is known, has an important 
bearing on the subject, namely that cavalry leaders were strictly prohibited from 
taking any action without the permission of superior authority. This in itself 
largely explains their astonishing inactivity,186 
  202 
   Mullens, the commander with responsibility for the advance of 1st Cavalry Division 
on 20 November stated his own case in ‘Lessons to be drawn from the Operations of the 
1st Cavalry Division in the battle which began on November 20th 1917’187 written less 
than a month after the event. In this he pointed out that after the experience of previous 
battles, close touch was maintained directly with the attacking infantry divisions, as a 
result “Reports, both accurate and prompt, were constantly received of the progress of 
the attack.” In the light of this he argued: 
Opportunities for the employment of cavalry are of so fleeting a nature that the 
G.O.C. leading Cavalry Division and the G.O.C. leading Cavalry Brigade who 
are the individuals on the spot, should be held responsible for taking advantage 
of any opportunities which occur. Time does not admit of sending the 
information back to the rear and for re-transmission to the front. … 
   It is most urgently represented that the leading Cavalry Division should be 
given the plan and should be allowed to carry out the task allotted in the best 
way that offers. 
He went on to catalogue the “counter-orders” he had received in the course of the day. It 
is clear that there is a good deal of merit in his argument. The interference of Cavalry 
Corps HQ, and possibly of Kavanagh himself, as well as that of IV Corps H.Q., was a 
significant factor in the slow progress of 1st Cavalry Division. Kavanagh also failed to 
push 2nd and 5th Divisions forward with adequate vigour, essentially abandoning 2nd 
Division on the side of the road for several hours and forgetting about it. 
   Gen. Woollcombe and IV Corps naturally took issue with almost every point made by 
Mullens, denying any responsibility for the command delays. Some of this controversy 
has been alluded to already earlier in this chapter. The IV Corps report summarising the 
exchange of orders between themselves and 1st Cavalry Division concludes  
 It is not seen how any of these orders [HP.14 et Seq.] impeded the advance of 1st 
Cavalry Division, or in any way interfered with the execution of the original 
orders. The only object of the various orders was to hasten the action of the 
cavalry. 188  
However, no matter what the ‘object’ of the orders may have been or the good 
intentions of IV Corps, it is difficult not to sympathise with Mullens. Woollcombe’s 
argument that the messages contained only ‘information’ is a weak one, notwithstanding 
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the fact that the said information was grossly inaccurate. The orders in the afternoon to 
move over Premy Chapel ridge were also a clear change from the original planned line 
of advance. That confusion and delay resulted is hardly surprising. Cavalry Corps 
Advanced Headquarters must also shoulder some of the responsibility. Their follow up 
message regarding Flesquières can only be regarded as a direct order to 1st Cavalry 
Division to advance by that route. Given the circuitous channels of communications and 
complex command structure, Mullens can hardly have been expected to ignore an order 
from Kavanagh on the grounds that he was since 6:15am under IV Corps rather than 
Cavalry Corps command. Kavanagh made no reference to this in his comments on the 
performance of the Division but it is tempting to suggest that this interference in the 
chain of command was at his behest. Either way the Cavalry Corps War Diary would 
seem to imply that they were under the impression that they were passing on the intent, 
if not the actual wording of IV Corps’ wishes.189  
   It should also be borne in mind that 1st Cavalry Division was extremely constrained in 
its freedom of movement. If the Hindenburg Support Line is taken into account the 
German defensive systems extended through Flesquières and some distance to the east 
of (beyond) Ribecourt. Thus the Division was not in a position simply to change 
direction and outflank defended positions in this part of the battlefield. Further on this 
would be possible, but not at this stage of the advance. The rôle of the cavalry was to 
move and fight flexibly beyond the lines of the enemy’s fixed defences, but up to that 
point they were in the hands of the infantry and tanks who must punch a hole through 
those defences for their advance. Whatever the protestations of Woollcombe and IV 
Corps, it was not the rôle of the cavalry to assist in the capture of Flesquières, that lay 
within the frontal part of the German defensive system, and thus the first phase of the 
attack. Co-operation with the cavalry was not planned until the later move on Bourlon 
and Fontaine. Harper’s 51st Division was conspicuous in its failure to capture 
Flesquières in the early stages of the battle and it was this which blocked the advance of 
the cavalry, and not vice-versa. This was summed up by Cyril falls when he observed: 
“The Cavalry action on a grand scale had been a complete failure. Whatever chances of 
success it may have had were extinguished by the failure to take Flesquières.”190 
   The second criticism levelled at the cavalry is of lack of initiative at lower levels of 
command, this has implications for the tactical effectiveness of the arm which forms 
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another key theme of this study. Both Robert Woollcombe191 and Stephen Badsey192 
have argued that years of inactivity had led to a cavalry force which was listless and 
timid, and incapable at all levels of decisive action. A curious further twist to these 
arguments is the view offered by Smithers that “…fortunately for themselves, the 
British cavalry did nothing.”193 The argument being that had the cavalry pushed 
forward, their self-evident uselessness and vulnerability to enemy machine guns would 
have led to senseless slaughter. Even Anglesey, who is normally reluctant to heap 
criticism on his chosen subjects follows this line, observing that the inactivity of the 
cavalry divisions was “… fully justified”194 and “how lucky it was that there were not 
more ‘thrusters’ in command.”195 
   Kavanagh, writing in February 1918 while generally supportive of his subordinates, 
took a similar line; 
I am confident that Maj. Gen. Mullens did everything in his power to carry out 
the instructions originally given him by IV Corps. The only criticism I have had 
to make on the action of the 1st Cavalry Division on the 20th November is that 
G.O.C. 2nd Cavalry Brigade when he finally started to advance by the Bois des 
Neufs (sic.) and carry out the original instructions given him, was slow in doing 
so, and did not appear to have pushed forward and supported his leading 
regiment with sufficient determination and resolution. His difficulties, however, 
were very great as his brigade was stretched out on a single narrow road with 
trenches and wire on either side for a long distance and their progress was of 
necessity slow. 196 
Others have also been critical of this, citing the presence of a company of tanks behind 
Premy Chapel Ridge, tasked with co-operation with the cavalry, but left unused.197  
   Before such criticism is accepted too readily the rôle of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade 
should be reflected upon. Leaving their points of concentration shortly after midnight, 
4th Dragoon Guards were to be lead regiment all day as the narrowness of the advance 
route did not offer the option of relieving them with another regiment. Thus they were 
responsible for the advance to Trescault, for patrolling towards Flesquières in the 
morning, for the dismounted assault on Ribecourt at 2:00pm, for patrolling over Premy 
Chapel Ridge prior to the abortive attempt at encirclement of Flesquières, and finally for 
attacking La Folie at the gallop at last light. By this time they had been marching and 
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fighting for 16 hours, and so their conduct is perhaps more remarkable for its continued 
aggressiveness than for the lack of it.  
   It is also clear that Beale-Brown and Sewell had still not ruled out the capture of 
Cantaing at last light. The deployment of one squadron frontally on foot towards the 
village (‘B’ Squadron 4th Dg. Gds.), while a second (‘A’ Squadron) attempted to gallop 
it via a flank is straight out of the pages of Cavalry Training. As Beale-Brown observed 
“It was now too late and too dark”198 to wait for guns and to seek out the co-operation of 
tanks. Indeed, had he done so the same criticism of hesitation might have been levelled 
with greater justification. Instead his regiments continued to fight flexibly and 
aggressively relying on their own internal resources. Further, as Sewell pointed out 
(quoted earlier) the presence of the enemy on the east bank of the canal, effectively in 
the rear of any attack towards Cantaing made it a dangerous undertaking. Had the 
Brigade not been held up for three hours earlier in the day by the events before 
Flesquières, the result may have been quite different. Add to this the exploits of the Fort 
Garry Horse across the St Quentin Canal and it is apparent that at regimental level at 
least there was no lack of ‘Cavalry Spirit’. 
   Higher up the chain of command, however, the accusation of indecisiveness carries 
more weight. Of the cavalry divisional commanders, Mullens seems to have pushed on, 
but Greenly (in command of 2nd Cavalry Division) was clearly reluctant to take any kind 
of chance in crossing the canal at Masnières on the evening of 20 November. The rôle 
of corps commanders, both of infantry and cavalry, has already been considered. The 
conclusions of the inquiry into the Cambrai battle, although principally concerned with 
the events of 30 November, were that while no blame could be attached to any 
commanders at corps level or above, there were failures lower down and that in 
particular “junior officers, NCOs and men” had been at fault.199 It is arguable that in the 
cavalry at least the reverse was true, and that while regimental and brigade commanders 
took the fight to the enemy as far as possible, they were let down by inertia and 
indecisiveness at each successive level of higher command. 
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Kavanagh and the Corps 
 
   Part of the command and control problem which plagued the cavalry in 1916 and 17 
was the number of tiers or levels of command through which its orders had to pass. One 
of these levels was that of the Cavalry Corps itself. As was outlined in Chapter 1 this 
calls into question the function and usefulness of the Corps as an instution. Given the 
conclusions of the previous section, that the failure to get the cavalry forward on 20 
November was in large part due to the interference of Cavalry Corps H.Q., and the 
widespread criticism of its commander which follows on from this, the obvious wider 
question arises. Did the Cavalry Corps and its leader have any positive rôle to play? 
Would a series of independent cavalry divisions under G.H.Q. control as was briefly the 
case in 1916, (described in Chapter 2) have been a better option, with divisions serving 
directly under infantry corps command?  
   The answer to this lies in precisely what a ‘Corps’ represents, and two interpretations 
of this are possible. Firstly, ‘Corps’ may be used in the sense implied in the term 
‘Regiments and Corps of the British Army’, that is in an essentially ‘Cap-badge’ rôle as 
a supra-regimental organisation of specialist troops of one kind or another. Obvious 
examples of this are the Royal Flying Corps (R.F.C), the Machine-Gun Corps (M.G.C.) 
formed in October 1915, and its offspring (formerly the Heavy Branch M.G.C.) the 
Tank Corps. Besides an important moral rôle in supplying their members with a 
corporate identity, these formations were vital to their constituent units as they provided 
a centre for training, for the development of specialist equipment relevant to the Corps’ 
rôle, and a voice in the ever more clamorous debate over manpower and resources. 
There is little doubt that the Cavalry Corps had an important function in this regard. The 
supplying and training of the cavalry, particularly over the winter was the responsibility 
of the Corps as has been discussed in earlier chapters. The moral value of the Corps was 
also important, as emphasised by Home on the break-up of the British and Indian 
Cavalry Corps in March 1916: “As regards the Cavalry the Corps formation has been 
done away with, …I am heartbroken over their decision. We have all worked hard for 
this old Corps and hoped one day it would be used in open warfare.”200 His contrasting 
joy at its reinstatement in September 1916 is evident: “It is very nice to be amongst the 
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old Cavalry once more. We are going to have all five Divisions and it will be a great 
day for us when we get going.”201 This morale factor should not be underestimated, the 
cavalry suffered from a steady drain of its manpower to those young Corps mentioned 
above, the Tanks and the RFC, and anything that raised the profile and prestige of the 
Cavalry was vital to its continuing success. 
   Thus the administrative value of the Cavalry Corps is not in doubt. What is much 
more questionable, however, is its operational function. This relates to the second 
definition of ‘Corps’ as a formation of a number of divisions, containing all arms and 
capable of limited independent action. This concept of the Corps can be traced in large 
part to the armies of Napoleon 100 years or more earlier. Its character and function in 
the B.E.F. in the Great War have been thoroughly examined by Andy Simpson in both 
his unpublished 2001 thesis,202 and his recent published paper in Sheffield and 
Todman’s Command and Control on the Western Front.203 While Simpson does not 
deal explicitly with the Cavalry Corps, indeed it is absent even from the list of corps 
excluded from his study, 204 his examination of the function of, and definition of the rôle 
of other Corps serves as a useful point of comparison with that of the Cavalry. 
   Simpson points out that in 1914 the B.E.F. had not fully resolved the question of corps 
function. While two corps were deployed to France this was largely because six infantry 
divisions was considered too large a force to be controlled directly by the Commander-
in-Chief. 205 The concept of self-contained all-arms forces was applied at divisional 
level, each infantry division having integral artillery, signal and engineer components as 
well as the necessary ambulance and supply train, and a squadron of divisional cavalry. 
During 1914 at the divisional level, the cavalry was similarly organised, having the 
same integral assets, R.H.A. batteries, mounted signal, engineer, and medical units.206 
Thus both infantry divisions and cavalry divisions could be considered as independent 
units, and indeed functioned as such.  It has been noted in Chapter 2, however that in the 
cavalry in particular many of these assets existed at brigade level, and that at the 
outbreak of war even the divisional structure, let alone that of the corps, had to be 
evolved ad hoc. 
   From late 1915, however, the relationship between the function of division and corps 
began to change, and from the Somme offensive of 1916 onwards a new system had 
developed. Simpson identifies four main functions of Corps after this period.207 The first 
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of these relates to artillery. Prior to each organised offensive large numbers of additional 
guns would typically be assembled. These fell under the command of the  corps artillery 
adviser, initially the Brigadier General Royal Artillery (B.G.R.A), later re-designated 
the General Officer Commanding Royal Artillery (G.O.C.R.A.). These officers 
controlled a force of artillery vastly larger than that assembled from within the divisions 
comprising the corps, and also took control of the artillery of those divisions, organising 
it to support the operations of the corps as a whole, supporting each division in turn as 
the operation required. In addition, one of the offensive  lessons that was gradually 
appreciated by the commanders of the B.E.F. in the course of the war was that it was 
unrealistic to expect troops to operate effectively beyond the protective umbrella 
provided by this artillery. 
   The three further corps functions devolve from the presence of this artillery; 
administration, planning and reconnaissance. As the corps’ larger guns were relatively 
immobile, corps tended to remain geographically quite static. The corps would remain 
in place while divisions rotated in and out of the area, and indeed different Army 
headquarters might also come and go from above the corps. Meanwhile the corps took 
control of administration within its area, roads, rail, supply dumps, supply of 
ammunition (particularly to the artillery) etcetera were all controlled by corps. This 
increasing concentration of assets at corps rather than divisional level is reflected in the 
concentration of the individual cavalry squadrons previously allocated at divisional 
level, into a ‘Corps Cavalry Regiment’ in May 1916.208 As a consequence of these 
factors when an operation was developed, much of the detailed planning would take 
place at corps level. Decisions about objectives would be made in conference between 
corps and army, and the artillery fire-plan developed accordingly by the G.O.C.R.A.. 
Individual divisions were responsible only for putting their troops in at the right time 
under the protection of this barrage. Finally, in support of its artillery, most corps had a 
dedicated RFC squadron available to direct artillery fire and conduct reconnaissance. 
Thus much of the information supplied to divisional and brigade commanders would 
have its origins at corps. This was the case not only before an attack began but, as 
Simpson emphasises, during the attack itself, where the ‘Big picture’ was best 
understood at corps level, supplied by information from individual divisions and 
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directly from contact aircraft. This picture was in turn fed back down the chain of 
command to the front line troops.  
   If the presence of Kavanagh and the Cavalry Corps Headquarters within the chain of 
command during an offensive, as they were at Cambrai, are to be judged, then 
Simpson’s corps function criteria provide a very useful comparison. It rapidly becomes 
apparent that Cavalry Corps HQ provided few if any of these functions. Above all, as 
the rôle of the infantry corps grew from the presence of its guns, so that of the Cavalry 
Corps declined in equal measure. Equipped only with its integral divisional R.H.A. 
Brigades, the artillery strength of the Cavalry Corps was in relative terms insignificant. 
Thus it was not able to directly support its constituent divisions. Nor did it command the 
local administrative infrastructure, or possess special local knowledge to assist those 
formations. A squadron of R.F.C. aircraft was directly attached to the Cavalry Corps, 
charged with providing information and communication, 209 but in the absence of guns to 
direct, one of the key functions of corps aircraft was lost. Also, in the event the weather 
on 20 November was such that little useful aerial reconnaissance was possible.210  
   Given these constraints, the placing of 1st Cavalry Division under the operational 
control of IV Corps on 20 November seems not only the better choice of command 
arrangements but practically the only sensible option. Were the division to be controlled 
by Cavalry Corps Headquarters, that headquarters would have no practical support (in 
the form of artillery) to provide to the division, and as it would not be receiving 
information on the progress of the adjacent infantry divisions, and its aircraft were 
struggling, no help in the form of information would be forthcoming either. 
   In short, the Cavalry Corps had no useful operational rôle on 20 November. Its 
presence in the chain of command served only to hinder the advance of the cavalry 
divisions. It is also arguable that had 2nd and 5th Cavalry Divisions not waited on 
Kavanagh’s word to advance, but simply moved up according to timetable behind the 
advance of III Corps (or been under their direct control), then the Canadian Cavalry 
Brigade might have reached the St Quentin Canal as much as two hours earlier. The 
consequences which might have flowed from that are a matter for speculation, but could 
have been significant. Before developing this idea to far, however, one of the other key 
rôles of the infantry corps must be considered, that is the provision of a heavy artillery 
umbrella for operations. It has been shown in a previous chapter that the advance of the 
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cavalry at Arras was severely hindered by the fact that it outran its artillery support. In 
spite of efforts to provide flanking fire from heavy guns to the south, the artillery 
command was insufficiently flexible to achieve this. Had significant forces of cavalry 
been able to cross the St Quentin Canal on 20 November, they may well have been able 
to inflict significant damage on un-organised German rear echelon units, but it is likely 
that had they encountered significant organised resistance this lack of guns would have 
become a significant factor in their ability to make any further progress. 
   Serious questions also surround the rôle of the Cavalry Corps and Kavanagh on 30 
November – 1 December. There is no doubt that the arrival of the 20th Hussars and the 
Guards on 30 November helped to restore the line around the German break- in at 
Gouzeaucourt. Kavanagh’s subsequent handling of the battle, however, was seriously 
flawed. Little or no information is available to determine what Kavanagh himself 
thought about the situation, his attitudes have principally to be inferred from his actions 
and the orders he gave. It seems his primary error was to believe (wrongly as it turned 
out) that the Germans in this area were intent on a further advance, when in fact they 
were a flank guard content to consolidate their positions on their early gains. From this 
misapprehension flowed a series of further errors. The first of these was that the 
German forces would present themselves as blocks of troops advancing across open 
country, and that they would thus be amenable to mounted attack, when in fact they had 
never ventured far beyond the existing British rear trench lines and had wired 
themselves in.  
   The next mistake was to believe that the situation was grave enough to commit his 
corps to battle come-what-may at whatever ultimate cost. This climate of panic was not 
exclusive to Cavalry Corps Headquarters and pervaded a number of parts of the British 
forces at that time, The B.E.F. by this point in the war was accustomed to being 
strategically on the offensive, the Germans had organised virtually no operational level 
offensive battles since Verdun, resticting themselves to local counter attack. Thus any 
big German attack would be a severe shock. This was compounded by the fact that 
Allied intelligence had, as discussed earlier, seriously misjudged the reserves available 
to the Germans and their capacity for offensive action. The initial success of the 
German attack, which took a substantial bite several miles deep out of VII Corps front  
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would have added to this sense of shock. This shock and surprise seems to have 
seriously affected Kavanagh’s judgement. 
   The result of these factors was a strange development. The Cavalry Corps War Diary 
refers several times to the ‘Cavalry Corps line’211 and indeed the Corps was given 
responsibility for the area between III Corps in the north and VII Corps in the south, 
where the German attack was centred. The allocation of a sector of the front to the 
Cavalry Corps implies that the cavalry would be capable of holding such a line in a 
similar fashion to an infantry corps. While they were indeed able to create a defence, it 
has been demonstrated that the Cavalry Corps lacked a large proportion of the 
infrastructure and assets considered normal in an infantry corps, in particular in artillery. 
Thus to expect them to function in the same way was demanding a lot. Rather than 
recognising the inherent weakness of his formation, and concentrating on a 
conservative, defensive strategy, Kavanagh seems to have decided that 1 December 
represented a historic opportunity for the Cavalry Corps to show its mettle, and in some 
way ‘save the day’. Thus he launched a series of increasingly desperate counter-attacks, 
each of which lacked all the basic ingredients for success, planning, intelligence, 
knowledge of ground, co-ordination with flanking units, but above all guns. The price 
for this ambition (paid by the Mhow Brigade in particular) has already been described. 
   An interesting contrast with the activities of the Cavalry Corps Commander at 
Cambrai is provided by the commander of the Tank Corps, Brig. Gen. Elles. His 
‘Corps’ was essentially an administrative, cap-badge organisation, with no tactical 
command rôle. His rather theatrical gesture of leading the attack of ‘H’ Battalion 
himself aboard the tank ‘Hilda’ flying a large and newly invented corps flag is widely 
quoted.212 However while he had been heavily involved in the planning of the attack 
and logistical preparations, the battalions of his corps were fully integrated into the 
command structure of the corps and divisions they were supporting. He was thus left 
with essentially nothing to do once the offensive had begun, except perhaps try to lead 
by example. It was also pointed out by Brig. Gen. Percy Hobart (himself a famous tank-
man) that since all of the Tank Corps vehicles were in the first wave of the attack, Elles 
did not have to worry about being in a position to command any reserves later.213 His 
acceptance of this is reflected in his own ‘Tank Corps Special Order’ issued before the 
battle: “All that hard work and ingenuity can achieve has been done in the way of 
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preparation. It remains for unit commanders and for tank crews to complete the work by 
judgement and pluck in the battle itself.”214  
   This relinquishing of operational control in the battle itself might have served as a 
useful model for the Cavalry Corps Commander. It is not known to what extent 
Kavanagh would have been aware of Elles’ approach, however even had he been, it is 
unlikely that he would have thought it relevant. The Tank Corps while growing in 
stature, had yet to establish any form or separate identity comparable to that of the 
cavalry. Tanks were still simply adjuncts to the infantry battle like machine-guns, or 
trench mortars. The concept of armour as a separate ‘arm’ and of distinct armoured 
formations had not yet developed. Indeed armoured cars had been integrated into 
cavalry formations in the same way as into infantry ones (as in 1918 tanks would be). 
Thus the the rôles of tanks and cavalry would have appeared far less analogous to the 
contemporary eye than they do today. 
 
 
Cavalry – Tank Co-operation 
 
   Discussion of the rôle of the Tank Corps leads naturally on to the fourth major theme 
of this study as outlined in Chapter 1, the relationship between cavalry and tanks on the 
battlefield. The techno-centric and rather anti-cavalry stance of much of the writing on 
Cambrai has already been touched on earlier in this chapter. However the operations at 
Cantaing on 21 November, and (less successfully) on 1 December, have shown that 
rather than cavalry and tanks being opposed, or mutually exclusive forms of warfare, 
battlefield co-operation was both possible and planned-for from the outset. Such co-
operation had been foreseen by the Cavalry Commanders, and special instructions for 
such operations were issued before the battle (see Appendix 4.1). Previous cavalry co-
operation with armour, in the form of armoured cars has been discussed in earlier 
chapters, and what is notable about these instructions is that they do not suggest that 
tanks are new to the cavalry, or that they require new tactics, rather that previous 
experience of cavalry–armour co-operation remains valid. Paragraph (d) of the notes is 
especially illuminating: 
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(d) Tanks should be used as pivots for the Cavalry. They are really moving 
Machine Guns heavily armed, and though they do not have the pace of 
Armoured Motors they should be used on the same principle.215 
Cavalry had been operating in conjunction with armoured cars since the Somme battles 
of 1916, and their successes in this regard during the German retreat to the Hindenburg 
Line in the spring of 1917 have already been examined in Chapter 3. Thus far from 
being new and wonderful, the cavalry attitude to tanks may be characterised as ‘like 
armoured cars, but slower’. 
   It is useful to examine each of the ways in which horses and armour were expected to 
co-operate, and the degree of success in each case. The primary function of the tanks 
was to do the work previously carried out by preliminary bombardment – to provide 
routes of advance through the German wire. For the infantry this was simply a matter of 
advancing in the wake of each tank and stepping over the crushed down wire 
entanglement. For the cavalry the job was rather more complex. As was the case in the 
opening phase of both the Somme and Arras offensives, the routes of ‘Cavalry Tracks’ 
were identified for the lines of advance of the cavalry divisions. Three such routes were 
identified. ‘Cavalry Track Battalions’ were assembled, one each from dismounted 
elements of each division. 216 It was the job of these troops to clear the line of advance in 
each case. To assist with the wire clearance 12 specially adapted Wire-Clearing Tanks 
were placed at the disposal of these parties, equipped with a large grapnel attached to 
the rear of the tank by a hawser.217 The idea was that the grapnel would be dragged 
behind the tank, which would break or drag aside the wire entanglement. The Tank 
Corps was content with the effectiveness of this approach, reporting  
 Wire pulled back to form gaps of at least 60 yards in every belt of wire to the 
final objective, just after midday on 20th November.  
 Stretch of wire limited to 60 yards definitely but much more could be done per 
tank if necessary. After pulling the wire away the ground is absolutely clear of 
every scrap of  wire or obstruction such as posts etcetera”218  
However, this was not necessarily the case, Third Army Instructions, after allocating the 
tanks, had warned that:  
  214 
6. Too great a reliance cannot be placed in the capabilities of the wire-pulling 
tanks. You must therefore be prepared to clear away any wire which still blocks 
your advance on any of the three routes.219 
This was good advice. Maunsell related in Cavalry Journal how “Certain tanks were 
detailed to assist our working parties clear the wire. The passages made by them did not 
enable the horses to get through. …Even after they had cleared a space, however, the 
denseness of the grass tangled up with odd bits of wire, iron stakes etcetera, needed a lot 
of clearing.”220 This view was expressed immediately after the battle in the 1st Cavalry 
Division report: “It was noted that the tracks made through the belts of wire by the 
passage of the tanks were not practicable for Cavalry. Several such passages were 
personally explored and in no case was it possible to ride a horse through.”221 Nor was 
wire the only obstacle, the commander of 4th Cavalry Division Track Battalion reported 
that no fewer than twenty-six separate trench lines had to be either ramped on bridged 
on his line of advance, a job for which tanks provided no assistance.222  
   It should not therefore be assumed that the tanks somehow swept a clear corridor 
ahead of the cavalry along which all they had to do was ride forward. The assertions of 
Col. Baker-Carr, commander of 1st Tank Brigade, that “On each section of the front, 
gaps in the wire, a quarter of a mile or more wide, had been made; the ‘going’ was 
splendid, and from midday onwards, except in a few isolated spots, organised resistance 
had ceased to exist,”223 should be regarded with extreme scepticism. Rather, as had been 
the case in previous offensives, the cavalry cut, dug, and bridged its way forward under 
its own power, albeit assisted by the wire-pullers. It is a tribute to the skill of the 
Cavalry Track Battalions that once again these tracks were ready on schedule.  
   Co-operation between cavalry and tanks in the exploitation phase of the 20 November 
battle was never properly tested, as (as has been discussed at some length) that phase of 
the battle never really took place. The cavalry were however able to co-operate 
successfully with tanks on two occasions, admittedly on a small scale. The first was the 
support gained by the Northumberland Hussars at le Quennet Farm on 20 November, 
and the second was the attack on Cantaing by the Queens Bays the following day. Both 
of these small fights showed that tank firepower and cavalry mobility could be 
successfully combined, events overlooked by those such as Travers, keen to emphasise 
the contrast between the two arms. 
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   Curiously, one of the problems highlighted by Wilfrid Miles in the Official History, 
and reiterated by Travers224 was the fact that where the tanks were successful, and 
pushed through the German organised defences into more open ground, they out-ran 
their infantry supports. The infantry who by that time had been following on foot some 
8,000 yards (7km) had become extremely tired. As Miles puts it “… the Tank Corps had 
already come to the conclusion that some form of rapid transportation was needed by 
the infantry.”225 A four-legged solution to this problem was perhaps not as far away as 
those fixated on technological solutions have suggested. 
   Travers also acknowledges that the tanks needed artillery as well as infantry support 
in order to be effective, but his thesis continues that the failure of this co-operation was 
a result of inflexibility on the part of the infantry and gunners who were not able to keep 
up with the new flexible warfare carried out by the tanks.226 This argument misses an 
essential point about the tanks at Cambrai, which was precisely their lack of tactical 
flexibility. The initial tank attack was highly successful, but only because each tank had 
a pre-prepared objective, and a thoroughly reconnoitred route to it. Once unleashed, the 
tanks were only able to crawl along their pre-ordained route. They were virtually blind, 
and communication with them was almost impossible. The suggestion that commanders 
were able to summon up tanks to participate in spontaneous exploitation operations 
neglects these basic facts. 
   The experience of the Cavalry Corps in co-operating with tanks after the German 
counter attack on 1 December is instructive in revealing the shortcomings of tanks in 
anything like a fluid battle. A variety of commentators, including the Commander- in-
Chief, Haig, congratulated the Tank Corps on the strenuous efforts made to put tanks in 
the field on 30 November. Sixty-three tanks were deployed, and Fuller called it “…one 
of the most remarkable tank achievements of the war.”227 Yet given that the Corps had 
started with 378 fighting tanks only ten days before,228 to field only slightly more than 
15% of that number shows the massive difficulties faced by the Corps in responding to 
any kind of unforeseen circumstance. (The Cavalry Corps, by contrast, was able to 
respond to the same events with a much larger portion of its strength. The news of the 
German attack was received at 8.30am,  the Corps had an advance H.Q. set up at Villers 
Faucon by 10.30 and elements of three divisions in action by noon.) 
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   Even once these tanks had been provided, their contribution to the battle was variable. 
Tanks were allocated to co-operate with the Guards in their recapture of Gouzeaucourt, 
but did not arrive until after the fighting was over. The following day, tanks were again 
allocated to support the Guards on the attack on Gauche Wood. These failed to arrive, 
while those supporting the complimentary attack on the wood by 5th Cavalry Division 
lost direction and shot up Hodson’s Horse before entering the wood after the fighting 
had ended. Lt. Col. Maunsell commented in his report on these events: “The actual 
presence of the tanks was more of a danger than an asset, for they attracted fire of every 
description and many casualties occurred to men standing in their neighbourhood. They 
were, in consequence requested to withdraw.”229 The War Diary of the Ambala Brigade 
records a similar sentiment in its ‘Lessons of 1st December’: “Keep away from tanks in 
the advance and send them away the minute the objective is reached – they draw 
fire.”230 To the south the tanks allocated to lead the attack of the Lucknow and Mhow 
Brigades of 4th Cavalry Division were not only unable to reach the arranged rendezvous, 
but when launched, took the wrong line and took no part in the cavalry attack, with 
tragic consequences for the Mhow brigade. 
   The conclusion suggested by these events is that cavalry-tank co-operation was 
certainly possible, but that it was very difficult to achieve ad-hoc except on a very small 
scale. It required a significant degree of planning, particularly on behalf of the tanks if 
they were to be able to participate at the right place and at the right time. Also, where 
this co-operation broke down, as often it did, the failure was by no means always 
attributable to the ‘medieval’ horsemen. Mechanised warfare was in its infancy, and not 
only did the tank-men still have a good deal to learn, but there was also still plenty of 
room on the battlefield for the flexible battlefield mobility provided by the horse, as was 
to be demonstrated as the war moved into its final year. 
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CHAPTER 5 
FROM OPERATION MICHAEL TO THE ‘HUNDRED DAYS’ 1918 
 
As regards the Cavalry - people at home ask ‘They had a great chance at 
Cambrai - is it any use keeping them? They will never have such a chance 
again.’ That is the crux of the whole matter - on this they may do anything - 
make the Cavalry into latrine caretakers. I shall be glad to have a rest - that is 
that. 
 Brig. Gen. A. Home, B.G.G.S. Cavalry Corps, 22 December 19171 
 
Introduction 
 
   The preceding chapters have shown how in 1917 the battlefield effectiveness of the 
cavalry was largely negated by poor command arrangements, and interference by senior 
commanders in their operations. This chapter examines the activities of mounted troops 
in the fighting of 1918. In particular it will be shown how these command and control 
problems were overcome in the Amiens offensive of August 1918 to give the cavalry 
one of its most operationally successful days of the war. This operational success was 
also repeated in the fighting of 8-9 October, examined in the later part of the chapter. 
Unfortunately the part played by the cavalry in the Amiens battle has predictably been 
much criticised, especially with regard to their relationship with tanks. The results of 
co-operation between mounted troops and tanks, in particular the new ‘Whippet’ models 
are also examined, in order to refute some of these criticisms. 
   The question of change and evolution is also considered. Firstly to what extent the 
character of the war really changed in 1918, as many scholars have suggested, is 
examined. It will be argued that this change was actually far more gradual than has 
often been argued, and that continuities with 1917 remained significant. Secondly, in 
this context while higher command and control methods evolved, the fighting methods 
at lower levels of command, based on pre-war princiciples revealed in earlier chapters 
continued to be ever more applicable. These are explored not only in the offensive 
battles of August and October, but also in the defensive fighting of March 1918 in the 
face of the German ‘Michael’ offensive. In the latter case it will be seen that a number 
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of the defensive errors of December 1917 were to be repeated, but that despite these 
constraints, the cavalry continued to be flexible and tactically highly effective. 
 
 
The Reduction of the Corps 
 
   John Terraine commented that in January of 1918 ‘The British Army in France was 
now at one of its lowest ebbs of the War’2 and as the remark quoted at the head of this 
chapter suggests, this malaise extended equally into the ranks of the cavalry. There was 
a feeling that Cambrai represented their best chance, and while supporters of the 
mounted arm were merely disappointed, those who opposed the presence of the cavalry 
in France took the opportunity to use them as a scapegoat for the failures of the 
offensive. Ironically, the cavalry was about to reach what was perhaps its peak of 
effectiveness in the whole war, as well as undergoing some of its severest tests yet. 
   Unfortunately this crisis of faith in mounted troops coincided with (or possibly 
contributed to) one of the fiercer periods of conflict in the ongoing dispute between 
Haig, as Commander- in-Chief in France, and the Prime Minister Lloyd George and his 
War Cabinet. There is not scope within this study to examine this dispute in depth, and 
indeed it has been the subject of a number of studies both objective, and partisan on 
both sides.3 However, in summary it may be characterised as an argument between 
Lloyd George and his followers who had lost faith in a decisive result in France at least 
in the short term, and with it faith in Haig as Commander in Chief; and Haig himself, 
who felt that France was the only decisive theatre of the war. The result was a starvation 
of the B.E.F. of manpower and resources, at a critical time when many observers 
including Haig felt that the collapse of Russia had placed Germany in an ideal position 
to mount a large attack in the west. (A view that was to be vindicated starting in March 
1918). 
   Within this broader context of manpower shortage, the cavalry was an easy target for 
reduction or even complete disbandment, The maintenance of five cavalry divisions in 
France had been challenged by the War Office as early as May 1917, when Haig was 
asked to consider the dismounting of at least one division. He was also reprimanded by 
the War Office for the diversion of cavalry reinforcements: 
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In this connection it is noticed that of the cavalry drafts lately dispatched as 
reinforcements for Infantry units in your command, 1,000 have apparently 
retransferred to cavalry. The Army Council desire to emphasize that drafts sent 
from this country for a particular arm should not be diverted to another arm 
without previous reference to, and sanction of, the War Office.4 
Haig felt strongly, as he always had, that a powerful force of cavalry remained a vital 
part of his offensive, and indeed defensive capability, and that to remove it was sho rt-
sighted folly. He set out his views at length in a letter to the War Office on 28 June 
1917. 
I hold strongly that as the war develops a time will come possibly at no very 
distant date when the employment of cavalry in masses will not only [be] 
feasible but urgently necessary in order to turn a favorable situation to full 
account. 
I consider it of such importance that the cavalry required for this purpose should 
be constantly available, and fully trained, that I am unable to concur either in 
any reduction of the five Cavalry Divisions now in France, or in their constant 
readiness for action in masses been impaired by using any part of them as 
Divisional, Corps, or Army Cavalry even as a temporary measure.5 
These remarks also demonstrate Haig’s continuing attachment, discussed in respect of 
each of the earlier offensives covered by this study, to the idea of massed cavalry 
exploitation, which was never to be realised. However, his desire to retain the cavalry 
intact, albeit for the wrong reasons, is commendable. 
   The outcome of this contest was a partial victory for the War Office, although the 
Cavalry Divisions initially remained unaffected, all but three of the Corps Cavalry 
Regiments, (mostly regiments of Yeomanry distributed amongst the infantry corps), 
were dismounted in October 1917.6 As will appear later this short-sighted decision was 
to impact on the Cavalry Corps later in 1918. The Prime Minister, supported by 
Winston Churchill (who had taken over from Lloyd George as Minister of Munitions, 
and was seeking additional manpower for his tank-based ambitions), also returned to the 
subject in December 1917. A minute of the Cabinet Committee on Manpower spelled 
out their position. 
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The Prime Minister stated that he gathered that the Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff [Wilson] was in substantial agreement with the desirability of using the 
personnel of the Cavalry in other arms of the Service, notably in Tanks, in the 
Air Service and Artillery. 
General Smuts pointed out that the American Army would require a large 
number of horses and the British Cavalry horses might be used for this purpose 
and a great saving of tonnage affected thereby. 7 
This time Haig, fighting to retain his own job, was unsuccessful in his defence of the 
Cavalry. The result of this was a reduction in strength of the Cavalry Corps in France 
from five divisions to three, and an accompanying reorganisation of the remaining 
troops. This was completed in early March 1918 (See Appendix 5.1).8 As part of this 
reorganisation the Indian regiments from within 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions were 
despatched to Palestine. The Canadian brigade and four of the British regiments 
remaining from these divisions were retained in France. (The exception being 1st 
(Kings) Dragoon Guards who had already been sent to India in October 1917.) Within 
the three remaining cavalry divisions, all of the Yeomanry regiments, (with the 
exception of the Queen’s Own Oxfordshire Hussars), and the three regiments of 
Household Cavalry were removed, the latter to be dismounted as machine gunners. 
These spaces were then filled by the British regiments from the former Indian cavalry 
divisions. The result was that 1st Cavalry Division remained almost unchanged; only the 
Bedfordshire Yeomanry were removed and replaced by 8th Hussars. 2nd Cavalry 
Division was entirely unchanged, while 3rd Cavalry Division lost three regiments of 
Yeomanry and three of Household Cavalry, replaced by three regiments from the Indian 
divisions, and the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, complete. The four regiments of 
Yeomanry removed from the cavalry divisions were originally intended to be converted 
to cyclists. The regiments had petitioned to be motor machine-gunners instead and this 
was initially agreed, but in the end the units were broken up to provide reinforcements 
to the regiments remaining within the Cavalry Corps to make up losses suffered during 
the March fighting.9 
   The ostensible purpose of this move was to increase the cavalry force in Palestine, and 
at the same time to save shipping in the provision of supplies to the cavalry in France. In 
fact neither of these objectives was achieved. Badsey has demonstrated that the saving 
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in shipping across the channel was easily eclipsed by the shipping required for the 
movements between France and the East,10 and the net gain to Gen. Allenby in Palestine 
fell to only two regiments, as after he had received a reinforcement of eleven regiments 
from France and elsewhere, he was ordered to return nine Yeomanry regiments for 
dismounted service in France as machine-gunners.11 The outcome of this vast re-shuffle 
was simply to reduce significantly the fighting power of the Cavalry Corps in France at 
the outset of what was to be its busiest year, without providing a major boost to 
numbers in other theatres, or any significant logistical savings. 
 
 
The German Spring Offensive: 21 March - 6 April 1918 
 
   A substantial German attack was widely predicted in the Spring of 1918. The collapse 
of Russia had freed large numbers of German troops to fight in the west, while the 
build-up of American forces in France meant that the window of opportunity for the 
Germans would not be long- lasting. Haig himself told the War Cabinet in January that 
‘…the coming four months would be the critical period of the war’12 The likely point of 
attack was recognised equally clearly; an assault on the southern, thinly defended 
portion of the British line around St Quentin with the aim of driving a wedge between 
the British and French armies south of that point. Such an attack would fall principally 
on the British Fifth Army under Gen. Gough, and the southern portion of Gen. Byng’s 
Third Army.  
   It is not the purpose of this study to discuss this attack as a whole, only the rôle of the 
cavalry in defending against it, however the British defensive strategy may be briefly 
summarised. While the B.E.F had spent the war to date largely on an offensive footing, 
the lessons of the increasingly sophisticated German systems of defence had been learnt 
by 1918. In particular the use of deep defensive positions, and ‘elasticity’ in the face of 
attack had become the basis of the defence, drawing the enemy into a previously 
determined ‘Battle Zone’ behind the thinly defended Front Line, where counter-attacks 
would be launched.13 Unfortunately in the Fifth Army area much of the rearward parts 
of this defensive system existed only as lines on maps, or as ‘spit- locked’ trenches only 
a few inches deep. The forces defending them were also thinly spread. Not only was an 
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additional section of front taken over from the French, but the divisions expected to 
hold it were reduced, in common with all the British (but not Dominion) divisions in 
France, from twelve battalions to nine. This was a response to manpower shortages, but 
each division was still expected to defend the same extent of front, and to act in all ways 
as if it were still twelve battalions strong. 14 
   All three cavalry divisions (of the recently much reduced Corps) were placed in 
support of the Fifth Army front. They were spread out approximately 12 miles behind 
the front line, with 1st Cavalry Division based at Flamicourt (just outside Peronne) 
supporting XIX Corps; 2nd Cavalry Division at Quesmy in the south near Noyon, and 3rd 
Cavalry Division in the centre at Athies, opposite St Quentin. The latter two divisions 
were tasked to support III Corps at the extreme south of the British line.15 
Unfortunately, the standing orders for these units in the event of an attack were based on 
a misapprehension. As has been seen earlier, for example at Cambrai, it was not 
uncommon for cavalry brigades to form dismounted units, usually of weak battalion 
strength, for service in the trenches. Fifth Army’s plan anticipated a fight contained 
within the organised defence lines of the ‘Battle Zone’, or at worst the similar but less 
fortified ‘Rear Zone’. Thus it was expected that the cavalry would contribute to this 
fighting on foot within these defensive systems. Maj. Preston, who fought in these 
battles as a Machine-gun Officer, and whose lengthy accounts of the events of 1918 in 
the Cavalry Journal form a significant source for this chapter, commented: 
For years our cavalry leaders had prepared and hoped for a ‘Gap,’ but they had 
always visualized the gap made by us in the German line. The possibility of the 
enemy making such a gap in our line occurred to few, if any of them.16 
   The German blow fell on the misty morning of 21 March. In many areas the British 
defences were rapidly overwhelmed. In particular to the south of St Quentin where 2nd 
and 3rd Cavalry Divisions were in support of III Corps, the German advance completely 
penetrated the ‘Battle Zone’ and pushed on into unfortified rear areas. Between Noon 
and 2.00pm on 21 March 2nd Cavalry Division was dismounted, and bussed forward to 
take up positions alongside the infantry on a defensive line along the Crozat Canal. 3rd 
Cavalry Division followed in similar fashion on 22 March. The led horses were 
evacuated to Carlepont, 22km (14 miles) to the west near Noyon. The cavalrymen of 
these two divisions were to carry on a fighting retreat on foot of nearly 30km (20 miles) 
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west and south past Noyon over the next five days before being reunited with their 
horses on the 27 March.  17 In the north, 1st Cavalry division was similarly dismounted 
on 21 March and fought for two days without its horses in support of XIX Corps.18 The 
narrative of this period is one of constant small delaying actions followed by repeated 
retreats to new positions and it will not be presented in detail here,19 however some 
comment is required on the wisdom of using the cavalry in this way. 3rd Cavalry 
Division produced an analysis of the March fighting, Points brought to notice during 
recent operations,20 and Preston devoted a substantial section to ‘Lessons Learnt from 
the Battle’.21 Both agree that the tactical effectiveness of the cavalry during this period 
was seriously hampered, and they highlight a series of issues. 
   The first is that the cavalryman was simply not equipped to fight on foot for long 
periods. He was not issued a back-pack and equipment had to be extemporised, usually 
by creating a roll of greatcoat and groundsheet, worn en-banderole rather 
unsatisfactorily. His mobility was of course also substantially reduced. This latter point 
applied in particular to the supporting machine-guns. When units were moved forward 
by bus many Vickers and Hotchkiss teams were forced to abandon their pack-horses 
and attempt to carry all their guns equipment and ammunition on foot. Preston describes 
his own experience where of the twelve guns in his squadron only four could be brought  
into action because his men simply could not carry enough ammunition, and he was 
reduced to driving to III Corps Headquarters in a borrowed car to collect more belt 
boxes.22 Only in the Canadian Cavalry Brigade was the commander of the Machine-gun 
Squadron ‘wise enough’ to insist on retaining his pack-horses when the unit was 
dismounted.23 The situation was even worse in 1st Cavalry Division where the whole of 
2nd Machine-gun Squadron, which normally would have provided integral fire support 
to 2nd Cavalry Brigade, had been detached and loaned to the infantry of 66th Division. 24 
   A similar situation applied to the artillery. Prior to the German attack all of the 
Cavalry Corps’ integral R.H.A. brigades were detached and incorporated into the 
relevant infantry corps’ artillery defence structures. This would have been fine had the 
battle remained static but as soon as the Germans broke through the cavalry divisions 
were forced to operate without their normal mobile artillery support, (an experience 
perhaps familiar to those cavalrymen involved in the December fighting at Cambrai the 
previous year). 3rd Brigade R.H.A. did not rejoin its parent (3rd) Cavalry Division until 
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25 March, by which time it had fired away all its 13-pdr ammunition and as a result it 
had to be sent to the rear in search of additional supply.25 
   The cavalry were thus forced into action without the mobility (and incidentally shock 
capability) provided by their horses, and with inadequate machine-gun and artillery 
support. Given these various disadvantages the dismounted cavalry acquitted 
themselves well in the days following the German breakthrough. Middlebrook is 
dismissive of their rôle in the early stages of the fighting, suggesting that their 
‘…performance as infantry was of unproved and doubtful value’26 and that in the years 
prior to 1918 ‘…the cavalry had been almost useless to the allied cause.’27 Preston, 
however, as might be expected, takes a different view: 
… The dismounted cavalry compared very favourably with the infantry. On no 
single occasion during these operations were cavalry driven back by a frontal 
attack: they only vacated a position when ordered to do so in consequence of 
withdrawals by people on their flanks.28 
He attributes this success at least in part to the overall quality of the cavalry units 
compared with their infantry counterparts in 1918. While many infantry units had been 
virtually wiped out in earlier offensives and made up with drafts of ever deteriorating 
quality, the cavalry ‘…still had a fair proportion of their pre-war officers and NCOs.’29 
In addition the cavalry had received substantial training in ‘open’ rather than trench 
warfare and were much more comfortable in the fluid fighting which characterised the 
early days of the battle. It is ironic that Haig had fought for the retention of the cavalry 
in anticipation of precisely this kind of fighting, albeit on the other side of the line, but 
at the same time the defensive scheme developed by G.H.Q. and Fifth Army had 
deprived them of almost all of their tactical advantages, throwing them into battle as 
inappropriately equipped and ill-supported infantry. 
   The cost to the Cavalry Corps of this fighting was substantial, the corps as a whole 
suffered 4,142 casualties (including over 200 officers) between 21 March and 7 April. 
This equates to an average of approximately 125 casualties of all types (killed, 
wounded, or missing) in each regiment, roughly 25-30% of their fighting strength. 30 
However as discussed earlier the fortunate coincidence of the dismounting of a number 
of Yeomanry regiments immediately prior to the offensive meant that many of these 
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experienced cavalry soldiers could be re- incorporated into the corps en-bloc and the 
overall fighting quality of the reconstituted units was left undiminished. 
 
 
Harman’s Detachment: Collezy: 24 March 1918 
(Figure 5.1 overleaf) 
   Despite the pre-planned dismounting of the majority of the Cavalry Corps on 21-22 
March, it rapidly became obvious that mounted troops were urgently required. 
Unfortunately the led horses had been moved so far from their regiments that re-
mounting formal units was not possible. Thus on 23 March orders were issued to 2nd 
and 3rd Cavalry Divisions’ headquarters to form scratch units out of those men available 
among the horse-holders and other rear echelon troops. Each regiment was ordered to 
find 50 men, this produced a mounted force of about 750, added to this were 600 
infantry, mostly returning leave-men, and as no integral machine-guns were available, 8 
Lewis guns and their crews from No. 13 Balloon Company were added to the force. ‘O’ 
Battery R.H.A. was also found to provide artillery support. The whole was placed under 
the command of Maj. Gen. Harman of 3rd Cavalry Division, becoming ‘Harman’s 
detatchment’.31 
   The principal function of Harman’s Detachment over the next few days was to 
provide mounted officers’ reconnaissance patrols reporting to III Corps Headquarters, a 
rôle which was vital in supplying information on the German, and indeed Allied 
dispositions. However the detachment was involved in one mounted action which, while 
possibly not of enormous strategic significance in the offensive as a whole, is instructive 
as part of this study of the tactical effectiveness of mounted troops. 
   On 24 March III Corps, along with the dismounted portions of 2nd and 3rd Cavalry 
Divisions, and a number of attached French units, held a line running north-west to 
south-east from a point a few miles south-east of Ham, to the river Oise in the south. 
Strong German thrusts at the northern end of this line broke the link with XVIII Corps 
to the north and temporarily created a gap around the flank of the III Corps line. On the 
morning of the 24th, Harman’s detachment was behind this northern flank of III Corps at 
Berlancourt. At 8.30am the force was ordered forward to establish the situation on this 
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potentially open flank and reorganise and support the various infantry units in that area, 
in particular reforming a defensive line around the village of Villeselve.32 
   A detailed account of what followed is contained in the 3rd Cavalry Division War 
Diary.33 The mounted troops formed from 7th and Canadian Cavalry Brigades moved to 
the east of Villeselve and made contact with the French units at the northern end of the 
III Corps line, forming a north facing defensive flank. The remaining mounted men, 
those of 6th Cavalry Brigade under Maj. Williams (10th Hussars), were ordered forward 
north-east through Villeselve to make contact with, and throw back the advancing 
Germans ‘…using the sword only’. The force under Williams’ command consisted of 
three, fifty-man troops drawn from the three regiments of the brigade; 10th Hussars (Lt. 
Ednam), Royals (Lt. Cubitt), and 3rd Dragoon Guards (Lt. Vincent).  
   This small force advanced north-eastwards along the road to Villeselve, turning 
northwards into a sunken lane leading to the hamlet of Collezy. At this point they came 
under machine-gun fire from the north and north-east and took temporary shelter behind 
a large farm to the south of Collezy. The Germans were found to be concentrated 
around two copses about 1000 yards (900m) to the north-east, firing at least four 
machine-guns. Williams immediately ordered a charge, in ‘Infantry attack’ formation; 
the 3rd Dragoon Guards formed the first wave, in loose line, followed by the 10th 
Hussars in similar formation, the Royals formed the third line, in section columns as 
flank guards. The force crossed the intervening 1000 yards at full gallop with swords 
drawn, over plough for the last 200 yards, cheering loudly as they closed with the  
enemy. As the 3rd D.G. line swung east to attack the easternmost copse, the Germans 
facing them broke and ran into the trees, but the Dragoons dismounted and followed, 
shooting several as they fled. Twelve prisoners were captured. Meanwhile the 10th and 
the Royals rode at the western copse where the greater part of the enemy lay. Between 
70 and 100 Germans were killed, mostly with the sword, and a further 94 were made 
prisoner. Three machine-guns were captured or destroyed. 
   Albert Turp, a Farrier Sergeant with the Royals was a participant in this charge, he 
later recalled: 
We had of course been taught that a cavalry charge should be carried out in line 
six inches from knee to knee, but it didn’t work out like that in practice and we 
were soon a pretty ragged line of horsemen at full gallop. We took the Germans 
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quite by surprise and they faced us as best they could, for there can’t be anything 
more frightening to an infantryman than the sight of a line of cavalry charging at 
full gallop with drawn swords.  
…I remembered my old training and the old sword exercise. As our line 
overrode the Germans I made a regulation point at a man on my offside and my 
sword went through his neck and out the other side. The pace of my horse 
carried my sword clear and then I took a German on my nearside, and I 
remember the jar as my point took him in the collarbone and knocked him over. 
As we galloped on the enemy broke and ran… 34 
   In the event although the supporting infantry were able to restore the line as a result of 
this charge, further withdrawals followed within a few hours and the ground was once 
again lost. However this encounter is of interest as it shows the effect of shock action 
against troops in the open (as opposed to in trenches), particularly against troops 
unprepared to meet a mounted opponent. The inability of machine-guns alone to halt 
charging cavalry was also demonstrated, although the cost to the 6th Cavalry Brigade 
detachment was severe; out of roughly 150 men, 73 became casualties (6 killed, the 
remainder wounded).35 The potency of this fast-moving form of fighting was to be 
demonstrated again on a larger scale later in the year during the Amiens battle in 
August, as well as in October (described later in this chapter).  
 
 
Moreuil Wood: 30 March 1918 
(Figure 5.2 overleaf) 
   After several more days of retreat, all three cavalry divisions were re-united with their 
horses. 1st Cavalry division was remounted on 24 March, and 2nd and 3rd Cavalry 
divisions on 26-27 March. 36 One other significant mounted engagement followed on 30 
March at Moreuil Wood. By this time the German advance had penetrated to within 
16km (10 miles) of Amiens. In the event this was to be the high-water mark of the 
offensive, but that of course was not apparent at the time, and the defence of the city 
was considered critical as its fall would sever rail communications between the B.E.F. 
to the north and the French to the south. On 28 March Gen. Gough was relieved of 
command of Fifth Army, and his place taken by Gen. Rawlinson (although the force 
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continued to be known as ‘Fifth Army’). Rawlinson was given the specific 
responsibility of defending Amiens with what remained of Gough’s force, and all three 
cavalry divisions were to be concentrated near the city for this purpose.37  
   The events following were described in the Cavalry Journal by Maj. Gen. Pitman, 38 
who had taken over command of 2nd Cavalry Division from Maj. Gen. Greenly on 22 
March. 39 The division had forced marched north towards Amiens over two days and 
arrived at Boves, 8km (5 miles) south east of the city on the night of 29 March. The 
division was four brigades strong having the Canadian Cavalry Brigade attached from 
3rd Cavalry Division, the remainder of which was still some distance away to the south. 
1st Cavalry Division was meanwhile engaged in holding the line to the east of the city. 
In the early hours of 30 March information was received of a strong German thrust 
north-west towards Amiens along and to the south of the line of the Amiens-Roye road. 
If continued this would carry the Germans onto high ground in the triangle formed by 
the junction of the rivers Avre (flowing south-east to north-west) and Luce (flowing east 
to west), virtually overlooking Amiens. The village of Moreuil lay in the valley of the 
Avre to the south, while the high ground between the rivers was occupied by the Bois 
de Moreuil, a triangular wood with one angle towards Amiens in the north west and its 
base along the Moreuil to Demuin road on the south-east. 
   At 7.00am on the morning of 30 March orders were passed by telephone to 2nd 
Cavalry Division from XIX Corps to advance as far as Moreuil and restore the line. 
Pitman travelled by car to brief his two nearest brigades in person. These were the 3rd 
Cavalry Brigade, who were ordered to move around to the north of Moreuil Wood, and 
the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, whom he ordered to advance directly westwards across 
the Avre to the threatened point.40 The Canadians arrived at Castel, in the Avre valley 
opposite the wood at about 9.15am.41 The Brigade commander, Brig. Gen. Seely, was 
up with the leading troops and he ordered his advanced guard regiment, Royal Canadian 
Dragoons, to attack the wood. The leading squadron under Capt. Nordheimer was to 
attack the nearest (north-western) corner of the wood while the two following squadrons 
were to circle around the wood to north and south and link up behind it. Capt. 
Nordheimer’s men were able to establish themselves in the north-western corner of the 
wood, but came under heavy rifle and machine-gun fire along the south-western side of 
the wood. Capt. Nordheimer himself being fatally wounded. The second squadron under 
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Capt. Newcomen attempted to push along the south-western side of the wood towards 
the southern corner but only reached about half-way along the face of the wood before 
they were forced into cover in the trees. The third Squadron under Maj. Timmis 
galloped along the north face of the wood but came under such heavy fire from the 
wood and points further east that he was forced to swing left and take shelter in some 
dead ground north of the wood.42 
   A few minutes later the second regiment of the brigade, Lord Strathcona’s Horse, 
arrived at the north-western corner of the wood. One Squadron (Capt. Trotter) was 
dismounted and sent eastwards through the trees to clear the northern face of the wood. 
A second squadron under Lt. Flowerdew was sent to follow Timmis’ R.C.D. men, 
mounted, around the north-eastern corner of the wood. Thanks to the work of Trotter, 
Flowerdew was able to reach the north-eastern corner of the wood without difficulty. 
These men were followed by the third squadron of L.S.H. under Lt. Morgan who 
dismounted at the eastern end of the north face of the wood. Morgan’s dismounted 
L.S.H. squadron, along with Trotter’s men from that regiment, and the survivors of 
Nordheimer’s R.C.D. squadron were then organised into a line by the Strathcona’s 
commander Lt. Col. MacDonald, and began to sweep south through the wood.43 
   The events that followed have become the stuff of legend, Lt. Flowerdew was to be 
awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross, and the scene painted by Alfred Munnings, an 
image which Anglesey chose for the dust jacket of the relevant volume of his History of 
the British Cavalry. However the sources differ on what actually took place, and 
whether indeed the event was a magnificent charge, or a more disorganised scuffle, with 
at least part of the mounted combat being the attempt of Flowerdew’s men to escape the 
attentions of their supposed victims.  
   The action began when Flowerdew mounted a bank at the north-eastern corner of the 
wood and, confronted with a force of Germans, charged down the eastern face of the 
wood, before ostensibly rallying, charging back through the enemy, and finally retiring 
into the eastern face of the wood. Seely, the brigade commander (who was not present 
at the charge) gave an account in his own memoirs based on the V.C. citation of ‘two 
lines of enemy each about sixty strong, with machine guns in the centre and flanks; one 
line being about two hundred yards behind the other’. Anglesey relies heavily on 
Seely’s account and interprets these two lines to be a line of Germans forced out of the 
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wood by the dismounted parties, and a second line of reinforcements approaching the 
wood. Seely’s account is however highly coloured and is not necessarily to be 
considered reliable. His record of his conversation with Flowerdew is representative : 
I galloped up to Flowerdew, who commanded the leading squadron of 
Strathcona’s, as we rode along together I told him that his was the most 
adventurous task of all, but that I was confident he would succeed. With his 
gentle smile he turned to me and said: “I know, sir, I know, it is a splendid 
moment. I will try not to fail you.”44 
It is hard not to be cynical about the ‘Boy’s Own Paper’ quality of this narrative. Pitman 
more prosaicly describes the target of the attack as‘…a party of about 300 of the enemy 
retiring from the wood.’45 This corresponds with the description given in the Canadian 
Cavalry Brigade War Diary.46 The Strathcona’s War Diary on the other hand describes 
‘…2 lines of machine-guns, about 20 in all,’47 although this is likely to be an 
exaggeration. An altogether different perspective is provided by a German account of 
the action, translated and published in the Cavalry Journal in 1927: 
…a small body of Strathcona’s Dragoons, some sixty in number, succeeded in 
breaking right through the front line and pushing on in rear of the leading 
companies in the direction of Moreuil. Here they came upon a platoon of No. 2 
Company [of 101st Grenadiers] in the act of being relieved, and by this platoon 
and by a machine-gun section of the 2nd Battalion the Canadians were received 
with a most murderous fire. Only a few of the dragoons succeeded in making 
their escape… A small scattered party of them came suddenly on the rear of No. 
7 Company and endeavoured… to cut their way through. But very few, 
however, succeeded in doing so; not one of them allowed himself to be taken 
prisoner – each man had kept the last round in his pistol for himself!48 
The last sentence clearly shows that hyperbole was not limited to Seely’s version of 
events. Unlike German cavalry, pistols in the Canadian cavalry were the preserve of 
Officers, NCOs and specialists. What is not disputed is that Flowerdew’s squadron 
suffered very heavily. Seely, quoting the VC citation, put their loss at ‘about 70 per 
cent’.49 The Strathcona’s War Diary gives losses for the action as a whole among all 
three squadrons at 157 out of the 350 present ‘including horseholders etc’50 (or nearly 
45 per cent). No doubt many of these were Flowerdew’s men. 
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   No information has been uncovered concerning German casualties, British accounts 
refer only to ‘…killing many with the sword.’51 Nor is it clear what effect on the fight as 
a whole the charge produced. The Strathcona’s War Diary was in no doubt: 
…their action had a great moral effect on those of the enemy who were still 
fighting in the wood. Hearing the clatter of hooves behind them and thinking 
themselves surrounded their resistance to our dismounted troops slackened 
considerably.52 
However it is not clear whether the troops attacked were already retreating out of the 
wood, or were reinforcing it, or even as the German account suggests, both. What is 
clear is that the struggle for the wood continued for at least another six hours. Not only 
were all the Canadians engaged but as the 3rd Cavalry Brigade arrived, its squadrons 
were also committed to the fight; the 4th Hussars joined the struggle on the south-
western face of the wood at about 10.00am, supported by the 16th lancers at about 
12.15pm and finally the 5th Lancers at about 3.00pm, until ‘The whole of the 3rd cavalry 
Brigade was thus in action in the wood.’53 Nor was the whole wood captured, and 
although the cavalry was able to occupy the majority of the eastern face of the wood, 
the southern tip adjacent to Moreuil itself continued to hold out. 
The Canadian Cavalry Brigade narrative admits: 
The losses were severe, most regiments having lost from half to one third of 
their officers, and a similar proportion of their men, and it would have been 
impossible to have held the wood but for the prompt arrival of General Bell-
Smythe’s [3rd Cavalry] Brigade who reinforced our weak points and bore the 
brunt of the fierce fighting later in the day on the western face of the wood.54 
The cavalry were able to hold on until 2.30am on the 31 March when the two brigades 
were relieved by infantry of 8th Division. 55  
   Thus the German advance towards Amiens had been halted on this part of the front, 
and congratulatory telegrams were sent from Rawlinson to 2nd Cavalry Division 
headquarters.56 While the action as a whole was successful, however, its individual parts 
are subject to a degree of criticism. Pitman offered a summary of his views on the 
performance of his own division. He comments favourably on the function of the 
division as a mobile reserve; when the German advance was identified his mounted 
troops were able to respond quickly to plug the gap. He is critical, however, of Seely’s 
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tactics on arriving at the wood. He commented that “The tactical handling of the 
Canadian Cavalry Brigade at Moreuil Wood on March 30 must not be taken as an 
example of how to make use of available troops.” 57  
   Seely seems to have been overcome by his sense of the urgency of the occasion and 
committed troops to battle as and when they arrived. Thus the three Royal Canadian 
Dragoons squadrons were committed towards three separate objectives widely 
dispersed, and as Lord Strathcona’s Horse arrived they too were broken up in a similar 
fashion. Also, these troops were committed to battle without the support of artillery or 
machine-guns, even through both were present with the brigade. All of the evidence 
suggests that the German 101st Grenadiers had been in possession of the wood for some 
time, indeed they were about to undergo a relief when the Canadians arrived.58 Thus it 
was not a race for the ground. A more considered, and well prepared attack might well 
have achieved the same result at less cost. As it was the fight was quickly left in the 
hands of junior squadron commanders, and succeeded due to a combination of their 
aggression and skill, combined with a degree of surprise on the part of the Germans. 
Any credit gained by the Canadians in this fighting did not save their already unpopular 
commander; Seely was relieved of command of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade on 21 
May 1918 and replaced by his able subordinate Lt. Col. R.W. Paterson, (formerly C.O. 
the Fort Garry Horse). 
   Flowerdew’s charge itself does not appear to have been decisive. Indeed it is possible 
to read in the German account of the charge not a squadron rallying to charge back 
through its foes, but a disorganised effort to cut an escape back along the route of the 
charge, followed by a flight into the cover of the trees. What it did provide, however, as 
was also the case at Villeselve, was a moral effect, not only on the Germans 
immediately present, but on wider British public opinion. Moreuil Wood and 
Flowerdew’s VC were extremely valuable as what in modern parlance would be termed 
‘Good P.R.’ in what were otherwise dark times for the B.E.F. The battle also occurred at 
the turning point of the campaign, no further advance towards Amiens was achieved by 
the Germans, although to what extent the small action at Moreuil Wood was a key to 
that is questionable.  
   What the Moreuil Wood fight does show, however, notwithstanding the usefulness or 
otherwise of Flowerdew’s heroics, is that the cavalry remained a mobile and effective 
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fighting force. No doubt Seely could have done a better job in command, but his brigade 
was still able to move at speed to the threatened point, and successfully retake a piece of 
strategically important ground from the enemy, in the face of machine-guns and 
artillery. Heavy losses were incurred, but it was not the one-sided massacre of popular 
imagination. 
 
 
Gough and Kavanagh 
 
   As the Front stabilised the Cavalry Corps remained in action up until 7 April when the 
last elements were relieved in the line and the divisions withdrew to rear areas. Their 
performance since 21 March was assessed very favourably at the time, Home 
commented on 25 March “The Cavalry barometer stands very high again, it was very 
low a month ago.”59 This praise was repeated by Gen. Gough in his own account of the 
battle in his memoir Fifth Army: 
The cavalry had played a great part in the battle. Their mobility, and their 
capacity to cross any country on horses and therefore to get rapidly from place to 
place made them far more powerful then their mere numbers would suggest. … 
Their great value during these ten days should never be forgotten. Had the 
Germans been able to make use of cavalry of the same calibre during these 
events it is more than probable that the whole course of the battle would have 
been altered.60 
Even the staunchest opponents of the cavalry in more modern writing have also been 
forced to acknowledge the rôle of the cavalry in the March retreat, and as Gough 
highlighted, the importance of the lack of equivalent German cavalry in the attacking 
force. Some of this literature has been examined in the opening chapter of this study.  
   The German lack of cavalry was recently (2006) considered by David Zabecki in his 
detailed study of the German March offensive. He concluded that two factors influenced 
this decision. Firstly that unlike the much vilified Haig, Ludendorf discounted cavalry 
from his calculations on the Western Front at an early stage, none of his doctrinal 
publications of this period even consider mounted troops.61 Secondly, the German army 
suffered from a chronic shortage of transport, both motor and equine, and to bring even 
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the infantry divisions involved in operation Michael up to establishment of transport, 
thirteen divisions in the East had to be stripped of their transport vehicles and horses, 
and rendered essentially immobile. Thus with every available horse pulling wagons for 
the infantry, and very poor stocks of fodder to feed even those horses, re-mounting a 
significant force of cavalrymen was never a realistic possibility.62 Ludendorf described 
this situation in his memoirs: 
Trench warfare offered no scope for cavalry. The formation of regiments of 
dismounted cavalry… was now continued. … Their horses were urgently 
required for the reorganization of the artillery and for our transport. The wastage 
in horses was extraordinarily high, and the import from neutral countries hardly 
worth consideration. The homeland and the occupied districts could not make 
good the shortage. There were many gaps.63  
Thus the non-use of cavalry by the Germans in March 1918 was not so much a strategic 
miscalculation, as Terraine has suggested (quoted in Chapter 1), rather it was a 
logistical necessity. 
   What is not widely appreciated about the British cavalry during the campaign is that, 
as was examined earlier, the cavalry divisions achieved much of their success precisely 
without the mobility so praised by Gough, as his defensive plan denied them their 
horses, machine guns and artillery for most of the first half of the battle. What he did 
not remove however was their training, and experience, proving that mobile warfare 
rests at least as much in the mind of the soldier as in his means of transport. As has been 
demonstrated in earlier chapters, at regimental and troop level the cavalry continued to 
be a flexible and highly professional force. As Home put it in his diary of 16 April 
1918: “Thank Heaven we still have three Cavalry Divisions made of the old stuff and 
properly officered. We can stop a break through anywhere.”64 Hyperbole perhaps, but 
with a strong grain of truth. 
   The effectiveness, particularly the moral effect, of small groups of mounted men 
against un-entrenched opponents was also demonstrated, even the scratch mounted 
forces available were able to overawe and defeat machine-gun armed opponents. 
Unfortunately, as Moreuil Wood was to demonstrate, question marks still hung over the 
capabilities of the higher commanders. It is arguable that this encounter was won by the 
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aggression and determination of leaders at squadron and troop level, despite, rather than 
because of the control exercised by their brigade commander.  
   As with the disappointments after Cambrai the previous year, recrimination and 
scape-goating was quick to follow the March-April fighting. Fortunately the spotlight 
had temporarily moved away from the cavalry. The chief casualty was Gen. Gough, 
who was removed from command of Fifth Army on 28 March and replaced by Gen.  
Rawlinson. 65 It is probable that quite apart from the failure or otherwise of the defence 
in the March fighting, Gough was a victim of the on-going feud between The Prime 
Minister and Haig. Charteris recorded on 5 April: 
He [the Prime minister] is of course looking for a scapegoat for the disaster to 
the Fifth Army and has apparently decided to go for Gough. DH [Haig] is 
furious about this. It would certainly be most unfair if Gough were held 
responsible. He had a dozen divisions to hold a front of 42 miles and he was 
attacked by 50 divisions.66 
Gough was a close friend of Haig, and as such a suitable surrogate for the Commander-
in-Chief himself. Ironically, it would appear that Gough’s loss was Kavanagh’s gain. 
The Cavalry Corps commander had not come out well in the aftermath of Cambrai, and 
it seemed likely that it would be he who would be sacrificed. Kavanagh mentioned in a 
note to the commander of 1st Cavalry Division, Maj. Gen. Mullens on 27 February “…it 
seems I am for home.”67 However, this did not happen, the performance of his corps, in 
contrast to that of Fifth Army in general transferred the pressure to Gough, who it seems 
had previously been supporting Kavanagh’s dismissal. Home recorded in his diary of 25 
March: 
Heard on 22 [March] that the CC [Corps Commander; Kavanagh] was going to 
be sent home, so got Barrow to let me go out on the 26th to see what was the 
matter. I found that Goughie was the matter and had evidently reported badly on 
the CC – this was the result. Luckily the CC was in a strong position and the 
result is that Goughie has gone home and that Henry Rawlinson succeeds him.68 
Given that both Gough and Kavanagh were close to Haig, and both, like their 
Commander- in-Chief, cavalrymen, it seems unusual that they should apparently be in 
competition, but if nothing else it further contradicts the myth that there was some form 
of cavalry ‘club’ in the upper reaches of the B.E.F. For the present, however, the 
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Cavalry Corps retained its commander and as an arm its star was at least briefly in the 
ascendant. 
 
 
The Battle of Amiens 8 August 1918: The Plan 
(Figure 5.3 overleaf) 
   The German attack towards Amiens in March 1918 was followed by a series of other 
blows, falling all along the length of the Allied front. None, however was to make gains 
as significant as those made against Fifth Army and gradually the German offensive 
resources were worn down. The last great attack was made on the Marne front on 15 
July 1918, and while initially successful was rapidly contained, and French and 
American counter-attacks followed. The balance thus started to shift as the Allies 
looked to change to the offensive themselves.  
   On 24 July, while the Marne fighting was still in progress Gen. Foch as overall Allied 
commander called a conference with the three national Commanders- in-Chief, Haig, 
Pershing, and Petain, to outline his offensive plans.69 It was these plans which provided 
the basis for the Anglo-French offensive of 8 August. If the degree of success of that 
offensive is to be judged, and the rôle of the cavalry in it assessed, then the original 
objectives of the battle need to be considered in some detail. Foch spelled out three 
areas where attacks were required to relieve pressure on the Allied front, and in 
particular on the railway system behind the front. Two of these, Château Thierry and St 
Mihiel lay in the Franco-American portion of the front, but the third lay opposite 
Amiens where the salient created in March threatened not only the Paris-Amiens 
railway, but also the junction point of the French and British armies. He further defined 
his ideas concerning this third area in a formal order issued on 28 July: 
1. The object of the operations is to disengage Amiens and the Paris-Amiens 
railway, also to defeat and drive back the enemy established between the Somme 
and the Avre. 
2. To do so the offensive, covered in the north by the Somme, will be pushed as 
far as possible in the direction of Roye.70 [about 40km (25 miles) south-east of 
Amiens] 
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   Prior to this, beginning around 5 July, Gen. Rawlinson, in command of what had now 
become the British Fourth Army had been developing an offensive plan to relieve the 
pressure on Amiens,71 so when presented with Foch’s scheme this accorded well with 
his own plans. Rawlinson, as has been alluded to earlier in this study, was more of a 
‘Bite and Hold’ general, and his plans for relieving Amiens reflected this. In this he was 
also guided by the terrain. The attack front lay between the River Somme in the north, 
running broadly west to east, and the junction with the French First Army, running 
south-east along the Amiens to Roye road. The ground within this triangle was highly 
suitable for an attack, the terrain was rolling, and the going firm with minimal shell 
damage. The initial German defences were also relatively weak, having been 
extemporised after their March attack: “…their front line consisting of very rough 
trenches with no dugouts worthy of the name, and few communication trenches.”72 
However, the opportunities for an advance in this area were not limitless. At a distance 
of about 10km (6 miles) east of the existing front lay the ‘Old’ or ‘Outer Amiens 
Defence Line’. This was a system constructed in 1916 which had originally faced east, 
and thus was mostly wired behind the trenches when attacked from the west, but it still 
represented a potentially defensible position. A few miles further east still lay the edge 
of the old Somme battlefield from 1916;  
…a wide stretch of country which had been fought over in the 1916 Somme 
battles and was completely covered with shell-holes and pieces of old wire, 
overgrown with thistles and rank grass. This shell-crater area – the near edge of 
which was a line running roughly north and south through Foucaucourt – was 
extremely difficult for infantry and well-nigh impossible for tanks and cavalry. 73 
Rawlinson thus developed a plan with strictly limited objectives, aiming at an advance 
to the ‘Old Amiens Defence Line’ and a consolidation there. This would still represent 
an advance of about 10km (6 miles) on a front about 16km (10 miles) wide, substantial 
progress by the standards of the Western Front. 
   The attack was initially scheduled for 10 August. It would be led by two corps; the 
Australian Corps (of five divisions) on the left, between the Somme river in the north, 
and the Amiens to Chaulnes railway line to the south; and on the right, by the Canadian 
Corps (of four Canadian and one British divisions) south of the railway and extending 
south as far as the boundary with the French along the Amiens to Roye road. To the 
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north of the Somme III Corps would provide a flanking attack, and to the south of the 
Roye road the French XXXI Corps would advance in parallel with the Canadians. 
Supporting the infantry attack were over 500 tanks of various kinds, in particular 72 of 
the new ‘Whippet’ light tanks (of which more later).74 
   All three divisions of the reduced Cavalry Corps were to be used in the offensive. In 
contrast to Rawlinson’s attitude to cavalry two years earlier, this time they were fully 
integrated into the attack. Two divisions were to move up as soon as the battle started 
and leapfrog through the infantry and push through to capture the more distant targets. 
3rd Cavalry Division was placed under the command of the Canadian Corps on the 
southern side of the advance, while one brigade (1st Cavalry Brigade) of 1st Cavalry 
Division was placed under Australian Corps’ control immediately north of the railway. 
Each cavalry brigade would be assisted by a company of sixteen Whippet tanks. 2nd 
Cavalry Division, and the remainder of 1st Cavalry Division would remain in reserve 
under Cavalry Corps’ control, but unlike in earlier battles no word from Corps would be 
required to launch the leading brigades, which would advance automatically under local 
control. In the light of the command and control problems of previous offensives, 
discussed in earlier chapters, this devolution of command was critical to the success of 
the cavalry, and is one of the most significant aspects of this battle in relation to the 
themes of this study. The mission of the cavalry was stated explicitly in the General 
Staff Instructions drawn up between 1 and 4 August: 
(a) The first mission of the Cavalry Corps on ‘Z’ day will be to secure the line of 
the outer Amiens defences, and hold it until relieved by infantry of the Canadian 
Corps.75 
   This plan had a great deal to recommend it. Rawlinson and his staff appear to have 
learned the lessons of Arras and Cambrai the year before. The new deeper defence 
systems used by both sides by this point in the war not only provided an environment 
with much more opportunity and freedom of movement for mounted troops, but also, 
their very depth created a necessity for forces which could advance faster than men 
simply on foot, to tackle the deeper recesses of the defensive system itself. This reflects 
a change from the vision of cavalry performing a ‘breakthrough’ function after the local 
tactical battle is complete, to one of their integrated participation in the tactical battle 
itself. The devolution of command to infantry corps commanders had also been tried 
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before, with varying degrees of success, but this time the cavalry were not simply to 
wait until their chosen commander launched them forward, but to advance 
independently and carry on their mission without external prompting. The integration of 
cavalry and light tanks was also a progressive step, but the success or otherwise of this 
will be examined later. 
   Had the battle of Amiens, and the operational success of the cavalry in it, been judged 
by historians on the basis of the plans drawn up prior to 4 August, no doubt it would 
have been judged an unqualified success (except of course for those who as with the 
Messines battle in 1917 might have criticised its lack of ambition). However Haig and 
Foch met again on 3 August.76 By this time Foch was so pleased with the progress of 
the counter attacks on the Marne that he pressed for a widening of the objectives for the 
Amiens offensive. The battle had already been brought forward two days to 8 August in 
order to increase the pressure on German reserves, and perhaps he saw the opportunity 
for inflicting a significant defeat on the enemy. Haig responded by naming a series of 
deeper objectives, not only Roye and Chaulnes themselves, on the near edge of the 
destroyed zone but also Ham, 24km (15 miles) to the east of Roye, beyond the river 
Somme – Canal du Nord line.77 This was embodied in an addition to the orders for the 
Cavalry Corps issued on 6 August: 
6. With the above object in view, the Cavalry Corps, as soon as they have 
accomplished their first mission (vide Fourth Army No.32 (G) para. 13 (a) 
[quoted above]), will push forward in the direction of the line Roye – Chaulnes 
with the least possible delay. 78 
As has been seen earlier in this study, it was characteristic of Haig to add ‘wider 
horizons’ to the limited plans of his subordinates, and it is arguable that in this case as in 
many others these ambitions were unrealistic. Here, however it must be asked to what 
extent he really believed in these objectives and whether their inclusion was more of a 
political gesture to Foch than a military expectation. What is certain is that the failure of 
the offensive to reach further than Rawlinson’s original target, the Old Amiens Defence 
Line, has provided ammunition to critics of both Haig and the cavalry ever since. 
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The Cavalry on 8 August  
 
   In preparation for the offensive the Cavalry Corps was brought up to positions to the 
west of Amiens, and then on the night of 7/8 August filed through the town to an 
assembly area in the ‘V’ of the Amiens–St Quentin and Amiens–Roye roads. This move 
was made in a single column over 28km (18 miles) long, but apart from a delay caused 
by a broken-down tank, passed without mishap.79 The divisions were formed up by 
2.30am, prior to ‘Zero’ hour for the infantry which was due at 4.20am. The battle began 
at 4.20 with, as at Cambrai, no preliminary bombardment but with creeping barrages 
ahead of the infantry and tanks. The infantry were rapidly onto and through the German 
first lines, and as the day dawned to a thick mist “….the issue of the day was never in 
doubt.”80 
   3rd Cavalry Division was tasked to support the Canadian Corps on the right (southern) 
side of the attack. Their line of advance lay roughly south-east towards the ‘Outer 
Defence Line’ at Le Quesnel. This would take the division across the only significant 
obstacle on the battlefield, the east-west flowing river Luce. Thus two contingencies 
were prepared for; a crossing by the bridges at Ignaucourt, or failing that a push further 
east around the head of the river valley. Patrols (of the Fort Garry Horse from the 
Canadian Cavalry Brigade) were on the move almost as soon as the battle began to 
establish the viability of these bridges. Lt. Col. Ewing Paterson* , who was temporarily 
in command of the 7th Cavalry Brigade, wrote an account of events for the Cavalry 
Journal in 1921. Crucially, he observed; 
…this decision [to advance] was left entirely to the G.O.C. 3rd Cavalry Division 
without having to await orders from Infantry Corps or Division Headquarters, as 
had so often happened in previous engagements, the consequence having been 
that the fleeting opportunity had nearly always been lost.81 
The critical importance of this development has been highlighted earlier in this chapter. 
Thus only just over an hour after ‘Zero’ at 5.40am the division began its move along a 
                                                 
* Not to be confused with Brig. Gen. R. W. Paterson, commanding the Canadian Cavalry Brigade in the 
same division. Ewing Paterson also went on (as Brig. Gen.) to command the 6th Cavalry Brigade in 
October. 
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prepared cavalry track up to the front line and across. Infantry fighting was continuing 
on either side of the cavalry line of march as they advanced.  
   At 9.15 the bridges were reported intact and the Division began its first ‘bound’ as far 
as the river valley on the south side of the Luce at Ignaucourt.82 The first troops across 
the river were Lord Strathcona’s Horse at 9.20am, this regiment then pushed on 
southwards to the boundary with the French on the Amiens – Roye road. Here they met 
up with ‘Brutinel’s Independent Force’, a column of Canadian motor machine-guns, 
cyclists, and truck mounted mortars tasked with protecting the flank of the attack along 
the road, capturing 50 prisoners and a gun en route.83 The two leading brigades of the 
Division, Canadian on the right, and 7th on the left were formed up across the river with 
their accompanying Whippets, and supporting R.H.A. and R.C.H.A. batteries, and 
machine-guns by 11.00am. Again without the necessity for further orders84 the two 
brigades then pushed on to their next objectives. 
   On the right (south) the Canadian Cavalry Brigade advanced towards Beaucourt 
village, and to the east of it Beaucourt wood. While the initial advance was made 
rapidly on horseback, with few casualties due to the speed of movement, as the village 
and wood were reached the Canadians were forced into a dismounted fire-fight. Eight 
Whippets attempted to support this attack but they too were forced back by fire from a 
German field gun used in the anti- tank rôle. Beaucourt village was eventually captured 
after a fierce fight, but it was not until reinforcements of Canadian infantry arrived at 
about 4.30 in the afternoon that the wood to the east fell.85 
   On the left of the Canadians, 7th Cavalry Brigade advanced eastwards. They were 
faced with the village of Cayeux on their left front near the Luce valley, then stretching 
for over a mile (2km) southwards along a crest the trees of Cayeux wood. To the right 
was a gap of about half a mile (1km) to the woods and village of Beaucourt. Ewing 
Paterson, in command of the brigade described it as “… a most formidable looking 
position.”86 The Brigade advanced with the Inniskillings (6th Dragoons) on the right and 
7th Dragoon Guards on the left with 17th Lancers in reserve. The Inniskillings were 
brought to a halt in a copse some distance short of Beaucourt wood, forcing the 7th 
Dragoon Guards to swing left (eastwards). The latter regiment was now faced with the 
length of Cayeux wood, and : 
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… without a moment’s hesitation gave the order to charge, and with one loud 
yell… were down the hill, across the open space, up the rise and into the copse, 
capturing the key to the position. 87 
Due to their being echeloned by the change of face to the left, each squadron of 7th D.G. 
made a separate assault into the edge of the southern part of the woods, however each 
was individually successful. Over one hundred prisoners were captured, (although some 
subsequently escaped), as well as in excess of twenty machine-guns and a battery of 
field artillery.  
   Capitalising on this success, the 17th Lancers pushed through the wood on the left 
(north) of 7th D.G., but on emerging from the wood towards Caix, the next village to the 
east, they came under heavy fire. Paterson himself had his horse shot from under him. In 
a textbook response, the 17th threw a squadron north successfully outflanking the 
offending guns, and the advance continued, reaching the ‘Amiens Outer Defence Line’ 
and the Divisional first objective by 2.30pm. A number of further prisoners were 
captured along the way including several complete field hospitals, and more artillery 
pieces.88 
   Ewing Paterson reviewed his brigade’s actions and provided several observations. 
Speed was of the essence, the German machine-gunners were unable to bring fire 
effectively on men charging towards them, and it was only in the last 60 yards that 
significant casualties were suffered, moreover “…once the men were on top of the 
enemy they put up no fight and appeared completely demoralised.”89 He was warm in 
his praise for his supporting R.H.A. battery and the initiative of its commander, but his 
supporting tanks had simply been left behind by the rapidity of the advance. He 
summed up the moral effect of large numbers of British cavalry appearing in what had 
been the German rear areas “A German officer when asked why he and his men had 
surrendered, said ‘Look, Look.’ Pointing around the country, ‘and wherever you look 
you see British cavalry.’”90 
   With the capture of Beaucourt wood to the south later in the afternoon by Canadian 
infantry the last brigade of 3rd Cavalry Division, the 6th, was pushed through between 
the two advanced brigades, and took up a position along the Outer Defence Line south 
of the 7th Cavalry Brigade. The Canadian Cavalry Brigade had already been relieved by 
infantry during the afternoon and in due course the rather depleted 7th Cavalry Brigade 
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was replaced by infantry at around 9.00pm, while the fresher 6th Cavalry Brigade held 
part of the line overnight.91 As the two brigades of 3rd Cavalry Division withdrew that 
night Paterson suggests they “…had good cause to be content.” 92 The division had 
advanced 11km (seven miles) and captured large numbers of prisoners and equipment. 
With the exception of the village of le Quesnel on the extreme right, all the divisional 
first objectives had been reached. 
   Advancing alongside 3rd Cavalry Division, to the north, were 1st Cavalry Division. 
The rôle of this division was divided; 9th Cavalry Brigade, advancing south of the 
Amiens – Chaulnes railway line was to move through the northernmost part of the 
Canadian Corps line, while 1st Cavalry Brigade advanced to the north of the railway, 
under the immediate command of the Australian Corps. 2nd Cavalry Brigade and the 
Divisional Headquarters would follow 9th Brigade south of the railway. Not only was 
this line of advance not hindered by the river crossing required of the 3rd Cavalry 
Division, but also each brigade could rest its inner flank on the railway line, a great aid 
to direction in the foggy morning.93  
   On the 9th Brigade front south of the railway the advance was led by the 15th Hussars 
on the left and the 19th Hussars on the right. Both had some initial difficulty crossing the 
debris of the old front lines, but by 11.00am the two regiments passed through the 
advancing Canadian infantry at Guillaucourt, about 6km (four miles) beyond the front 
line, and just short of the infantry’s second (‘Red Line’) objective.94 At 11.15am the 
Hussars were ordered forward onto their objectives in the Old Amiens Defence Line.95 
The historian of the 15th Hussars described the subsequent moves: 
There is little doubt that many felt that this moment was worth all the years of 
waiting. As the 15th swept past the position just captured by the Canadians, these 
latter leapt to their feet, and loudly cheered the regiment as it passed by. The 
distance to be covered was about two thousand yards, and almost at once the 15th 
came under machine-gun-fire, a few men and horses fell, but the momentum was 
gained, the forward rush continued, and in a remarkably short time all squadrons 
reached their objectives, dismounted and occupied the old trenches.96 
Once again speed and aggression had proved effective in the face of machine-gun fire, 
and the brigade objectives were all achieved by around 1.00pm.  
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   In due course 2nd Cavalry Brigade, (in reserve to this point) was sent forward to 
prolong the line to the right of 9th Cavalry Brigade and link up with the left of 3rd 
Cavalry Division to the south, thus by around 1.30pm the whole of the Outer Defence 
Line south of the railway, with the exception of the southernmost portion around le 
Quesnel was in cavalry hands. During the afternoon 2nd Cavalry Brigade pushed patrols 
out beyond the line to reconnoitre the villages further east, but these were met with 
heavy fire and it became apparent that the German defences were hardening and no 
further advance was possible.97 
   To the north of the railway 1st Cavalry Brigade advanced with 2nd Dragoon Guards 
(Queen’s Bays) in the lead. At about 9.15am the Bays passed through the Australian 
infantry on their ‘Red Line’ objective just short of the village of Harbonnieres. Coming 
under fire as they came into sight of the village, two squadrons of the Bays galloped 
forward, gaining a position in a valley south of the village and near the railway line. In 
the process a number of Germans were killed or captured and several machine-guns 
overrun. A further attempt was made to move north-east circling around the rear of the 
village anti-clockwise, but this was beaten back by heavy fire from the line of a road 
leading out of the village to the south-west. An attempt was then made to clear this 
opposition using Whippet tanks, but this too was beaten back with the loss of two tanks 
knocked-out and one broken-down, as well as further loss to the cavalry. At this point 
the regiment consolidated its position to the south of the village, with a south facing 
defensive flank along the railway, supported by machine-guns, and by the brigade 
R.H.A. battery on a ridge to the rear.98 
   At about 9.45, 5th Dragoon Guards were ordered forward around the north side of 
Harbonnieres, however their mission was essentially to ignore resistance from the 
village and ride on to the Outer Defence Line. This was quickly accomplished (at a trot) 
despite taking fire from the north side of the village, and the 5th D. G. pushed on across 
the trench line. At this point three trains were sighted in the distance, one of which was 
famously captured by ‘A’ Squadron after it had been disabled by an aerial bomb 
complete with its full complement of German soldiers allegedly returning from leave.99 
Two squadrons of 5th D.G. continued to cause havoc beyond the Outer Defence Line 
until about 10.30am, overrunning a dressing station near Vauvillers, and three batteries 
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of artillery, although it was only possible to disable a few of the guns of the latter before 
abandoning them. Both squadrons then withdrew to the Defence Line.100  
   During this period it would appear that the remaining resistance in Harbonnieres itself 
had collapsed, prompted by the arrival of 5th Australian Division infantry at about 
10.30am, as the cavalry War Diaries do not record any further fighting for the village, 
and by 12.15pm Brig. Gen. Sewell commanding 1st Cavalry Brigade was able to report 
to 1st Cavalry Division that his brigade was established on its objective along the 
Amiens Outer Defence Line.101 Unfortunately heavy fire from the village of Vauvillers 
in particular made any advance beyond this objective impractical. 
   By early afternoon on 8 August the Cavalry Corps had achieved all its initial 
objectives. Their orders were now to wait on the consolidated Outer Defence Line until 
relieved by the infantry, before pushing on more deeply into the German rear areas. 
Vigorous patrolling was carried out beyond the Defence Line, but it became 
increasingly apparent that German reinforcements were arriving and the defence 
hardening. Thus no further advances were made that day. Rawlinson, however remained 
optimistic and new objectives based on an advance of another 8km (5 miles) on 9 
August were assigned.102 Infantry attacks were launched on the following days, and the 
cavalry brought up in readiness each time to exploit any gains made. But although the 
front was advanced most of the distance initially proposed by Rawlinson, almost to 
Chaulnes, it was clear that, as so often had been the case in the past, the offensive had 
run out of steam. Rawlinson put an official end to operations on 11 August, ordering the 
Cavalry Corps back into reserve around Amiens.103  
 
 
Success and Failure on 8 August  
 
   The operational success or otherwise of the cavalry forms one of the themes of this 
study. Unfortunately, in the case of the Amiens battle the criteria by which this might be 
judged vary according to the standpoint and biases of the judge, and not all have been 
kind to the cavalry. The Commander- in-Chief, Haig, seems to have been well pleased 
with the performance of the cavalry on 8 August. He recorded in his diary on 13 August 
1918: 
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General Kavanagh explained to me the nature of the operations carried out by 
the cavalry. These were highly successful, and I feel sure that without the rapid 
advance of the cavalry the effect of the surprise attack of the 8th would have 
been much less and very probably the Amiens outer defence line would not have 
been gained either so soon or so cheaply. 104 
It would seem difficult to contradict this ve rdict, the Cavalry Corps had captured 
virtually all its primary objectives by lunchtime on the first day of the offensive. Their 
haul of prisoners was also impressive, Preston estimates this at about 3,000105 out of an 
overall total for the British and Dominion forces of around 18,000.106 Large numbers of 
machine-guns were also overrun, as well as several batteries of artillery, several 
hospitals and at least one train (5th D. G. claimed 20 officers and 740 other ranks as 
prisoners from this one capture alone).107 In terms of equipment captures, as well as 
personnel it is also likely that the impact of the cavalry on the German defenders was 
under-represented in the statistics as in many cases prisoners were passed back to the 
infantry, or simply ignored as the cavalrymen rode on towards their objectives.108 The 
moral effect of the cavalry on the defenders should not be underestimated either. The 
opinion of one German officer on large numbers of horsemen loose in his rear areas has 
already been quoted earlier. 
   Various figures are available for casualties, Preston provided a figure (up to 12 
August) of 1054 human casualties in the Cavalry Corps,109 although by his own 
admission figures vary. Edmonds in the Official History offered a lower figure of 887, 
(with a horse loss of 1,800) out of a total loss of all arms in the offensive of 22,202.110 
The latter figure represents an average of something over 1,000 casualties per 
participating infantry division (including those in reserve). The cavalry was not 
significantly involved in the fighting after the first day, nonetheless, 1,000 casualties 
over three divisions is not an excessive loss compared with that of the infantry. Within 
the Cavalry Corps the casualties were fairly evenly spread, although naturally those 
brigades most heavily involved in the fighting suffered most heavily, the Canadian 
Cavalry Brigade suffering the most heavily with 196 casualties of whom 25 were killed.  
   Clearly, contrary to the widely held misconception both during the war and since, 
where the going was good, machine-guns alone were not an insuperable obstacle to 
mounted troops, Preston summarised the position: 
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These three days’ operations showed the great value of mounted troops in 
exploiting the success of a surprise infantry attack so long as the ground was 
such as to permit rapid movement [his italics]. It was not so much the actual 
enemy machine-guns that held up the cavalrymen in the latter stages, as the fact 
that the broken ground prevented manoeuvres to avoid and outflank these 
machine-guns. And it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the infantry and 
tanks were equally unable to cope with these conditions.111 
   The verdict of subsequent historians has not been as kind to the cavalry. As elsewhere, 
Sir James Edmonds lead the attack, claiming “the attempts to use cavalry as a mounted 
arm in direct attack before every machine gun had been captured or silenced brought 
little profit in spite of the gallant efforts of the squadrons.”112 Others were less subtle; 
McWilliams and Steel observed as recently as 2001 “The glaring failure of the day was 
the performance of the cavalry.”113 Schreiber, in his work on the Canadian Corps 
claimed that “…the stubborn resistance of German machine-gunners,” combined with 
artillery, meant that the cavalry were riding to “…certain death”, 114 and elsewhere that 
the use of cavalry was “…a pathetic attempt to fulfil the atavistic hopes and beliefs of 
old cavalry officers, including Field Marshal Haig.”115 As the successive chapters of this 
study have shown, such extravagant opinions occur with depressing regularity in the 
literature of the war. The views of Prior and Wilson, and John Terraine, have also been 
examined in the introduction to this study, but fall along similar lines.  
   It would appear that criticism of the rôle of the cavalry on 8 August has had as its 
focus two main points. The first point is that no ‘breakthrough’ occurred, and it is 
argued the cavalry had no rôle in the battle unless a breakthrough was achieved. 
Secondly, the horsemen failed to co-operate effectively with the tanks, not only failing 
to produce significant results in combination, but also hampering the tanks from 
achieving the success that might have been possible had they operated on their own. As 
McWilliams and Steel put it “The Whippet tanks were seriously handicapped by being 
attached to the cavalry.”116 The refutation of each of these misconceptions form two of 
the major themes of this study, and both have already been touched upon in earlier 
chapters. 
   The first of these criticisms can be linked to Haig’s extension of the objectives. As so 
often in the past he did not allow his vision to be constrained by a ‘Bite and Hold’ 
  256 
attack, and suggested the possibility of a deeper and more complete success. As has 
been discussed earlier it is questionable to what extent Haig himself believed that this 
would occur, and to what extent it was a gesture towards Foch who was eager for results 
which would support his attacks in the south. However, once the revised orders of 4 and 
5 August had been issued, mentioning the Roye-Chaulnes line and even Ham, away to 
the east, these objectives became the criteria by which the offensive as a whole, the 
sucess of the cavalry, and even Haig himself have subsequently been judged. This is 
despite the fact that these revised orders made very little difference to the operation as 
carried out, the basis of the operation continued to be the limited attack up to the 
Amiens Outer Defence Line originally conceived by Rawlinson. Were the success of 
the operation to be judged on the basis of Rawlinson’s original plan up to 4 August, (to 
which hardly any changes were made in spite of Haig’s promptings) it could only be 
judged a success. 
   Criticism of the cavalry can also be attributed to a failure to acknowledge the tactical 
rôle of mounted troops. This study has shown that as the battlefield deepened from the 
start of 1917 onwards, and the German defences became more flexible, the 
opportunities for mounted troops to contribute significantly to an all-arms battle at the 
tactical level grew steadily. 8 August represented a high point in this process. Not only 
was the rôle of the cavalry in capturing local tactical objectives early in the battle fully 
acknowledged in Rawlinson’s plan, but their positioning well forward at the start of the 
battle, without the necessity for orders from corps commanders before advancing, 
allowed them to live up to their potential. Many commentators, however, remain 
wedded to the idea that the only rôle for cavalry was one of exploitation, and that their  
contribution to a tactical, ‘Bite and Hold’ battle was minimal, or superfluous. Prior and 
Wilson observed “The cavalry, for example, would only play a part if Haig’s wildest 
dreams came true; [i.e. a complete breakthough] Rawlinson’s more modest purposes 
could be accomplished without them.”117 This view neglects the important part played 
by the cavalry in attaining those ‘modest purposes’ not only more quickly, but as Haig 
commented (quoted above) more ‘cheaply’, as the Cavalry Corps casualty figures 
testify. 
   The second platform for criticism of the cavalry was the success or otherwise of co-
operation with tanks (already discussed in some detail in relation to the Cambrai battle 
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in Chapter 4). Whippet tanks were attached to each brigade, but this, as before at 
Cambrai, led to a good deal of scape-goating of the cavalry for the failures of the tanks. 
This criticism followed two strands. The first of these was that somehow the tanks could 
and should have been used on their own in some grand deep penetration operation. 
McWilliams and Steel summarised this argument : 
The tank officers had anticipated a powerful, concentrated thrust that would 
swing south and ravage the German rear areas ahead of the French First Army. 
Tied to the vulnerable cavalry, however, the Whippets were spread out over a 
wide front, which reduced their impact and eliminated the possibility of a 
concerted swing southward.118 
Anglesey traces the origin of this piece of wild speculation to Fuller, while pointing out 
that it was Fuller himself who proposed the combination of Whippets with cavalry to 
Rawlinson in the first place.119 The Whippet tank under discussion, in spite of its 
glamorous name was only marginally quicker than its larger Mark V colleagues; 7mph 
(12kmh) on good going but only half that cross-country, and it was certainly no more 
reliable mechanically. Thus the idea of massed tank exploitation was no more viable in 
August 1918 than it had been in December 1917. In any case, as has been discussed 
earlier, the broken terrain beyond the Outer Defence Line would have been as much a 
bar to tank advance as it would to that of horses. Thus the suggestion that tanks could 
have achieved what cavalry did not remains a fiction in the minds of tank enthusiasts 
rather than a realistic possibility. Nonetheless the tank supporters were quick to make 
their point. Home was painfully aware of this within a few days of the battle, writing on 
12 August:  
The Cavalry had a chance of doing a job and carried it out splendidly. In the 
papers a great deal of credit is given to the tanks, especially the Whippets, they 
being the latest toy. We shall have to get a tame correspondent and have the S. 
African business once more: nothing but advertisement.120 
   The second strand of criticism related to the success or otherwise of the direct co-
operation between the horsemen and the tanks. The historian of the 6th Tank Battalion 
offered a comment on this in 1919, which has become the standard view among later 
historians; 
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As a result of the Amiens battles, it was found that the present Whippet was not 
suitable to operate with mounted troops. One of two things invariably occurred; 
either the cavalry wanted to move forward at the gallop, in which case they out-
distanced the Whippet, or the Whippets were able to move forward and the 
cavalry were prevented by machine-gun fire or barrage.121 
The first part of this statement is undoubtedly accurate. After the early phases of the 
battle the tanks struggled to keep up with the cavalry. With the cavalry brigades 
advancing as rapidly as they did this is hardly surprising. Lt. Col. E. Paterson, 
commanding 7th Cavalry Brigade stated: “The whippet tanks, owing to the rapid 
advance from Bois-de-Morgemont and the difficulties of bad going and steep 
undulations, never appeared in the picture.”122  
   The second part of the argument, that the tanks were able to get forward where 
cavalry were not, is not supported by the evidence. In fact it was often coming under 
fire that prompted the cavalry to gallop in the first place, rapid movement being a 
proven tactic in the face of enemy machine-guns. The War Diary of Lord Strathcona’s 
Horse bears this out; 
A heavy crossfire of MGs developing from Beaucourt it was considered 
inadvisable to move more slowly under this fire, and Major Torrance was 
ordered to get on to the more covered position without reference to the tanks. … 
The distance between the Advance Squadron and the main body at this time had 
become considerable because in accordance with instructions the main body had 
not sent ahead of the Whippets.123 
Thus the tanks were often left behind precisely because the cavalry were under fire. 
Equally unfortunately for the tanks, the contrast between the vulnerability of cavalry to 
machine-gun fire, and the relative invulnerability of tanks was not borne out by reality 
either. As has been shown the cavalry were able to use their mobility to minimise 
casualties. Tanks on the other hand drew fire, and were vulnerable to anti-tank fire from 
German artillery, (fired both indirectly, and in the specific anti-tank rôle over open 
sights,) but lacked the protection of rapid mobility. They were thus no more able to 
confront well emplaced enemy troops by frontal attack than were the cavalry. The losses 
of three tanks in the unsuccessful attack to the south of Harbonnieres demonstrated this, 
and the two tanks brought up to support the failing Canadian Cavalry Brigade attack 
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against Beaucourt were equally unsuccessful.124 In fact no occasions have been 
identified on 8 August where the cavalry advance was halted but the tanks were able to 
push on.  
   Only where there was good ground and room to manoeuvre were tanks alone, cavalry 
alone, or the two in concert, able to progress. Where this was possible, useful co-
operation took place. Tanks co-operated with 1st Cavalry Brigade in the clearance of 
Bayonvillers, and joined with the initially successful advance of the Bays along the 
north side of the railway “…obtaining very good practice on all kinds of targets”, 125 
before joining in the attacks around Harbonnieres. The two arms, mechanical and 
equine, were thus a good deal less mutually incompatible than may have been argued. 
Nonetheless the cavalry remained sceptical of the immediate potential of the Whippets, 
and worried about their impact on the mobility of horse-mounted troops. An after action 
report prepared by Cavalry Corps at the end of August observed: 
(a) the recent operations have proved that; 
(i) these tanks cannot keep up with the advanced bodies of Cavalry fighting in 
open warfare, and that therefore if an attempt is made to use them, the action of 
the Cavalry is delayed and opportunities lost.126 
Thus “… the task given to Whippet tanks should be a strictly limited one.”127  
   A significant amount of space has been given to this debate, but although the tanks 
may have been lauded in the press of the day, it is easy to over-emphasise any 
contemporary split between supporters of mechanical technology, and those of 
horseflesh. Only with the benefit of hindsight, and the wholesale replacement of equine 
by petrol power in the later twentieth century has it been possible to envisage a wholly 
mechanical, horseless army. Such a vision simply did not exist between 1914 and 1918, 
and those such as Travers,128 who have castigated the commanders of the day for not 
embracing the technology more fully, essentially miss this point. It should also be 
remembered that significant numbers of tank officers were cavalrymen, the commander 
of 6th Tank Battalion itself is listed in operational orders as ‘Lt. Col. C. M. Truman (12th 
Lancers).’129 Clearly his new job did not over-ride his old regimental affiliation. Thus 
while problems of co-operation undoubtedly existed, these should not be viewed as a 
‘rivalry’ between ‘old’ and ‘new’ arms, more as a developing mobile arm (mechanical 
and equine) seeking to absorb a new piece of equipment. 
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   One of the most telling facts which challenges the supposed anti-horse stance of the 
tank enthusiasts is the preferred mode of transport of tank officers. The nature of the 
tanks of the day meant that communication among the crew of a single tank was very 
difficult, and tank to tank communication essentially impossible. The result of this was 
that at Cambrai most tank officers in the rôle of section leader or above (excepting of 
course, famously, their Brigadier), advanced on foot. This allowed them the flexibility 
to move around and liaise with their infantry counterparts.130 When ‘Whippet’ tanks 
were introduced to co-operate with the cavalry, the faster pace of advance meant that 
these officers simply mounted, not on tanks but on horses. The history of the 6th Tank 
Battalion records 
The difficulties of company commanders in keeping touch with the tanks on 
such a wide front were enormous, and they were compelled to be mounted. This 
fact largely accounted for our heavy casualties among senior officers.131 
Nor was this practice limited to operations in co-operation with cavalry. A posthumous 
Victoria Cross was awarded to Capt. Richard West of 6th Tank Battalion, for his actions 
during two operations in August and September of 1918. His citation records that he 
commanded from horseback, and had several horses shot under him, before becoming a 
casualty himself. On both occasions he was co-operating with infantry formations : 
He therefore rode forward on horseback to our front infantry line in order to 
keep in touch with the progress of the battle and to be in a position to launch his 
tanks at the right moment.132 
Clearly these men had no quibble with the use of horses on their newly ‘mechanised’ 
battlefield. 
   This discussion, however has more to do with the historiography of the battle than the 
operation itself. In summary, 8 August was a significant operational success, in which 
the Cavalry Corps (assisted by the tanks) played no small part. At last a plan had been 
evolved which placed the cavalry well forward in the right place at the right time, with 
realistic objectives, and removed the dead hand of corps level command. This allowed 
the local commanders to act with boldness and initiative within an ever deepening 
battlefield, the outer reaches of which were at the limits of the tactical range of a 
conventional infantry and artillery attack. The battle also pointed the way to how the 
war would ultimately be won, not by a sweeping mobile victory but by well organised 
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localised blows of overwhelming power, delivered with an ever increasing frequency. 
Unfortunately, the usefulness of cavalry in the latter type of fighting rather than the 
former, seems to have been widely overlooked. 
 
 
The Cavalry Corps: August - October 1918  
 
   Even as the last phases of the fighting around Amiens were in progress, a further 
diminution of the power of the cavalry was being contemplated. On 25 July Sir Henry 
Wilson in his capacity as Chief of the Imperial General Staff produced a lengthy 
document; ‘British Military Policy 1918-19’.133 Amongst other things this document 
laid out the notorious ‘Plan 1919’ whereby the final offensive against the Germans 
would be delayed for a full year. Haig was dismissive of much of its content, but 
significant in the context of this study were Wilson’s remarks concerning the cavalry. 
He argued that one cavalry division should be dismounted entirely and used as tank or 
machine-gun troops. A second could be retained under G.H.Q. command but this would 
no longer require a Corps Headquarters establishment and this could be reduced to a 
simple training inspectorate. The third remaining cavalry division would be broken up 
as corps cavalry, “…the need for which has been greatly felt during this year’s 
campaign.”134 This last remark is viewed with some irony as it was Wilson who was 
instrumental in the dismounting of almost all of the corps cavalry in October of 1917. 
Wilson continued to push this policy at a conference of senior officers on 11 August, 
despite the protestations of Kavanagh. Home, recording the meeting, commented “The 
CC [Kavanagh] tackled the latter [Wilson] on the question of doing away with the 
Cavalry Corps. H.W. said that he intended doing so. They will regret it.”135  
   The timing of these meetings was unfortunate. While the Amiens attack had been very 
successful it was widely accepted that now the battle-front had reached the destroyed 
zone of the previous years’ fighting there would be little further opportunity for large 
scale mounted action, at least until the British armies emerged on the far side of the 
‘Hindenburg’ line and the German prepared defences. At the same time Wilson was 
right in that as the armies advanced the need for mounted troops in the corps and 
divisional cavalry rôle was acute. As the historian of the Oxfordshire Hussars put it 
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“…the moment the war became one of movement every unit in the Army from corps 
down to platoon, began screaming for mounted troops to help them – their previous 
opinion of their uselessness having suddenly changed.”136 Kavanagh and Haig were thus 
forced to accede to the demands for dispersal of some of the remaining cavalry among 
the advancing armies, while trying to retain a mounted striking force in the Cavalry 
Corps. Haig continued to look beyond the immediate fighting to a point when the 
wholesale German retreat would begin and mounted troops would be vital. He wrote in 
his diary on 1 September: 
I therefore wished the Cavalry Corps to be kept as strong as possible, and at the 
present time merely to detach the minimum number of squadrons necessary for 
Divisional and Corps requirements. By this procedure I hoped to have an 
efficient Cavalry Corps ready to act vigorously when the decisive moment 
comes, and reap the fruits of victory. 137 
Nonetheless on 4 September he directed Kavanagh to break up the 2nd Cavalry Division, 
sending a brigade to each of the First, Third, and Fourth Armies. This provided 27 
squadrons, a further 12 squadrons remained in still-mounted corps cavalry regiments, 
notably those from the Dominions; King Edward’s Horse, the Canadian Light Horse, 
and the 13th Australian Light Horse. Thus 39 squadrons were available for the 59 
divisions of the B.E.F. The duties of these small parties of mounted men, operating 
often in small troop or patrol sized units, were un-glamorous but constant, keeping the 
advancing infantry in touch with the enemy. There is not space in this study to provide 
the detail of all these small operations, and many have been thoroughly described in 
Preston’s exhaustive account in the Cavalry Journal,138 however his conclusions are 
instructive: 
There can, however, be no doubt that the decision to break up one cavalry 
division was the only wise one under the circumstances. Some people might 
think that army cavalry was a luxury, but in September 1918 divisional cavalry 
was clearly a necessity. Once the final British advance began, infantry divisional 
commanders and brigadiers needed mounted men almost every day. 139 
   Little can be said agains t this, the squadrons had to go; if any blame is to be 
apportioned it should fall on Henry Wilson who in 1917 had dismounted the troops 
whom these men replaced. Unfortunately as a consequence it left the Cavalry Corps 
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pitifully weak. Haig still clung to his view that a moment would come for the cavalry. 
He had already tried to bolster its strength with the addition of 4th (Guards) Brigade 
infantry in buses, as well as additional motor machine-gun batteries “with the object of 
exploiting the situation which I hope will arise after we get the Marquion – Canal du 
Nord line.”140 Interestingly the attachment of infantry in buses to the cavalry, rather than 
being an innovation of 1918, can be seen in Haig’s plan for Loos in 1915, discussed in 
chapter 2, showing the continuity of thinking of the C.-in-C. if not of the wider Cavalry 
Corps. Even with these additions a force of six cavalry (and one infantry) brigades on 
the whole front of the B.E.F. was never going to be decisive. Preston made the rather 
telling comparison with the forces under Allenby in Palestine, where the impact of 
mounted troops was undeniable : 
Sir Edmund Allenby had 4 cavalry divisions to 7 infantry divisions, as compared 
with Sir Douglas Haig’s 3 cavalry divisions to 59 infantry divisions, and the 
strength of the hostile forces is in each case is even more significant; the Turks 
had only 3,000 sabres and 32,000 rifles - equivalent to 1 cavalry and 4 infantry 
divisions – whereas on September 25th 1918 the Germans had no less than 71 
divisions opposite the British. 141 
In the light of these figures the Cavalry Corps, however effective it might be on a local 
level, was becoming strategically somewhat irrelevant.  
   As the force shrank Haig became ever more guarded about its use, commenting on 6 
September “I do not propose to employ the Cavalry Corps until I judge the situation 
favourable for obtaining decisive results.”142 Meanwhile the Corps would be withdrawn 
for training to prepare them for such a day. A large scale ‘Scheme’ was carried out by 
the Cavalry Corps on 17 September, based on exploitation of a collapse of organised 
enemy defences. Haig rode out in person to observe this exercise and wrote a lengthy 
critique of its results to be circulated to regimental commanders and above.143 The time 
taken out of the Commander- in-Chief’s schedule for this kind of micro-management is 
not beyond criticism, but it clearly demonstrates his continuing aspirations for the 
Corps. Home’s view on the matter was more sanguine: “I hate these Schemes. They are 
so much more difficult to arrange than actual fighting.” However, “…the Chief enjoyed 
his day with the Cavalry. It was luckily a fine warm day and that has a great deal to do 
with the tempers of the great.” 144 
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Mobile Columns – Mobile Warfare? 
 
   When the dispersal of 2nd Cavalry Division, and Haig’s conflicting ambitions for a 
unified cavalry force are considered, these must be placed in the context of the pattern 
of fighting which had developed by 1918. Haig clearly believed that the B.E.F. was on 
the cusp of a significant change, from the trench warfare familiar up to that point, to a 
flowing, mobile battle, pursuing a defeated and demoralised enemy. It has become a 
pattern among scholars to identify a period starting with Amiens on 8 August when this 
new warfare took place, and indeed the term ‘The Hundred Days’, has been borrowed 
from its original context describing the Waterloo campaign of 1815, to cover the three 
and a half months between Amiens and the Armistice on 11 November. Edmonds 
suggests that this term was current as early as 1919, when Sir Archibald Montgomery-
Massingberd published The Story of the Fourth Army in the ‘Battle of the Hundred 
Days’, August 8th to November 11th 1918.145 However, the question must be asked to 
what extent the combat of this period was significantly different from that which had 
passed before, and if so what brought this about?  
   It is true that from Amiens onwards the B.E.F. was consistently successful, and the 
battle-front was more ‘mobile’ than it had been for years, however while a series of 
victorious attacks moved the armies across France, the character of each of these attacks 
was not dissimilar to those which had gone before. The presence of the former 
battlefields of 1916 and 1917 and their influence has been discussed already, and it is 
possible to divide the ‘Hundred Days’ into two phases, the fighting up to and through 
the Hindenburg Line from August to the end of September, and a more mobile phase 
after that. Sheffield considered these ‘first fifty days’ and observed: 
In spite of the dramatic nature of the initial advance, the Battle of Amiens in 
many respects followed the pattern of previous battles. Like the first day of 
Arras, initial success became more difficult to exploit as impetus ran down on 
subsequent days and resistance grew stronger.146  
He further describes the B.E.F. “…sequencing a series of shallow battles rather than 
persevering with futile attempts to fight deep battles of penetration.”147 This presents a 
vision of fighting methods and conditions which are very similar to what had gone 
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before. The difference being that the ‘learning curve’148 which the British forces had 
followed had refined their approach to battle to the degree that, in combination with an 
equivalent decline in German resources and fighting quality, local victories could be 
achieved. Looking specifically at the cavalry, a direct tactical lineage can be traced 
between what the Cavalry Corps achieved in August 1918, and what it strove towards at 
Arras and Cambrai (with the varying amounts of success discussed in earlier chapters). 
While it has been argued in this chapter that the cavalry played a valuable rôle in the 
Battle of Amiens, this was not necessarily because the nature of the fighting had 
fundamentally changed, (compared with Arras or Cambrai) but that the cavalry had 
developed their skills within the existing context. 
   This leaves the second ‘fifty days’ after the breaking of the Hindenburg line, the 
period which many have seen as the period of true ‘open warfare’. Again the change in 
the nature of the fighting seems to have been anticipated more than realised. Haig held 
his remaining cavalry divisions in readiness for their great exploitation manoeuvre, but 
in the event only committed them to action once, on 8-9 October, a battle which was a 
significant success for the cavalry (discussed in the next section) but not the crushing 
blow to a defeated enemy which he might have anticipated. Kavanagh was asked by 
Haig in 1919 to sum up his thoughts on this period. Kavanagh in reply described a 
situation: 
(b) When after continued defeats the enemy’s morale is so lowered that he is 
ripe for the action of masses of cavalry. 
However , he went on:  
The situation described in (b) had been arrived at on the morning of the 
Armistice, and two cavalry divisions were on the march east of the Scheldt, 
when orders were received to stop them. 149   
Apparently in the eyes of the G.O.C. Cavalry Corps, the moment which Haig had been 
waiting for did not arise until the last moments of the conflict, by which time, (perhaps 
recognising that fact) the Germans had given in. Indeed a week before the armistice 
Haig offered use of the Cavalry Corps to both Generals Byng and Rawlinson 
(commanding Third and Fourth Armies respectively) and both declined the offer,150 
despite the fact that both had shown themselves amenable to the use of cavalry in the 
past. 
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   Another development during 1918 which some scholars have viewed as a key 
indicator of the changing nature of the fighting is the ‘all-arms mobile force’, what 
Griffith called with some hyperbole the “Cavalry brigade battle group”. 151 Cavalry had 
been co-operating successfully with armoured cars, and indeed their own integral 
brigade level machine-guns and artillery since 1916, and co-operated successfully with 
cyclists at Arras in 1917, however attention has focussed on the creation in 1918 of ad-
hoc all-arms forces including truck borne infantry and mortars, as well as cyclists. Thus 
the character and performance of these forces requires examination. 
   The first instance of the formation of such a unit in 1918 was ‘Brutinels independent 
Force’ assembled for the Amiens battle of 8 August.152 This force did not include any 
cavalry, consisting of motor machine-guns, cyclists, and truck mounted trench-mortars, 
nor was it particularly flexible, being essentially tied by its wheeled vehicles to the 
Amiens – Roye road which was its line of advance. Its ‘independence’ was also 
questionable, the unit was not intended to penetrate deeply into the German position, 
but rather to run up and down the road acting as a flank-guard to the Canadian Corps to 
the north. Its rôle was therefore a strictly limited one, of a specialist character, rather 
than a step towards genuine mobile warfare. 
   At the start of September the same commander was called upon to lead a similar force 
during the assault on the Drocourt-Quèant or ‘D-Q’ line, part of the ‘Hindenburg’ 
system of defences. The Canadian Corps, part of First Army, was to attack this 
defensive system on 2 September, with an axis of advance along the Arras-Cambrai 
road. In addition to the D-Q defences themselves the possibility existed of achieving a 
bridgehead across the Canal du Nord, where the road crossed the canal some 6km (four 
miles) beyond the German front lines. Using the road as a line of advance, a plan was 
developed for a force consisting of two motor machine gun brigades, an artillery 
battery, a cyclist battalion, and trench-mortars in motor- lorries, to push through the 
main infantry attack and drive on down the road to the canal at Marquion. This time the 
force would be accompanied by two regiments of cavalry; 10th Hussars from 6th Cavalry 
Brigade, and the Canadian corps cavalry; the Canadian Light Horse, along with a 
section of 6th Machine-gun Squadron. 153 
   The cavalry portion of the force included O.C. 10th Hussars, Lt. Col. Whitmore 
(encountered previously in Chapter 3 at Monchy in 1917). He provided a scathing 
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critique of this operation in the Cavalry Journal in 1925.154 Whitmore points out that as 
the column was likely to pass beyond the infantry, into the area bombarded by its 
supporting artillery, a corridor was left 1000 yards (950m) wide astride the road which 
was excluded from the Allied creeping barrage. It was down this ‘cylindrical funnel’ 
that the force would advance. As he explained, his difficulties were manifold : 
If he [the force commander] deviates more than 500 yards on either side of his 
centre of advance he comes under the bombardment of the artillery, both heavy 
and light, of his own attacking corps. His area of operations is certain to be 
bombarded by the enemy holding the crossings in front of him. He has no 
opportunity of disposing his horses when a dismounted attack on the canal 
crossing becomes necessary. And the road by which he has advanced has by 
now become seriously obstructed by all conditions of traffic which necessarily 
follows in the wake of a successful attack.155 
Fortunately for Whitmore and his men, the fighting on this attack front remained too 
heavy all day for the force to advance, and the Germans withdrew behind the canal 
overnight on 2-3 September, hence their services were not required. What would have 
become of them had this foolhardy scheme been attempted is not pleasant to 
contemplate.  
   Thus the assembly of a ‘mobile force’ by optimistic operational planners did not 
necessarily imply a realistic prospect of ‘mobile warfare’ actually taking place. Merely 
assembling the troops does not automatically predicate the appropriate conditions for 
their employment. It is arguable that Haig, as so often in the past, laid out a vision of a 
mobile war of pursuit, but that this never really came about. At the same time a series of 
battles were fought, conducted in a style which had much in common with offensives of 
the preceding years. However, the increasing success, and quickening tempo of what 
were in fact ‘Bite and Hold’ battles, led to the impression, both among his subordinate 
commanders, and among later scholars, that a truly ‘mobile’ phase of the war had 
arrived. Much of the success of this process was due to the B.E.F.’s ability in 1918 to 
equip and supply repeated large scale attacks on different parts of the front only days 
apart, instead of the months of logistical build-up which would have been required 
earlier in the war. However even this successful attacking cycle could only be 
maintained at a certain level. It is arguable that had a German collapse such as Haig 
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envisioned actually taken place, the Allied logistical effort, which was stretched almost 
to breaking point already by the existing speed of advance, would have been unable to 
cope with a faster movement.156 
   The presence on the battlefield at Amiens, and again in October, of the Cavalry Corps 
has also contributed to the impression of a ‘new’ character of the fighting. For many 
observers this is a clear indicator of a change in the nature of the war, given that in 
previous years their participation was presumed to be impossible. This study has argued 
that the latter impression is wrong, and that mounted troops had a legitimate place in the 
fighting of 1916 and 1917. Thus no wholesale change in the character of the fighting 
was required for the Cavalry Corps to be successfully involved in 1918. Travers has 
criticised the high command of the B.E.F. in 1918 for not embracing what he sees as a 
technological alternative to the ‘Semi-traditional forms of warfare’157 carried on in 
1918. He vastly overstates the potential of the available technology as an alternative, but 
his stress on the continuity (or ‘tradition’) supports the idea of a continuum between the 
fighting of 1918 and what went before. 
   Much of this debate over the character of the war, and the nature of offensive tactics 
has focussed at a high level, in the ambitions of Haig and his Army commanders. At the 
same time, however the war was being fought and won at a lower command level. The 
nature of the German defence allowed attacks to be carried out not only at corps and 
army level, but also by individual divisions and even brigades. This type of attack when 
carried out in 1916 or 1917 has rightly been criticised, but in 1918 it was a key part of 
keeping the pressure on the retreating German forces. It has been argued158 that the 
‘mobile’ character of the war is evident at this level, whether or not it is apparent in 
large scale set piece attacks.  
   For example in early October the 55th (West Lancashire) Division formed all-arms 
advanced guards in its infantry brigades “so as to follow up rapidly should any 
considerable retirement of the enemy take place.”159 Each infantry brigade in the 
division was allocated an 18pdr battery and a machine-gun company as well as trench 
mortars on G.S. wagons, and medical and engineer units. Cavalry was included in each 
force from the corps cavalry regiment, but this consisted only of a Section; i.e. a 
Corporal’s patrol of 8 men, hardly a battle-winning number of mounted troops. This 
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force would be unleashed on the enemy when a suitable moment arrived by the issuing 
of a “‘Scurry’ telegram”. However: 
As events turned out, the method of withdrawal of the enemy did not enable the 
Corps to issue any definite order for an advance at a particular time, and 
consequently the “Scurry” telegram was never issued from Divisional HQ.160  
Thus even at this lower level of command, while the expectation of a mobile battle had 
trickled down from above, this did not necessarily translate into actual mobile fighting. 
   Nonetheless, a study both of Preston’s account of 1918 in the Cavalry Journal161 or of 
individual regimental histories162 does show these small forces of cavalry in daily 
contact with the enemy, in a way which was not the case earlier in the war. There is no 
doubt that cavalry troops were able to fulfil in 1918 a rôle which had been a traditional 
part of their duties for several hundred years and had only fallen out of use since 1915; 
that of reconnaissance. It was in reconnaissance, as well as despatch riding, and prisoner 
control, that the regiments of Cavalry dispersed as corps troops in August 1918 earned 
their keep. The German withdrawal meant that each time they broke contact with the 
advancing British troops their new positions had to be identified before an attack could 
be developed.  
   Good intelligence and communications are a vital part of military operations. Thus the 
rôle of the cavalry as reconnaissance troops was a vital one and should not be under-
estimated. It is not the same, however, as the use of mounted soldiers in the actual 
assault on those enemy positions or in the exploitation of any success. Once the latest 
German rearguards had been located, the assault upon them was typically an infantry 
and artillery affair. Indeed even if the local commanders had wanted to include 
horsemen in their plans of attack the cavalry were simply not there in sufficient 
numbers. A regiment of cavalry per infantry corps equates to a squadron per division, 
and a troop (30 or so men) per infantry brigade. Deduct those engaged on 
communications duties and prisoner escort, and each infantry brigade commander was 
left with little more than a handful of cavalrymen, under the charge of a junior NCO.  
   This scarcity of ‘mobile’ resources was not limited to the cavalry. Griffith has 
successfully demonstrated that as the front of attack widened to incorporate the whole 
of the B.E.F. in 1918 the number of tanks available to any one division was pitifully 
small, and attacks were typically mounted without tank support.163 Thus far from 
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commanders spurning these mobile options, the ‘semi- traditional’ infantry/artillery 
battle which Travers criticises, was forced upon the B.E.F. by the unprecedented scale 
of the fighting. 
 
 
The Last Hurrah: 9 October 1918 
(Figure 5.4 overleaf) 
   The mounted soldiers distributed along the front as corps and divisional cavalry 
continued to be in action almost daily until the moment of the armistice (and in some 
cases for a few hours after it), however only one opportunity arose fo r large scale 
cavalry action. This was during the ‘Second Battle of Le Cateau’ between 8 and 10 
October. By the beginning of October the B.E.F. had penetrated the last of the 
significant German defences. The assault of 29 September had carried Fourth Army 
through the main ‘Hindenburg’ defence line, (memorably with the assault of 46th 
Division across the St Quentin Canal at Riqueval,) and continuing attacks up to 5 
October overcame the supporting ‘Hindenburg Support’ and ‘Beaurevoir’ lines.164 
Haig’s ‘Second Phase’ of the campaign, that beyond the formal trench lines, was 
potentially about to begin. 165  
   By 5 October Fourth Army occupied a line facing broadly north-east, about 10km (6 
miles) beyond the line of the St Quentin Canal, and beyond the recently captured 
villages of Beaurevoir and Montbrehain. Their axis of advance followed a Roman road 
which branched off the St Quentin to Cambrai road at Riqueval then ran straight north-
east, passing just to the north of Le Cateau 20km (twelve miles) from the front line of 5 
October, and ultimately on to Mauberge and Mons. On 5 October Gen. Rawlinson 
issued orders for an attack by three Corps; IX, II American and XIII, astride the road, 
with the objective of a line through the villages of Serain and Premont. The attack 
would be on a front of approximately 12km (eight miles) with infantry objectives 
around 6km (four miles) into the German position. 166 The Cavalry corps was tasked 
with exploitation beyond the infantry objective line, potentially as far as Le Cateau, but 
specifically as far as the railway station and junction at Busigny, approximately 10km 
(six miles) beyond the infantry start line. The cavalry attack would be made initially by 
1st Cavalry Division with 3rd Cavalry Division in support. The order to advance would 
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rest with the Corps Commander, Kavanagh, a retrograde step in command and control, 
compared with the automatic advance at Amiens, but unlike on previous occasions, he 
placed himself at the forward Headquarters of 1st Cavalry Division early in the battle so 
as to be well placed to judge the moment to move.167  
   Starting at 5.10am, the infantry assault was initially successful. Fighting for the 
objective villages of Premont and Serain was reported to 1st Cavalry Division 
Headquarters by 9.00am and in response to this the lead brigade (9th Cavalry Brigade) of 
1st Cavalry Division was sent up to try to get through between the two villages.168 This 
advance was described by the historian of the 15th Hussars: 
…the countryside presented an attractive appearance. The broad belt of 
destroyed and devastated areas had now been left behind, and stretched out to 
view lay the rolling highly cultivated countryside of agricultural France, 
untouched by war since 1914. … 
Nevertheless this peaceful prospect was deceitful, for the German retreat was not 
by any means disorganised, and the rearguards were most skilfully placed169 
The lead regiment, 19th Hussars rapidly encountered heavy fire. Kavanagh 
characteristically ordered the division to push on in strength, but Maj. Gen. Mullens, 
commanding 1st Cavalry Division made his own reconnaissance and determined that 
“…there were no signs of a disorganised retreat, and considerable resistance from both 
machine gun and artillery had been met with…”170 He therefore pushed his two 
remaining brigades out to either flank to try to find a way around the two villages.  
   The period from 11.00am to around 2.00pm was filled by a series of increasingly 
desperate efforts by the three cavalry brigades to get forward, but without success. This 
included a number of relatively costly and ultimately unsuccessful mounted attacks on 
German machine-gun and artillery positions. Two troops of 19th Hussars did succeed to 
the south of the villages in capturing a battery of field guns at the point of the sword, but 
in so doing took so many casualties that, realising their weakness, their erstwhile 
prisoners turned on them with hand-grenades and the cavalrymen were driven off with 
further casualties.171 One of the fatalities was Lt. Col. Franks, who had led the regiment 
since 1915, all of the officers who accompanied him in the attack also became 
casualties. The event was described by Sqn. Sgt. Maj. Brunton of ‘C’ Squadron: 
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The charge was sounded, squadrons rapidly formed into line, and away we went 
hell for leather; it was a mad ride through shell fire. We rode clean through the 
guns, killing many gunners by the sword. Those that were spared bombed us as 
we passed through. 172 
Nor were casualties among the cavalry restricted to those charging artillery batteries, 
German aerial bombing was also a problem, particularly where the cavalry were forced 
to dismount, as led horses made a tempting target and could make no reply if 
attacked.173 
   By mid afternoon, Rawlinson decided that the infantry attack by XIII and II American 
Corps’ infantry should be renewed, and the cavalry were withdrawn in readiness to 
support this attack, however by 4.00pm it became apparent that this renewed assault 
would have to wait until the following day. Water supply was also becoming a 
significant problem, so the cavalry divisions were withdrawn west of Beaurevoir 
overnight. Even after this withdrawal the Corps continued to be troubled by German 
aerial bombing, which caused several casualties.174 Preston argued that this intensive 
bombing of the cavalry was a specific German tactic born of their fear of the potential 
of the Corps, but he offers no evidence of this from the German side.175  
   8 October cannot be considered a particularly successful day for the cavalry. The 
German defences had not deteriorated to the degree seen on 8 August, allowing freedom 
of movement within and behind their lines, and their careful positioning of machine 
guns and artillery, combined with close air support show that they were by no means a 
spent force. Preston excuses this by arguing that the cavalry corps and divisional 
commanders were mindful of Haig’s strictures on keeping the corps intact, and that they 
were thus less aggressive than they might have been. He describes the 1st Cavalry 
Division casualties (at around 200) as “light” and further argues that “… the principle 
[was] accepted that, in the attack, reserves should be used to exploit a success rather 
than redeem a failure; and that if there was no success it was better to admit it and try 
again another day in another way.”176 These two observations are hard to reconcile with 
the evidence of the War Diaries; clearly 19th Hussars sustained significant losses around 
Serain and Premont. Also, far from finding ‘another way’ Kavanagh responded to the 
news that they were held up by ordering Mullens “to push on to Maretz in force.”177 (i.e. 
straight up the Roman road) with the remainder of the division, clearly attempting 
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precisely to ‘redeem a failure’. Fortunately Mullens chose a liberal interpretation of this 
order, throwing 1st and 2nd Cavalry Brigades out to the flanks, albeit without making any 
greater progress.  
   The following day was more successful. Having ended the day on 8 October on a line 
through the villages of Premont and Serain, Fourth Army repeated the attack on 9 
October. The infantry objectives this time were to be the villages of Maretz, and then 
Honnechy and Maurois, representing an infantry advance of another 8km (five miles) 
along the Le Cateau road. The attack on this part of the front was to be carried out by 
XIII Corps and supported by the Cavalry Corps which would once again seek to exploit 
towards and beyond Le Cateau. 178 As 1st Cavalry Division had borne the brunt of the 
fighting the day before, the two cavalry divisions were exchanged, and 3rd Cavalry 
Division would lead the advance with 7th Cavalry Brigade as advanced guard, keeping 
in close touch with the infantry. 179 
   After a 5.20am start in thick mist, the infantry once again made rapid progress. The 
Headquarters of 3rd Cavalry Division received word at 8.45am that the infantry had 
taken the village of Maretz, (an advance of about 4km (two and a half miles)) and that 
“…touch with retreating enemy had been temporarily lost.”180 Clearly an opportunity 
presented itself for the cavalry which had not arisen the day before. In response to this 
Maj. Gen. Harman, commanding 3rd Cavalry Division ordered an advance. The lead 
brigade, 7th Cavalry Brigade had been broken up into patrols and spread along the front 
in contact with the infantry. It would take time to reform this brigade as a striking force. 
Harman therefore ordered the two remaining brigades to leapfrog through the advanced 
guard brigade and the infantry and push on towards Le Cateau; 6th Cavalry Brigade on 
the southern side of the main axial road and Canadian Cavalry Brigade to the north. 
   First into action were the Canadians. The leading regiment, the Fort Garry Horse 
reached the limit of the infantry advance to the northeast of Maretz, at about 9.30am. 
The infantry was held up by significant German machine-gun fire from the edge of the 
bois de Gattingny, about one mile (1.6km) ahead. The Machine guns accompanying the 
Fort Garry Horse, and the four guns of ‘A’ battery R.C.H.A. were quickly brought into 
action against the edge of the wood, and at about 11.00am a mounted attack was 
launched, one troop of Fort Garry Horse attacking frontally while a further four troops 
swung left and entered the woods from the west. The frontal attack was extremely 
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costly “… most of the troop became casualties.” But the flanking attack succeeded in 
clearing the wood “… killing a great number of the enemy with the sword.”181 Around 
200 prisoners were captured, along with a 5.9” howitzer, an anti- tank rifle, a trench 
mortar, and around 40 machine-guns,182 many of the latter abandoned in the face of the 
frontal charge. 
   While this attack was in progress Lord Strathcona’s Horse had extended the left of the 
Fort Garry Horse in a wide flanking move around the northern end of the bois de 
Gattigny pushing on towards and to the south of the village of Bertry and capturing 
further prisoners; a party of 30 fleeing from the Fort Garry attack to the south, and a 
further group of 45 who were successfully charged by one squadron of L.S.H. in a line 
of rifle pits north of the wood.183 By midday the Canadian Cavalry Brigade was within 
striking distance of, (and taking machine-gun fire from) the villages of Maurois and 
Honnechy, astride the Le Cateau road, the original infantry objectives. 
   To the south of the main road, 6th Cavalry Brigade had joined the leading infantry on a 
line close to the railway south-west of (and short of) Honnechy by about 11.00am, 
however heavy fire was encountered from the village at that point and the infantry 
attack had stalled. The brigade commander, Ewing Paterson, made his own 
reconnaissance at about 11.30am to be told that the infantry “… were so exhausted and 
the resistance so strong that it was not intended to advance further that day.”184 At about 
11.50am a conference was held of all the senior cavalry commanders, Kavanagh was 
present along with Gen. Harman, commanding 3rd Cavalry Division, as well as 
Brigadiers E. Paterson (6th C.B.) and R.W. Paterson (Canadian C.B.).185 It was decided 
that “… a vigorous attempt should be made to capture Honnechy and Reumont [the next 
village a further mile (1.6km) up the road] or the whole advance would peter out.”186 
The plan required a frontal attack on Honnechy by the Royal Dragoons and 10th 
Hussars, while 3rd Dragoon Guards circled the village to the south, and the Fort Garry 
Horse attacked from the north. The flanks would be protected by the remainder of the 
Canadian Cavalry Brigade to the north, and by the Inniskilling Dragoons to the south, 
borrowed from 7th Cavalry Brigade for the purpose. The attack was timed for 2.00pm, at 
which time the infantry attack would also be renewed. 
   As the commander of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade returned to his headquarters he 
discovered that in fact the northern village, Maurois, had already fallen to an attack by 
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two troops of the Fort Garry Horse.187 Thus when the divisional attack began at 2.00pm 
the Royal Dragoons were able to pass to the north of Maurois, (which masked them 
from Honnechy, which was still in German hands) and push on towards Reumont, re-
crossing the Roman road and taking up a position to the south-east of the village, while 
the Canadians encircled it from the north. The German garrison of Reumont withdrew, 
but a number were captured before they could escape, the Fort Garry Horse also 
“…killing a number of the enemy with the sword,”188 no doubt those who did not 
surrender with sufficient alacrity. 
   Meanwhile to the south, 3rd Dragoon Guards moved around Honnechy to attack the 
village from the south-east. They were under heavy fire from their flank and rear 
(despite the efforts of the Inniskillings to provide flank protection) and had to close up 
to pass under the embanked railway line via a bridge over the Honnechy-Busigny road. 
They soon opened out again and approached the village at a gallop. The attack was a 
rapid success, Honnechy was occupied by 2.40pm,189 and infantry of XIII Corps 
followed the Dragoons in and were able to complete the clearance of the village shortly 
after.  
   Thus by about 3.00pm the 3rd Cavalry Division occupied a line facing north-east from 
south of Reumont across the road and as far north as Troisvilles (captured earlier by 
Lord Strathcona’s Horse). At about this time word was received via Fourth Army that 
German units retreating from the fighting opposite Third Army to the north were 
passing across the front of the cavalry on the Inchy to Le Cateau road. This traffic was 
brought under artillery fire by a battery of 4.5” howitzers attached to the Canadian 
Cavalry Brigade as well as their own R.C.H.A. guns.190 Meanwhile 6th Cavalry Brigade 
was ordered to advance on Le Cateau and cut the roads leading out of the town. 
Unfortunately most of this brigade were dismounted holding positions south of 
Reumont and the strength of the opposition ahead of them made any further advance 
impossible. The plan was therefore revised to send the Canadians forward north of the 
Roman road, supported by 7th Cavalry Brigade.191 
   The Canadians advanced at about 5.00pm and in fading light Lord Strathcona’s Horse 
established a line of posts cutting the road from Inchy along a front facing north-west 
from Troisvilles to above Neuvilly. On their right the Royal Canadian Dragoons, hardly 
engaged so far that day, pushed forward to the high ground overlooking the river Selle. 
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The lack of progress of 6th Cavalry Division south of the Roman road meant that the 
Fort Garry Horse had to form another defensive flank on the right along the line of the 
road overlooking Le Cateau. The Canadian Cavalry Brigade was thus strung out in an 
elongated rectangle with one regiment on each of three faces. These posts were to be 
held until daylight on 10 October when the Canadian Cavalry Brigade was relieved and 
7th Cavalry Brigade took over the positions. 192 
   The high ground overlooking the river Selle, and the villages of Montay and Neuvilly 
was the limit of the cavalry advance. Orders were issued for 7th Cavalry Brigade to push 
on across the river on 10 October, but advancing patrols soon came under heavy fire and 
it was apparent that the Germans had consolidated their positions on the far bank. Gen. 
Kavanagh recalled both Cavalry Divisions into reserve in the course of the day and they 
took no further significant part in the fighting.193 In fact such was the strength of the 
German position that it was to be a week before Fourth Army renewed its attack, by 
which time artillery had been brought forward and a new set-piece assault prepared.194 
   9 October was clearly much more successful from a cavalry point of view than the day 
before. The 3rd Cavalry Division had advanced about 14km (eight miles) from the 
infantry start line on a front of about 5km (three miles) and over 400 prisoners had been 
captured, along with over 100 machine guns, and various field pieces, trench mortars 
and other equipment. Furthermore the rapidity of their retreat had prevented the 
Germans from carrying out their routine destruction of the abandoned villages, a fact 
which if not of great significance to the advancing Fourth Army was certainly important 
to the local inhabitants.195 Nonetheless it was on this day’s fighting that Sir James 
Edmonds gave his widely quoted verdict that “…the cavalry had done nothing that the 
infantry, with artillery support and cyclists, could not have done for itself at less 
cost;”196  
   This remark has gained such wide currency that it deserves detailed examination, and 
it can be challenged on a number of points. If the infantry advances of each day, 8 and 9 
October are measured, both show an advance of around 6km (four miles). Although the 
cavalry was not able to progress on 8 October it was able to get forward about 13km (8 
miles) on 9th. In each case the infantry attack was launched at around 5.00am and by 
about 9.00am had more or less run out of steam; references occur in the War Diaries to 
the ‘exhaustion’ of the infantry. It is no coincidence that the range of an 18lb field piece 
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was around 6,500 yards – 6km (four miles).197 It is thus probably fair to say that a set 
piece infantry attack had the potential only to get forward as far as the reach of its 
barrage, or about 7-8 km (5 miles) at most. A hiatus would then occur at which point 
either the German defence was sufficiently dislocated to allow cavalry to push through 
as on 9 October and effectively ‘double’ the gains made, or alternatively the Germans 
continued to resist to the point that a renewed set-piece was required. Edmonds’ 
assertion that infantry could have pushed on a further 8km (five miles) without cavalry 
assistance is deeply questionable. Also, his qualification that the infantry could do so 
‘with artillery support’ misses the essential point that beyond the range of the guns 
firing from behind the start line, that artillery support was very difficult to provide. The 
presence of the cavalry was thus arguably an important element which could ‘add value’ 
to an attack by increasing the gains made beyond what was possible with infantry 
alone.198 That this was not possible every time does not detract from its usefulness on 
the occasions when an additional advance was possible. 
   Whether or not the infantry could have made similar gains ‘at less cost’ is also open to 
question. In addition to the approximately 200 casualties in 1st Cavalry Division on 8 
October, 3rd Cavalry Division suffered a further 395 human casualties on 9 October.199 
This represents an average of 300 per division over both days, a figure remarkably 
similar to that suffered in the Amiens fighting of 8 August. No detailed infantry loss 
figures for these two days have been identified, but that the infantry would have done 
better in terms of casualties is unlikely. 
   It has also been argued that after the “heavy defeat” 200 of 8 October the German army 
planned to re-establish a defence behind the river Selle and that on the 9th “only weak 
rearguards faced the Allied forces.”201 Many of the defenders withdrew overnight on 8/9 
October to occupy the ‘Hermann’ position beyond the river, and only ‘defended 
localities’ remained facing the XIII corps and the cavalry the next day. 202 There is no 
doubt that the cavalry found their advance on the 9th possible in a way that it had not 
been the day before. However it is equally true that those rearguards were strong 
enough to require a significant set-piece infantry attack, and as just discussed, the 
potential depth of that attack was limited; only by the use of cavalry was it possible to 
bring the Fourth Army into a position to challenge the new defences along the Selle 
within 24 hours, albeit that these were not formally attacked until some days later. 
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Contact with, and pressure on the enemy was thus maintained in a way which would not 
have been possible without mounted forces. 
 
 
1918 in Retrospect 
 
   Preston concluded his study of 1918 thus : 
It may or may not be true to say that we should have defeated the Germans just 
the same in the autumn of 1918 even without our cavalry. But it is certainly true 
that, had it not been for that same cavalry, there would have been no autumn 
advance at all for the Germans would have defeated us in the spring.203 
He was clear that the rôle played by the cavalry in defence in March was crucial, but 
that later on its importance was more arguable. The success or failure of the German 
March offensive was at times finely balanced, and probably hung on a range of factors 
any one of which might be seen as critical. No doubt the part played by the cavalry was 
important. However it was equally the case that the cavalry was quite badly handled, 
both in terms of its dismounting at a vital point in the battle, and also in the tactics 
applied by Seely at Moreuil wood. Thus while the troops themselves deserve a great 
deal of credit, that owing to the ir leaders is rather less. 
   In August 1918 there seems to have been, at some levels within the B.E.F. at least, a 
full appreciation of what cavalry could do and how to integrate them into the developing 
all-arms battle. Amiens on 8 August was a model example of how to integrate mounted 
forces into a set piece attack and get the best out of them. Much of the credit for this 
falls ironically to Rawlinson, who in the past had not seemed keen to embrace the 
potential of cavalry. Both the design of the infantry attack on 8 August, and the rôle 
allocated to the cavalry, also show a clear continuity with the battles of 1917, lessons 
appear to have been learned and tactics developed which proved highly successful on 
the day. The 9 October fighting showed that this was not an isolated episode, but that a 
system had been developed whereby the limited progress achievable by a well executed 
infantry attack could be significantly expanded upon by well handled cavalry. In short 
while ultimate ‘breakthrough’ was never at issue, a five-mile gain could be converted 
into a ten-mile gain by the well timed intervention of mounted troops. Unfortunately the 
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wider ambitions of Haig, and the ammunition this provided for his critics, has meant 
that this tactical achievement has largely been neglected. 
   After Amiens, however, the ever widening extent of the offensive, and its increasing 
tempo of attacks meant that the small number of horsemen available to the B.E.F. was 
never going to be more than an occasional presence in what cont inued to be an infantry 
and artillery fight. The proportion of cavalrymen in the manpower of the B.E.F. in 
France and Belgium on 11 November 1918 is recorded in official statistics as 0.56% of 
the total force, or 0.77% of the combatant strength (this latter figure compares with 
58.19% for the infantry, or more comparably 0.62% for cyclists).204 Haig’s constant 
campaigning to retain any cavalrymen he could was laudable insofar as more mounted 
troops would no doubt have been useful, but was ultimately based on a false premise. 
He continued, as he had since 1916, to believe in a day when the German defences 
would be broken to the extent that an independent force of cavalry could sweep through 
and create havoc in their rear areas. This day never came. Thus he was doing the right 
thing for the wrong reasons. There is little evidence that he ever truly recognised the 
tactical function of cavalry within the German defensive systems, and in co-operation 
with other arms, preferring still to see them as an independent exploitation force. 
   The degree to which the fighting ever evolved into the ‘mobile’ or ‘semi-mobile’ 
warfare advocated by some historians is also questionable. Various all-arms columns 
were assembled, no doubt following the urgings of the Commander- in-Chief, but there 
is little evidence of actual combat by these forces. Certainly the value of both cavalry, 
and armoured cars or motor machine gunners grew as the year progressed, but this was 
essentially in the rôle of reconnaissance units. The set-piece fighting still remained the 
domain of the infantry and guns, with the occasional assistance of a few tanks, if for no 
other reason than that too few cavalry were available.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Themes of this study 
 
   A series of questions were raised at the outset of this study (Chapter 1) concerning the 
performance of the British and Dominion cavalry on the Western Front  during the 
period 1916-1918. This time-frame was chosen because it was thought to represent the 
part of the struggle when ‘trench warfare’ was most fully developed, and that an 
examination of the rôle of cavalry in that theatre and period would go to the heart of the 
debate on the usefulness of the arm in the war as a whole. Four principal questions were 
asked: 
· How ‘effective’ was the cavalry on the battlefield of 1916-1918? This question 
concerns the ability of mounted troops to survive in the environment created by 
modern artillery and machine-guns, their ability to move around the battlefield, 
and crucially their ability to inflict casualties on, and demoralize their 
opponents at a tactical level. 
· How did the arm evolve? Much has been made of the changes in equipment and 
doctrine amongst other arms in the B.E.F. The question arises to what extent the 
cavalry changed its approach to the fighting in line with the wider changes in 
the nature of the war. 
· How well led was the Cavalry? Questions of Command, Control, and 
Communications (“C3”) are key to understanding the way in which the First 
World War was fought. They are equally key to any assessment of the rôle of 
the cavalry. 
· How did the cavalry interact with new technology and Tanks in particular? 
History has not been kind to the cavalry in this regard, but the truth of the 
matter is a lot less clear cut than it has suited many historians to believe. 
The conclusions drawn from the four case studies forming the main body of this thesis 
are summarised below in relation to each of these questions. In addition a fifth larger 
question is also addressed, this is the overall ‘success’ of the cavalry, the extent to 
which they were able to achieve at an operational level the tasks set out for them, or 
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whether despite being tactically effective, the limitations of command and control 
prevented them from fulfilling their true potential. 
 
 
Tactical Effectiveness 
 
   It is clear from all the operations studied in this thesis that the cavalry were effective 
in combat at a tactical level, in spite of the prevailing conditions of the battlefield (or as 
effective as their infantry counterparts, at any rate). The first factor in their favour was 
their mobility. It has been shown on a number of occasions that the premise that the 
cavalry were incapable of moving around on the battlefields of the Western Front is 
simply false. Barbed wire and shell holes, while a challenge, were not an 
insurmountable obstacle, and the character of the battlefield did not in and of itself 
prevent the cavalry from participating in the fighting. A good deal of effort had to be 
put into the preparation of cavalry tracks, and in forward planning, but this was no more 
or less of a problem for the cavalry than it was for other arms. Indeed the Tank Corps, 
supposedly the solution to the problem of trenches and barbed wire, arguably never 
reached a degree of mobility comparable to the cavalry. Thus the battlefield was not 
necessarily any more hostile an environment for a horseman than for any other soldier. 
It has also been argued that the character of this battlefield evolved as the war 
progressed, and far from becoming more hostile, actually created ever greater 
opportunities for cavalry action. 
   The analysis of the battle of 14 July 1916 in Chapter 2 clearly demonstrated the ability 
of mounted troops to move around the battlefield. Nor is there any evidence in later 
operations that ground was a significant constraint. At Cambrai in 1917, as discussed in 
Chapter 4 it was not the ground but command and control issues which delayed the 
cavalry advance. Amiens, and other battles in 1918 as discussed in Chapter 5 showed 
that when these command issues were at least partially resolved, the cavalry was able to 
move deep into the German positions and onto objectives beyond the immediate reach 
of the infantry.  
   The fighting at Monchy-le-Preux during the Arras battle, described in Chapter 3 also 
showed that the cavalry possessed a firepower capability disproportionate to their small 
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numbers due to the presence of large numbers of machine-guns, both the Vickers of the 
MGC(C) and the Hotchkiss guns integral to the regiments themselves. This firepower, 
combined with their mobility made the cavalry a potent force on the battlefield. Their 
ability to move ahead of the advancing infantry and to take and defend ground was 
demonstrated on a number of occasions. The combination of mobility and firepower has 
a very modern ring to it, but it excludes the third, and at least equally important tool at 
the disposal of a mounted soldier – shock action with cold steel. The ability of mounted 
troops to seize ground, and to hold it with rifle firepower and automatic weapons is a 
concept found more acceptable by those critical of the cavalry arm. It would be quite 
possible to accept all that has been argued for so far, while still holding on to the idea 
that shock, ie. cavalrymen charging with sword or lance in hand, was nonetheless 
obsolete. For many writers the very idea of a soldier using cold steel from horseback 
stands as a metaphor for obsolescence; or as Badsey put it: “…as a touchstone of all that 
is reactionary, foolish, and futile.”1 On some occasions mounted shock creeps into the 
narratives of these historians, but it is excused as somehow peculiar or exceptional. A. J. 
P. Taylor described the action of the 7th Dragoon Guards at High Wood as “…a sight 
unique on the Western Front.”2 Similarly, while the earlier comments from Prior and 
Wilson concerning the cavalry at High Wood have already been examined in Chapter 2, 
they revisited the subject in their 2005 work The Somme: 
Nevertheless they [7th Dragoon Guards] actually managed to spear sixteen 
Germans with their lances (certainly one of the strangest episodes in all the 
fighting on the Western Front and sixteen of the unluckiest victims)…3  
The suggestion is that these events were so bizarre and unusual as to be of no account, a 
German soldier might equally live in fear of being struck by lightning. Traditionally 
also, ‘cavalry charges’ have been viewed as a feature of the fighting of 1914, and of the 
latter days of 1918, and as such, as indicators of the different character of the war during 
those periods. While this may have been the case in 1914, the evidence of 1916 and 
1917 serves to undermine the supposed separate character of 1918. It is one of the 
themes of this study that there was a strong continuity between the style of warfare 
before and into 1918, and the evidence of shock combat further supports this. 
   This study has described not one or two but a whole series of episodes of shock 
action. Table 6.1 (overleaf) lists those occasions discussed in this study when a 
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significant force of cavalry (at least a squadron) attacked enemy forces and inflicted 
casualties with close quarter weapons, (sword, lance or revolver). This excludes 
occasions when the Germans fled as the cavalry approached and no contact was made, 
but does include occasions where although contact was reached, the cavalry were 
ultimately unsuccessful, as it is closing with cold steel, rather than holding ground 
which is at issue here.  
 
Table 6.1: Occasions of Arme Blanche Combat 1916-18 
Location Date Offensive/Operation 
High Wood  July 1916 Somme 
Gueudecourt September 1916 ” 
Guyencourt March 1917 Advance to Hindenburg 
Line 
Saulcourt  March 1917 ” 
Villers Faucon March 1917 ” 
Monchy- le-Preux April 1917 Arras 
La Folie Château November 1917 Cambrai 
Cantaing November 1917 ” 
Noyelles November 1917 ” 
Manières – Crevecoeur Road November 1917 ” 
Catelet valley (‘Kildare 
Trench’) 
December 1917 ” 
Collezy March 1918 Operation ‘Michael’ 
Moreuil Wood March 1918 ” 
Cayeux Wood August 1918 Amiens 
Harbonniers August 1918 ” 
Vauvillers August 1918 ” 
Premont August 1918 ” 
Gattingny Wood October 1918 2nd Le Cateau 
Honnechy  October 1918 ” 
Reumont October 1918 ” 
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Twenty separate fights are included. High Wood was far from unique, indeed the spread 
of these actions across almost all the major operations of the last three years of the war 
(with the exception of those around Ypres) shows that such combat was relatively 
commonplace, and certainly was not suicidal, as some have attempted to suggest. This 
is not to suggest that shock was always the best choice, the attack of the Inniskillings at 
Epehy during the German counter-attack at Cambrai is an example of a costly and 
hopeless failure. However, as has been explained this attack was forced on the local 
commanders from above, rather than being a tactic selected by the men on the spot. 
Their response to their orders on that day showed that regimental and brigade 
commanders at least, while happy to include the mounted charge in their portfolio of 
options, knew equally well when it was not appropriate. 
   The significant morale effect of sword-armed horsemen in rear areas should also not 
be underestimated. Several instances have been highlighted in earlier chapters where 
German forces were significantly demoralised by the prospect of being attacked at close 
quarters by horsemen, and fled or surrendered in consequence. The counter-balancing 
positive effect on Allied foot troops is also significant. Both at Arras, and at Amiens 
cavalry were cheered on their way by the infantry, creating the wider impression that 
the battle must be going well somewhere if they were advancing. The importance of the 
absence of cavalry from the German order of battle in March 1918, given the fragile 
morale of the retreating Allied troops, has also been discussed, and this no doubt stems 
from a fear, not that they might outflank, or shoot at the retreating troops, but that they 
would literally ‘ride them down’ with swords. Thus the ‘arme blanche’ was by no 
means obsolete, and the sword, like the bayonet, was simply one of an arsenal of 
weapons that included the machine gun, the rifle and the artillery shell.  
   The effectiveness of the cavalry was also enhanced by character of the soldiers within 
its ranks. To a much greater extent than was possible in the infantry, cavalry units were 
kept up to strength with experienced men (there were no ‘New Army’ cavalry 
regiments). Even in March 1918 the dissolution of the Yeomanry units in the Cavalry 
Corps and their re-posting into the regular regiments meant that the proportion of ‘old 
soldiers’ in these units was very high. Training for Haig’s vision of independent 
operations behind the front, albeit on the German side of the line, also meant that these 
men were much more comfortable on a fluid battlefield. This was relevant defensively 
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in March 1918, as discussed in Chapter 5, as well as in attack. Cavalry soldiers were 
more used to extemporising defensive lines with their flanks un-supported, than were 
their infantry colleagues. A criticism of the cavalry discussed in the opening chapter of 
this study, was that trench warfare had left them tactically stale and inflexible, if 
anything in 1918 the reverse was true, it was their infantry counterparts who were most 
disconcerted by leaving the trenches. 
   Unfortunately, while disproportionate firepower, mobility, and where appropriate its 
shock capability, were critical to the effectiveness of cavalry, on various occasions, 
particularly in defence, the senior command managed to deny them each of these 
advantages. The lack of heavy artillery in the Cavalry Corps, (as well as other corps 
assets typical in infantry corps) has already been discussed. Both at Cambrai in 1917 (in 
Chapter 4), and in March 1918 (in chapter 5) this problem was exacerbated by the 
removal of R.H.A. batteries from the cavalry brigades at crucial moments, thus denying 
them what little integral artillery firepower they had. Machine-gun units were 
sometimes also detached. In spite of this the cavalry were expected to make infantry-
style counter attacks without the support of any significant bombardment. These attacks, 
for example at Cambrai, were predictably costly and unsuccessful. 
   The premature dismounting of the cavalry in March 1918 and the removal of the 
horses many miles to the rear was also a mistake. Not only did this deny the Corps its 
vital mobility, which would have been a great asset in the fluid fighting of that period, it 
also had a further impact on its firepower. The cavalry were not equipped to transport 
their machine-guns, or more importantly supply them with ammunition without their 
horses. Thus the removal of the horses not only slowed the cavalry down radically it 
also left them with significantly less combat power. The dismounting of the cavalry also 
denied them their shock capability. The creation of ad-hoc mounted units in 1918, and 
the occasions when these were used in a shock rôle, such as at Collezy on 24 March, 
demonstrates that had there been more mounted troops available this tactic might well 
have proved more widely useful.  
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Evolution: The Learning Curve 
 
   The study of any aspect of the war between 1914 and 1918 rapidly reveals the 
evolving character of the war; each offensive and campaigning season was different 
from those which had preceded it. Scholars vary over the degree to which this evolution 
was a product of technological change, increasing expertise among the soldiers or their 
leaders, or even a blind ‘natural selection’ process. A key concept in the study of this 
process in the Allied armies is the idea of the ‘Learning curve’, the idea that the British 
army in particular learned gradually from its mistakes, and over time developed a highly 
effective, and indeed war-winning range of fighting techniques.  
   It is hard to see much evidence of evolution in the cavalry arm below brigade level. In 
fact what is quite striking is that the reverse appears to be true. As the war progressed 
the cavalry increasingly fell back on tactical methods that came straight from the pre-
war pages of Cavalry Training. (This is discussed in Chapter 3.) This should not, 
however be regarded as a retrograde or unfortunate step. The cavalry tactics described 
in that book were the result of long and at times heated debate, and were in fact 
remarkably appropriate to the conditions of the war. The  emphasis on the use of 
firepower to suppress objectives while highly mobile forces advanced by a flank to 
finally close with cold steel made good use of the varied capabilities of the cavalry. The 
continuity of manpower in the cavalry discussed above was also probably a factor. 
Whereas the infantry of the pre-war B.E.F. was almost entirely destroyed in the first 
years of the war to be replaced by a ‘New’ army requiring fresh training, and with little 
tactical or doctrinal background to fall back on, the cavalry through continuity of 
manpower was able to retain much of its pre-war ‘tactical culture’. 
   In spite of this the rôle of the cavalry did evolve as the war progressed. It was not so 
much that the cavalry changed, but that the nature of the war changed around it. In 
short, the battlefield became more ‘cavalry-friendly’ as the war itself evolved. The key 
to the widening rôle of cavalry was the development of the ‘post-Somme’ deep 
defensive system. In 1916 as long as British forces were hurling themselves at a very 
strong, but very shallow German defensive line, there was little rôle for the cavalry as 
the ‘breach’ envisioned by Haig was never created. Subsequently as the Germans 
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moved to a far deeper, but more porous defensive system, the importance of horsemen 
grew in proportion. A lower density of defences, and strong-points with gaps between, 
rather than solidly defended lines offered ready-made ‘gaps’ for the cavalry to exploit, 
but not by riding on to capture railheads deep in the rear, rather by out flanking and 
attacking positions within the fighting zones themselves (the ‘Battle zone’ and 
‘Counter-attack zone’ of the German system). The cavalry were also called upon to take 
advantage of the increasing fluidity of the battlefield to seize by ‘coups de main’ 
objectives which would then be temporarily defended by automatic weapons before 
being handed on to supporting infantry. Gueudecourt in 1916 (Chapter 2), Monchy in 
1917 (Chapter 3), or Honnechy and Reumont in October 1918 (Chapter 5), were all 
examples of this practice.  
   The ever increasing depth of German defensive systems from the battle of Arras 
onwards also created the problem that a ‘Bite and Hold’ attack, however ambitious, was 
limited in its potential by the battle range of its principal weapon, marching infantry. It 
had been demonstrated, and seems to have been understood by 1918 that the maximum 
assault depth that could be expected of infantry on foot was about 5,000 yards (4.5km). 
With defensive systems developing to depths of 10,000 yards (9km) or more, this would 
never be decisive. Despite experiments at the mechanical transportation of troops in 
tanks, (which poisoned them with fumes and moved slower than the infantry could 
walk) or lorries, (which were vulnerable to fire and had no realistic cross-country 
mobility), the horse remained the only practical means of projecting rifle and more 
particularly machine-gun strength into the furthest parts of the enemy defences.  
   A clear opportunity can therefore be identified on the evolving battlefield of the 
Western Front for the successful use of mounted troops. However this is with the 
benefit of historical hindsight. The question arises whether this opportunity was ever 
fully identified at the time, and whether the cavalry was handled appropriately, at all 
levels of command, to take full advantage of it. This is discussed in the next section. 
Secondly, while the B.E.F. was predominantly on an offensive footing strategically, 
several occasions arose where the cavalry was forced to fight defensively, in particular 
in March 1918. Here it is arguable that a misunderstanding and misapplication of deep-
defence principles was to put the British Fifth Army at a distinct disadvantage.  
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Command, Control, and Communications 
 
   The third question examined in this study is that of command. It has been argued 
above that below brigade level the cavalry was tactically effective, and remained so 
throughout the period under consideration without much alteration to its methods. 
Clearly, however its rôle in operations changed as the war progressed. This was a 
product not only of the changing character of the fighting, but also the interaction 
between those changes, and the developing understanding by higher commanders of 
how cavalry could be included in operations.  
   Inevitably any analysis of this process begins with the Commander- in-Chief of the 
B.E.F. during the relevant portion of the war; Douglas Haig. The cavalry owed a 
substantial debt to Haig for its very survival on the Western Front. As has been 
discussed in Chapter 5, he was a powerful advocate for retention of mounted forces on 
several occasions, particularly after Cambrai and in early 1918. However his keen 
support for the arm should not be confused with a clear understanding of its rôle. At a 
tactical level Haig had a very modern concept of how cavalry should function. He 
advocated combined arms tactics, extensive use of machine-guns, and a firepower and 
shock balance which was vindicated on several occasions during the war. The 
continuing applicability of the tenets of his 1912 Cavalry Training in the spring of 1917 
or in 1918 has been described. Unfortunately at an operational level it is arguable that 
Haig misunderstood the nature of the war from 1916 right up to November 1918, not 
only in the sphere of the cavalry but right across the board. His plans and objectives for 
the Somme battles of 1916 began with, and persisted with the idea that the German 
defences were susceptible to a ‘breakthrough’, that the trench system was a finite rigid 
structure which would fail catastrophically if put under enough pressure (analogous to a 
dam bursting). The rôle he envisioned for mounted troops was one flowing through, and 
exploiting this breach (real or metaphorical) in the enemy defences. His anticipation of 
this long-awaited event was apparent in his thinking concerning every subsequent 
offensive, and indeed he was still preparing for this change in the nature of the fighting 
when he arranged for the Cavalry Corps field exercises of September 1918 (discussed in 
Chapter 5).  
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   Evidence of this unchanging outlook is contained in the Cavalry Corps War Diary. 
Haig wrote to the Cavalry Corps commander, Kavanagh, and Lt. Gen. Ivor Maxse (in 
his rôle as Inspector General of Training) on 6 September 1918 with his thoughts about 
the proposed cavalry field day, stating: “I do not propose to employ the Cavalry corps 
until I judge the situation favourable for obtaining decisive results.”4 Appended to this 
letter was a copy of the notes of a meeting held by Haig with Army Commanders, 
dating from two years before; 18 March 1916, the content of which he presumably still 
considered relevant, viz: 
 The action of mounted troops in the offensive battle under existing trench 
warfare conditions follows on the action of infantry and artillery, who must first 
effect a breach in the enemy’s outer systems of defence.5  
In short he saw the cavalry rôle in September 1918 in identical terms to that of March 
1916. It is one of the contentions of this study that this return to ‘mobile warfare’ 
anticipated by Haig never happened, even in 1918. What took place instead was a more 
subtle change in the character of the fighting within both sides’ defensive systems, and 
it was this process which led to the development of an environment in which mounted 
troops had ever increasing scope for action.  
   Among Haig’s subordinates, the Army commanders of the B.E.F. the degree of 
recognition of these changes was variable. As will be discussed, while Gough for 
example was quick to see the new potential for cavalry, others like Rawlinson were 
slower, albeit that the latter had a greater opportunity in the final phase of the war to 
embrace and make use of the new tactical realities. In the planning for 1 July 1916 
discussed in Chapter 2 there is little evidence of any appreciation of a rôle for the 
cavalry in the initial infantry and artillery battle. Haig was wedded to the idea of deep 
exploitation, and Rawlinson, commanding Fourth Army, while not a believer in a 
breakthrough, had no use for horsemen in his limited ‘Bite and Hold’ plan. Indeed there 
was little reason for him to seek it, the German defences, and thus his planned ‘bite’ 
were both comparatively shallow. Nor as the fighting progressed did Rawlinson include 
the cavalry in his subsequent plans. His orders for September delayed their advance 
until after the artillery, showing clearly that he did not consider them an important part 
of the battle he was intending to fight. 
  298 
   In April 1917 at Arras, discussed in Chapter 3, Gen. Allenby produced a slightly more 
progressive plan than that used on the Somme, in that it brought the cavalry divisions 
involved in the offensive closer to the attack front. Indeed the cavalry divisions’ ‘Final 
position of readiness’ was beyond the infantry start line, an innovative step. However 
there was little expectation that the cavalry would be involved in the fight within the 
German defences. No move was expected of the cavalry until the infantry had reached 
their final ‘Green line’ objectives. The order for the cavalry to move, even to the ‘Final 
position of readiness’ was not received by the Corps until more than nine hours after the 
battle had begun (2.40pm, after a ‘Z’ hour of 5.30am). This left little time or daylight 
for the cavalry to contribute to the battle. It is also arguable that the fighting around 
Monchy on 11 April, which brought the cavalry into action, was not intended as a 
combined arms fight within the German deep defences, (albeit that is what it became) 
but the result of Allenby’s misapprehension that a genuine breakthrough had been 
achieved and that his forces were “... pursuing a defeated enemy.” 
   At Cambrai in the autumn of 1917, discussed in Chapter 4, Gen. Byng did not push 
the cavalry as far forward at the outset, having ‘Advanced Concentration Areas’ around 
8km (5 miles) behind the front lines at Fins. However a set time was provided for their 
forward movement, ‘Z+2½’, or 2½ hours after the infantry attack began at 6.20am. 
Indeed, 1st Cavalry Division moved off ahead of schedule only two hours after the battle 
had begun. Unfortunately after that, as has been described, ambiguities in the chain of 
command and the (no doubt well-meaning) interference of Kavanagh effectively wrote 
the cavalry out of a significant rôle in the battle, and left them subject to unjustified 
vilification ever after.  
   Interestingly, it might be argued that the confusion developed precisely as a 
consequence of attempts by the two Corps commanders concerned; Woolcombe and 
Kavanagh, to involve the cavalry in the fight within the German defences and divert 
them from their breakthrough/exploitation rôle. It has also been argued in this study that 
the cavalry was able both to survive and to fight quite effectively within the confines of 
the German positions west of the St Quentin canal, as the activities of Brig. Gen. Beele-
Browne’s 2nd Cavalry Brigade demonstrated. However, these ad-hoc successes should 
not be taken as justification for the actions of those higher commanders. If the cavalry 
was intended to fight within the defended zone this should have been planned for from 
  299 
the start, there was no place for this kind of chopping and changing during a Great War 
offensive. 
   Only in 1918, as discussed in Chapter 5, and ironically in the hands of Gen. 
Rawlinson, who appeared such a sceptic in 1916, did the Cavalry Corps finally operate 
in a pre-planned rôle within a combined arms ‘Bite and Hold’ battle. Even then this was 
tempered by the broader ambitions of Haig, who continued to await the collapse of 
German resistance. Nor did Rawlinson apparently see cavalry as always a necessity in 
his attacking schemes, when later in the first week of November both he and his 
colleague at Third Army, Gen. Byng, were offered use of the Cavalry Corps again, both 
declined. 
   Another key factor in the failure of the cavalry to reach its full potential in these 
offensives was the nature of the communications available to these commanders. The 
presence of wireless sets within the cavalry at Cambrai, for example, has been 
commented upon. Contact aircraft were also available, but in spite of these advances, 
the telephone, or more often the despatch rider or messenger were the principal means 
by which higher commanders could follow a battle. These lines of communication were 
simply too slow to allow commanders above divisional level to exercise real-time 
command over their troops. Time and again the cavalry were forced to wait until 
released by corps and army commanders before they could move forward. This all too 
often meant that they were late in setting off, and missed exactly the fleeting 
opportunities it was their job to exploit. Only at Amiens where start times were pre-
programmed and required no higher approval were the cavalry able to move quickly 
into the battle. 
   These difficulties were exacerbated by the pyramidal structure of the lines of 
communication. Adjacent units in the front line were connected only by a chain which 
led back through numerous tiers of headquarters, via corps or even army command. The 
ability of cavalry commanders to co-operate effectively with their colleagues from other 
arms was severely hampered by this. The 14 July 1916 fighting described in Chapter 2 
is an example of this, where brigade and divisional commanders of infantry and cavalry 
were able to physically meet on the battlefield, but lacked the authority to spontaneously 
co-operate with each other without reference to higher commanders who were 
inevitably out of touch with events. 
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   Only one army commander seems to have clearly grasped these problems and their 
impact on the potential of cavalry in trench fighting, and to have done so at an early 
stage, he was also a cavalryman; Gen. Gough. In August 1916, as the Somme battles 
raged, G.H.Q. distributed to Army commanders a document submitted by Gough, in 
which he in turn credited the ideas of the G.O.C. 3rd Cavalry Division, Maj. Gen. 
Vaughan. In it Haig’s idea of a widespread collapse of resistance was rejected: 
1. It is never safe to say that the enemy is demoralized as a whole. 
Demoralization, especially in trench warfare, only affects a portion of the hostile 
troops at a time and is only temporary. Our aim must be to get the cavalry in 
contact with those troops that are temporarily demoralized.6  
Gough argued that a combination of detailed planning, good communications, and close 
co-operation between arms, would be required to bring this about. He advocated the 
allocation of a ‘zone of action’ to each cavalry division and giving the divisional 
commander freedom to act independently within that area. He rejected the top-down 
command which was to blight subsequent offensives, 
5. The governing factor of the whole question is, with whom should the decision 
for the cavalry to intervene lie? If with the Army Commander or the Corps 
Commander, owing to the delays involved in getting the information back, and 
the orders out, it will probably be impossible for the cavalry to take advantage of 
any temporary demoralization. 7  
The paper ended with the rather rueful conclusion: 
7. Unless some such scheme is adopted there is little probability of the cavalry 
intervening at the right time and place.8 
Unfortunately both at Arras and at Cambrai he was to be proved right. As was discussed 
earlier in relation to the Ypres offensive of 1917 (in Chapter 4), Gough has widely been 
characterised as a cavalry obsessed ‘Thruster’ sharing Haig’s unrealistic dream of a 
breakthrough. The 1916 paper suggests a much more thoughtful approach to mounted 
warfare, at odds with that of Haig. Evidence of this can be seen in the preparations for 
the Fifth Army attack at Bullecourt in support of the Arras offensive, in April 1917. 
Here Gough was provided with one cavalry division to support his attack, ostensibly 
with the aim of linking up with the two cavalry divisions allocated to Third Army. 
However at an army commanders’ conference prior to the battle he objected that since 
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his operation was intended only to capture a portion of the Hindenburg Line defences, 
the cavalry division would not be needed. In the event he retained it at Haig’s 
insistence. 9 (It saw no action.) 
   Hints of Gough’s vision for the cavalry can be detected in his plan for the Ypres battle 
in July 1917. Here was an offensive designed as a high-tempo sequence of shallow ‘Bite 
and Hold’ attacks, supported at local level by forces of cavalry integrated into the 
infantry attack. Unfortunately any analysis of Gough’s aspirations or tactical 
innovations for the Ypres battle becomes clouded by the failures of the offensive as a 
whole. This was followed by his use as a scapegoat for the failures of the defence in 
March 1918, (and here it has been argued the cavalry was rather poorly handled at the 
higher command levels), leading to his dismissal at the end of March 1918. It was thus 
left to Rawlinson to see through the victories of 1918. 
   Within the Cavalry Corps itself, the effectiveness of the arm also suffered due to the 
inadequacies of its commander, Kavanagh. The disastrous effects of his desire to be 
involved in the chain of command during the Cambrai battle in 1917 have been 
discussed in Chapter 4. During the same battle he can also be accused of 
misunderstanding the appropriateness or otherwise of shock action in defence. 
Kavanagh seems to have turned to mounted action not in response to its immediate 
tactical appropriateness (in terms of ground or opponents) but rather in proportion to his 
own concept of the criticalness of the moment. He was prepared on 30 November 1917, 
to attempt (as he saw it) to ‘save the day’ by launching a series of cavalry charges which 
the commanders on the ground knew to be suicidal. In the event only one was actually 
carried out, but it was a disaster for the Inniskillings who were obliged to attempt it. 
Similarly, at a lower level of command, Brig. Gen. Seely’s handling of the Canadian 
Cavalry Brigade at Moreuil Wood in 1918 is open to similar criticism. ‘Desperate times 
require desperate measures’ but it is equally true that cooler heads might have handled 
both of these crises less hastily and with less drama, and ultimately fewer losses to the 
cavalry. 
   Overall, it is hard to see much skilful leadership or doctrinal originality in the higher 
ranks of the mounted arm. The Corps was rather unimaginatively led. That it was able 
to perform so well came down to the individual skills and morale of its soldiers and 
junior leaders. Before too harsh a judgement is made of its senior commanders, however 
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it must be remembered that their rôle was not only to direct the operations of the Corps 
but also to lead it morally and create the required esprit de corps. In this latter function 
Kavanagh emerges in a better light. Little evidence of the character of ‘Black Jack’ 
Kavanagh has been uncovered in this study, but it seems that he was highly regarded 
both by Haig, (who as has been shown treated him on a par with Army commanders, 
rather than with his peers commanding infantry corps) as well as by his subordinates. 
On his appointment to lead the Cavalry Corps in September 1916 Home commented “I 
am glad Kavanagh is going to command as he is a real leader of men, and knows his 
job, has a mind of his own.”10 His reputation as a fighting soldier had been made in 
command of 7th Cavalry Brigade in the fierce fighting around Ypres in October 1914, 
and a judgement on him at that period was offered by one of his soldiers, Trooper Lloyd 
of the Life Guards: 
Our brigade seemed to get a call almost every time we were out, so we became 
known to the troops in the salient as ‘Kavanagh’s Fire Brigade.’ …The shortage 
of casualties on those occasions was largely due to the masterly way in which 
we were handled by our Brigadier. He never spared us, but wherever the brigade 
went he took the lead, and there was no braver man in it than himself. 11 
One interpretation of this is that while Kavanagh was a brave and popular leader, 
capable of inspiring his men, his grasp of the niceties of higher command was lacking. 
This would accord with his tendency to respond to crises with aggression, either directly 
on the telephone to his subordinates, or indirectly in ordering mounted charges, (both of 
which occurred on 1 December 1917) rather than by taking a more considered approach. 
Such a ‘Thruster’ might be a success at brigade level, but commanding a corps was a 
different, more subtle matter.  
 
 
Tanks and the Mobile Battle  
 
   The fourth question set out in this study concerned the relationship between cavalry 
and tanks. Consideration was given in the introduction to this study (Chapter 1) to the 
way cavalry and tanks have been set-out essentially in opposition by many historians of 
the Great War. Simply put, the argument follows that trench warfare had rendered the 
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cavalry redundant, then the appearance of tanks broke the deadlock, but the re-
appearance of cavalry (and cavalry commanders) on the newly mobile battlefield then 
interfered with the potential of the new tanks to win the war. This is of course a gross 
oversimplification but it goes to the heart of the matter, a choice is offered; old-style 
horses, or new armour, and the two are mutually exclusive. 
   This study has shown that while there was a degree of inter-corps and inter-arm 
rivalry, this opposition simply did not exist during the war itself. Despite the growth in 
mechanical transport in the B.E.F. the horse remained by far the dominant form of 
motive power on the Western Front (aside from railways), no one would have seriously 
suggested that the horse might be removed from the military scene altogether. Thus 
armoured forces developed within a framework in which the presence of horses was 
taken for granted. Nor did armour appear on the battlefield suddenly or fully developed. 
Armoured cars, (as opposed to tanks,) had been in France since the opening shots of the 
war in 1914, and their co-operation with cavalry from 1916 onwards has been 
discussed. Thus the cavalry were able to assimilate the appearance of tanks on the 
battlefield much more smoothly and organically than has been widely acknowledged. 
This inter-relationship is exemplified by the fact that in 1918 ex-cavalrymen were riding 
in tanks, and the commanders of tank battalions were on horseback. 
   Criticism of the cavalry has also stemmed from a misunderstanding of the capabilities 
of the tanks. The heavy tanks (Marks I to V) simply were not weapons of exploitation. 
Brig. Gen Hobart commented of Cambrai: 
The Mk IV tank was not a suitable weapon for mobile warfare,… The task given 
to the Tank Corps by the Army was to get the infantry through the Hindenburg 
Line.12 
The job of these vehicles was to crush the wire to allow the infantry into the German 
defences and to destroy machine gun positions. It was not to drive on into the enemy 
rear areas, nor would they have been capable of doing so. Thus while there is little 
doubt that the cavalry failed in its task of exploitation at Cambrai, this was not a task 
that could or should have been performed by tanks. 
   Even with the arrival of the Whippet in 1918, the Tank Corps still did not have a 
weapon capable of deep exploitation, and indeed although a ‘light tank’, the Whippet 
was only marginally faster than its heavy counterparts. Thus these vehicles could not 
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have superseded the cavalry as some have suggested. Thus in no sense did the 
appearance of tanks render the cavalry obsolete. Sometimes the two arms were able to 
co-operate directly together on the same part of the battlefield, on other occasions this 
was less successful, most often however they were in different places with different jobs 
to do. Cavalry and tanks should be seen as two complimentary components of the wider 
B.E.F. fighting machine, each doing their job within an increasingly co-ordinated and  
successful overall package which included infantry, guns, aircraft, and all the other 
instruments of war. 
   It is also one of the key arguments of this study that the transition from the ‘trench 
warfare’ of 1916 to the supposedly ‘mobile warfare’ of 1918 was a much more gradual 
and less marked process than has been previously suggested. The battlefield started to 
deepen with the changes in German defensive methods at the end of 1916, and this trend 
continued until the end of the fighting. Further, the moving battle-front of 1918 was 
created more by an increasing tempo of fighting, made possible by improved logistics, 
and by the frequent iteration of ‘Bite and Hold’ attacks, than by any great ‘revolution’ in 
how the war was fought. Tanks were an important part of this evolving picture, but were 
not necessarily the catalysts for any dramatic change. Indeed by the latter stages of 1918 
the scale of the fighting and the width of the active front, exacerbated by the relative 
scarcity of tanks and the difficulty of moving them between attacking corps, meant that 
tanks became a luxury during that fighting rather than a necessity. 13 It is therefore 
possible to see the circumstances of the Tank Corps and the Cavalry Corps as analogous 
rather than opposed, both contributing to, and participating in, but neither dominating, 
an evolving infantry and artillery battle. Also by 1918 this battle was taking place on 
such a scale that neither corps was numerically in a position to make more than a 
marginal contribution. 
 
 
A Final Verdict: Success or Failure? 
 
   The final question that arises is that of ‘success’. Was the cavalry able to achieve the 
objectives set out for it by those planning its rôle in the battles in which it participated? 
Given the tactical effectiveness at lower levels of command discussed earlier in this 
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chapter this question is focussed more at the operational level (that is to say in 
operations at the scale of corps and army). Was the cavalry able to play its larger part in 
each offensive as a whole and fulfil its commander’s objectives?  
   The short answer to this is that it was not, that the cavalry was mostly unsuccessful at 
an operational level. However it is one of the contentions of this study that this failure 
was not inevitable and intrinsic to the cavalry as an arm, but was the result of a 
combination of factors which do not relate to the troops themselves but to their 
commanders. This can be seen in each individual offensive examined in this study. In 
1916 the rôle of the cavalry defined by Haig and Rawlinson was the exploitation of a 
breakthrough of the German positions. That this breakthough was not achieved was not 
the responsibility of the cavalry, despite the odium which has fallen on them as a result. 
Similarly at Arras in 1917 the cavalry was not able to reach the deep objectives defined 
for it by Third Army. Again, however, it is arguable that these objectives were 
unrealistic and reflected Gen.Allenby’s mis-reading of the battle as it developed. The 
offensive at Cambrai in 1917 was stunningly successful in its early stages, and there is 
no doubt that the cavalry failed to take full advantage of this situation. However this 
was the result of command and control failures outside the control of the cavalry 
divisions themselves, rather than their own ineffectiveness. Only at Amiens in 1918 
were the cavalry completely successful in obtaining the goals initially set out for them 
in the offensive. Unfortunately, even here Haig inserted into the plan deeper objectives 
which were completely unrealistic, and these have remained to cast a shadow over the 
achievements of the corps on that day. Thus operational success always eluded the 
cavalry, but this had more to do with exaggerated expectations than failures within the 
corps. 
   There is a further reason why the contribution of the cavalry to the outcome of the war 
was not decisive. They were present in the B.E.F. in such small numbers that they could 
only play a small part in comparison to their colleagues in other arms, and as the war 
developed in 1917 and 1918 to allow greater potential for the cavalry to contribute, their 
numbers in proportion to the size of the B.E.F. as a whole, dwindled almost into 
insignificance. The question of whether ‘more cavalry, better led’ would have been 
helpful on the Western Front is ultimately like many counterfactual arguments, 
somewhat sterile, however it is reasonable to argue that the cavalry that was present, 
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when it was offered the chance to get into battle, acquitted itself well, and showed that 
at brigade and regimental level it was an effective fighting arm. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 2.1: A British Cavalry Regiment in Typical Attack Formation  
 
‘Squadron column in line of troop columns’ 
Note: only basic fighting elements have been shown, medical and signal units might 
accompany as well as attached MGC(C) troops. Column intervals between squadrons 
have also been shortened, these might be up to 200 yards. An Indian based regiment 
would have four squadrons each of three troop columns. (Drawn from Cavalry 
Training, 1912, Chapter 4) 
 
       ENEMY 
‘B’ Squadron 
 
   T     T        Sqn HQ   T     T 
 IIII  < ‘Deployment Distance’ > IIII   IIII   IIII     
 IIII   IIII   IIII   IIII 
 
 IIII   IIII   IIII   IIII 
 IIII   IIII   IIII   IIII 
 
 IIII   IIII   IIII   IIII 
 IIII   IIII   IIII   IIII 
 
 IIII   IIII   IIII   IIII 
 IIIH   IIIH   IIIH   IIIH 
 
         Regt. HQ 
‘C’ Squadron 
 
   T     T        Sqn HQ   T     T 
 IIII   IIII   IIII   IIII     
 IIII   IIII   IIII   IIII 
 
 IIII   IIII   IIII   IIII 
 IIII   IIII   IIII   IIII 
 
 IIII   IIII   IIII   IIII 
 IIII   IIII   IIII   IIII 
 
 IIII   IIII   IIII   IIII 
 IIIH   IIIH   IIIH   IIIH 
 
‘A’ Squadron 
 
   T     T        Sqn HQ   T     T 
 IIII   IIII   IIII   IIII  
 IIII   IIII   IIII   IIII 
 
 IIII   IIII   IIII   IIII 
 IIII   IIII   IIII   IIII 
 
 IIII   IIII   IIII   IIII 
 IIII   IIII   IIII   IIII 
 
 IIII   IIII   IIII   IIII 
 IIIH   IIIH   IIIH   IIIH 
 
 (Key overleaf) 
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Key 
T Troop leader (Subaltern) 
 
IIII 8-man Section in two ranks    IIII Hotchkiss-gun section 
IIII (commanded by Corporal)    IIIH 
 
 
 
‘Deployment Distance’ Sufficient width to allow the troop to form into two-rank line of 
   Sections, a minimum of  40 yards, often much more. 
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Appendix 3.1: A Note on the Recent Cavalry Fighting up to 7th April 1917 
 
A NOTE 
ON THE  
RECENT CAVALRY FIGHTING 
UP TO 7TH APRIL 1917 
 
ISSUED BY THE GENERAL STAFF 
 
APRIL 1917 
 
   The following deductions are drawn from the experience of the cavalry recently acting on the front of 
the advance over open country:- 
 
(a.) Very careful reconnaissance of the ground, as well as the enemy’s position, before attacking is 
essential. Recconnaissance by aeroplane is not sufficient. Patrols must be used freely, usually 
mounted by day and dismounted by night. 
 
(b.) When the locality to be attacked lies in a depression, it is often advisable to allot objectives on 
rising ground beyond. This gives a better chance of cutting off a retreating enemy and prevents 
losses, especially to led horses, from hostile bombardment directed on the locality after its 
capture. 
 
(c.) Short, sharp bombardments immediately prior to attack (registration having been carried out 
unostentatiously beforehand) gave good results. Very careful observation is required to enable a 
lift to be made at the right moment. Cavalry will seldom, if ever, have enough guns to set up a 
regular barrage, but with careful arrangements for observation, and a rapid and bold advance of 
the artillery if the attack succeeds, it should be possible to give some cover to the advance, to 
shell the retiring enemy, to search for likely hostile observation parties, and to engage a counter-
attack. 
 
(d.) Advances were made successfully over exposed ground moving at a gallop, extended. 
 
(e.) Combination of rapid turning movements with frontal attacks and covering fire (to hold the 
enemy’s attention) gave good results. Armoured cars proved very useful in frontal attacks and 
seemed to attract most of the hostile fire. 
 
(f.) When attacking, a sudden opening of hostile machine-gun or rifle fire from a flank may be dealt 
with by detaching a troop or squadron to gallop at the gun or riflemen while the main body 
continues its advance. 
 
(g.) Rapidity of execution is essential. Any hesitation after a decision has once been formed is fatal. 
Manoeuvring for ground and cover from view during an advance, if delay is entailed, will 
seldom give results sufficient to compensate for the loss of time involved. 
 
(h.) It is advisable, in attacking localities, to tell off pursuing detachments beforehand. They must 
follow the attack closely. A limit should usually be laid down beyond which pursuit is not to go. 
Within this limit pursuing detachments must act with extreme boldness. 
 
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS 
10th April 1917 
 
(PRO Ref; WO33/816) 
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Appendix 3.2: Human Casualties 3rd Cavalry Division 9-11 April 1917 
 
11 April Total 9-11 April 
Officers Other ranks Officers Other Ranks 
Unit 
K
illed 
W
ounded  
M
issing 
K
illed 
W
ounded  
M
issing 
K
illed 
W
ounded  
M
issing 
K
illed 
W
ounded  
M
issing 
Brigade HQ     1      3  
3rd D.G. 1 3  19 68 2 1 2  18 75 3 
1st R.D.     2 22 1  1  2 28  
Nth. Som. Yeo.  4  4 12   3  5 17  
6th MG Sqn.  2  1 5   2  3 4  
C Battery RHA    3 14     3 16  
6
th B
rigade. 
Brigade total 1 9  29 122 3 1 8  31 143 3 
Brigade HQ             
1st Life Guards             
2nd Life Guards             
Leics Yeo.           1  
7th MG Sqn.             
K Battery RHA    1 6        
7
th B
rigade. 
Brigade total    1 6      1  
Brigade HQ 1   2   1    2  
R.H.G. (Blues)   1 3   17 4 1 3   17 4 
10th Hussars  2 7  25 150 5 2 7  25 150 5 
Essex Yeomanry 1 12  18 94 10 1 12  18 94 10 
8th Mg Sqn.  3  8 28 2  3  8 28 2 
G Battery RHA  1  3 14   2  3 14  
Brigade total 5 26  56 303 21 5 27  54 305 19 
3
rd C
avalry D
ivision. 
8
th B
rigade. 
Divisional Total 6 35  86 431 24 6 35  85 448 24 
 
Notes 
Bold figures are taken from tables in Preston (1931).  
Italicised figures are from Whitmore (1920), where casualties are listed by name.  
Other figures are extracted from Divisional and Brigade War Diaries.  
Discrepancies between Preston’s overall totals and those for 11 April only, reflect minor losses on the 
first two days of the offensive. 
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Appendix 3.3: Equine Casualties – Cavalry Corps 1-14 April 1917  
 
 Killed Died  Destroyed Total Non Fatal 
Losses  
Overall 
total 
1st Cav. Division 31 55 55 141 - 200 (est.) 
2nd Cav. Division 273 154 37 464 308 772 
3rd Cav. Division 563 18 24 603 382 985 
Totals    1208  1957 
 
Bold figures are from Cav. Corps D.D.V.S. War Diary.  
Remainder are from unit diaries (See main text). 
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Appendix 4.1: Notes on the Use of Tanks with Cavalry 
 
NOTES ON THE USE OF TANKS WITH CAVALRY* 
 
1.  The sphere of activity and the radius of the tank is limited and the pace of advance is slow. 
These are the main disadvantages  
 
2.  On the other hand, the tank can break through wire, move into villages held by Machine Guns 
and sit on strong points held. 
 
3.  Its use to Cavalry advancing is very great, but in legislating for Cavalry action supported by 
tanks the following points must be borne in mind. 
 (a) Tanks work in sections of 3 tanks. 
(b) They must be given definite objectives, and successive waves of tanks must be used, 
instead of giving tanks successive objectives. 
(c) Cavalry must not wait for tanks, but must push on. On the other hand, if held up, the 
arrival of tanks will be of the utmost use. 
(d) Tanks should be used as pivots for the Cavalry. They are really moving Machine 
Guns heavily armed, and though they have not the pace of Armoured Motors they 
should be used on the same principle. 
(e) Therefore Cavalry use their mobility to get round the flanks of every village or 
position held by the enemy, whilst tanks move straight on it . 
  
 4.  Attention is drawn to the Training Note on Tanks which has been issued to all concerned. 
 
 Cavalry Corps 
 10 November 1917 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*‘Cavalry Corps Instructions for Operations GY, Appendix C’, Cav. Corps GX 272/39, 10 November 
1917, Contained in Cav. Corps War Diary, November 1917 Appendix VII, WO95/574 
Appendix 5.1: Reorganisation of the Cavalry Corps March 1918 
Orders of battle from Becke A. F. (Ed) 1935 Order of Battle of Divisions Part 1 The Regular British Divisions (H.M.S.O. London) 
 
Cavalry Corps November 1917       Cavalry Corps March 1918 
 
1st Cavalry Division 
1 Cav. Bde  2nd DG (Bays) 5th DG  11th Hus    *  *  * 
2 Cav. Bde  4th DG  9th Lcrs  18th Hus    *  *  * 
9 Cav. Bde  15th Hus  19th Hus  Beds Yeo**.   *  *  8th Hus 
 
2nd Cavalry Division 
3 Cav. Bde  4th Hus  5th Lcrs  16th Lcrs   *  *  * 
4 Cav. Bde  6th DG (Carab) 3rd Hus  Q. Own Ox. Hus   *  *  * 
5 Cav. Bde  2nd D (Greys) 12th Lcrs 20th Hus    *  *  * 
 
3rd Cavalry Division 
6 Cav. Bde  3rd DG  R.Dgns  N. Som. Yeo.**   *  *  10th Hus 
7 Cav. Bde  1st L. Gds 2nd L. Gds Leics Yeo.**   7th DG  6th D (Innis)  17 Lcrs 
8 Cav. Bde  R. Hse Gds 10th Hus  Essex Yeo.** (Can.Cav. Bde) R.Can Dgns L. Strath. Hse Ft Garry Hse  
 
4th Cavalry Division 
Sialkot Cav. Bde  17th Lcrs  6th Cav.  19th Lcrs    Div broken up 
Ambala Cav. Bde 8th Hus  9th Hse  30th Lcrs 
Lucknow Cav. Bde 1st (Kings) DG 29th Lcrs 36th Hse 
 
5th Cavalry Division 
Mhow Cav. Bde  6th D (Innis) 2nd Lcrs  38th Hse     Div. broken up 
Secunderabad Cav. Bde 7th DG  20th Hse  34th Hse 
Canadian Cav. Bde R.Can Dgns L. Strath. Hse Ft Garry Hse 
 
* Unchanged  ** Units broken up to reinforce Cav. Divisions April 1918 
Indian Regts shown shaded 
 
